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The essays, on my lap, lie. A finger 
Of light, in our pressurized gloom, strikes down, 
Like God to poke the page, the page glows. There is 
No sin. Not even error. Night, 
 
On the glass at my right shoulder, hisses 
Like sand from a sandblast, but 
The hiss is a sound that only a dog’s 
Ear could catch, or the human heart. My heart 
 
Is as abstract as an empty  
Coca-Cola bottle. It whistles with speed.  
It whines in that ammoniac blast caused by the passage of stars, for 
At 38,000 feet Emerson 
 
Is dead right 
 
ROBERT PENN WARREN 




I hope you hate Carlyle 
& Emerson’s insufferable essays,  



















* Robert Penn Warren, ‘Homage to Emerson, On Night Flight to New York,’ The Collected Poems of Robert Penn Warren (Baton 
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 194 
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“The market-place,” [Napoleon] said, “is the Louvre of the common people.”  
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
‘Napoleon, or the Man of the World’ (1850) ‡ 
 
Presenting a unique revision of the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), this thesis 
considers Emerson’s practical and theoretical interest in quotation and appropriation 
relative to his developing position on American political economy and the intellectual 
outcomes of antebellum economic expansionism. I will reflect on the ways in which recent 
scholarship has sought to examine the political and economic investments of Emerson’s 
authorship through his conceptualizations of the act of reading; and examine Emerson’s 
relationship with cultural, critical and commercial value systems relative to his historic, 
political and socioeconomic contexts.  
Emerson’s analysis of the mechanisms and responsibilities of literary criticism 
depends upon the coalescence of capitalist and culturalist imperatives. I will investigate 
the ways in which the intersection of criticism and commerce impacted his use of 
metaphor, ideas of critical exchange and intellectual proprietorship; and effects his efforts 
to conceptualize what he called the ‘mechanics of literature.’§ Reading across two major 
periods of activity—1836 to 1850 and 1860 to 1875—the alliance of Emerson’s early and 
later works will be foregrounded in order to consider the development and coherency of 
his thinking. His cumulative efforts to explore the cultural, political and practical effectivity 
of literary criticism will be read as an indicator of the value Emerson placed on market-
based economics and as foundation for an examination of his ideas of cultural progress 
and critical practice more widely.  
Through the act of quotation and appropriation, in particular, the political 
implications of Emerson’s thinking are underscored by an identification of the importance 
of context and proprietorship as determiners of cultural and critical value. I will argue that 
this position is informed by Emerson’s receptivity to the ascendance of market ideologies 
in the nineteenth century, and both underpins Emerson’s conceptualization of the act of 
reading and effects the ways in which Emerson has subsequently been read in twentieth 
and twenty-first century American Studies. 
 
 
‡ Emerson, ‘Napoleon, or the Man of the World’ (1850), CW.IV., 240 
§ Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), in (eds.) S. E. Whicher, W.E. Williams, R.E. Spiller, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
Vol.II., 1836-1838 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press; Harvard University Press, 1964) 63 
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Ayn Rand Beforehand  












































Emerson […], doesn’t he dimly seem some Ayn Rand beforehand?  
 
WILLIAM H. GASS 
‘Emerson and the Essay’ (1985) 1 
 
 
Your debts and credits, and your web of habits, are the very best basis of poetry.  
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 






















1 William H. Gass, ‘Emerson and the Essay,’ Habitations of the Word: Essays (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 10 
2 Emerson, ‘Journal TU’ (Undated, 1849), JMN.XI., 134 
 3 
Emerson’s career-long analyses of the symbolic and practical consequences of the ownership of ideas—
borne out by the movement of information, idea or image—are acutely informed by his vision of culture 
as a marketplace of meaning. In this thesis, I will argue that Emerson’s investigations of literary criticism 
and creativity are illuminated by his persistent evaluation of the ideological implications of the circulation 
of literary matter.  
As America’s industrial, economic and technological evolution were read by Emerson as a ‘silent 
revolution’ so too was his conceptualization of national culture and literary engagement informed by the 
revolutionary changes wrought by an increasingly market-led United States of the nineteenth century.3 I 
will map the ways in which Emerson sought to consider this ‘revolution’ in ways both practicable and 
theoretical, and consider the function of the marketplace as a central metaphor for the organisation and 
conceptualisation of his reflections on the dialectical progress of a national literary culture. 
In this respect, Emerson’s work is representative of both a practical and theoretical consideration 
of how forms of cultural labour are effectuated in moments of economic, industrial and technological 
change. As his work responds in part to the cultural consequences of financial crisis in 1837, Emerson’s 
conceptualist engagement with literary criticism is equally enhanced by a sensitivity to the ideological, 
intellectual and symbolic properties of market dynamism and depression. Emerson would not only 
comment on these socioeconomic circumstances in his work directly, he would also seek to systematise 
and analyse the practical, theoretical and intellectual aims and ambitions of literary criticism by assessing 
the philosophical and ‘scientific’ value of financial collapse as key to the advancement of an American 
culture of letters.4 Answering to the economic disequilibrium and uneven regional development that took 
place in the 1830s and onwards, the consequences and effects of the subsequent period of economic 
recovery are also evidenced in his structures of thought as author, his examinations of the act of reading, 
and both his use of metaphor and analysis of the function of metaphor itself. The crisis of 1837 will be read 
 
3 In the ‘Seventh of March Speech on the Fugitive Slave Law’ (1854), Emerson notes that the new media form of the 
newspaper ‘has wrought […] a silent revolution;’ see Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Seventh of March Speech on the Fugitive 
Slave Law’ (1854) in (eds.) R.A. Bosco, J. Myerson, The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol I., 1843-1871 (Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 2001), 334 
Further references to this volume will be noted as LL.I. 
4 See Emerson, ‘Journal C’ (May 14, 1837), JMN.V., 304 
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as significantly impacting his conceptualist relationship with value formation and intellectual property, and 
an analysis of the ways in which this period of depression and recovery speaks to both early and late period 
works in Emerson’s canon will be essential to this thesis. Emerson’s interest in appropriation and quotation 
will be central, and argued as a conceptual means of consolidating a career-long examination of the 
juncture of market economics and the ‘mechanics’ of critical enterprise.5  
Examining the intersection of Emerson’s politics and poetics in two later essays in particular—
‘Wealth’ (1860) and ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875)—I will examine the political and philosophical 
consequences of his interest in ‘the art of appropriation,’ as he terms it.6 ‘Quotation and Originality’ will 
be regarded as a keystone essay in this revision of Emerson’s conceptualizations of literary criticism.7 
Alternately pedagogical and conceptualist in character, Emerson’s own explication of his ‘art’ will be 
shown to merge his literary and political aspirations through an active investigation of the circulation, use 
and retooling of received ideas and extant cultural materials. As will be shown, it is in ‘Quotation and 
Originality’ and ‘Wealth’—amongst other essays—that Emerson’s theoretical and practical relationship 
with appropriation and quotation will be centralized in pursuit of this idea, and I will investigate the ways 
in which these essays compound an interest in the circulation, dissemination and ownership of ideas as can 
be chronologically traced from his early period writings through to his later publications. 
An analysis of how Emerson himself read, how he would demand that we ourselves should read, 
and how he has subsequently been read, represent the tripartite ambitions of this study. But that he should 
so repeatedly refer to the ways in which we borrow, plagiarise and repurpose appropriated or ‘ready-made’ 
cultural matter demands further investigation and will thus also be a focal point of my analysis.8 Emerson’s 
sense of the political and philosophical instrumentality of literary engagement will be foregrounded, as will 
 
5 Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), EL.II., 63 
6 Emerson: ‘Our country, customs, laws, our ambitions, and our notions of fit and fair, —all these we never made, we found 
them ready-made; we but quote them. Goethe frankly said, "What would remain to me if this art of appropriation were 
derogatory to genius? Every one of my writings has been furnished to me by a thousand different persons, a thousand things.’ 
See ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
7 An essay that, although published in 1875 (eight years prior to Emerson’s death, 1882), ‘Quotation and Originality’ would 
be first delivered as a lecture in 1859; its parallelism with ‘Wealth’ is thus notable as they would have been initially authored 
in tandem. 
8 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
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his suggestion that literary engagement can serve as a metaphor for various forms of civic and economic 
participation. His interest in the parallelism of cultural and capitalist economics will be investigated relative 
to the development of the American marketplace in the 1830s and 1840s, the institutionalization of 
scholarship, the indenturing of print and publishing cultures in the antebellum, the ideological effects of 
technologization, and the multi-layered nature of his critical legacy in twentieth and twenty-first century 
Emerson Studies. However, rather than subjecting Emerson to an investigation of his historical contexts 
alone, I will examine the ways in which he would look to the circuitry of capitalist economics to investigate 
the importance of ‘the concept of context’ more broadly.9  
What are the aims and ambitions of Emerson’s practical interest in the development of criticism 
as an American institution? How do the intellectual outcomes of economic depression, recovery and 
expansionism inform his efforts to establish a definition of reading that is both conversant with and 
cognizant of the expansionist economic veuve of his hour? As we will see, the idiosyncrasies of Emerson’s 
interest in literature are best represented by his want to analyse critical processes rather than cultural 
products; by his formulating a marketplace of meaning that stresses the importance of the exchange of 
cultural materials over and above any consideration of their creation. I will explore the ways in which 
Emerson’s interest in the development of a cultural economy, dependent upon the use of ‘secondhand’ 
ideas, is both a response to his own economic circumstances and an ideological reaction to the progress of 
an American culture of letters.10  
This remains an understudied and underexplored element of Emerson’s career-long examination 
into the cultural and symbolic implications of criticism as both act and institution, and his self-professed 
interest in the commercial, institutional and industrial ‘mechanics of literature’ (to borrow his term) will 
prove fundamental.11 Looking specifically to Emerson’s early lectures ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), ‘The 
 
9 A phrase and focus I borrow from Benjamin Pickford in ‘Context Mediated: Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Political Economy 
of Plagiarism,’ Nineteenth-Century Literature, 72.1. (2017), 39 
10 Although not widely acknowledged by his recent critics, Emerson’s sense of the ‘simultaneous richness and sterility of 
secondhand material’ has been argued by Andrew Delbanco as indicating Emerson’s ‘considerable salience for a modern 
and even postmodern sensibility.’ See Andrew Delbanco, in introduction to Representative Men: Seven Lectures (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press; Harvard University Press, 1996), xii-xiii 
11 Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), EL.II., 63 
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Present Age’ series (1838 to 1839), ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841) and ‘The Young American’ (1844)—
alongside recent and now-canonical revisionist critical responses to Emerson’s cultural and canonical 
standing—I will suggest that a complex engagement with the ethics and aesthetics of market exchange are 
essential to Emerson’s philosophical definitions of criticism. The importance of Emerson’s own intertextual 
allusions and the ways in which he himself has been read since the mid-twentieth century will form a part 
of this enquiry and, in this context, several notable acts of appropriation within his writings (both accredited 
and unacknowledged) will be investigated. Emerson liberally borrows from the works of Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe (1749-1832); Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821); Gulian C. Verplanck (1786-1870); Francis 
Wayland (1796-1865); and Karl Marx (1818-1883), and his use of these writers’ works will illuminate the 
complexity of his developing relationship with appropriation over the course of his authorship, and act as 
indicators of a conceptualist and practical position on the circulation of culture as he sought to facilitate. 
Such an analysis cannot be staged without an acknowledgment of how the American 
Transcendental (or what Emerson would term ‘Transcendental Criticism’) connects to his interest in 
technology and the technologization of the cultural sphere.12 Looking to doctrinal and theoretical materials 
contemporary to his major publications—and to recent historicist accounts of his receptivity to America’s 
economic development—the introduction of new technologies (such as the rotary printing press), and the 
institutionalization and industrialization of American publishing (1815 to 1850), will also be investigated 
as a means to consider Emerson’s interest in our ‘conductorship’ or operation of culture,13 and our capacity 
to ‘control’ or operate cultural matter.14 The ways in which revisionist readers of the American 
 
12 Emerson, ‘Journal E’ (Undated, 1840), JMN.VII., 352 
13 A term I borrow from Albert S. Southworth, whom—in a distinctly Emersonian tone—describes the faculty of critical 
‘observation’ explicitly as ‘the locomotive to be attached to the train of thought and engineered under your own 
conductorship; the power which turns the revolving wheels must be created by fuel from your own stores.’ See Albert S. 
Southworth, ‘An Address to the National Photographic Association of the United States, Delivered at Cleveland, Ohio, June 
1870,’ Philadelphia Photographer 8.94 (1871), 315-23, in Merry A. Foresta and John Wood, Secrets of the Dark Chamber: The Art 
of the American Daguerreotype (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1995), 297-99.  
14 Emerson’s interest in ‘control’ in both political and cultural domains is noteworthy, and indicators of its conceptual 
significance can be gleaned across his writings. For example, see the following summative examples; on government and 
self-determinacy: ‘Hands off! let there be no control and no interference in the administration of the affairs of this kingdom 
of me;’ on the formation of critical opinion: ‘Self-control is the rule;’ on inspiration and taste: ‘Are these moods in any degree 
within control? If we knew how to command them!’ Respectively, see Emerson, ‘New England Reformers’ (1844), CW.III., 
255.; ‘Social Aims’ (1875), CW.VIII., 86.; ‘Inspiration’ (1875), CW.VIII., 274 
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Transcendentalist tradition have analysed the economic ‘strain’ in Emerson’s writings will also be explored 
in this context, and an identification of the intersection between literary culture and capitalism within his 
essays and addresses—between critical and commercial value systems—will be shown to disrupt recent 
critical insistence that his earlier and later works contradict one another.15  
In terms of his use of the marketplace as both an ideological and economic paradigm, critics such 
as Sacvan Bercovitch, Christopher Newfield and Michael T. Gilmore have argued that we can keenly 
distinguish between the anti-market stance of Emerson’s early essays and addresses and the apparently pro-
market, libertarian character of his works post-1843.16 However, I will maintain that there is sufficient 
evidence to counter such a position and propose, instead, that a more consistent and coherent position on 
the co-dependency of culture, technology and circulatory economics can be identified across his works.  
An examination of the connection between Emerson’s interests in culture and capital is not unique 
to this project, however. Whilst Daniel Aaron would name Emerson the ‘seer of laissez-faire capital,’17 
historian Charles Sellers has argued Emerson as ‘the mid-century prophet of the corporate/capitalist 
millennium;’18 a figure who would all too regularly confuse what he called the ‘merchant’s craft’ with the 
critic’s calling.19 Although these evocative characterizations of Emerson’s Transcendentalism are often 
posed without sufficient explication, they commonly look to his later writings to best qualify and anchor 
his cultural and critical influences. Similarly, novelist William H. Gass’s identification of Emerson as an 
‘Ayn Rand beforehand,’ looks to explore the potential application of Emersonian thought to a twentieth-
century context. However, beyond this fleeting and tendentious comparison, Gass fails to locate ample 
evidence to support such a claim (beyond an acknowledgment of Emerson’s critical legacy and his place 
 
15 Richard A. Grusin, ‘Put God in your Debt: Emerson’s Economy of Expenditure, PMLA, 103.1. (1988), 35 
16 In particular, see Michael T. Gilmore, ‘Emerson and the Persistence of Commodity,’ American Romanticism and the 
Marketplace (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 18-35.; Sacvan Bercovitch, ‘Emerson, Individualism, Liberal 
Dissent,’ Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic Construction of America (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 307-353; 
and Christopher Newfield, ‘Market Despotism: The Poet Affirms the Laws,’ The Emerson Effect: Individualism and Submission 
in America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 153-174 
17 See Daniel Aaron, ‘Emerson and the Progressive tradition,’ in (eds.) M.R. Konvitz, S.E. Whicher, Emerson: Critical Essays 
(Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 85-99.; 93-94 
18 Charles Sellers, ‘The Bourgeois Republic,’ The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 380 
19 Emerson, ‘Wealth’ (1850), CW.VI., 87 
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within American popular culture more generally).20 Nonetheless, as this thesis will show, his comparison 
is entirely justifiable. 
Presenting a summary of her interest in the ethics and aesthetics of economization, Rand’s 
Romantic Manifesto (1971) argues ‘capitalism’ as a ‘monopoly system of mysticism;’ 21 as a means with which 
to describe ‘the pattern of issues’ that permeate Romanticism’s aesthetic and critical cultures and represent 
an effort to correlate the creative arts with theories of political economy.22 Whilst Rand notes that ‘there is 
generally no accepted definition of Romanticism (nor of any key element of art, nor of art itself),’ we can 
perceive a Romantic ‘theory of intellect’ as ‘a product of the nineteenth century’ and as resulting of two 
key influences—‘Aristotelean thought’ and ‘capitalist economics.’23 ‘Aristotelianism […] liberated man by 
validating the power of his mind,’ she writes; ‘capitalism,’ conversely, ‘gave man’s mind the freedom to 
translate ideas into practice (the second of these influences was itself the result of the first).’24 We find no 
explicit working definition of ‘capitalism’ in Emerson as we would do in Rand’s work.25 However, the term 
 
20 Rand would unpack her position in ‘The Goal of My Writing’ (1963): ‘the motive and purpose of my writing can best be 
summed up by saying that if a dedication page were to precede the total of my work, it would read To the glory of man. […] 
My purpose is the presentation of an ideal man,’ she writes; ‘[and I work] to define and present the conditions which make 
him possible and which his existence requires […]. I had to present the kind of social system that makes it possible for ideal 
man to exist and to function—a free, productive, rational system, which demands and rewards the best in every man, great 
or average, which is, obviously, laissez-faire capitalism.’ See Rand, The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature (New 
York, NY: Signet Books; Viking, 1971), 162-173. See also John B. Ridpath, James G. Lennox, ‘Ayn Rand’s Novels: Art or 
Tract? Two Additional Views,’ The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 25.2. (1976), 213-214.; Max E. Fletcher, 
‘Harriet Martineau and Ayn Rand: Economics in the Guise of Fiction,’ The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 33.4. 
(1974), 367-379.; Ruth Rosen, ‘Ayn Rand: A Romantic, Secular Libertarian,’ Reviews in American History, 39.1. (2001), 190-
195; and Jennifer Burns, in introduction to Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 4 
21 Ayn Rand, ‘What is Romanticism?’, The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature (New York, NY: Signet Books; 
Viking, 1971), 94-95 
22 Ibid., 95 
23 Ibid.,  
24 Ibid. 
25 In introduction to Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal [1946], Rand cites The Encyclopedia Britannica to explain her use of the 
term: ‘CAPITALISM, a term used to denote the economic system that has been dominant in the western world since the break-
up of feudalism. Fundamental to any system called capitalist are the relations between private owners of non-personal means 
of production (land, mines, industrial plants, etc., collectively known as capital) and free but capital-less workers, who sell 
their labor services to employers.... The resulting wage bargains determine the promotion in which the total product of society 
will be shared between the class of laborers and the class of capitalist entrepreneurs.’ See Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. IV. 
(1964), 839-845; see Ayn Rand, in introduction to Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (New York, NY: Signet Books, 1966), 13-
14 
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does recur in Emerson’s writings, and thus demands that we better contextualize Gass’ laconic aside.26  
The simpatico between Emerson and Rand that Gass quietly identifies depends more on the 
conceptual ‘power of mind’ that Emerson asserts than it does his critical vocabulary, and his assertion that 
our capacity for a technical ‘translation’ of thought into action owes a great deal to the industrialization 
and economization of antebellum America.27 Commenting on Rand’s key ideas, Roxanne Fand argues 
that Rand viewed ‘Democracy and capitalism [as] the twin pillars of individualism, upholding the doctrine 
of equal and unalienable rights for all.’ However, she notes that the interpolation of these two concepts 
prove contradictory; ‘the principles of majority rule and individual rights conflict within democracy; while 
private profit and fair public trading conflict with capitalism.’28 Thus, Fand notes, Rand sought to engineer 
a ‘Romantic’ philosophical perspective that would elucidate the co-dependency of democratic and 
capitalistic principles: in other words, a means of considering literature as a socioeconomic force. This, 
Gass infers, was also Emerson’s prerogative.  
Of course, it is Emerson and not Rand that I will focus on herein, but this set of conflicts—majority 
rule and individual right; private profit and fair trade—are essential components within Emerson’s writings 
 
26 See ‘The Transcendentalist’ (1844), wherein Emerson cites ‘the sturdy capitalist’ in his depiction of the conflict between 
self-trust and faith in social and economic systems he acknowledges as a preponderate problem amidst his contemporaries. 
See Emerson ‘The Transcendentalist’ (1844), CW.I., 331. David Leverenz describes this passage as indicative of Emerson’s 
want to satirize the economic circuitry of the early antebellum, describing Emerson’s ‘sturdy capitalist’ as a ‘wonderful send-
up of old Boston bankers and new venture capitalists alike […].’ See ‘The Politics of Emerson’s Man-Making Words,’ PMLA, 
101.1. (1986), 42 
27 Cyrus K. Patell argues that ‘[Emersonians] rely upon a methodological individualism in which they shift the ground of 
inquiry from culture and society to the individual and translate moments of choice into moments of individual choice.’ He 
contends that ‘commercialization’ underpins Emerson’s method. See Cyrus K. Patell, ‘Emersonian Strategies: Negative 
Liberty, Self-Reliance, and Democratic Individuality,’ Nineteenth-Century Literature, 48.4. (1994), 440-479. Rather than 
‘translation,’ Emerson would himself use the phrase ‘awkward imitation’ and enlist the expression of thought as an act of 
reproduction: ‘Your action is good only whilst it is alive, —whilst it is in you. The awkward imitation of it by your child or 
disciple, is not a repetition of it, is not the same thing but another thing. The new individual must work out of the whole 
problem of science, letters, & theology for himself, can owe his father’s nothing. There is no history; only biography.’ See 
Emerson, ‘Journal D’ (Undated, 1839), JMN.VII., 202. These ideas are more famously encountered in ‘History’ (1841), 
CW.II., 10.; somewhat ironically, Emerson also appears to be both practicing and preaching his position, as these ideas relay 
an instance of conceptual appropriation. See Thomas Carlyle’s ‘On History’ (1837)—’History is the essence of innumerable 
biographies’—in Critical and Miscellaneous Histories, Vol. II., (Boston, MA: J. Munroe & Co., 1838), 247. Editors of Emerson’s 
Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks—A. W. Plumstead, H. Hayford—note that ‘Emerson undoubtedly read this essay when 
it first appeared as ‘Thoughts on History,’ Frazer’s Magazine (Nov. 1830), 413-418,’ and that this edition of the magazine 
Emerson’s can presently be found in Emerson’s own, private library. 
28 Roxanne J. Fand, ‘Reading The Fountainhead—The Missing Self in Ayn Rand’s Ethical Individualism,’ College English, 71. 
5. (2009), 486-505 
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on agency, interpretation, the act of reading, critical exchange and intellectual proprietorship. Centralizing 
what Emerson would term ‘the force of two in literature,’ I will allege that his characterization of critical 
exchange as a form of cultural or economic ‘cooperation’ wholly depends upon a conceptualization of the 
mores and mechanisms of America’s market economy and elucidates a complex awareness of the 
intersection of ‘public’ and ‘private interest.’29 As such, this thesis will justify Gass’s comparison as a means 
of connecting the concerns, tropes and metaphor of both his early and later works. I will argue that the 
politics of Emerson’s poetics are exposed by his efforts to draw correlation between the ascendance of the 
market as both ideology and institution and the development of a distinctly American literary culture. 
In order to best ascertain this correlation between Emerson’s early and late-period writings, I will 
take Emerson’s metacritical investments in the act of reading as a starting point and lens with which to 
scrutinize broader patterns and recurrences within his public and private writings. The symbolic and 
significative function of the reader as a figure within his works, his pedagogical commentaries on the act 
of reading, the intertextual and intratextual mechanisms employed in the interrelation of his private 
journals and published works, and his concern for the practical and theoretical consequences of scholarship 
will be read through an analysis of nineteenth-century American political economy and recent critical 
responses to America’s economic and political progress across the 1830s and 1840s. In so doing, I will 
investigate such categorizations of Emerson’s cultural philosophy as succinctly ‘capitalist’ in character and 
examine the ways in which such readings are self-consciously foregrounded by Emerson himself. I will 
argue that Emerson’s position should not be isolated to an analysis of his later works alone but, instead, 
operate as an extension of both his private and public writings of the late-1830s onwards.  
Emerson not only reacted to the industrialization of an American cultural domain, but he also 
sought to assimilate its terms and systems. Mercantile cultures of exchange—the idea of use and surplus—
are exploited to explore critical activity and cultural relation within a period defined by economic collapse, 
recovery and expansion on the one hand and by the institutionalization and formalization of a national 
literary culture on the other. In order to examine the implications of Emerson’s interest in the act of reading, 
 
29 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 189 
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the agency of interpretation, and the cultural effects of circulatory economics, I will study how—within 
Emerson’s lifetime—industrialization, economic expansionism and rising literacy levels affected the social 
and civic responsibilities of scholarship and literary culture. But the ways in which such ideas impact 
Emerson’s relationship with quotation and appropriation will be crucial.  
‘It has come to be practically a sort of rule in literature, that a man having once shown himself 
capable of original writing, is entitled thenceforth to steal from the writings of others at discretion,’ Emerson 
writes in 1850.30 ‘Thought is the property of him who can entertain it and of him who can adequately place 
it. A certain awkwardness marks the use of borrowed thoughts; but as soon as we have learned what to do 
with them they become our own.’31 I will pinpoint such a theory of ‘use’ as can be identified in Emerson’s 
writings, as a means to both examine the ‘economic strain’ of his reflections on criticism, and as a basis 
from which to investigate the coherence of his early and late-period publications. In order to address both 
the contents and contexts of his works, Emerson’s theorizations of what it means to read and be a reader 
must be seen as a wider form of cultural labour that is self-conscious and sympathetic towards both public 
intellectualism and the institutionalization of scholarship. I will propose that Emerson’s conceptualist and 
practical relationship with appropriation and quotation serves as a fulcrum from which we can investigate 
how a market-based economics influenced his work across periods and genres. Emerson’s assimilation of 
systems, metaphors and ideological positions from the marketplace not only illuminates his own practice 
as a writer and thinker but also underwrites his advocacy for the kind of relationship with a literary text 
that we ourselves should practice in the contexts of a commercial present.  
A corpus of seven addresses and essays will prove key to this study: ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), 
‘The Present Age’ series (1838 to 1839), ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841), ‘The Young American’ (1844), and 
the later essays ‘Wealth’ (1859), ‘Poetry and Imagination’ (1875) and ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875). 
Whilst ‘The American Scholar,’ ‘The Young American,’ and ‘Wealth’ have garnered significant attention 
in contemporary Emersonian scholarship; ‘The Present Age’ and ‘Quotation and Originality,’ however, 
 
30 Emerson, ‘Shakespeare, or the Poet’ (1850), CW.IV., 198 
31 Ibid. 
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remain curiously maligned in recent revisionist reactions to his corpus and influence.32 These lesser studied 
works will be highlighted as key texts in this investigation, and argued as crucial for an acknowledgment 
of the coherency and clarity of Emerson’s thinking. I will contextualize these essays with reference to both 
his journals, notebooks and parallel publications and—so as to foreground the development and 
consistency of his thinking—approach Emerson’s writings and thematic concerns chronologically. 
Emerson’s reference to his first major essay collections of 1841 and 1844 as a ‘Series’ is also significant. It 
is imperative that we read Emerson’s works sequentially and cumulatively, and his exacting definition of 
his major works as in ‘Series’ arguably constitutes an overlooked instruction for the study of Emerson’s 
published materials. Looking for progression between these collections, and for supplementary materials 
in his journals and notebooks, I will begin with his early works of the late-1830s and seek to establish 
correlation between his early public lectures and essays, 1836 to 1850, and subsequent consolidation in his 
later writings, 1860 to 1875, by examining repetitions and recurrences as between his private papers and 
published writings. 
Part One—‘COMMERCIAL VALUES’—consisting of one chapter divided into three subsections—will 
examine Emerson’s critical legacy in order to contextualize his early work on criticism, cultural labour and 
the metaphoric implications that abound through an analysis of the act of reading. Beginning with a brief 
survey of recent reactions to Emerson’s work to preface an outline of his early conceptualizations of critical 
practice, I will look particularly at the ways in which a critical ‘reconstruction’ of Emerson’s writings has 
both politicized his philosophy and inspired a self-reflexive exploration of the act of scholarship itself. The 
works of Cary Wolfe and Vernon Louis Parrington will frame this investigation, and I will survey the ways 
in which Emerson articulates the symbolic value of critical work and the importance of the relationship 
between a reader and writer. I will look chiefly at the early essays ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841) and ‘Thoughts on 
Modern Literature’ (1840) and investigate how Emerson’s interest in the conceptual bind of self and state 
correlates with his reflections on reader/writer relations and interpretative agency. This will preface an 
exploration of Emerson’s interest in the dissemination and circulation of idea and image relative to his 
 
32 See Newfield, ‘The Market in Quotations,’ The Emerson Effect, 161 
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remarks on the industrialization and technologization of the literary sphere as a form of ‘silent revolution.’ 
Joel Porte’s work on Emerson’s critical legacy—and Emerson’s essays ‘History’ (1841) and ‘The Young 
American’ (1844)—will be key to this discussion, and these ideas will preface the final part of this chapter, 
wherein Emerson’s thoughts and reflections on ‘silent revolution’ are defined in relation to various patterns 
of exchange, marketization and economy. One of these strands, Emerson’s transference of individualism 
as a European school of thought into a more practical American context, allows for the development of a 
theory of critical exchange in his private writings across a 24-year period, 1836 to 1860; a theorization of 
cultural economy he would refer to as ‘OTHERISM.’ Looking chiefly at the repetition of words, phrases and 
images across this date range, Emerson’s use of metaphor is particularly pronounced in his establishment 
of this position: one that has been entirely overlooked in his early writing by recent critics and can be argued 
as informed by the ascent of market ideologies both in terms of concept and symbolic vocabulary. 
Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ speaks to the development of his interest in political economy as discipline 
and circulation as concept over the course of his early-career publications. In his desire to detail a 
metaphorical marketplace, he coins the term in order to explore the connections between criticism and 
capital through an evocative reading of exchange mechanisms that—beginning as a theory of critical 
transaction in 1836—is restaged as a theory of ‘COMMERCIAL VALUE’ in 1845. In order to further the 
chronology and coherency of Emerson’s thinking, I will examine the ways in which these ideas are 
developed in his private writings prior to their subsequent appearance in published works such as ‘Wealth’ 
(1860) and ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875). 
Part Two moves on to consider Emerson’s historical and cultural contexts more directly. 
‘GEOLOGY AFTER AN EARTHQUAKE,’ divided into three distinct chapters, focuses more on the technological 
and industrial development of American literary culture, 1815 to 1850, to examine the interrelation of 
Emerson’s early and later works. I will concentrate on the cultural effects of economic downturn, 
depression and recovery during Emerson’s early authorship and examine in more detail how he 
conceptualizes labour, proprietorship and critical enterprise in his early works only to compound his 
position in his later writings. I will examine ‘The American Scholar’ (1837); ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841); 
and ‘Wealth’ (1860); ‘The Man of Letters’ (1863); ‘Progress of Culture’ (1875) and ‘Quotation and 
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Originality’ (1875), and an investigation of these essays will be accompanied by parallel commentaries 
posed in Emerson’s journals and notebooks. 
In Chapter ii.i.—‘THE ETHICS & AESTHETICS OF FINANCIAL PANIC’—I will examine the ways in 
which the financial panic of 1837 affected his conceptualization of the act of reading and the agency of 
interpretation as drawn across both early and later works. This climactic event enables a mapping of recent, 
reticulated critical reactions to Emerson’s work, and encourages further consideration of the ways in which 
the panic of ‘37 operated as a turning point in Emerson’s intellectual development (or a ‘conceptual shift,’ 
as Randal Fuller would term it, ‘from a concern with political process to concern with the representation 
of politics’).33 An investigation of Emerson’s comments in his journals, 1835 to 1845, will be significant 
here, as will be the later essays ‘Wealth’ (1860) and ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875). In Chapter ii.ii., 
‘REVOLUTIONS IN RELATION,’ an array of legalistic movements concerning copyright cultures and 
intellectual proprietorship, 1815 to 1850, will provide a secondary context for Emerson’s theoretical interest 
in the responsibilities of scholarship and the expansion of the American book trade, the professionalization 
of the American publisher, and how technological modes of production changed the circulation of paper 
materials. The works of three historians will be of significant value to this study: Meredith McGill, Charles 
Sellers and Richard Teichgraeber. Examining the ways in which all three classify Emerson’s age as radical 
in character—a ‘revolution’ in American publishing (McGill), a ‘market revolution’ (Sellers); and a 
technological ‘revolution’ (Teichgraeber)—an analysis of these forms of cultural transformation will allow 
for an identification of the complexity of Emerson’s assertion that his age must be read as one of ‘silent 
revolution.’34 Emerson’s desire to establish a ‘new literature’ fostered and fed by America’s industrial and 
economic progress will be read relative to these studies so as to preface a close reading of Emerson’s interest 
in the ‘mechanics of literature’ and appropriation as will follow.35 
 
33 Randal Fuller, in introduction to Emerson’s Ghost: Literature, Politics and the Making of Americanists (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 6 
34 See Meredith McGill, American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853 (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); and Richard F. Teichgraeber III, Sublime Thoughts/Penny Wisdom (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1995). 
35 Emerson: ‘There is no topic that may not be treated, and no method excluded. Here, everything is admissible, philosophy, 
ethics, divinity, criticism, poetry, humor, anecdote, mimicry,—ventriloquism most,—all the breadth and versatility of the 
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Chapter ii.iii., ‘APPROPRIATING THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR,’ will investigate Emerson’s ‘art of 
appropriation’ and both examine and contextualize theories of critical engagement and cultural 
participation, looking again to the later works ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875) and ‘Wealth’ (1860). 
Emerson’s assimilation and absorption of the works of others—and the ways in which he both practiced 
and preached this ‘art of appropriation’—will be mapped further. This chapter will consider the ways in 
which instances of appropriation in Emerson’s writings can be identified and theorized in the context of 
‘the market-place’ and the efficacy of commercial systems of circulation. Emerson’s ‘art of appropriation’—
and the overall significance of ‘Quotation and Originality’ as an essay—will be further defined through his 
appropriation of the works of American banker and politician Gulian C. Verplanck (1786-1870) and his 
references to (and appropriations of) works by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), Napoleon 
Bonaparte (1769-1821), and Karl Marx (1818-1883). Emerson’s conceptualizations of creativity and 
authenticity will be argued as crucial for an understanding of his appropriation of the works of others, most 
noticeably in his late period writings.  
In conclusion, the centrality of ‘appropriation’ within Emerson’s works will be expanded into an 
analysis of the intratextual mechanisms we can identify within his authorship more broadly: a theory of 
critical ‘constellation,’ as Emerson would himself term it.   
As questions regarding the nature of Emerson’s cultural canonization and his currency of his own 
works as forms of cultural capital re-emerge in the twentieth and twenty-first century, the links between his 
conceptualist and practical ideas regarding reading and criticism remain paramount. This thesis will 
examine not only how such concerns have been registered in recent analyses of Emerson’s corpus and 
cultural purchase but will also charter the ways in which such ideas can be concretely and consistently 
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Emerson’s cultural legacy has consistently undergone a process ‘perennial refocusing’ both inside and 
outside of the academy in the years subsequent to his death in 1882.2 Consequently, twentieth and twenty-
first century Emerson Studies has witnessed a concerted effort to address the ways in which he sought to 
establish ‘a mode of expression’ in which ‘philosophy and literature would bear a relation to each other not 
envisioned in the given, outstanding traditions of philosophy in in England and in Germany.’3 This ‘mode,’ 
particular to his historical and national context, has resulted in a radical distinction between the ways in 
which Emerson was read at the onset of the twentieth century and its end. ‘No one ever accused Emerson 
of being predictable,’ writes Cary Wolfe in 1994, so it is only fitting that, in considering the cultural drift of 
Emerson’s reputation, recent ‘critical reconstructions’ of his corpus have both philosophically and 
culturally ‘produced a figure who little resembles the “Yankee sage” of American Studies at mid-century.’4 
The ‘old Emerson,’ as Wolfe portrays him, ‘was energetic but wild, inspiring but misty, brilliant on the 
level of the sentence, and even paragraph, but a house of cards when it came to cumulative power and 
compelling, overall coherence.’5 The ‘new’ Emerson, as Wolfe terms him, ‘is something else’ entirely.6 
‘Less an untamed metaphysician than a powerful and persuasive stylist,’ this later iteration of Emerson’s 
cultural commentaries renders him less ‘a serious philosopher,’ than an ‘incisive, if problematic, social and 
cultural critic.’7 
Fed in part ‘by the growing influence of Marxist theory in American Studies and the challenging 
politicization of culture by ideological critiques of all kinds,’ such ‘reconstructions’ of Emerson’s work—
according to Wolfe—centre ‘less on the Transcendentalist trying to make his break and his peace with the 
religious tradition, and more on the promise and peril of liberal individualism.’8 A summation of Wolfe’s 
argument, simply put, is that Emerson’s metacritical interests in scholarship, the agency of interpretation, 
 
2 P. Adams Sitney, ‘Emersonian Poetics,’ Eyes Upside Down: Visionary Filmmakers and the Heritage of Emerson (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 1-20 
3 Stanley Cavell, in introduction to (ed.) D.L. Hodge, Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 4-5 
4 Cary Wolfe, ‘Alone with American: Cavell, Emerson, and the Politics of Individualism’, New Literary History, 25.1. (1994), 
137 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 137 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 137-138 
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and the socio-economic indices of cultural engagement argue that we need not only analyse the content of 
Emerson’s writings themselves; but we also need consider the ways in which Emersonian cultural criticism 
has fostered an investigation of the culture of critical consumption that has itself emerged around his works. 
Such a position has clear bibliographic precedent, and will be the focus of this chapter, which will both 
survey recent ‘reconstructions’ of this ‘new’ Emerson and introduce the complex textual systems that 
Emerson would establish in the first phases of his authorship. 
Internal schisms, rifts and contradictions accompany Emerson’s efforts to explore the 
codependency of private enterprise and public welfare in his exploration of the act of reading as metaphor 
for economic participation, and this is reflected in recent criticism. Although Emerson does detail an 
aggressive interest in ‘the purposes of art’ and ‘of study’ across his works, any clarity as per the 
philosophical and political indications of his thinking has proven hard to come by.9 A ‘fog,’ as Stanley 
Cavell puts it, clouds our receipt of his writings today, and our experience of reading Emerson in the 
contemporary is shrouded in an atmosphere of critical confusion.10 Critics concede that his habitual 
tendency towards stylistic and poetic abstraction complicates any critical classification of his writings from 
the standpoint of either a philosophical or political category. His cultural commentaries are so diverse in 
their critical indication that a close reading of his writings requires a theory of personal ‘control,’ writes 
Joel Porte.11 A ‘typographical mystification’ accompanies any evaluation of his works,’12 and ‘matters are 
genuinely in a tangle’ writes Jonathan Bishop,13 and Emerson’s politics are governed by an irrational and 
unerring faith in self-determinacy, as Mark Patterson would state.14  His aesthetics are so diffuse that they 
require ‘perennial’ and constant ‘refocusing,’ writes P. Adams Sitney.15 Irving Babbitt—and Van Wyck 
Brooks before him—would also famously publish ardent criticisms of Emerson’s writing that lament his 
 
9 Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), CW.I., 81 
10 Stanley Cavell, ‘Emerson,’ Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 20 
11 Joel Porte, ‘The Problem of Emerson,’ Consciousness and Culture: Emerson and Thoreau Reviewed (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2004), 32-33 
12 Ibid., 33 
13 Jonathan Bishop, Emerson on the Soul (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 158 
14 See Mark R. Patterson, ‘Ralph Waldo Emerson and the American Representative’ in Authority, Autonomy and Representation 
in American Literature, 1776–1865 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 137-140 
15 P. Adams Sitney, in introduction to Eyes Upside Down: Visionary Filmmakers and the Heritage of Emerson, 20 
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lack of lucidity. Babbitt would note that although Emerson is ‘an important witness to certain truths of the 
spirit in the age of scientific materialism,’ in end, he proves ‘too satisfied with saying about half the time 
that everything is like everything else, and the rest of the time that everything is different from everything 
else’ to be of any palpable philosophical value.16 This broken system of simile underpins a corpus of works 
that Babbitt admits can be defined as ‘disquieting’ at times, but primarily due to the ‘vagueness’ of its 
philosophical and political direction, the ‘lack of grip’ his works commonly exercise in their ‘dealing with 
the particulars,’ and the ways in which he so freely interchanges political specificity with poetic platitude.17 
Examining Emerson’s investigative analysis of the act of reading, and the origins of his interest in 
economic circularity and the forms of commercialism upon which his theories of cultural engagement 
depend, this chapter will contest the ‘fog’ that Cavell attests troubles our reading of Emerson. I will examine 
Emerson’s continuous and cumulative study of scholarship, and Porte’s sense of our need to ‘control’ the 
critical indications of Emerson’s work will be key. Identifying interrelations between Emerson’s early and 
later works, I will explore the ways in which Emerson’s more naïve reconnoitering of the philosophical 
and political dimensions of scholarship and subjectivist interpretative practice in the 1830s and 1840s—a 
theoretical study of ‘use’ or critical ‘control’—informs the more astute analysis of appropriation he would 
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Emerson’s own (self-confessed) ‘experimental literary procedures’ and ‘his highly ambivalent attitude 
toward his own age have always made him a Rorschach exercise for his reader’s projects of self-
discovery.’19 More acutely than as capable of scaffolding any effort to engage any particular form of social 
exigency, David Smith argues it is Emerson’s interest in persona as a cultural object and as the autotelic 
endpoint of critical engagement that chiefly preoccupies his engagements with culture.20 As such, and as 
Douglas R. Anderson remarks in his Philosophy Americana (2006), ‘for many argument-riffers and 
intellectual historians Emerson does not appear to be doing philosophy.’21 For Anderson, this is partly why, 
‘for most of the twentieth century, his work lived only in literature programs.’22  
Rather than engage ‘the immense form of society at large’ (in philosophical terms), Emerson 
considers the metonymic propensities of the single subject; how we can read exegetically outward to 
consider the relationship between an individual reader and their political contexts.23 However, if we are to 
put Emerson’s theory to work, his position appears to prioritize the process of critical application to such 
a degree that the subjectivist core of critical engagement proves foregrounded. In short, our own critical 
desire determines the value of a text as much as its original intent. As Peter Carafiol notes, a distinctly 
 
18 Emerson, ‘The Progress of Culture’ (1867), CW.VIII., 205 
19 David L. Smith, ‘Representative Emersons: Versions of American Identity,’ Religion and American Culture: A Journal of 
Interpretation, 2.2. (1992), 159-160. Emerson would himself speak to his practice as an ‘experiment’ explicitly; see Emerson, 
‘Circles’ (1841), CW.II., 318 
20 Smith, ‘Representative Emersons,’ 318 
21 Douglas R. Anderson, ‘Emerson’s Platonizing of American Thought,’ Philosophy Americana: Making Philosophy at Home in 




‘Emersonianist’ form of interpretation has therefore proven pivotal ‘not so much to [the development of] 
American writing as to American criticism;’ a claim that appears to support Anderson’s comment regarding 
the self-direction of the Emersonian reader.24 To read in an ‘Emersonian’ fashion, he infers, is not to 
identify what a text says but to identify best what we want it to communicate.25 In this respect, the critical 
‘reconstruction’ of Emerson that Wolfe identifies cannot be divorced from the still prevalent idea that 
Emerson’s strength lies in the ability of his writings to communicate all things to all readers.  
The value that Emerson affords the act of reading owes to his want to ally ‘objective reality’ and 
‘subjective experience,’ and frames what Wai-Chee Dimock has referred to as a ‘general economy of 
selfhood’ wherein processes of economic ‘circulation’ are mirrored in our individual processes of mind, 
‘and whose standard of movement registers only subjective affect.’26 In sum, Emerson was interested in the 
ways in which we allot value to select signs, symbols and subjects relative to our own, singular logic and 
our own critical intent.27 Dimock argues that Emerson’s interest in the ‘circulation’ of ideas through the 
act of reading is emblematic of his want to analyse ‘the empirical fact of America’s abundance.’28 How the 
economic progress of an independent America in the early 1800s ‘enabled him to posit something called 
the self’ by virtue of the emphasis placed on an ‘ownership’ of matter by mercantile ideologies and 
imperatives in ascendance.29 However, the application of Emerson’s thoughts on reading and criticism in 
practice—the ‘Emersonianist’ mode, as Carafiol regards it—has become something of a distilled 
convention and proves central to the development of American Studies as both discipline and institution. 
Dedicated to what Gene Wise has referred to as the study of ‘paradigm drama,’ Wise suggests that 
American Studies has sought to ‘recapitulate’ American culture by asking a train of significant questions 
of it commonly thought of as Emersonian in nature; ‘What imperatives are there in the larger culture and 
social structure, and in the culture and social structure of academe, which have made possible the quest for 
 
24 Peter Carafiol, ‘Reading the Tradition: The Rhetoric of Transcendentalist Scholarship,’ The American Ideal: Literary History 
as a Worldly Activity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 42 
25 Ibid. 
26 Wai-Chee Dimock, ‘Scarcity, Subjectivity and Emerson,’ boundary 2, 17.1. (1990), 90-91 




an integrating American Studies? How have these imperatives changed over time?’30 Dealing 
simultaneously with two central and primary issues—‘Who we are?’ and ‘Where we are heading?’—Wise 
proposes that a conflict between presentism and prospect underscores American Studies as ‘movement,’ 
and facilitates a radical rereading of America’s cultural past that considers cultural and political progress 
perpendicularly.31 As noted, his summation of the grounding theses of American Studies is founded on 
Emersonian questions. Look to Emerson’s ‘Experience’ (1844), for example—and the essay’s grounding 
thesis and opening remark in particular—‘WHERE do we find ourselves?’ This foundational statement is of 
undeniable importance to Wise’s assessment of the intellectual aims and ambitions of American Studies as 
discipline, but is also key to Emerson’s own development of his ‘Transcendental Criticism’ as he would 
term it in his journals, 1840.32 ‘Criticism must be transcendental, that is, must consider literature ephemeral 
& easily entertain the supposition of its entire disappearance,’ Emerson writes,33 and the critic’s ‘aim’ needs 
be ‘on life and not on literature,’ as he would later suggest.34 Thus, the ‘Emersonianist’ or ‘Transcendental’ 
critic should consider the real-world application of critical ideas rather than simply sequester their 
significance to the institution of criticism or cultural convention.  
As Emerson argues, ‘The astronomer discovers that geometry, a pure abstraction of the human 
mind, is the measure of planetary motion. The chemist finds proportions and intelligible method 
throughout matter; and science is nothing but the finding of analogy, identity, in the most remote parts.’35  
 
If it were only for a vocabulary, the scholar would be covetous of action. Life 
is our dictionary. Years are well spent in country labors; in town; in the insight 
into trades and manufactures; in frank intercourse with many men and 
 
30 Gene Wise, ‘Paradigm Dramas in American Studies: A Cultural and Institutional History of the Movement,’ American 
Quarterly, 31.3. (1979), 298 
31 Ibid. 
32 See Emerson, ‘Experience’ (1844), CW.III., 45. Richard A. Grusin offers an interesting reading of the philosophical 
importance of ‘Experience’ and Emerson’s guiding question, suggesting that it situates his perspectivism as radically 
exploring and engaging forms of cultural mediation that seat him as within a complex and progressive philosophical 
cosmogony. See ‘Radical Mediation,’ Critical Inquiry, 42.1. (2015), 129 
33 Emerson, ‘Journal E’ (Undated, 1840), JMN.VII., 352 
34 Emerson: ‘[The] receiver’s aim is on life, and not on literature, will be his indifference to the source. The nobler the truth 
or sentiment, the less imports the question of authorship. It never troubles the simple seeker from whom he derived such or 
such a sentiment. Whoever expresses to us a just thought makes ridiculous the pains of the critic who should tell him where 
such a word had been said before. ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 192 
35 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 88 
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women; in science; in art; to the one end of mastering in all their facts a 
language by which to illustrate and embody our perceptions. I learn 
immediately from any speaker how much he has already lived, through the 
poverty or the splendor of his speech. Life lies behind us as the quarry from 
whence we get tiles and copestones for the masonry of to-day. This is the way 
to learn grammar. Colleges and books only copy the language which the field 
and the work-yard made.36 
 
Interpretative agency, in other words, is the ‘finding of analogy’ for ‘country labors’ and the ascendent 
culture of ‘trades and manufactures.’ Its scientific, political and philosophical worth is vital to Emerson’s 
mind; and his characterization of the scholar as a kind of searcher, and assertion that the ‘finding of 
analogy’ needs itself be regarded as a significant labour form, has proven key to recent considerations of 
the contemporary resonances of Emerson’s thoughts on criticism within the field of American Studies.37  
The ‘Emersonianist’ reader, according to Carafiol, is both lens and discerner of analogy, but such 
a characterization is present in Emerson’s writings themselves. A distinctly metacritical self-consciousness 
that sought to consider the aims and ambitions—both institutional and personal—that underpin scholarly 
work. Considering the history of American Studies’ institutionalization over the course of the twentieth 
century, and the implementation of Emerson’s ideas on analogy and ‘original relation’ therein, Wise signals 
Emerson’s place as at the very foundation of this movement.38 However, he does so by inference rather 
than by explicit textual evidence. Nevertheless, for Wise, a critical canon of early twentieth century critics 
exacts a vital antecedent to the ‘reconstruction’ of the Emersonian Transcendental that Wolfe indicates. 
 
36 Ibid., 97-98. Emerson’s remarks on scholarship and its remove from quotidian (and proletarian) experience are interestingly 
summarized by Reza Hosseini in ‘Emerson and the Pale Scholar,’ Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review, 57.1. (2018), 
115-135 
37 This idea is also raised by Jay Gurian in ‘American Studies and the Creative Present,’ Midcontinent American Studies, 10.1. 
(1969), 76-84 
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faded wardrobe?’ This infamous complaint that introduces Emerson’s debut is emblematic of his rejection of any critical 
‘obligation to the historical, cultural and intellectual situatedness that we encompass under the shorthand context,’ as 
Benjamin Pickford has argued; ‘Establishing a theme that is thereafter never completely absent from his work.’ See Emerson, 
‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 3; and Pickford, ‘Context Mediated: Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Political Economy of Plagiarism,’ 35 
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Looking to the works of Perry Miller, Robert Meredith, et al, Wise depicts the ways in which a 
historiographic and revisionist critical treatment of Emerson’s work reflects the broader aims of American 
Studies as a young discipline. However, he does not remark on the fact that the form of critical enterprise 
Emerson would himself detail in his efforts to consider the subjectivist principles of a critic’s engagement 
with culture entirely echo his terms of argument.39 Instead, Wise looks to the works of Vernon Louis 
Parrington to ground his investigation of the first steps of American Studies as an accepted academic 
institution. Coining what he terms the ‘Parrington paradigm,’ he is keen to explore the ways in which the 
axis of an argument corresponds to the personal and political aims of the individual reader.40  
According to Wise, ‘more than any other Americanist,’ it was Parrington’s seminal Main Currents 
in American thought (1927) that reanimated the idea of cultural scholarship as a socially responsible and 
radical form of political engagement; specifically, by way of an analysis of Emerson’s early address, ‘The 
American Scholar.’41 A ‘passionate mind encountering a dynamic world, sans the mediating forms of 
convention,’42 Parrington’s reading of Emerson’s resituated ‘the genteel Transcendentalist’ as ‘the most 
searching critic of America’ and its cultural and political offices.43 For Wise, Parrington’s scholarly 
response to Emerson’s remarks on scholarship engineers an ‘incisive’ form of ‘cultural criticism.’ Parrington 
reads Emerson’s work as facilitating a politically predicated and philosophically dedicated analysis of ‘the 
tragic gap between the real and the ideal’ (echoing what Emerson would term ‘gulf between every me and 
thee’).44 In so doing, and seeking to speak to the further canonization of Emerson, he would argue 
Transcendentalism as a means of considering the aims and ambitions of a particularly Americanist 
philosophical tradition. 
However, as Randall Fuller notes, such is the creativity of the work underpinning Parrington’s 
assessment of this revolutionary form of cultural critique that Parrington’s work could itself be addressed 
 
39 See Carafiol, The American Ideal, 89, 100-101 
40 Wise, ‘Paradigm Dramas in American Studies,’ 315 
41 Ibid., 298 
42 Ibid. 
43 Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860 (New York, 
NY: Harcourt Brace, 1954), 383 
44 Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, 386.; see also, Emerson: ‘There will be the same gulf between every me and 
thee as between the original and the picture.’ ‘Experience’ (1844), CW.III., 77 
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as a subtle act of censorship or appropriation. Parrington ‘wholly ignored’ Emerson in the various guises 
that he appears across his works; eliding any sense of how ‘Emerson the metaphysician, Emerson the poet, 
Emerson the prose stylist and Emerson the mystic’ may effectuate his argument or question its aims.45 
Parrington’s project, to Fuller’s mind, thus pictures the ways in which ‘a canonical figure may fill the 
personal and cultural needs of a reader or a critic in ways that may have little to do with that canonical 
figure’s actual texts.’46 Parrington’s treatment of Emerson as an object sculpted as much out of the aims, 
ambitions and intent of the individual reader’s own critical desire as from the content of the work itself 
could be considered problematic. However, it is another critical trait identifiable in Emerson’s writing.  
In ‘The American Scholar,’ Emerson arguably justifies the liberties Parrington takes with his source 
material by positing what he would term ‘creative reading.’ ‘There are creative manners, there are creative 
actions, and creative words; manners, actions, words, that is, indicative of no custom or authority, but 
springing spontaneous from the mind's own sense of good and fair,’ Emerson notes:47 
 
I would not be hurried by any love of system, by any exaggeration of instincts, 
to underrate the Book. There is creative reading as well as creative writing. 
When the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book 
we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is doubly 
significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the world.48 
 
Rather than a theory of creativity, Emerson’s position on ‘creative reading’ intuits the act of reading as 
constituting a form of property—as a literalized act of knowledge formation—and as a mean of taking 
ownership of the inventions and allusions a work contains. A reading, in this regard, becomes a cultural 
object as vital as the literary work that catalyses it; it is an object that itself needs circulate and, in so doing, 
forge or ‘create’ further reactions, ‘creating’ both new readings and, incidentally, an economy of 
participation and invention in so doing. We read only to partake in ‘an ever-expanding knowledge 
 
45 Randall Fuller, ‘How to Dismantle American Culture,’ Emerson’s Ghosts: Literature, Politics and the Making of Americanists 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 71 
46 Ibid. 
47 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar (1837), CW.I., 90-93 
48 Ibid. 
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[system],’49 and to participate in the ‘slow growth’ of a cultural economy.50  
This dialectical view of the participatory qualities of critical and cultural progress has continued to 
resonate with critics seeking to explore the conflict between critical desire and social exigency that 
underpins scholarly attention. Furthermore, it has been employed as a means with which to consider the 
pedagogical application of Emerson’s thinking on the agency of criticism to the contemporary, commercial 
university.51 As David LaRocca infers, Parrington’s employment of Emerson as a vehicle for his own 
critical and political predilection is indicative of a continuous pattern amidst Emerson’s modern-day 
readers. Introducing an anthological survey of Emersonian criticism, Estimating Emerson (2010)—a 
collection that spans an expansive period, 1834 to 2008—LaRocca endorses Parrington’s treatment of 
Emerson by proxy.52 He argues that Emerson’s philosophical formations and portrayed fascination in the 
mechanisms of critical engagement endorses the singular reader’s possible contribution to (and 
revolutionary capacity to alter) apparently fixed systems or structures of thought through ‘creative’ 
interpretative engagement. In so doing, he proposes Emerson as an ideal philosopher fit for an analysis of 
the structures of thought and market imperatives of our contemporary academic system.53  
Axiomatic to Emersonian scholarship is a form of critical self-reflexivity, LaRocca suggests; one 
in which revisionist accounts of Emerson’s philosophical scaffold can call into question the validity of the 
critic’s social function and the university’s ability to foster such radical forms of cultural analysis. ‘One 
crucial aspect of Emerson’s legacy,’ he writes, ‘is that he [has] prompted many academics […] to explore 
the meaning of academic discourse and the role that the academy plays in intellectual and everyday life.’54 
 
49 Ibid., 88 
50 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 182 
51 A connection between America’s developing critical institution of the 1830s and ‘40s and a university informed more by 
‘postindustrial economy’ than pedagogy is a focus of Christopher Newfield’s argument in Unmaking the Public University: The 
Forty Year Assault on the Middle Class (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Newfield cites Emerson particularly 
as an early theorizer of this process of economization. See ‘The Three Crises and the Mass Middle,’ 28-29 
52 David LaRocca, in introduction to (ed.) D. LaRocca, Estimating Emerson: An Anthology of Criticism from Carlyle to Cavell, 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 19 
53 Such ideas are key to the work of Rita Felski, whom—without direct reference to Emerson—would argue a similar form 
of creativity as preponderate in her own analysis of present-day scholarship. For example, see Rita Felski, ‘Recognition,’ The 
Uses of Literature (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 23-50.; and ‘Digging Down and Standing Back,’ The Limits of 
Critique (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 52-85 
54 LaRocca, in introduction Estimating Emerson, 19 
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Several of the most ‘prominent’ of academic critics of Emerson’s work, as such, ‘undertake metacritical 
reflections of the academic profession, including its conceptual categories, assigned titles, accepted 
disciplines and fields of inquiry.’55 In this way, ‘Emerson’s writings retain an ongoing challenge—truly a 
perpetual provocation—to any mode of complacency over the meaning and relevance of the academy.’56 
Such ideas are redolently laced into Emerson’s ‘American Scholar.’ ‘Books are the best of things, well used; 
abused, among the worst,’ he notes. ‘What is the right use? What is the one end which all means go to 
effect? They are for nothing but to inspire’ and, in so doing, antedate action and instigate ‘metacritical’ and 
reflexive self-reflection on interpretation as a cultural institution.57  
LaRocca’s position speaks more to an ‘Emersonianist’ critical legacy than it does any textual 
providence, but such claims are undeniably evocative in terms of the implications borne by Emerson’s 
emphatic sense of the cultural resonance and significance of a ‘reader’ at work. Nonetheless, an increasing 
awareness of the ways in which pivotal thinkers such as Parrington have arguably appropriated Emerson’s 
works for the sake of their own critical agenda has resulted in recent scholars seeking to explore the 
consistency and continuity of Emerson’s ideas and their ideological suggestion. When a lack of consistency 
is established, it is Emerson’s receptivity to the evolving complexity of commercial systems in the 
antebellum marketplace that is often seen as fundamental. F. O. Matthiessen, for example, has argued that 
the ‘want of continuity’ in Emerson’s authorship is a ‘natural product’ of the rapid industrialization of his 
historical moment.58 As such, a sense of critical ‘vertigo’ can be identified in his early writings as Emerson 
altercates between the spiritual and pastoral basis of his youth and the broader, more existential and 
ideological concerns as can be identified over the course of his maturation (following the publication of his 
First and Second Series essay collections, respectively, 1841 and 1844).59  
Emerson was conscious of a need to ally his interests in spiritualism and the practical and political 
 
55 Ibid., 19-20 
56 Ibid., 20  
57 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 90-93 
58 F. O. Matthiessen, ‘In the Optative Mood,’ American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 56 
59 A term Cary Wolfe uses to describe the sensation of reading Emerson’s early writings of the late 1830s and 1840s; see Cary 
Wolfe, ‘The Eye is the First Circle: Emerson’s Romanticism, Cavell’s Skepticism, Luhmann’s Modernity,’ in The Other 
Emerson, 271-301 
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effectivity of market cultures and industrialization in order to stage a more conceptualist reading of 
scholarship and the agency of interpretation. He valued scholarship unequivocally and would repeatedly 
connect the idea of studentship with a conceptualization of social progress and social connection. ‘We 
think too lowly of the scholar’s vocation,’ he would write in his journals, 1838, lamenting the rank of 
scholarship in the bulwark of America’s cultural institutions of the late-1830s. ‘A scholar is a selecting 
principle,’ he notes: ‘He takes only his own out of the multiplicity that sweeps & circles by him. He is like 
one of these nets or frames that are set out from the shore on rivers to catch driftwood, &c. So, in every 
community where aught new or good is going on, God sets down one of these Perceivers and Recorders. 
What he hears is as homogenous ever with what he announces.’60 Emerson would deliver his famous paean 
to the progress of American scholarship, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), a mere five years after his 
resignation from the pulpit in the Second Unitarian Church of Boston in 1832, and the apparent exchange 
of interests from the theocratic to the socio-economic systems of governance that accompanies this shift is 
distinct.61 Through an increased receptivity to new labour forms and conceptualizations of work 
transformed by this period of industrialization, economization and technologization, Emerson’s explicit 
remarks on the difficult equation of disparate labour forms and social cohesion in ‘The American Scholar’ 
are particularly significant. ‘Man is priest, and scholar, and statesman, and producer, and soldier,’ he notes 
in ‘The American Scholar’—‘In the divided or social state these functions are parcelled out to individuals, 
each of whom aims to do his stint of the joint work, whilst each other performs his.’62 However, he argues 
that labour has become so definitive a means of ascribing our personal contribution to a social whole that 
the process of individuation that a division of labour proves to inspire also problematizes the establishment 
of a social imaginary; of our envisaging society as a cohesive entity: 
 
[The] individual, to possess himself, must sometimes return from his own 
labor to embrace all the other laborers. But, unfortunately, this original unit, 
this fountain of power, has been so distributed to multitudes, has been so 
minutely subdivided and peddled out, that it is spilled into drops, and cannot 
 
60 Emerson, ‘Journal D’ (Undated, 1838), JMN.VII., 40 
61 See Paul Grimstad, ‘Emerson’s Adjacencies’ in (ed.) B. Arsić and C. Wolfe, The Other Emerson, 251-271 
62 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 83 
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be gathered. The state of society is one in which the members have suffered 
amputation from the trunk, and strut about so many walking monsters, —a 
good finger, a neck, a stomach, an elbow, but never a man.63 
 
For Emerson, the division of labour can be extended into a process in which the scholar—through their 
reflection on the citizenry of this ‘divided state’—becomes another form of labourer. Here, the scholar—
his ‘delegated intellect’—is explicitly charged with the conceptual task of simultaneously understanding 
the ‘state of society’ as well as the ‘fate of its members.’ 
 
Man is thus metamorphosed into a thing, into many things. […] The priest 
becomes a form; the attorney a statute-book; the mechanic a machine; the 
sailor a rope of the ship. In this distribution of functions the scholar is the 
delegated intellect. In the right state he is Man Thinking. In the degenerate 
state, when the victim of society, he tends to become a mere thinker, or still 
worse, the parrot of other men’s thinking.64 
 
This is one substantiation of the ways in which Emerson’s interest in labour, in ‘the dignity of ministry,’ 
operates in tandem with his more conceptualist engagement with the responsibilities of criticism. His 
characterization of the processes and philosophies that support the ‘Thinking’ individual in his writings 
cannot be divorced from the mechanisms and agency of critical interpretation, but also serves a pivotal and 
political function; to ‘think’ through the possible connection of disparate ‘laborers,’ and to position our 
‘own labor’ (as scholars) so as to consider the concept (and contexts) of ‘labor’ more broadly. 
The critic, scholar or reader (as Emerson would interchangeably describe them) is thus a figure 
essayed as capable of allying the disparate parts and elements of an uneven and unequal social whole.65 
Emerson suggests that our process of ‘selecting’ or electing the resonant symbols (both aesthetic and 
political) that accompany a period of economic and industrial acceleration is the very object of scholarly 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 83-84 
65 For a thorough investigation of this idea relative to the importance of Emerson’s thinking to the division of thought and 
action in contemporary scholarship, see Reza Hosseini, ‘The Pale Scholar’ in Emerson’s Literary Philosophy (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2021), 57-81. 
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work and that the ‘scholar’ is the sole figure capable of reticulating these ideas into a socio-political and 
economic entity or network. From the onset, however, these ideas contain the paradox that Emerson will 
later seek to unravel in his work on quotation, appropriation and intellectual authenticity. On the one hand, 
the critic’s capacity for ‘selection’ sits at odds with his fear that the ‘thinker’ simply stands as a ‘parrot’ of 
the ideas of others. On the other hand, however, the act of quotation or appropriation—a more technical 
and deliberative form of ‘parroting’—allows him to consider the ‘creativity’ of critical enterprise by 
foregrounding the ‘secondary use’ of cultural material, and by positioning the self as a critical lens capable 
of refracting the intimations of a work of literature rather than simply reflecting and repeating them.66 This 
complex theory of ‘use’ is key, and exacts a foundation from which we can consider Emerson’s efforts to 
assess the aims and ambitions of critical enterprise as directed toward the analysis of ‘life’ and ‘not 
literature.’ This is not only vital for an analysis of Emerson’s view of reading as a practice—and the ways 
in which Emerson has himself been read—it is also crucial for an understanding of the conceptual 
importance of circulation to Emerson’s thinking: how an image or idea moves from place to place only to 
attain new resonances, new value.  
As a means of countering critical allegation that Emerson’s interest in reading begins and ends with 
an assertion of the power of subjectivist repose, his fascination in the social systems that support culture’s 
circularity buttress his interest in political economy. As previously mentioned, he appears more invested in 
the dissemination of ideas than their authorship and, in so doing, establishes the marketplace as a metaphor 
for his reflections on cultural participation. But the fact that he would so explicitly draw correlation between 
critical and commercial forms of value, and assert both forms as contingent upon circulatory economics, 
is an element of his aesthetic philosophies that has proven largely overlooked. Rather than representative 
of a formal interest alone, Emerson sensed that literature needed be regarded as metaphor for modes of 
social connection and correlation.  
In ‘Quotation and Originality,’ he would make the following remark as per his feeling for the 
 
66 Emerson: ‘The primary use of a fact is low; the secondary use, as it is a figure or illustration of my thought, is the real 
worth. First the fact; second its impression, or what I think of it.’ See ‘Poetry and Imagination’ (1875), CW.VIII., 11 
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symbolic resonances of critical enterprise:67 
 
Can we not help ourselves as discreetly by the force of two in literature? 
Certainly, it only needs two well placed and well-tempered for coöperation, 
to get somewhat far transcending any private enterprise!68 
 
Terms such as ‘cooperation’ and ‘private enterprise’ are not seen as contesting one another if we are to sit 
Emerson’s theory of ‘the force of two in literature’ in the contexts of his early writings. Moreover, they are 
regarded as co-dependent. That Emerson would so explicitly establish a connect between his interests in 
the cultural and political power of both criticism and commerce will thus be the focus of this survey of both 
Emerson’s interest in the symbolic authorities of criticism and the symbolic indications of marketization. 
The ‘discrepancy between the dissident power of Emerson’s ideas in the sphere of culture and their manifest 
weakness in the sphere of politics’ is regarded as a mainstay of in analyses of Emerson’s practice, and 
depends upon the idea that Emerson’s ‘mythified’ voice speaks to theorizations of individuality more 
astutely than any collective or social concern.69 To counter such an idea, Emerson’s early reflections on the 
act of reading relative to his thoughts on the correlation between self and society in his oft-cited paean to 
self-determinacy, ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), prove particularly pertinent.  
The Latinate epigraph and verse that introduces ‘Self-Reliance’ is misleading when read within the 
canon of works: Ne te quaesiveris extra /Do not seek for things outside of yourself.70 Keeping in mind Parrington’s 
selective/elective reading of Emerson’s early remarks on scholarship, the major concepts and ideas that we 
encounter Emerson’s early period have been read in a wildly diverse number of ways and ‘Self-Reliance,’ 
as both concept and essay, is a good candidate for considering how Emerson has been recently read, revised 
and ‘reconstructed.’  
 
67 See Jacques Rancière’s reading of Emerson’s early lectures in his work Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art (2013). 
Rancière sees Emerson as drawn towards an affective, interpretative ‘infinitization’—a realization of the ‘common potential’ 
of ‘material life’ or ‘sensible materiality’ within a work of literature. He cites Emerson’s essay ‘The Poet’ to elucidate his 
position, suggesting that Emerson looks to widen participation by stressing the multivalent and associative meaning of poetic 
language rather than narrow it down to individual agency. See Jacques Rancière, (trans.) Zakir Paul, ‘The Poet of the New 
World: Boston, 1841—New York, 1855’, in Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art (New York, NY: Verso, 2013), 65 
68 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 189 
69 Christopher Newfield, ‘Emerson’s Corporate Individualism,’ American Literary History, 3.4. (1991), 673 
70 Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), CW.I., 43 
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Disregarding the essay’s infamous celebration of ‘Whim’ as a key characteristic of critical 
enterprise, ‘Self-Reliance’ has broadly been read as delineating a theory of social connectivity and relation 
rather than simply a celebration of self-governance in order to politicize Emerson’s critical value.71 As 
Prentiss Clark writes, a brief review of critical reactions to this major early work draws up a wide array of 
interpretations. For Harold Bloom, ‘Self-Reliance’ is ‘the American religion [that Emerson] founded’ 
which ‘converts solitude into a firm stance against history, including personal history,’ while—for 
Lawrence Buell—it is ‘a personal life practice’ emphasizing ‘personal integrity’ and delineating a ‘robust’ 
theory of ‘coexistence.’ Conversely, Stanley Cavell argues ‘Self-Reliance’ as a form of moral perfectionism 
and analysis of thought that precedes the institutional extension of twentieth century language 
philosophies.72 ‘Self-Reliance’ is a ‘democratic’ theory of  ‘individuality,’ according to George Kateb; a 
‘program of recovery from alienation as well as the very essence of positive freedom,’ as Lou Ann Lange 
would similarly characterize it; or a theory of ‘radical self-dependence,’ as Stephen E. Whicher would 
define it.’73 As Clark notes, an Emersonian theory of ‘Self-Reliance’ is thus far from a determinative 
concept, even within the sphere of Emersonian Studies itself. It is ‘most often considered synonymous with, 
or expressive of, individualism—individualism in both fruitful and destructive forms—and evaluated in 
connection to the health of democracy,’ and yet scholars simultaneously see ‘Self-Reliance’ as 
underpinning a panoply of socio-political paradigms. In this sense, these various readings and redefinitions 
 
71 Emerson: ‘I would write on the lintels of the door-post, Whim. I hope it is somewhat better than whim at last, but we 
cannot spend the day in explanation.’ Ibid., 52. Emerson would return to this point in ‘History,’ and suggest that our inability 
to clearly state a thought—that a published idea is always liable to be misread and regarded associatively—is something of a 
cultural predicament: ‘[It] is the fault of our rhetoric that we cannot strongly state one fact without seeming to belie some 
other.’ See ‘History’ (1841), CW.I., 39 
72 This is an idea central to Stanley Cavell’s career-long engagement with Emerson’s works, and effort to explore the efficacy 
of Emerson’s ideas from within the conventions of twentieth century European philosophy and an American intellectual 
cosmogony; see, in particular, This New and Unapproachable America: Lectures After Emerson, After Wittgenstein (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989)  
73 Prentiss Clark, ‘Pulse for Pulse in Harmony with the Whole: Hearing Self-Reliance Anew’ in Nineteenth-Century Literature, 
69.3. (December 2014) 319-321. For sources of these various derivations and definitions, see Harold Bloom, ‘Introduction,’ 
in (ed.) Harold Bloom, Ralph Waldo Emerson (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985), 7; Lawrence Buell, Emerson 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 63, 65, 78; Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and 
Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); George Kateb, Emerson 
and Self-Reliance (Lanham, MD: Sage Publications, 1995), xviii; Lou Ann Lange, The Riddle of Liberty: Emerson on Alienation, 
Freedom, and Obedience (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), xxi; and Stephen E. Whicher, Freedom and Fate: An Inner Life of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, (Philadelphia, PN: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953, 1971), 50 
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of the term ‘Self-Reliance’ prove somewhat ironic, as critics have increasingly sought to consider Emerson’s 
thinking as a foundation for broader reflection on the political life of the individual subject. ‘Self-Reliance’ 
has been argued as championing human rights; as promoting self-culture; as nurturing equality; or 
conversely, as an apotheosis of America’s corporatist spirit. Whilst some have read ‘Self-Reliance’ as a 
means of engaging the relation of self and state, others have argued the essay as a distilled theory of 
capitalist competition and market convention.74 As a celebration of the private self over public good; as 
negating sociality; as privileging self-absorption; as tending dangerously towards anarchy.75 Nevertheless, 
debated as its definition may be, Clark suggests that the term seems be the ‘handle’ that scholarship attaches 
to this ‘man without a handle’ (borrowing from Henry James Sr. and his famous dismissal of Emerson).76  
As a maxim, Emerson’s epigram—Do not seek things outside of yourself—is a statement concordant 
with the general treatment of interpretation frequently posed in his works, and with regard to the popularity 
of ‘Self-Reliance’ in particular. However, such a position proves ironic if we look at Emerson’s treatment 
of the act of reading and his emphatic sense of the ways in which a reader is always a contingent and 
conditional figure. Ever dependent upon a book or an author to classify as a reader at all, Emerson 
(seemingly self-consciously) ironizes and complicates his theory of ‘Self-Reliance’ through a continuous 
exploration of critical reflection and critical exchange as can be identified across his works. As he would 
note in the late ‘Quotation and Originality’—an essay already signalled as representing a later confluence 
of ideas preponderate in Emerson’s early writings—‘The profit of books is according to the sensibility of 
the reader.’77 Such an enumeration of the significance of ‘sensibility’ as at the foundation of critical practice 
is consistently restated in his early public and private works. ‘What can we read, see acquire but ourselves?’ 
he would write in his journals, 1832; ‘Take the book, my friend, and read your eyes out, you will never 
find there what I find.’78 At first, the idea that our basis and foundation of criteria is informed by personal 
 
74 Newfield cites Emerson as a particular significant thinker in retooling notions of ‘collaboration’ for the culture of 
competition that underpins market ideologies. See Newfield, ‘The Submissive Center,’ The Emerson Effect, 37 
75 Clark, Pulse for Pulse in Harmony with the Whole: Hearing Self-Reliance Anew,’ 391 
76 See Henry James, (ed.) Frederick W. Dupee, Autobiography (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 347. 8 
77 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 194 
78 Emerson, 18th February 1832, ‘Blotting Book III’ JMN.III., 327.; this line is repeated in ‘Spiritual Laws’ (1841)— ‘Take 
the book into your two hands and read your eyes out, you will never find what I find.’—CW.I., 149 
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experience or ‘sensibility’ over and above such arena as event; the authority of text, the celebrity or renown 
of an artist or maker, the power of political circumstances, or the sway of social exigency appears anathema 
to Emerson. A surface reading gives us sense of the significance of ‘self-reliance’ and self-determinacy as 
his chief political and intellectual ambitions, and scholarship provides a means of testing his thinking within 
such an institutional and ‘impersonal’ context as critical enterprise.79 Such statements as these seem to 
suggest that Emerson’s exploration of the ‘profit’ of critical engagement is, in end, the aid it offers us as we 
work towards our projects of self-discovery and self-realization within an increasing socialized public 
sphere; that literature is a field we till only to foster a more pronounced, legible—and archly personal—
interior life. Thus, Do not seek for things outside of yourself.  
However, Emerson’s interest in the ‘profit’ of critical enterprise can be seen to be systematized if 
we are to explore the interrelation of his private writings in the 1830s and his published works of the 1840s 
and 1850s. Evidence of the importance of ‘sensibility’ to critical practice is repeated across Emerson’s major 
publications. In his mid-period collection Representative Men (1850)—and the theoretical essay that would 
introduce the six portraits of cultural celebrity that follow, ‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850)—he explores the 
ways in which that which is latent or undeveloped in consciousness is produced through the application of 
structures of private thought to public discourse. Twice in ‘Uses of Great Men’ he tropes on a botanical 
term to explore the co-dependency of private thought and its public catalysts. First, ‘Man is that noble 
endogenous plant which grows, like the palm, from within outward. His own affair, though impossible to 
others, he can open with celerity and in sport.’80 And second, ‘Man is endogenous, and education is his 
unfolding. The aid we have from others is mechanical compared with the discoveries of nature in us.’81 
Although Emerson’s sense that this is a ‘mechanical’ process sits at odds with his organic (and organicist) 
metaphor, his realization that the latent and ‘endogenous’ content we strive for is inconceivable without 
the aids of external stimuli (thus his stress on ‘education’ as a vital element of this ‘mechanical’ 
 
79 According to Sharon Cameron’s reading of Emerson, the central claim of his thought is that ‘the impersonal […] leads to 
the social in its highest form,’ and that the person is a fleeting and unstable construct; that ‘nothing is ours except rhetorically, 
or positionally.’ See Sharon Cameron, ‘The Way of Life by Abandonment: Emerson’s Impersonal,’ Impersonality: Seven 
Essays (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 85, 89.; and 79-107  
80 Emerson, ‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850), CW.IV., 31 
81 Ibid. 
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procedure).82 Emerson emphasizes this point one final time near the end of this essay to suggest, in sum, 
that to produce, one must first consume: ‘We are equally served by receiving and by imparting […] It seems 
a mechanical advantage, and great benefit it is to each speaker, as he can now paint out his thought to 
himself.’83 Such comments are directly in conflict with Emerson’s sense that we should not ‘seek’ for things 
‘outside of [ourselves],’ on the contrary, here he explicitly suggests that we need ‘mechanically’ work with 
external stimuli to more keenly gain access to our own thinking. These remarks are indicative of the way 
in which Emerson would regularly essay analyses of our ‘methods of interpretation’ and repeatedly 
reinstate the importance of our assimilating public matter only to subject it to our own unique and ‘creative’ 
reading.  
A number of recent critics who have deliberatively worked to identify a more radical theory of 
reading in Emerson’s major works have argued our need to revise Emerson’s critical methods. In the main, 
this is due to Emerson’s inconsistency. In his early works, he would lament ‘our preposterous use of 
books,’84 latterly, he would less tendentiously call for an analysis of ‘our use of literature.’85 However, the 
plural element of both claims proves deceptive. Emerson would often home in on the importance of 
personal ‘sensibility’ to cultural engagement as he highlights the importance of our forging an identifiably 
unique interpretation of cultural matter, notes Tracy Scott McMillin. Fixated by the ‘solemn engagement 
 
82 Emerson’s choice of term here is of interest; ‘mechanic’ or ‘mechanical’ was listed in Noah Webster’s An American 
Dictionary of the English Language (New York, NY: S. Converse, 1828) as follows: 1. Pertaining to machines, or to the art of 
constructing machines; pertaining to the art of making wares, goods, instruments, furniture, etc. We say, a man is employed 
in mechanical labor; he lives by mechanical occupation.; 2. Constructed or performed by the rules or laws of mechanics. The 
work is not mechanical.; 3. Skilled in the art of making machines; bred to manual labor.; 4. Pertaining to artisans or 
mechanics; vulgar., i.e., To make a god, a hero or a king, or Descend to a mechanic dialect.; 5. Pertaining to the principles of 
mechanics, in philosophy; as mechanical powers or forces; a mechanical principle.; 6. Acting by physical power; as 
mechanical pressure. ‘The terms mechanical and chimical, are thus distinguished; those changes which bodies undergo without 
altering their constitution, that is, losing their identity, such as changes of place, of figure, etc. are mechanical; those which 
alter the constitution of bodies, making them different substances, as when flour, yeast and water unite to form bread, are 
chimical. In the one case, the changes relate to masses of matter, as the motions of the heavenly bodies, or the action of the 
wind on a ship under sail; in the other case, the changes occur between the particles of matter, as the action of heat in melting 
lead, or the union of sand and lime forming mortar. Most of what are usually called the mechanic arts, are partly mechanical, 
and partly chimical.’ Emerson’s use of the term appears to play on these various definitions of the term; punning on the 
connotations that pertain to ‘manual labor,’ on the one hand; artisan cultures, on the other; and the increasing 
technologization and industrialization of the American landscape. 
83 Emerson, ‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850), CW.IV., 31 
84 Emerson: ‘Byron says of Jack Bunting, —“He knew not what to say, and so he swore.” I may say it of our preposterous 
use of books.’ See ‘Spiritual Laws’ (1841), CW.II., 164 
85 Emerson, ‘Circles’ (1841), CW.II., 312 
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or entanglement of [a reader] with a text;’ by the ‘potential significances’ of a work of literature that abound, 
relative to the critical investments of an individual reader; and by ‘the interaction of different contexts in 
which reader and text operate,’ his theory of ‘sensibility’ emerges as a theory of critical self-interest.86 
Emerson’s allusion to the ‘mechanical advantage’ of textual engagement is thus noteworthy. Evidence of 
his fascination in the ways in which we ‘operate’ (rather than engage) literary material as though it were a 
‘mechanical’ instrument designed to aid us in our need to better ‘paint out [our] thoughts to [ourselves]’ is 
consistent in both his private and public writings. Nonetheless, Emerson’s emphasis on our assimilating 
ideas purely for the betterment of self-understanding is in itself a politically loaded perspective.  
It is true that, at first glance, Emerson’s suggestion that ‘sensibility’ sits at the foundation of critical 
practice appears to speak to his radical and reactionary sense of the ‘infinitude of the private man,’87 and 
‘The [self-] sufficiency of the private man’ is a sentiment we can equally (and repeatedly) locate in his 
works.88 ‘I set the private man first,’ he would proclaim in a lecture of 1856. ‘He only who is able to stand 
alone is qualified to be a citizen,’ Emerson argues; and his feel for the importance of literature as a form 
and cultural field appears to support and fortify his sense of the importance of the ‘private’ life.89 In 
‘Thoughts of Modern Literature,’ for example—an early lecture of 1839 that he would redraft for its 
subsequent publication in The Dial, 1840—he argues that ‘The poetry and the speculation of the age are 
marked by a certain philosophic turn which discriminates them from the works of earlier times,’90 noting 
an intellectual ‘turn’ towards a widespread acceptance of self-interest as a prominent feature of authorial 
activity.91 ‘The poet is not content to see “how fair the apple hangs from the rock,” what melody “a sunbeam 
awoke in the groves,” but now resolves what is the apple to me? and what the birds to me? […] and what am 
I?’ This, writes Emerson, ‘is called subjectiveness’—a critical mode in development (and one that he would 
subsequently be regarded as a significant champion thereof) that sought to sophisticate the idea that critical 
 
86 Tracy Scott McMillin, ‘Writing in the Name of Emerson,’ Our Preposterous Uses of Literature: Emerson and the Nature of 
Reading, 2000), 47-48 
87 Emerson, ‘New England Reformers’ (1844), CW.I., 254 
88 Ibid. 
89 Emerson, ‘Speech at the Kansas Relief Meeting in Cambridge’ (1856), CW.XI., 258 
90 Emerson, ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature’ (1840), CW.XII., 312 
91 Ibid.  
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engagement functions as a perennial form of autobiographical reflection.92 Picturing the process of a reader 
at work at a text or an observer engaging a scene, he proposes that ‘As the eye is withdrawn from the object 
in nature’ it is ‘fixed on the subject or mind.’93 Thus, our relationship with external matter depends upon 
its being refracted along the axis of personality; rendered unique by our own corpus of ideas, events and 
desires that are operatively our own. Emerson thus appears to argue the act of reading as valuable only in 
so far as it is able to assist us in a relational development of identity; in an identification of self that is 
expressed relative to the sensible world around it: What is the apple to me?  
We can track this idea across both Emerson’s early and later writings. As he would note in ‘Nature’ 
(1836), all that which is ‘NOT ME’ is a tool to better qualify and elucidate that which is, and his stress on 
the ‘sensibility’ of the reader is arguably founded in such thinking if we are to examine the development of 
his thinking.94 In the late essay ‘Success’ (1870), he argues that it is ‘the good reader that makes the good 
book;’ that ‘a good head cannot read amiss,’ and ‘in every book he finds passages which seem confidences 
or asides hidden from all else and unmistakably meant for his ear.’95 He would rephrase this idea in 
‘Quotation and Originality,’ explicitly terming ‘sensibility’ as key to his characterization of the ‘good 
reader,’ and reinstating his sense of the all-important ‘selecting principle’ that underpins his 
conceptualization of critical engagement. Reflecting on his own experiences as a reader, he suggests that 
‘We are as much informed of a writer’s genius by what he selects as by what he originates.’96 Considering 
an encounter with a quotation—with a ‘select’ phrase recontextualized—he argues that his position on 
critical ‘sensibility’ is twofold in its significance. First, ‘sensibility’ facilitates a theory of personal resonance, 
a means of vitiating his ‘selecting principle’ by stressing the importance of critical desire to critical 
engagement. However, and second—and in a fashion similar to the theoretical ‘NOT ME’ that he proposes 
in ‘Nature’—our capacity to ‘select’ works from a public, cultural domain also pictures a co-ownership of 
 
92 See Lawrence Buell, ‘Autobiography in the American Renaissance’ in (ed.) Paul John Eakin, American Autobiography: 
Retrospect and Prospect (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 54-55 
93 Emerson, ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature’ (1840), CW.XII., 312-313 
94 Emerson: ‘Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul. Strictly speaking, therefore, all 
that is separate from us, all which Philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature and art, all other men and 
my own body […].’ See ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 4-5 
95 Emerson, ‘Success’ (1870), CW.VII., 296 
96 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 194 
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canon by proxy. 
Contending that ‘every house is a quotation out of all forests and mines and stone-quarries,’ an 
ability to recognize what’s ‘mine’ and that which contravenes my argument is an idea literalized in 
‘Quotation and Originality.’ Emerson portrays the works of others—a cultural canon—as though a ‘mine’ 
or ‘quarry.’ A space in which we toil and hunt for ideas of ‘an equal mind and heart’ to our own: 
 
We read the quotation with his eyes and find a new and fervent sense; as a 
passage from one of the poets, well recited, borrows new interest from the 
rendering. As the journals say, “the italics are ours.” The profit of books is 
according to the sensibility of the reader. The profoundest thought or passion 
sleeps as in a mine until an equal mind and heart finds and publishes it. […] 
Observe also that a writer appears to more advantage in the pages of another 
book than in his own. In his own he waits as a candidate for your approbation; 
in another's he is a lawgiver. Then another’s thoughts have a certain 
advantage with us simply because they are another’s.97 
 
Considering Emerson’s intersecting theories of selection, ‘sensibility’—and our co-custody of ‘the italics’’—
David LaRocca suggests that Emerson’s comments on critical engagement and the importance of the work 
of ‘another’ underpins a need to accordingly reread Emerson; to reconsider his standing as a ‘patron saint 
for the creative commons and open-access digital catalogues of today.’98 Whether we side with LaRocca 
or no, such comments demonstrate how Emerson’s relationship with the act of reading necessitates a more 
radical revision of his canonical standing.  
In this regard, Cornel West’s identification of ‘American evasion of philosophy’—a cultural want 
to explore ‘the near, the low, the common,’ to borrow Emerson’s terms—is key.99 West argues that the 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 David LaRocca, ‘Emerson Recomposed: Nietzsche’s Uses of his American Soul-Brother,’ in (ed.) M.T. Conrad, Nietzsche 
and the Philosophers (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 223 
99 Emerson: ‘I read with some joy of the auspicious signs of the coming days, as they glimmer already through poetry and 
art, through philosophy and science, through church and state. One of these signs is the fact that the same movement which 
effected the elevation of what was called the lowest class in the state, assumed in literature a very marked and as benign an 
aspect. Instead of the sublime and beautiful, the near, the low, the common, was explored and poetized. […] The literature 
of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life, are the topics of the time.’ 
See ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 110-111 
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philosophical fortitude of Emerson’s logic of refusal—the ‘NOT ME’ of ‘Nature’—is not to be read 
bibliographically, nor in terms of a history of philosophical ideas themselves. West alleges that Emerson’s 
lack of interest in method or philosophical scrutiny, or his inadequate understanding of Kant, Hegel, and 
European Romantic philosophies, problematizes any effort to clearly situate his writings within any specific 
intellectual lineage. However, West also argues that Emerson sought to evade the trappings of a 
philosophical past for more specific and political ends. ‘To evade modern philosophy means to strip the 
profession of philosophy of its pretence, disclose its affiliations with structures of powers (both rhetorical 
and political) rooted in the past, and enact intellectual practices […] that invigorate and unsettle one’s 
culture and society,’ West writes.100 As he notes repeatedly throughout his discussion, this potentially 
makes Emerson kin with his contemporary Karl Marx (a point West stakes by borrowing from Emerson’s 
own self-classification as an ‘experimenter’ whom ‘unsettles all things’).101 Such an assertion results in a far 
more radical re-reading of Emerson’s cultural centrality than we typically encounter in recent, revisionist 
responses to his thoughts on aesthetics, politics and the agency of interpretation:102 
 
Like his contemporary (and major twentieth-century competitor) Karl Marx, 
Emerson is a dyed-in-the-wool romantic thinker who takes seriously the 
embodiment of ideals within the real, the actualization of principles in the 
practical—in short, some kind of inseparable link between thought and action, 
theory and practice […]. Similar to Marx, Emerson focuses on the pressing 
concerns unleashed by the American, French, and Industrial Revolutions: the 
scope of human powers and the contingency of human societies. These concerns are 
 
100 Cornel West, ‘The Emersonian Prehistory of American Pragmatism,’ The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of 
Pragmatism (London: Macmillan, 1989), 37 
101 Emerson: ‘Do not set the least value on what I do, or the least discredit on what I do not, as if I pretended to settle any 
thing as true or false. I unsettle all things. No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker 
with no Past at my back.’ See ‘Circles’ (1841), CW.I., 318 
102 Daniel M. Savage summarizes the conservatism of Emerson’s political thought as follows: ‘Emerson scholars have long 
noted the ubiquity of change in his perspective on the natural and social worlds. They have also called attention to the 
dialectical process that Emerson credits with driving such change. They have not, however, paid much attention to the fact 
that the standard Emerson applies to the pace of change in the social world is the same aesthetic standard that he derives 
from the world of nature, and applied to the world of art. Emerson refers to the aesthetically pleasing nature of flowing or 
graceful change (as opposed to abrupt) found in nature and art as beauty. When applied to the political, social, and religious 
worlds this pace of change results in what we call gradualism. Although Emerson frequently favored political, social, and 
religious reforms that were considered radical at the time, he believed that the proper pace of progress toward these goals 
was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.’ See Daniel M. Savage, ‘Progressive Change in Emerson’s The Conservative,’ 
Humanitas, 1.2. (2009), 125-142 
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addressed by highlighting the wilful self (or selves) up against and overcoming 
antecedent circumstances, or to put it in the language of social science, the 
relation between purposeful subjects and prevailing structures, conscious 
human agents and social constraints.103 
 
 
For West, the link between thought and action, theory and practice lie in Emerson’s engagements with 
literary culture and critical activity. These spheres serve symbolically to signal an interest in the social 
structures of governance and political rule: ‘the scope of human powers and the contingency of human 
societies,’ as he would put it. But however evocative it may be to sit Emerson and Marx side by side, the 
methodological differences between these two thinkers proves to exceed the legitimacy of their conceptual 
similarities; West’s avowal that ‘purposeful subjects’ and ‘prevailing structures’ constitute comparative 
points being too vague in this regard. In Marx, recognition of ‘prevailing structures’ is the precursor to the 
development of class consciousness and the instigator of collective action to effect revolutionary change. 
Emerson’s preoccupation with personality and subjectivity, conversely, forecloses his critique and limits 
its sphere of operation to culture rather than radical or revolutionary social progress.  
As a number of recent critics have indicated, this is a problem that impacts our reading of Emerson 
today, and has proven to challenge the contemporary resonances of his work in application. Nonetheless, 
and despite Emerson’s writings apparently holding a greater acuity in more culturalist than political 
quarters, his emphasis on critical ‘speculation’ as an act of self-reflection has been regarded as a foothold 
for us to retrospectively politicize his position, particularly with regards to the concept of ‘privacy,’ and 
with the commercialist character of his theory of ‘sensibility’ kept in mind.  
‘Emerson’s idea of radical change has ultimately looked to the individual rather than the group,’ 
notes Johannes Voelz,104 and Emerson’s engagement with interpretative agency and the act of reading as 
practices grounded in the betterment of personal perspective (our ability to more keenly ‘paint’ our thoughts 
out for ourselves) has been accordingly assessed as a self-conscious means of exploring both the politics of 
 
103 West, ‘The Emersonian Prehistory of American Pragmatism,’ The American Evasion of Philosophy, 10 
Emphasis in original 
104 Johannes Voelz, in introduction to Transcendentalist Resistance: The New Americanists and Emerson’s Challenge (Dartmouth, 
NE: University Press of New England, 2010), 2 
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individualism and a fetishization of the individual in his major works. As David Leverenz suggests, 
considering the centrality of ‘privacy’ in Emerson’s early writings, ‘From the 1840s to the 1980s […] 
Emerson’s cultural centrality had been ensured not by general assent, but by the advocacy of two very 
different pressure groups: intellectuals and businessmen,’ and ‘in political terms,’ Leverenz notes, we could 
call these two arena Emerson’s ‘interpretative constituencies.’105 Leverenz suggests that Emerson’s interest 
in individuation thus hinges upon a conceptualization of privacy and proprietorship—a reification of the 
terms of ownership (of both objects and ideas) in which the idea of individualism speaks to both the 
professionalization of the critic and to the romanticist heroism of the entrepreneur within the wider history 
of American capital.106 
Leverenz is not alone in fastening Emerson’s thinking and cultural worth to the development of an 
American economic culture and the maturity of marketplace ideologies, and such readings emphasize both 
the subjectivist heart of Emerson’s perspectivism and the ease with which his thinking can be applied to an 
American socioeconomic milieu of the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries.107 However, such 
 
105 David Leverenz, ‘The Politics of Emerson’s Man-Making Words,’ 38-56 
106 A good example of Emerson’s influence in this regard is Norman Vincent Peale; an author whose mid-century, quasi-
spiritual and psychiatric treatises mark him out as a significant vehicle for the popularization of Emersonian aphorism outside 
of the annals of the academy. Peale would persistently refer to Emerson throughout his popular psychological works of the 
1950s and ‘60s, underscoring Emerson’s socio-cultural purchase as a pseudo-spiritual, agnostic saint for entrepreneurial 
agency. See Norman Vincent Peale, The Power of Positive Thinking (New York, NY: Fireside, 1952), 166. See also Ida M. 
Tarbull’s now-canonical History of the Standard Oil Company (New York, NY: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1904. The frontispiece 
to Tarbull’s History pairs Emerson’s ‘Self-Reliance’ with J.D. Rockefeller in a pair of epigraphs—’An institution is the lengthened 
shadow of one man.’ — EMERSON, IN AN ESSAY ON SELF-RELIANCE; ‘The American Beauty Rose can be produced in its splendor 
and fragrance only by sacrificing the early buds which grew up around it.’ — J.D. ROCKEFELLER, JR., IN AN ADDRESS ON TRUSTS 
TO THE STUDENTS OF BROWN UNIVERSITY. For a good analysis of the philosophical contexts behind this epigrammatic 
employment of Emerson, and his stress on the intellectual fortitude of ‘whim’ in ‘Self-Reliance’ in particular, see Howard 
Horwitz, ‘The Standard Oil Trust as Emersonian Hero,’ Raritan, 6.4. (1987), 97-119 
107 Emerson’s works constitute a ‘ballast’ for the hegemonic extension of capitalist enterprise, writes John Updike in the New 
Yorker in ’03 on the occasion of Emerson’s bi-centenary celebrations. ‘To be sure, [he] did not create American expansionism 
or our especial exploitive verve,’ Updike argues, but perhaps it was Emerson who ‘cemented’ the evolving cultural and 
ideological impact of capitalism by way of the ‘high-minded apology’ that his corpus constitutes for America’s commercialist 
character, elevation of the country’s commercialist cultural codes, and the economic prerogatives of the early 1800s onwards. 
See John Updike, ‘Big Dead White Male: Ralph Waldo Emerson turns 200,’ The New Yorker (August 4th, 2003), 77-81; John 
Updike, ‘Emersonianism’—a talk given delivered at University of California (Davis, CA) in 1983, and subsequently revised 
and published in The New Yorker, as ‘Emersonianism,’ June 4th (1984), 112-113; both pieces are reproduced in (ed.) D. 
LaRocca, 547-555 and 530-547, respectively. See also, Adam Cohen, ‘Editorial Observer; It’s Emerson’s Anniversary and 





ideas owe wholly to the subjectivist centre of Emerson’s theoretical treatment of critical agency. Emerson’s 
works have ‘spoken to readers in sharply different ways,’ writes Lawrence Buell (evoking Clark’s argument 
regarding the conflicting definitions of ‘Self-Reliance’ in recent Emerson Studies).108 Noting that there is 
no one way in which Emerson’s works should be addressed—Buell infers that a correlation could be drawn 
between the forms of critical free-association and interpretative agency that Emerson would seemingly 
advocate and, thus, he sits an onus on competition, gain, and deed-holding concomitant with the 
implementation and development of laissez-faire capitalism from the early 1800s to the onset of the 
twentieth century. 
Such readings are further supported by the ways in which Emerson appears to encourage critical 
engagement solely to embolden the fortitude of the ‘private man.’ As Emerson would note in ‘Literary 
Ethics’ (1838), ‘the resources, the subject, and the discipline of the scholar’—‘the whole value of history, 
of biography’—is to ‘increase my self-trust.’109 A rewording his position on the ‘endogeneity’ of intellect as 
he would detail in ‘Uses of Great Men,’ this enlargement of ‘self-trust’ relies upon a theorization of 
interpretation, or what Emerson would refer to as ‘spontaneous thought.’ ‘Men grind and grind in the mill 
of a truism, and nothing comes out but what was put in,’ he writes; ‘But the moment they desert the 
tradition for a spontaneous thought, then poetry, wit, hope, virtue, learning, anecdote, all flock to their 
aid.’110 To return to the epigraph that opens ‘Self-Reliance’ with which I began, here, we’ve another 
indication of the inappropriateness of the line Emerson borrows from Beaumont and Fletcher (if we are to 
look beyond the irony that such an allusion is itself a second-hand citation): Do not seek for things outside of 
yourself. Artful thought appears unequivocally bound to a theory of personality or ‘sensibility.’ However, 
that theory of personality itself appears contingent upon a theory of consumerism, upon the exchange and 
consumption of external goods, ideas and information.  
The degree of ‘spontaneity’ Emerson would encourage is always a reaction to external stimuli, and 
the ‘outside’ is thus as essential to Emerson’s thinking as the psychological interior; it aids in our exploring 
 
108 Lawrence Buell, ‘Emersonian Self-Reliance in Theory and Practice,’ Emerson, 59 
109 Emerson, ‘Literary Ethics’ (1838), CW.I., 158, 160 
110 Ibid., 165-166 
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the machinations of selfhood, and supplies the necessary tools, grammar and symbolic diction with which 
to express a self with greater celerity and legibility. To further understand the ‘sensibility’ of the reader we 
must, then, understand the link between the internalized versions of Emerson’s individualism and how it 
both relies on and modifies such external stimuli.  
As seen, Emerson’s insistence of the self-centeredness of the individual reader should thus not be 
localized to a review of his later works alone.111 If we look to his early writings, the position he would detail 
in ‘Quotation and Originality’ (that our attentions should be on ‘life’ and not ‘literature’) is not only 
antedated but also (and arguably more concretely) proves bound to a discussion of literary culture if we 
turn to Emerson’s early notebooks. In 1835, at the very beginnings of his career, Emerson poses a 
significant rhetorical question: ‘What is a book?’ he asks. Responding to his own query, he suggests that a 
‘book’ is ‘Everything or nothing.’ That, as a material object, a book is ultimately expendable. ‘The eye that 
sees it is all.’112  
 
What is the heaven’s majestical roof fretted with golden fire to one man, but 
a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors? Well, a book is to a paddy a fair 
page smutted over with black marks; to a boy, a goodly collection of words 
he can read; to a half-wise man, it is a lesson which he wholly accepts or 
wholly rejects; but a sage shall see in it secrets yet unrevealed; shall weigh, as 
he reads, the author’s mind; shall see the predominance of ideas which the 
writer could not extricate himself from, and oversee.113  
 
Emerson’s ‘eye’ is redolent of his remarks in ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature,’ in which the apparent 
interchangeability of the observer/reader therein is also reminiscent of the oft-cited ‘transparent eyeball’ of 
his debut publication, ‘Nature’ (1836): ‘Standing on the bare ground,—my head bathed by the blithe air 
and uplifted into infinite space,—all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; 
I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me.’114 Under a certain light, Emerson’s 
 
111 See Christopher Newfield, ‘Liberal Racism,’ The Emerson Effect, 180-183. Newfield explores this point by examining 
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comment in his journal as per his ‘indifference’ to the book as an object (as he would subsequently put it 
in ‘Quotation and Originality’) helps us unpack the complexities of this famously obscure declaration in 
‘Nature.’115 The ‘eye that sees [the book] is all’—‘the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me’ 
(emphasis my own).116 The self is therefore held as a critical lens in Emerson’s hands; as a filter for the 
better explication of the external world, or a ‘subject lens’ as he would term it in ‘Experience.’117 More 
importantly, it also supports his assertion that scholarship is governed by a ‘selecting principle,’ as he would 
come to term it in 1838—his belief that the ‘sage’ can ‘see secrets yet unrevealed.’ 
Such thinking not only impacts Emerson’s comments on an abstract and anonymized reader’s 
relationship with a text, but also reflects his own critical practice as a reader. Often critically categorized as 
a ‘reader,’ first and foremost,118 Emerson classifies his own authorial activities by way of Coleridge’s four-
classes of critics; the hourglass, sponge, jelly-bag, and the Golconda; and, in so doing, further compounds the 
importance of critical ‘selection’ to his thinking.119 Here, Emerson’s favour for the subjective is again 
centralized. Drawing on Coleridge’s categories, personal identity is not only conceived of as a lens for the 
flat record of lived experience, but also as a filter for the election or ‘selection’ of symbolically and factually 
resonant materials: ‘The hourglass gives back everything it takes in, unchanged. The sponge gives back 
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everything it takes in, only a little dirtier. The jelly-bag squeezes out the valuable and keeps the worthless, 
while the Golconda runs everything through a sieve, keeping only the nuggets.’120 According to his 
biographer Robert D. Richardson, Emerson was ‘the Golconda par excellence, […] or what American miners 
call a high-grader—a person who goes through a mine and pockets only the richest lumps of ore.’121 
Figuratively toying with this ‘mine’—establishing the slippery terms of possession that accompanies his 
analysis of critical engagement by striving to distinguish between what belongs to us, as readers or authors, 
and what pertains more broadly to the cultural milieu to which we belong—the aptness of Emerson’s ‘eye’ 
becomes all the more apparent. His theory of ‘selection’ is here pronounced yet again, his position on 
critical ‘sensibility’ sophisticated, and his later assertion in ‘Quotation and Originality’ that ‘The 
profoundest thought or passion sleeps as in a mine until an equal mind and heart finds and publishes it,’ 
given precedence. 
However, it is in Emerson’s remarks on the critic’s ‘eye’ in 1835 that he first establishes a 
conceptualist model of criticism or critical observation that we repeatedly encounter in his early writings. 
The ‘eye’ of his excursus is a semantic play on the first person ‘I’ so integral to his thinking; the book, as 
an object, is devalued as the process of critical reflection supersedes any interest in the book itself as point 
of interest. This early assessment of the importance of the reader as a character in Emerson’s writings is 
revelatory in terms of the politics of his poetics as well. The hierarchy of Emerson’s argument not only 
champions the reader, it reframes his position on interpretation as a complex form of collaborative or social 
labour by way of the dependency between a reader and writer. The reader helps ‘extricate’ ideas secreted 
behind the writer’s work; the writer enables that moment of enlightenment; a book is considered a meeting 
of minds rather than an indifferent object awaiting a reader’s attentions; but the reader and writer are 
entirely dependent upon one another, their reciprocal alienation being. 
Whilst Emerson’s all-seeing ‘eye’ of his private papers in 1835 precedes the ‘transparent eyeball’ of 
published writings, 1836, the application of his thinking to a more concrete discussion of reader/writer 
relations destabilizes any critical supposition that Emerson’s early works are lacking in consistency or a 
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theoretical coherency. He repeatedly alludes to criticism as a form of ‘social’ work. ‘It is easy to see that 
what is best written or done by genius in the world was no man’s work, but came by wide social labor,’ he 
would note in ‘Shakespeare, or the Poet’ (1850).122 In ‘Quotation and Originality,’ he would argue that 
cultural mythologies depend upon a systemic process of social circulation: ‘a legend is tossed from believer 
to poet, from poet to believer, everybody adding a grace or dropping a fault or rounding the form, until it 
gets an ideal truth.’123 ‘Other men are lenses through which we read our own minds,’ he asserts again in 
‘Uses of Great Men,’124 and—again in ‘Shakespeare’—would propose that a published work of literature is 
‘altered, remodeled and finally made [our] own’ through the process of our reading; that an interpretation, 
made public, will be subject to precisely that same process once again; and so the cycle continues.125  
Together with Emerson’s overall refutation of the book as an important artefact in favour of the 
‘I/eye’ that decodes its meaning, Emerson’s position on critical engagement is thus far more complex than 
it first appears. At first glance, his sense of the authority of the ‘eye’ appears to support the primacy of the 
‘private’ mind so often associated with his perspectivism. Indeed, Emerson’s theory of ‘original relation’ 
appears a precedent to the development of such a line of thought. But how should we read his admonition 
that we seek out ‘our own works and laws and worships;’ that we identify a unique national culture despite 
the primacy of the ‘private man’ in his writings?  
Rather than his theory of ‘original relation’ representing any simplistic refusal of tradition and 
convention, Emerson’s conceptualization of critical relation is contingent on forms of organization as well 
as on the spontaneity of independent, critical thought. Emerson regularly contravenes his emphatic stance 
on the authority of the ‘private man’ by alluding to the social systems that support interpretation. More 
importantly, it is literature that Emerson repeatedly looks to in order to elaborate on the complexities of 
such a position. In sum, Emerson is trying to build two intersecting theories of public and private value in 
tandem, and the distinction between critical reflection and ‘published’ thought allows him to consider the 
co-dependency of these two forms of critical worth and consider the interrelation of the private and public 
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modes that underwrite the process of critical engagement. The concatenation of a reader and writer through 
the act of exchange assists in our unpacking of Emerson’s previous claim that a critic should work towards 
literature’s ‘ephemerality,’ its ‘disappearance.’ His emphasis on this collaborative or ‘social’ practice of 
meaning-making and the systems of circulation that support culture’s dissemination is both complemented 
and complicated by a consistent effort to devalue the special status afforded literature as a medium and the 
book as a cultural artefact. Echoing the ‘everything or nothing’ that he would note in his journals, 1835, 
Emerson claims in ‘The American Scholar’ (1837): ‘I had better never see a book, than to be warped by its 
attraction clean out of my own orbit.’126 The authority warranted a text is a limiter to interpretative 
freedom; it makes a ‘satellite’ of a mind instead of supporting the facilitation of any endogenous ‘system.’127  
This seeming elevation of the subjectivist autonomy of the reader is again accompanied by a 
general disregard for the literary object itself and a distinct disaffection for the act of writing. In the autumn 
of 1839, he states that ‘Those only can sleep who do not care to sleep;’ and that ‘those only can act or write 
well who do not respect the writing or the act.’128 The following year, he would consolidate these disparate 
diary entries and consider the aforesaid formation of a discrete, theoretical position—his ‘Transcendental 
Criticism’—in which he argues that ‘Criticism must be transcendental, that is, must consider literature 
ephemeral & easily entertain the supposition of its entire disappearance.’129 ‘In our ordinary states of mind, 
we deem not only letters in general but the most famous books parts of a preestablished harmony, fatal, 
unalterable,’ he notes; ‘but Man is critic of all such works and should treat the entire extant product of the 
human intellect as only one age, revisable, corrigible, reversible by him.’130 
Such a voluminous rejection of the authority of canon is again redolent of Emerson’s opening 
remarks in ‘Nature.’ His call for our rejection of ‘the dry bones’ and ‘faded wardrobe’ of ‘the past.’131 But 
the explicit attention he pays to the variety of work a critic should rehearse—and, indeed, the ambitions of 
that work itself—relays an interest in the ‘mechanical’ craft of criticism and the act of reading both. As 
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such, Emerson’s call for ‘original relation’ requires some further unpacking, and especially with regard to 
the conflict between sociality and self-interest, between ‘human intellect’ and the ‘endogenous’ 
development of a critical perspective.  
In the following part of this chapter, I will consider this conflict of interest as between self and 
society; between culture as a material, external realm and as a means to express a complex theory of 
privacy. What proves particularly striking are the ways in which Emerson explores these terms of argument 
by implementing a symbolic and conceptual vocabulary drawn from the capitalist expansion of the 
American marketplace. Seeking to better describe and depict the character and behaviourism of culture’s 
circulatory systems, Emerson is interested in the ‘profit’ of critical enterprise;132 assured that our ‘debts and 
credits […] are the very best basis of poetry;133 that we ought ‘credit literature with more than the bear word 
it gives us.’134 As Luke Plotica notes, an investigation of both the practicable and symbolic effects of ‘market 
principles and practices’ resound across Emerson’s writings, and a conceptual engagement with ‘trade, 
wealth, competition, compensation, property, labor and vocation’ informs his use of metaphor and 
symbol.135 Emerson’s ‘purpose’ was by no means to provide an ‘unabashed endorsement’ of American free 
enterprise. At the same time, even though Emerson’s ‘favorable use of the language of commerce is more 
than metaphorical’ it reflects a genuine commitment to the market as a site of self-improvement’ and 
cultural power.136 As such, Emerson’s concentration on privacy and the ‘private man’ and his use of ‘fiscal 
metaphor’ becomes a way to explore forms of democratic and economic participation across his era.137 
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The theory of politics which has possessed the mind of men, and which they 
have expressed the best they could in their laws and in their revolutions, 
considers persons and property as the two objects for whose protection 
government exists. Of persons, all have equal rights, in virtue of being identical 
in nature. This interest of course with its whole power demands a democracy. 
Whilst the rights of all as persons are equal, in virtue of their access to reason, 
their rights in property are very unequal. One man owns his clothes, and 
another owns a county. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 





As previously discussed, Emerson imagines literary culture as an archly social domain—as a form of ‘social 
labor’—but, crucially, contingent on the estrangement of its participants. The ‘gulf between every me and 
thee,’ as he defines it in ‘Experience’ (1844), both promulgates and conditions any sense of subjective 
freedom a ‘reader’ could be allotted.139 This leads to a crucial Emersonian impasse: how does one articulate 
a theory of autonomy when a form of social labour is necessary for its establishment?  
He would frequently touch upon this issue in his journals and notebooks and, not uncommonly, 
suggest that a writer’s labours are best defined by the ways in which they open space for fresh interpretation. 
‘[Write] on,’ he would note, 1838, ‘& by & by will come a reader and an age to justify all your context. Do 
not even look behind. Leave that bone for them to pick and welcome.’140 Punning on the idea of a corpus 
of works as a corpse of materials—its various parts, pieces or ‘bones’ deliberately left exposed for dissection, 
further analysis, and critical application/recombination—Emerson also here alludes to the centrality of 
criticism to his thinking by toying with the idea of our ‘picking a bone’ as an argumentative gesture by 
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nature. Whilst a reader and writer are bonded in this participatory view of literary culture—dovetailing by 
virtue of the co-dependency of these two labour forms—that reader and writer can only work freely if the 
‘gulf’ between them is maintained. A writing generates a reading; both activities requiring one another to 
function coherently and to enable a valorisation of the particulars of their work; but a complex and 
networked process of definition needs take place to make certain of the alienation and estrangement of its 
participants.  
In spite of the occasional clarity of Emerson’s efforts to outline his privileging of the ‘reader,’ the 
muddy qualities of this romance of participation often hampers the lucidity of his position. In seeking to 
detail a complex system of connect/disconnect between reader and writer as it emerges in Emerson’s 
works, I will explore the concrete character of Emerson’s politics as a corollary to the kind of critical 
participation he portrays between a reader and writer. I will look to both Emerson’s own self-conscious 
engagement with this issue in his writings (looking to Emerson’s essay of 1841, ‘History,’ and address of 
1844, ‘The Young American,’ in particular); and the ways in which recent criticism has sought to solidify 
a common understanding of the political investments of Emerson’s poetics. 
In his essay ‘The Problem of Emerson’ (1973), Joel Porte argues that the academic amassing of 
Emerson’s corpus since mid-century—and an accommodation of his intellectual celebrity in American 
popular culture following his death in 1882—has led to a consistent manipulation of his original 
meaning.141 Instead of working with any fidelity to Emerson’s initial arguments or intentions, his work is 
consistently subject to a process of decontextualization. This is true in terms of the progress of Emerson 
Studies, Porte notes, as an ongoing re-evaluation of his philosophy can be evidenced in line with the 
contemporary trends and interests of the academy. But is equally true if we look to the kind of treatment 
Emerson’s works have experienced outside of an academic context. Broken down into quotable phrases 
and aphorisms, his essays litter a cultural landscape in part more often than in their entirety, and the ‘bones’ 
of Emerson’s body of work have been subjected to precisely the process of recontextualization or 
decomposition that he would detail in his journals in 1838. For Porte, this impacts how Emerson has since 
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been regarded, not to mention the philosophical and cultural significance of the American Transcendental 
as a school of thought: 
 
Emerson’s fate, somewhat like Shakespeare’s, was that he came to be treated 
as an almost purely allegorical personage whose real character and work got 
submerged in his role as a touchstone of critical opinion. More and more, the 
figure of Emerson merged with current perceptions of the meaning and drift 
of American high culture, and the emblem overwhelmed his substance.142  
 
There is an irony at play here—as previously discussed—as Emerson appears to have been well aware of 
the dangers of the dissimulation of an author’s body of work. Furthermore, Emerson also seems to 
encourage such a critical process as Porte would outline. Nevertheless, recent critics have been sensitive to 
this issue in Emerson’s writings. As Glen Johnson notes, Emerson’s early lectures on criticism and literary 
culture portray a self-consciousness of ‘two’ prevailing ‘problems’ within his philosophy—‘one social, and 
the other aesthetic.’ According to Johnson, by concentrating on the craft, character, moral and 
philosophical dimensions and implications of critical engagement, Emerson identified ‘a compromise that 
neither sacrifices the former nor ignores the latter.’143  
A search for the particularities of this ‘compromise’ have proven key to the persistency of 
Emerson’s popularity, both in and outside of an academic milieu.144 Not only must we consider Emerson’s 
‘allegorical personage’ as developed by the consistent drift of ‘critical opinion,’ but also as informed by his 
want to explore the idea of America over and above the realities and lived experience of an American 
populace. An interest in the development of an ‘American sentiment’ can be traced across Emerson’s early 
writings, as he would put it in ‘The Young American’ (1844).145 A form of cultural patriotism that—echoing  
Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’—drives individual action at an ethical, critical and philosophical level to 
correlate individual activity and a conceptualization of ‘public welfare,’ as Emerson would himself term 
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it.146 But how such a ‘sentiment’ reads rather than the way it is written seems be Emerson’s means of 
navigating the ‘compromise’ between critical engagement and its more abstract philosophical tenets. ‘We 
admire that poetry which no man wrote,’ he notes; ‘which is to be read in a mythology, in the effect of a 
fixed or national style of pictures, of sculptures, or drama, or cities, or sciences.’147 A national feeling, ‘style’ 
or literature is more important to Emerson than each individual work, which is concordant with Porte’s 
sense of the ways in which the meaning and intimation of Emerson’s works have drifted with the tide of 
public opinion. Significantly, however, it is also a further indication of the ways in which the ‘Emerson 
problem’ Porte notes is self-consciously figured in Emerson’s own writings. For Porte, the need to explore 
the perpendicular relation of a literary canon to the drift of popular ‘critical opinion’ is intrinsically tied to 
the political determinates of academic work since the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, this leads to a 
potentially censorial relationship with literary work (as we have seen in Parrington’s treatment of 
Emerson). As the light and shadow of a work is explored relative to contextual interests as much as it is 
the content of a work itself, we ultimately seek to explore the changing shape of that canon relative to the 
political and institutional development of a discipline.148 Arguably, Emerson’s aforementioned 
‘Transcendental Criticism’—a form of reading that considers literature itself as ‘ephemeral’ and 
insignificant relative to its real-world application—infers a similar line of argument.  
However, beyond a feeling that criticism should be recast as a radical form of cultural engagement 
capable of ‘transcending’ the trappings of culture itself—beyond staging a rallying call for the increased 
intellectual and political autonomy for the singular, American subject—Emerson seems at stalemate. 
Considering the implementation of his ‘American sentiment’ and its political ambitions, he is vocal in his 
want to stage a ‘revolution’ in the ‘offices and relations of men;’ and he knows that this ‘revolution’ need 
prove extensive to a wide array of social domains.149 He cites ‘religion;’ ‘education;’ ‘association;’ and 
‘property’ as ‘modes of living’ that need be subject to this ‘speculative’ and forward-thinking ‘revolution in 
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relation.’150	But in practice, any expression of the machinations of such a ‘revolution’ lacks focus. Distanced 
from the inexorable violence and political ambitions of the historic American Revolution itself and, instead, 
effectuated by the ascent of new industrial and economic paradigm, Emerson’s engagement with revolution 
falls foul. According to West, it is Emerson’s fixation with subjectivity that restricts the effectivity of his 
argument, limiting his sphere of operation to culture, as noted. Nonetheless, in Emerson’s thoughts toward 
revolution, the progress of culture is deliberately foregrounded, whilst the development of any inclusionary 
socio-political ideology is largely disregarded.  
Emerson’s sensitivity to the significance of revolution can be read down to the level of the sentence, 
however. It is noteworthy that there appears to be a distinction in his writings as between ‘Revolution’ (a 
public, historic moment of socio-political upheaval); and ‘revolution’ (a moment of progress or radical 
change experienced personally or locally). He capitalizes the term to denote a specific historical moment—
as in ‘the French Revolution,’ or ‘the American ‘Revolution’ that rendered the country ‘politically 
independent,’ for example. The word is then in lowercase when he refers rhetorically to the evolution of 
personal feeling:151 as in ‘Love’ (1841), in which an emotional charge such as a ‘divine rage [or] enthusiasm’ 
constitutes ‘a revolution in mind and body,’152 or in ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), when he refers to the 
‘gradual domestication of culture’ as a ‘revolution’ that will take place in the mind’s eye of the ‘private 
man.’153 More interested in the dissemination of ideas than their actual political implementation, 
Emerson—more importantly—again calls upon literary forms to argue his point and, more specifically, the 
industrialization of the literary sphere characterizes the prospective revolution of his hour.  
More interested in the potential of the newspaper, pamphlet or idea as a prospective radical agent 
than he is its specific application, in the ‘Seventh of March Speech on the Fugitive Slave Law’ (1854) he 
notes that the new media form of the newspaper ‘has wrought […] a silent revolution.’ In ‘Worship,’ from 
The Conduct of Life (1860), and again in ‘The Progress of Culture’ (1867), he reuses the term to argue that 
technological innovations and new media forms have impelled a ‘silent revolution’ in both ideational and 
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ideological contexts.154 Thus—as Rob Wilson has noted—Emerson was intent on ‘refiguring more 
responsible forms and affiliations of radical dissent’ and, rather than simply advocate social upheaval 
without sufficient political cause, would look to the burgeoning book trade and print technologies to 
explore the dissemination of idea, image and information.155 In identifying the book, newspaper or poem 
as ‘silent’ agents of revolutionary political progress, rather than endeavouring to identify the aims and 
ambitions of that revolution itself, Emerson’s reflections on what forms of cultural labour or cultural dissent 
he sought to champion are not always clear.156 Indeed, the ‘silent revolution’ of Emerson’s excursus could 
be argued as a premeditated apology for the degree of quietism he would later be accosted for in twentieth- 
and twenty-first century reactions to his work (such was his stance on such moments of social exigency as 
the abolition movement, Indian removal, regional divisionism and economic disequilibrium that would 
result in the outbreak of Civil War in 1861).157 Nonetheless, Emerson’s sense of the authority of this ‘silent 
revolution’ is foundational to his study of the interpretative ‘eye/I,’ and central to his metacritical 
engagement with the act of reading. The ‘individual’ should not be acknowledged as the endpoint of 
Emerson’s cultural commentaries, writes T. Gregory Garvey, but rather needs be regarded as the ‘locus’ of 
social change; as the operator or interpreter of this potent and revolutionary material (i.e., a reader of the 
daily news).158 For Garvey, any prospective ‘revolution’ in Emerson’s writings needs be understood as 
cellular—as examining the power of the individual to influence the plural—and evidence of such thinking 
can be gleaned elsewhere in Emerson’s early works.  
In Emerson’s ‘History’ (1841), ‘the publicness of opinion’ is argued as irrevocably bound to the 
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machinations of ‘private opinion,’ a process central to an understanding of cultural progress:159 
 
Each new fact in [our] private experience flashes a light on what great bodies 
of men have done, and the crises of his life refer to national crises. Every 
revolution was first a thought in one man’s mind, and when the same thought 
occurs to another man, it is the key to that era. Every reform was once a 
private opinion, and when it shall be a private opinion again it will solve the 
problem of the age. The fact narrated must correspond to something in me to 
be credible or intelligible. We, as we read, must become Greeks, Romans, 
Turks, priest and king, martyr and executioner; must fasten these images to 
some reality in our secret experience, or we shall learn nothing rightly.160 
 
 
Prior to the publication of Emerson’s First Series and ‘History,’ Emerson remarks in his journals—1838—
‘That which is individual & remains individual in my experience of is of no value.’161 Conversely, that 
which is rendered public, as in ‘History,’ heralds revolutionary potential. This statement in ‘History’ is, 
then, a counterpoint to Emerson’s more famous assertion in ‘Self-Reliance’ that ‘An institution is the 
lengthened shadow of one man.’162 Complicating what would alternately read as another paean to his 
interest in the authority of the ‘private’ self, in ‘History’ Emerson unpacks a complex and dialectical system 
of exchange as contingent upon private thought and reflection as it is upon the publication and of ideas. 
The individual—a ‘locus’ of change, to borrow Garvey’s phrase—is required as a first lens. That individual 
transforms an object of attention along the axis of their understanding and experience—publishes that 
thought—only for the process to be reinstated. Culture’s progress, Emerson infers, is thus always 
contingent on a dialectical process of assimilation, adulteration, and secondary expression; the ‘selecting 
principle,’ his interpretative ‘I/eye,’ being the first link in this communicative chain that requires a theory 
of ‘secondary use’ to cohere and endure. 
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Emerson’s interest in a reticulated cultural economy is a quiet point within his writings; 
occasionally lost within his more voluminous and explicit commitment to an independence and autonomy 
of mind. But sufficient evidence can be tabled to suggest that he sought to engineer a more participatory 
form of culture as dependent on the balance of private reflection and the publication of thought—upon 
both thought and voice—elsewhere in his writings.  
Picturing this system, he notes that ‘we all involve ourselves in it the deeper by forming 
connections.’163 ‘Man the critic’—as he characterizes his cultural participant in heavily gendered 
language—is a figure fostered by the industrialization and institutionalization of the literary sphere. The 
ascendance of the ‘subjective’ reader, as he would describe them in his ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature,’ 
is thus both a product of the technological enhancement of publication and the engine of its evolution. 
Emerson’s interest in the formation of a network culture provides a basis from which we can consider how 
critics have used (or appropriated) his works, and Emerson’s aim—to examine literature’s dependency on 
technological infrastructures capable of supporting this balance of private reflection and publication—is as 
topical today as in Emerson’s epoch.164  
As he would note in ‘The Poet’ (1844), the ‘selecting principle’ that would govern his 
conceptualizations of interpretative and creative thought, thus also effects our critical responsibility: a need 
to forge connections between the disparate elements of a commercial or industrial society. ‘Readers of 
poetry see the factory-village and the railway, and fancy that the poetry of the landscape is broken up by 
these,’ Emerson notes, ‘for these works of art are not yet consecrated in their reading; but the poet sees 
them fall within the great Order not less than the beehive or the spider's geometrical web.’165 Considering 
this ‘geometrical web,’ he suggests that a parity can be struck between its various nodes; that ‘the belt of 
wampum and the commerce of America are alike.’166 The individual ‘eye’/‘I’—by a process of ‘ulterior 
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intellectual perception’—gives each symbol caught in this ‘web’ a newly allotted significance:167 
 
We are symbols and inhabit symbols; workmen, work, and tools, words and 
things, birth and death, all are emblems; but we sympathize with the symbols, 
and being infatuated with the economical uses of things, we do not know that 
they are thoughts. The poet, by an ulterior intellectual perception, gives them 
a power which makes their old use forgotten, and puts eyes and a tongue into 
every dumb and inanimate object. He perceives the independence of the 
thought on the symbol, the stability of the thought, the accidency and fugacity 
of the symbol.168 
 
This theory of the ‘multiform’ meaning of materials,169 to borrow Emerson’s term for it, is key an 
identification of the degree of sophistication that critics have identified in Emerson’s emphatic interest in 
our ‘use of literature’ rather than of literature itself as a medium, per se.170  
How do we regard this theory of use? Emerson, ‘by his own admission,’ was not ‘a system-builder’ 
writes Norman Miller.171 We will not find a ‘unified and internally consistent set of tenets built upon a 
premise or fact’ within his writings and will instead encounter a corpus ‘informed by the logic of a spider 
web rather than that of a skyscraper.’172 Arguing that Emerson’s philosophical position proves ‘circular 
rather than linear, intuitional rather than syllogistic,’173 Miller’s thinking is emblematic of the kind of critical 
treatment Emerson has received, but also proves to echo the kinds of system we can identify in Emerson’s 
early writings.174  
It is of note that Emerson’s sensitivity to the economic divisionism of his contemporary society 
allows him to formulate a concept of alienation rather than the specificities of social inequality. While he 
seems to centralize a theory of ‘public welfare’ in his analyses of America’s cultural progress, without 
 
167 Ibid., 20 
168 Ibid., 20 
169 Ibid. 
170 Emerson, ‘Circles’ (1841), CW.II., 312; see also, Hosseini, ‘Two Interpretations of Emerson’s Fragmentary Style,’ 
Emerson’s Literary Philosophy, 36-45 





concrete riposte to the political exigencies of his hour, critics have likewise argued that Emerson’s 
relationship with aesthetics also proves too muddied to propose any clear position. As Lawrence Buell 
notes, ‘Emerson never wrote a treatise on aesthetics.’ His later texts concerning critical praxis were little 
more than ‘detached reflections’ cobbled together by his literary executor James Elliot Cabot, and his early 
reflections on critical engagement too obtuse to be considered doctrinal.175 Indeed, Emerson himself can 
be found to justify Buell’s claim when, writing to Thomas Carlyle in an atypically confessional tone, 1838, 
he notes ‘I sit & read & write with very little system,’ and admits that any return to his own writing is 
accompanied by a sensation of bafflement and confusion.176  
This self-confessed lack of structure and method has proven to affirm Emerson’s reputation for 
obscurantism and abstraction; has complicated our means of either categorizing or applying his thinking 
beyond the antebellum precinct as a cultural and historical context.177 However, I will argue that an 
investigation of Emerson’s practical and theoretical interest in appropriation—and examination of his 
efforts to correlate conceptualizations of appropriation and market economics—argues a counter position: 
that a system can be struck in Emerson’s writings, an ‘aesthetic treatise’ can be evinced, and evidence of 
such a system can be seen as in development from his earliest writings on.  
This system—a ‘method of mind,’ as he would term it in 1836, or ‘OTHERISM,’ as he would 
succinctly define it—is persistently linked to the symbolic implications of an ownership of ideas.178 I will 
explore this ‘method’ in more detail further on, but Parrington’s own ‘metacritical’ treatment of Emerson 
is worth keeping in mind as we follow the progress of Emerson’s position, 1836 to 1850, and as we consider 
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the ways in which Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ informs his later remarks on aesthetics and critical activity; more 
significantly, it transmutes into what he would later call the ‘art of appropriation,’ 1875: 
 
Πάντα ῥεῖ: all things are in flux. It is inevitable that you are indebted to the 
past. You are fed and formed by it. The old forest is decomposed for the 
composition of the new forest. The old animals have given their bodies to the 
earth to furnish through chemistry the forming race, and every individual is 
only a momentary fixation of what was yesterday another’s, is to-day his and 
will belong to a third to-morrow. So it is in thought. Our knowledge is the 
amassed thought and experience of innumerable minds: our language, our 
science, our religion, our opinions, our fancies we inherited. Our country, 
customs, laws, our ambitions, and our notions of fit and fair, —all these we 
never made, we found them ready-made; we but quote them. Goethe frankly 
said, “What would remain to me if this art of appropriation were derogatory 
to genius?” Every one of my writings has been furnished to me by a thousand 
different persons, a thousand things […].179 
 
As vividly described in ‘Quotation and Originality,’ the ways in which we actively borrow, manipulate and 
repurpose ‘ready-made’ materials drawn from the public domain provides Emerson with a basis for a 
broader analysis of the possible interpolation of cultural and commercial methods of exchange. He argues 
a reading as a ‘remodeling’ of a fixed idea, as he would suggest in ‘Shakespeare’—one that then entered 
back into circulation for further adulteration as he notes in ‘History’—but here foregrounds our use of 
‘ready-made’ materials over and above the creation or origination of new works. ‘Every word and particle 
is public and tunable,’ he notes in ‘Quotation and Originality.’ We need not invent new words, but consider 
instead new ‘uses’ of the ‘amassed thought and experience of innumerable minds’ we have access to.’180  
Describing his position on this process of critical ‘flux’ in more detail, Emerson explicitly alleges 
the marketplace serves as the ideal metaphor for considering the ways in which an image, idea or article of 
information changes hands, and he regards his position as inferentially, unerringly ‘capitalist’ in character. 
Designating critical exchange as a form of mutually beneficial ‘transaction,’ he suggests that ‘The capitalist 
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[…] is as hungry to lend as the consumer to borrow; and the transaction no more indicates intellectual 
turpitude in the borrower than the simple fact of debt involves bankruptcy. On the contrary, in far the 
greater number of cases the transaction is honorable to both. Can we not help ourselves as discreetly by the 
force of two in literature?’181 If we are to extend this ‘art,’ to read it as both a practical rubric and ideological 
position, the ways in which it informs his own intratextual practices is as significant as his absorption and 
assimilation of the works of others. Whilst Emerson’s ‘art of appropriation’ will be the focus of later 
chapters, as will a range of examples of appropriation within Emerson’s writings, we need to first examine 
the material that leads to its later articulation and consider the work that precedes his ‘force of two in 
literature’ and the systems in place that support his own explicit identification of the act of quotation or 
critical exchange as ‘capitalist’ in character.  
 ‘OTHERISM’ begins with an act of critical exchange within a study of culture’s circularity; a 
theoretical position that—entirely overlooked in recent scholarship—indicates the ways in which Emerson 
uses appropriation as a means with which to circuitously consider both the growth of the American 
marketplace and the industrial and technological advancement of culture during his lifetime. In order to 
examine Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ in earnest, I will first assess his complex relationship with individualism 
within his early works, and investigate the ways in which position exacts foundation for his later, radical 
efforts to incorporate critical and commercial value forms into a single analysis of critical exchange. 
Emerson’s position on the relationship between self and society is informed by a significant 
intellectual lineage; one which we are aware of due to his habit of documenting his reading materials in his 
private journals. Reading lists from his early period number Joseph Fourier and Robert Owen amidst a 
cycle of familiar romantic antecedents to his Transcendentalism. He pens a favourable review of Albert 
Brisbane’s Social Destiny of Man in The Dial in 1840, for example, and publishes an article entitled 
‘Fourierism and the Socialists’ in the same periodical, 1842.182 The review appears to support the idea of a 
transference of European paradigmatic ideas to an American context, such as associationism and 
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Fourierian Socialism.183 Whilst an analysis of such bibliographic precedents is significant to this assessment 
of the sophistication of Emerson’s standing, it is of note that Emerson reads (or misreads) the core tenets 
of such ideas.184 As will be shown, Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ appears to take ‘associationism’ literally, 
understanding the term as a semiotic formation rather than a political position. However, the form of 
associationism that Emerson espouses appears more concerned with economy—the percolation and 
development of market ideologies—and the circulation and ownership of ideas than any question of 
equality and has been argued as troubling the political implications of Emerson’s thinking. An Emersonian 
view of ‘equality does not eliminate so much as it relocates and reframes social division,’ allowing 
alienation to become a social problem that carries personal rather than collective consequences. 185 To 
consider this idea, Larson refers to an infamous tautology in Emerson’s mid-period address, ‘New England 
Reformers’ (1844). ‘The union is only perfect when all the uniters are isolated,’ he writes. Emerson’s 
position requires further explanation because it is here that the complex character of his individualism first 
come to the fore. ‘New England Reformers’ is the first example of Emerson’s employment of the term 
‘individualism’ in his published writings; a term that takes centre stage in discussions surrounding social 
organization in his period.186 Fuelled by ‘the rise of Saint-Simonism,’ ‘individualism’ defined America’s 
cultural self-study in the 1830s and 40s, according to Cyrus K. Patel, and owed more to the philosophical 
practices and political contexts of European revolutionary thought than it did to America’s claims to 
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independence in the 1770s.187 Opposed to ‘individualism’ was the newly coined ‘socialism,’ brought into 
common parlance by Alexandre Vinet partly in response to its more bureaucratic affiliate, 
‘associationism.’188 Considering individuality and individualism as distinct concepts the former, simply 
stated, infers the inalienable rights of one; and the latter, the necessary cohesion of self-determinate, 
alienable subjects within a community. One is singular (individuality); the other social (individualism). 
‘Beware of confounding individuality with individualism,’ Alexandre Saint-Cheron would warn in 1831,189 
predating the definition that Tocqueville would subsequently establish in Democracy in America in 1835.190 
However, before we look to Emerson’s own version of individualism, and the ways in which it 
encompasses a theory of economic agency, it is worth comparing it to its European antecedents and, in 
particular, those that inspired Emerson’s thinking regarding the conflict between individualism and 
individuality. 
Saint-Cheron identifies individualism in La Revue encylcopédique as ‘that mean egoism, lonely and 
disunited, which chokes all dignity, all the élan of the soul, all faith, while the sentiment of individuality is 
the holy exaltation of man, conscious of the life in him and all others, in God and nature.’191 A year later, 
in a contribution to the same periodical in 1832, Pierre Leroux responded to the complexities of Saint-
Cheron’s position by more explicitly advocating individuality over and above individualism: ‘We are neither 
individualists nor socialists. We believe in individuality, personality, liberty; but we also believe in 
society.’192 This intellectual conflict feeds directly into Emerson’s major works, and the effort to balance 
belief in both society and individuality.  
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Look again to Emerson’s famous pronouncement in ‘Nature:’ ‘Standing on the bare ground, —my 
head bathed by the blithe air and uplifted into infinite space, —all mean egotism vanishes. I become a 
transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all.’193 Lifted from Emerson’s famous ‘Transparent Eyeball’ 
passage, his semantic play with ‘I’ and ‘all’ as the ‘eyeball’ is a contraction that echoes Saint-Cheron’s 
thinking. Whilst Saint-Cheron’s remarks on individualism would detail ‘that mean egoism, lonely and 
disunited,’ Emerson would work to ideate a ‘space’ wherein ‘all mean egotism vanishes.’ Thus, the conflict 
between individuality and individualism as illustrated in the work of Saint-Simon and Saint-Cheron 
arguably finds a ‘space’ in Emerson’s analysis of the philosophical character of the American union in 
‘New England Reformers.’ This ‘space’ is not only a moral and philosophical domain, but an arena where 
the ‘I’ and ‘all’ of his argument conceptually coalesce. His tautological remark that ‘The union is only 
perfect when all the uniters are isolated’ thus appropriates the complex history of the term ‘individualism’ 
from his European antecedents, foregrounding Emerson’s want to ally his conceptualizations of self and 
society, but—equally—frames the complexity of his position. Since Emerson, ‘Americans have always 
conceived of individuality as a social formation,’ remarks Patel; it is a means of organizing the 
terminological conflict between individuality and individualism into a new ideological position that would 
seek to enumerate both self and society as co-dependent terms.194  
Exploring Emerson’s emphasis on the ‘first person,’ Sacvan Bercovitch suggests that, in opposition 
to Fourier, Emerson was more keenly influenced by the writings of Pierre Leroux than Saint-Cheron. As a 
philosophical basis for a practical form of government and culture could grow, ‘individualism,’ according 
to Leroux, 1832, served to ‘liberate the bourgeoisie’ and support the expansion of a participatory and 
market-led economy. For Leroux, individualism conceptually underpins ‘a political economy of everyone 
for himself,’ notes Bercovitch; and, as such, his work represents a vital precedent to Emerson’s thinking.195 
In Leroux’s influential essay ‘On Individualism and Socialism’ (1834), Leroux champions a collectivist 
and utopian social imaginary in which: ‘Every man is a fruit on the tree of humanity; but the fruit, although 
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the product of the tree, is nonetheless complete and perfect in itself; […] Thus each man within himself 
reflects the whole of society, each man is in a certain fashion the manifestation of his century, of his people, 
and of his generation, each man is humanity.’196 This lyrical impression of the relationship between self 
and society significantly influenced Emerson’s own socio-political perspective.197 For Emerson, the 
‘considered labors of man’ are ‘the ripe fruit’ of society,198 and ‘An individual man [is as] a fruit which it 
cost all the foregoing ages to form and ripen.’199  
These similarities between Emerson and Leroux have to be taken into account when we address 
Emerson’s own theorizations of individualism as itself ‘a breath-taking work of culture,’ writes 
Bercovitch—‘a wholesale appropriation of […] all the forms of reform and revolution nourished on both 
sides of the Atlantic by the turmoil of modernization.’200 It is in this context that Bercovitch refers to the 
ways in which Leroux’s ‘fruiting tree’ is carried into Emerson’s comments regarding the ‘metaphysical’ 
powers of capitalism.  
In 1846, Emerson would connote ‘community’ or ‘communatism’ (as he puts it) as a form of 
‘bedlam.’ By ’47, he directly renounces the influence of ‘Fourier, St. Simon, Leroux’ and the Chartists as 
‘crazy men.’201 According to Bercovitch, from 1842 to 1850, Emerson (either implicitly or explicitly) 
provides an ‘unabashed endorsement’ of what can only be described as ‘free-enterprise ideology.’202 In a 
note commending the thinking of Adam Smith, Emerson notes that ‘Laissez faire is the only way’ and 
continues to only to allude to the fragility of Leroux’s ‘tree of humanity.’ In his Journals, he writes ‘& I see 
you snap the sinews with your sumptuary laws. […] The powers that make the capitalist are metaphysical; 
the force of method, & the force of will makes banks & builds towns. We must therefore leave the individual 
[…] to the rewards and penalties of his own constitution.’203 Alongside ‘considered labor,’ Emerson cites 
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‘Commerce’ as ‘a single fruit’ on the boughs of Leroux’s tree, arguing for an intersection between 
capitalistic and individualistic forms of ‘constitution.’ Once again, a conceptual relationship with 
circulation is key to Emerson’s thinking. In Emerson’s hands, ‘poetic knowledge’—or rather a poetics of 
knowledge formation—centres around the movement and ownership of an image or idea. Emerson’s 
metaphor is of twofold value. ‘Commerce’ is a product of the collective forces that foster the growth and 
health of this tree (the plant, soil and cultural climate), but commerce itself is also the system that informs 
that tree’s growth. As David M. Robinson notes, it ‘is the pursuit of the larger contextual pattern that will 
make sense of an individual object by demonstrating its relation to a whole’ that we should understand as 
Emerson’s chief aim; and Robinson’s standpoint presents a good summation of the ways in which Emerson 
sought to exact a form of criticism enhanced by its commercial and industrial contexts.204 Thus, whilst 
Emerson takes reading as a metaphor for perception—an idea we can support by way of the 
interchangeability of the ‘eye/I’ previously mentioned—his later writings also indicate a desire to organize 
knowledge and examine the relation of an individual thought to a broader, cultural and/or informational 
mass. Emerson’s position is far-reaching, extrapolatory, and analytical.  
‘Natural objects,’ he writes in ‘Poetry and Imagination’ (1875), ‘if individually described and out 
of connection, are not yet known, since they are really parts of a symmetrical universe, like words of a 
sentence; and if their true order is found, the poet can read their divine significance orderly as in a Bible.’205 
Here, the process of reading emphasizes the idea of ‘connection’—a symmetrical or reciprocal reading of 
the process of understanding. See his notes on ‘reader and the book,’ from the late essay ‘Books’ (1870), 
for example: ‘one without the other is naught,’ he writes.206 This desire to establish a cultural unity through 
an analysis of the relation of objects (rather than the individualistic qualities of an object itself) extends 
beyond the metaphor of a reader and writer, however, to also encompass the dependency of a public 
speaker upon their audience. In ‘Poetry and Imagination,’ Emerson remarks on the symmetrical, organic 
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and organicist connectivity between ideas and their manifestation as constituting a scientific perfection: 
‘The electric word pronounced by John Hunter a hundred years ago, arrested and progressive development, 
indicating the way upward from the invisible protoplasm to the highest organisms, gave the poetic key to 
Natural Science, of which the theories of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, of Oken, of Goethe, of Agassiz and Owen 
and Darwin in zoölogy and botany, are the fruits,—a hint whose power is not yet exhausted, showing unity 
and perfect order in physics.’207 While the process of connectivity is anchored in symmetry and order it is 
also, crucially, about movement; a movement of mind that evaluates the linkage between reader and 
audience; so as to understand the powers of an audience. For Emerson, ‘the value of a trope is that the 
hearer is one,’ and we thus need examine the symbolic inferences of this ‘hearer’ in his hands.208  
To explain the idea of connectivity he seeks to underscore, Emerson reinstates the conceptual 
importance of circulation. Once again, he is not concerned with the ‘primary meaning’ of an object; rather, 
its cultural power—the force of two in literature,’ as he would term it—relies as much on the implications 
of an idea as it does on its documentation. Emerson establishes a working definition of ‘poetry’ in ‘Poetry 
and Imagination’ that again foregrounds this interest in simile and ‘secondary use;’ in other words, the 
circulation of ideas secreted in metaphor:209  
 
Poetry. —The primary use of a fact is low; the secondary use, as it is a figure 
or illustration of my thought, is the real worth. First the fact; second its 
impression, or what I think of it. The lover sees reminders of his mistress in 
every beautiful object; the saint, an argument for devotion in every natural 
process; and the facility with which Nature lends itself to the thoughts of man, 
the aptness with which a river, a flower, a bird, fire, day or night, can express 
his fortunes, is as if the world were only a disguised man, and, with a change 
of form, rendered to him all his experience. We cannot utter a sentence in 
sprightly conversation without a similitude. Note our incessant use of the 
word like, —like fire, like a rock, like thunder, like a bee, “like a year without 
a spring.” Conversation is not permitted without tropes; nothing but great 
weight in things can afford a quite literal speech. It is ever enlivened by 
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inversion and trope. God himself does not speak prose, but communicates 
with us by hints, omens, inference and dark resemblances in objects lying all 
around us.210  
 
Emerson notes that the ‘delight’ we wrest from an ‘image’ owes to the re-contextualization of that image, 
in its sitting in ‘new dress’ or a new context. Note ‘the new virtue shown in some unprized old property, as 
when a boy finds that his pocket-knife will attract steel filings and take up a needle,’ he writes.211 This 
explicit interest in the ‘secondary’ purchase of an idea or image is key to Emerson’s critical praxis. ‘Poetic 
knowing,’ to again cite Robinson, ‘is fundamentally a recognition that perception is connection,’ that we 
value the correlation of ‘facts’ or ‘feelings’ more acutely than we do the ‘fact’ or ‘feeling’ itself. What proves 
of note is that Emerson’s scrutiny of metaphor—and examination of the free agency of interpretation—
should aim to examine such a process of reading as akin to the ‘power’ he acknowledges in ‘the perfect 
order of physics,’ how the result of private research facilitates concrete concept, furthering the project of a 
social body of knowledge. However, it is also Emerson’s interest in the ‘secondary’ idea that prefaces the 
political aspects of his criticism.212  
Although these references pertain to Emerson’s later writings, we can read such thinking 
retrospectively into his earlier works. Both ‘Books’ and ‘Poetry and Imagination’ are essays that, although 
published in the 1870s, are rooted in lecture materials from the 1850s; but these ideas can be traced back 
even further. Emerson may not be explicitly interested in the procedural dimensions of political reform—
‘I do not wish to push my criticism on the state of things around me to that extravagant mark,’ he notes in 
‘Man the Reformer’ (1841)—but he nonetheless wants to embed his thinking within the social concerns of 
a popular audience.213 Arguing against our ‘isolation from the advantages of a civil society,’214 he cites ‘the 
near, the low, [and] the common’ as his locus of concern.215 ‘The mind of this country, taught to aim at 
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low objects, eats upon itself,’ he notes;216 it automatically rejects ideas that appear ‘too vague and indefinite 
for the uses of life,’ and requires—instead—a practical philosophy of participation, application and 
custom.217 What proves of note is that Emerson would explicitly link such a project to the study of 
‘economy.’ In ‘Man the Reformer,’ he charges that we need ‘learn […] the meaning of economy. Economy 
is a high, humane office, a sacrament, when its aim is grand; when it is the prudence of simple tastes, when 
it is practiced for freedom, or love, or devotion.’218 Emerson’s desire to unpick the ‘lesson’ and ‘meaning’ 
of economy is equally present in his literary and philosophic research as his interest in individualism. A 
twenty-one-year-old Emerson lists Adam Smith’s Works in a brief itinerary of ‘BOOKS TO READ’ in 1825 
and, over the subsequent months, he notes that Smith moves from a pile of ‘BOOKS TO READ’ to a list of 
works he is actively ‘READING.’219 An explicit reference to Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) also appears in 
Emerson’s later works, where—in a lecture delivered to the Philorhetorian and Peithologian Societies of 
Wesleyan College in 1845—he cites Smith’s conceptualization of Napoleon as an influence on a par with 
Swift’s political pamphlets and Humboldt’s ‘system of nature.’220  
In order to examine the significance of Smith’s works to Emerson, Thomas Birch (in a rare essay 
dedicated to Emerson’s relationship with the progress of American political economy) cites Francis 
Wayland—a professor of moral philosophy, president of Brown University, and ‘acquaintance’ of 
Emerson’s. Wayland’s ‘popular college text’ The Elements of Political Economy—published a year after 
Emerson’s Nature, 1837—is particularly significant in terms of Emerson’s want to articulate ‘the meaning 
of economy.’ Wayland’s work contains ‘simple’ restatements of ‘classic economic principles found in 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and J. B. Say,’ but is also—according to Birch—‘one of the most systematic 
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220 Emerson, ‘Discourse Read Before the Philomathesian Society of Middlebury College in Vermont, 22nd July 1845,’ LL.I., 
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and original treatments of how intelligence functions in economy to be found at that time.’221 Birch 
summarizes Wayland’s position as follows:  
 
Wayland classified human industry or labor into three types according to the 
nature and degree of intellectual effort involved. The highest form is 
“discovery or investigation,” which includes the work of philosophers such as 
Newton and Franklin, “who discover the laws of nature.” Next is 
“application or invention,” which “teaches us how to make application of the 
principle” discovered by the philosopher. This type of industry encompasses 
the work of “professional labor [force],” and although Wayland only cites 
doctors, lawyers, and manufacturers, he clearly means to refer to any 
capitalist with managerial responsibility. Finally, is “operative” human 
industry, which consists of pure “physical effort.” Physical labor creates 
changes “of form or place in matter” and therefore concerns the development 
of “material products;” the first two types of labor produce and utilize 




The production of knowledge is unique in comparison to others forms of labour, Wayland argues, ‘because 
he who first creates, has no means of monopolizing it.’ Or as Birch puts it: a process of acculturation 
necessarily follows the dissemination of an ‘idea’ in print ‘[because] others cannot be barred from 
possessing knowledge once it has been discovered and because it can be reproduced at virtually no cost at 
all.’223 Knowledge, Birch writes, is thus figured as ‘a gift of nature,’ because print technologies make it 
‘freely available to all.’ Wayland argues: 224 
 
The product which [the philosopher or inventor] creates has an indefinite 
power of self-production. If a man discovers a law and reveal it to his 
neighbor, that is, create this change in his mind, his neighbor may create the 
same product in an hour, in the minds of a thousand persons, and each of 
 
221 Thomas D. Birch, ‘Towards a Better Order: The Economic Thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson,’ 389 
222 See Francis Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy (New York: Leavitt, Lord and Company, 1837), 43-48 
223 Birch, ‘Towards a Better Order: The Economic Thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson,’ 390 
224 Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy, 47 
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these in the minds of a thousand more. And specially, by means of the press, 
this power is multiplied indefinitely.225 
 
Wayland’s ‘power’ is an interesting antecedent to Emerson’s ‘force of two in literature,’ and echoes 
can also be found in Emerson’s ‘History.’ But Birch notes that—at the time of writing—economic theory 
had yet to embrace a substantive and utilitarian conceptualization of the ‘public good’ in American 
thought.226 Nonetheless, the idea is implicit in Wayland’s discussion of intellectual production in which 
the public good, according to Birch, ‘exhibits non-excludability’ (i.e., all persons have free access to the 
product) and nonrivalry in consumption (i.e., one person’s consumption of the product does not detract 
from another person’s consumption). Conversely, a ‘private good is characterized by excludability and 
rivalry;’ it is driven by a conceptualization of ‘material scarcity rather than abundance,’ the market here 
being a space riven by conceptualizations of competition and ownership.227  
Emerson comments on Wayland’s theological writings in a journal entry of 1830; and 
acknowledges his attendance at Wayland’s lecture on ‘Human Life’ in the spring of 1840.228 However, 
above all, Emerson absorbed Wayland’s sense of cultural and critical engagement as the ‘highest form of 
human industry,’ one in which the capacity to ‘[create] intellectual property that serves a public good’ 
becomes a chief aim.229 This, then, is a crucial element of Emerson’s theorizations of the development of 
an antebellum market economy. For Birch, Emerson’s interest in ‘capitalism’ is that it ‘treats nature as a 
commodity,’ and allows for ‘an economy [to emerge] in which property and wealth are material, divisible 
and privately owned.’230 The development of this network of proprietors is key, but—once again—literary 
culture provides Emerson with a means to consider the complexities of capitalism in action. Emerson—on 
the one hand—sought to facilitate a ‘poet’s economy,’ in which nature, wealth and property coalesce into 
a common spiritual and cultural resource, ‘indivisible and freely accessible to all.’231 On the other, however, 
 
225 Ibid. 
226 Birch, ‘Towards a Better Order: The Economic Thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson,’ 390 
227 Ibid. 
228 See Emerson, ‘Blotting Book PSI,’ (Undated, 1830) JMN.III., 208.; and ‘Journal F2’ (March 28th, 1840), JMN.VII., 489 




the intellectual effects of economic expansion would herald intellectual ramifications that he would note 
with some trepidation. Emerson can be seen to be ill at ease with the cultural ascent of capital in his earliest 
publications. In ‘Nature,’ for example, he locates a ‘fear’ that capitalism is constructing the ‘selfish savage’ 
as a stand-in for the American subject.232 For Emerson, ‘hope’ for the ‘moral and spiritual growth’ of 
America’s fledgling national culture ‘resides in the poet’s economy alone,’ Birch writes, and not in a simple 
subjugation of mind to the rules of the marketplace. In this ‘poet’s economy,’ a system present in Emerson’s 
essays from his earliest publications on,233 Emerson advocates a revolutionary economic system;234 one that 
resembles a developmental model of free-enterprise, with poetic practice and ‘thought’ as a stand in for 
material goods and services, or a declaration of ‘psyche’ over ‘sovereignty,’ as Jeffrey Sklansky has put it.235  
‘The meaning of economy’ may be something that Emerson stresses as a necessary object of 
intellectual attention, but it is also a more complex rewriting of Wayland’s economic theories than Birch 
acknowledges. In ‘Man the Reformer,’ Emerson provides an assessment of Wayland’s thinking. Rather 
than simply calling for a conceptual rereading of ‘the meaning of economy,’ ‘Man the Reformer’ actively 
reconsiders ‘economy’ as both a term and concept. 236  
 
The idea which now begins to agitate society has a wider scope than our daily 
employments, our households, and the institutions of property. We are to 
revise the whole of our social structure, the State, the school, religion, 
marriage, trade, science, and explore their foundations in our own nature; we 
are to see that the world not only fitted the former men, but fits us, and to 
clear ourselves of every usage which has not its roots in our own mind. What 
is a man born for but to be a Reformer, a Remaker of what man has made; a 
renouncer of lies; a restorer of truth and good, imitating that great Nature 
 
232 Emerson: ‘At present, man applies to nature but half his force. He works on the world with his understanding alone. He 
lives in it and masters it by a penny-wisdom; and he that works most in it is but a half-man, and whilst his arms are strong 
and his digestion good, his mind is imbruted, and he is a selfish savage. His relation to nature, his power over it, is through 
the understanding, as by manure; the economic use of fire, wind, water, and the mariner’s needle; steam, coal, chemical 
agriculture; the repairs of the human body by the dentist and the surgeon. This is such a resumption of power as if a banished 
king should buy his territories inch by inch, instead of vaulting at once into his throne.’ See ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 72 
233 See Jeffrey P. Sklansky, ‘Transcendental Psychology,’ The Soul’s Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 
1820-1920 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 50-61 
234 Birch, ‘Towards a Better Order: The Economic Thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson,’ 390 
235 Sklansky, ‘Transcendental Psychology,’ The Soul’s Economy, 39 
236 Emerson, ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841), CW.I., 245 
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which embosoms us all, and which sleeps no moment on an old past, but 
every hour repairs herself, yielding us every morning a new day, and with 
every pulsation a new life?237 
 
His stress on the ‘reformer’ as a ‘remaker of what man has made’ reinstates the importance of Emerson’s 
‘second use’ of objects, of no less than a revision of ‘our whole social structure.’ The emphasis on 
‘remaking’ or repurposing materials turns the reader into a form of primary labourer (recall his 
aforementioned comment that, in the moment of its engagement, a work of literature is ‘altered, remodeled 
and finally made [our] own’ through the process of reading). Here, Emerson argues that such logic reaches 
beyond the verges of literary culture into theory of political being, recasting his reader as a metaphor for 
the relation of a single subject to a ‘social structure,’ and indicating their capacity to alter its shape and 
form. For Birch, given the volume of Emerson’s allusions to the conceptual importance of economy, these 
ideas infer that Emerson’s reflections on economy are a kind of testimony to, if not credible theory of, the 
‘creative potential’ of American capitalism.238 They are ideas restated in Emerson’s later essay ‘Wealth’ 
(1860), wherein he notes that all economies have both spiritual as well as ideological effects, and again 
correlates the singular subject with the psychological and economic character of a social whole. ‘All things 
ascend,’ he notes, ‘and the royal rule of economy is that it should ascend also […]. The merchant’s 
economy is a coarse symbol of the soul’s economy.’239 But the dominance of America’s cultural emphasis 
on economization can equally be identified in Emerson’s earliest writings.  
Writing again in his private journals, a matter of months after the publication of ‘Nature’ in 1836, 
he states that his contemporary historical moment ‘will be characterized as the era of trade, for every thing 
is made subservient to that agency. The very savage on the shores of the N. W. America holds up his shell 
and cries “a dollar!” Government at home is conducted on such principles.’240 In 1839, he restates this idea: 
‘Commerce is only a single fruit of the new habit of thought. Yet such is the predominance that belongs to 
Trade and its consequences, at the present day, that viewed superficially the age might easily be designated 
 
237 Ibid., 245-246 
238 Birch, ‘Towards a Better Order: The Economic Thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson,’ 401 
239 Emerson, ‘Wealth’ (1860), CW.VI., 125 
240 Emerson, ‘Journal B’ (Undated, 1836), JMN.V., 237 
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as the age of Commerce.’241 Emerson’s 1839-40 Winter series at the Masonic Temple, Boston, opened with 
these comments—on December 4th, 1839—focusing on ‘trade and its consequences’ in a fashion that 
would then carry over into the authorship of Emerson’s First and Second Series essays of ’41 and ’44.  
In this context, it is notable that this early phase of Emerson’s authorship—and first experience of 
exposure as a public intellectual—would devote such attentions to a conceptualization of ‘commerce.’ A 
subsequent lecture delivered at the Lyceum (Salem, Massachusetts) on February 26th or 27th, 1840, 
presented as ‘The Character of the Present Age’ (and later repeated as ‘The Present Age’)—at the Concord 
Lyceum on March 4th, and again at the Franklin Lyceum (Providence, Rhode Island) on March 20th, re-
articulates the centrality of ‘commerce’ as a pressing, thematic concern: 
 
Commerce removes from nature that mystery and dread which in the infancy 
of society defend man from profanation before, yet his prudence and his 
conscience are enlightened. At this day amidst the grandeur of Commerce the 
philosopher may well occupy himself with the price of its gifts. There is 
nothing more important in the culture of man than to resist the dangers of 
Commerce. An admirable servant, it has become the hard master.242  
 
Although Emerson notes ‘the dangers of Commerce,’ he also notes that a ‘philosopher’ should concern 
themselves with an analysis of its conceptual ‘grandeur,’ and we should characterize ‘Commerce the 
Philosopher’ as of equal importance in Emerson’s early writings as his ‘American Scholar.’ As Emerson 
tries to deal with the contradictory notion of both the ‘grandeur’ and ‘dangers’ of Commerce as a cultural 
form, his description of ‘Commerce’ is whittled down to a single paragraph and yet even here, ‘Commerce, 
dazzling us with the perpetual discovery of new facts, of new particulars of power, has availed to transfer 
the devotion of men from the soul to that material which it works.’243 As before, Emerson deliberately 
identifies in economic phenomena a philosophical, political and ideological domain capable of establishing 
alignment between the labour of a reader and the productivity of a worker, an idea that he would return to 
 
241 From the introductory lecture to the series ‘The Present Age’ (1840), EL.II., 190-191 
242 Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), EL.II., 190 
243 Ibid., 191 
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in his later works. See ‘Domestic Life’ (1870), for example, wherein he notes that ‘many things betoken a 
revolution of opinion and practice in regard to manual labor that may go far to aid our practical inquiry.’244 
Here, we’ve unequivocal evidence that Emerson’s interest in the practicalities of critical agency drew 
heavily upon his reflections on America’s labour systems.  
Emerson’s favouring of the term ‘cooperation’ over ‘private enterprise’ is—as John C. Gerber 
points out—proof that his version of cultural reception is always transactional by nature, always (ideally) 
of mutual benefit:245 ‘the capitalist of either kind is as hungry to lend as the loaner to borrow,’ as Emerson 
notes in ‘Quotation and Originality,’ returning us to the idea of the ‘force of two in literature.’246  
 
Can we not help ourselves as discreetly by the force of two in literature? 
Certainly, it only needs two well placed and well-tempered for cooperation, 
to get somewhat far transcending any private enterprise! Shall we converse as 
spies? Our very abstaining to repeat and credit the fine remark of our friend is 
thievish. Each man of thought is surrounded by wiser men than he […] 
Cannot he and they combine? Cannot they sink their jealousies in God’s love, 
and call their poem Beaumont and Fletcher, or the Theban’s Phalanx’s?247 
 
Emerson was aware of the possibility that his theorizing around the transactional nature of 
literature, quotation and appropriation as a form of social ‘cooperation’ might be read as disjointed and 
without coherency. In the mid-period lecture ‘Recent Literary and Spiritual Influences’ (1843), for 
example, he alludes to the works of Dante Alighieri to frame his thinking and rephrase his 1840 subjective 
theory of interpretation. ‘Dante,’ Emerson notes—‘who described his [own] circumstances’—‘would be 
unintelligible now. But a thousand readers in a thousand different years shall read his story and find it a 
picture of their story by making of course a new application of every word.’248 A rephrasing of the remarks 
 
244 Emerson, ‘Domestic Life’ (1870), CW.VII., 116 
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248 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Journal J,’ (Undated, 1841), JMN.VIII., 158.; Emerson would also weave this phrase into his 
late lecture ‘Recent Literary and Spiritual Influences’ (1843): ‘There are certain deductions to be made. Swedenborg had this 
vice: that he nailed one sense to each image; one and no more. But in nature, every word we speak is million-faced or 
convertible to an indefinite number of applications. If it were not so, we could read no book. For each sentence would only 
fit the single case which the author had in view. Dante, who described his circumstance, would be unintelligible now. But a 
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on ‘subjectiveness’ Emerson would levy in ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature,’ Emerson’s emphatic interest 
in intentionality, instrumentality and the circulation of cultural matter as preoccupies him in his works of 
the early 1840s struggles to correlate the self-interest of his perspectivism—of ‘private interest’—with his 
concern for the efficacy of economic forms of participation or ‘cooperation.’ 
However, within the idea of ‘subjectiveness’ lies the desire to connect literary analysis with a 
philosophical ‘turn’ towards self-knowledge: ‘What is the apple to me? And what the birds to me? And 
what am I?’249 In more complex terms, the theory of ‘subjectiveness’ is also about exploring the contingent 
or conditional status of the ‘I’ at work in thoughts towards cultural and critical engagement more broadly. 
But considering Buell’s declaration that Emerson ‘never wrote a treatise on aesthetics,’ I will propose that 
he did argue a position on intellectual property and critical exchange that we could retrospectively regard 
as notes towards a ‘treatise on aesthetics.’ Emerson’s stance is difficult to track, as it is propositioned 
cumulatively across a number of journal entries prior to its appearance in his later, published works; but 
his repetition of materials across the contexts of both his published and private writings is crucial. Not only 
did Emerson theorize a position on the subjectivist imperatives of critical engagement, he also put such a 











thousand readers, in a thousand different years and towns, shall read his story and find it a version of their story by making 
a new application of every word’, LL.I., 69  




Property is an intellectual production.  
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 





Under the moniker ‘OTHERISM,’ a mere matter of months after the publication of ‘Nature’ (1836), Emerson 
introduces a theory of cultural exchange in his journals that significantly antedates the ideas later 




I see plainly the charm which belongs to Alienation or Otherism. “What wine 
do you like best, O Diogenes?” “Another’s,” replied the sage. What fact, 
thought, word, like we best? Another’s. The very sentiment I expressed 
yesterday without heed, shall sound memorable to me tomorrow if I hear it 
from another. My own book I read with new eyes once a stranger has praised 
it. It is, (or is it not?) all the one and the same radical fact which I noted above, 
that the picture pleases when the original does not, that the subjective must 
be made objective for us & the soul, body. Or is the charm wholly in the new 
method by which it was classified; for, a new mind is a new method.251 
 
In the establishment of his ‘OTHERISM,’ Emerson shows how value is established by the co-dependency of 
critical desire, personal need, and public pressure. As an object moves between parties involved in this 
minor economy, the importance of property as privately owned (and that ownership being defined by a 
distinction between what is ‘mine’ and what pertains to ‘Another’) not only affords a theory of personal 
resonance but also a theory of public value. Simply put, for an object to be mine, I need ‘Another’ so as to 
 
250 Emerson, ‘Wealth’ (1860), CW.VI., 104-105. 
251 Emerson, ‘Journal B’ (Undated, 1836),’ JMN.V., 254  
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define the difference. Considering the ambitions of Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM,’ his assertion that ‘a new mind 
is a new method’ requires some explication. 
In the first phases of his career, Emerson sought to build a cultural encyclopaedia of concepts; 
composed exclusively of aphorisms (both borrowed and original).252 Undertaken between 1824 and 1836, 
this project was ultimately abandoned and, instead, later mined for quotable phrases and workable conceits. 
Under the heading ‘METHOD,’ the entry runs as follows:  
 
‘Method is progressive arrangement.’ — COLERIDGE; ‘Method is union of like 
with like.’ — CARLYLE; ‘The popularity of Phrenology is because it is a 
method for the vulgar. What with Ideality, veneration, constructiveness, they 
can class facts they never approached near enough to separate before. Le 
Bourgeois Gentilhomme delights to classify.’ — Prose. R.W.E.; ‘A man is a 
method or principle of selection & gathers only what is like him as unerringly 
as a sparrow builds her nest.’ R.W.E.; Classification is a delight. [blank].253  
 
The significance of Emerson’s new ‘method’ of mind (and interest in the ‘sublime’ or ‘poetic’ qualities of 
‘critical analysis’ as he suggests) reappears across Emerson’s authorship, demonstrating his creative, 
assimilative and appropriative impulses.254 By adapting and conjoining Coleridge and Carlyle’s phrasing, 
he declares ‘A new mind is a new method,’ in his journals, 1836,255 and again, 1851.256 In ‘Spiritual Laws’ 
 
252 Emerson: ‘When I was quite young I fancied that by keeping a Manuscript Journal by me, over whose pages I wrote a list 
of the great topics of human study, as, Religion, Poetry, Love, &c, in the course of a few years I should be able to complete a 
sort of Encyclopaedia containing the net value of all the definitions at which the world had yet arrived. But at the end of a 
couple of years my Cabinet Cyclopaedia though much enlarged was no nearer to a completeness than on its first day. Nay, 
somehow the whole pan of it needed alteration.’ See ‘Journal E’ (Undated, 1839), JMN.VII., 302 
253 Emerson, ‘Encyclopaedia,’ (1824; 1836), JMN.VI., 222. The editors of the Harvard/Belknap publication of Emerson’s 
journals note that the reference to Coleridge is paraphrased from a discussion of critical method in Essay IV, The Friend; see 
The Complete Works of S.T. Coleridge, Vol. II. (1853), 408-417. Emerson’s fondness for this phrase can be asserted by way of 
its repetition; see JMN.III., 299.; and JMN.V., 114. For the reference to Thomas Carlyle in its original context, see 
‘Prospective,’ in Thomas Carlyle, (ed.) K. McSweeney, P. Sabor, Sartor Resartus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 61 
254 Emerson: ‘Literature is now critical. Well, analysis may be poetic. People find out they have faces & write Physiognomy; 
sculls, & write Phrenology; mysteries of Volition and Supervolition, & explore Animal Magnetism/Somnambulism. 
Chemistry is criticism on an apple & a drop of water & the glassy air which to our fathers were wholes but which we have 
resolved. Is not the sublime felt in analysis as well as in a creation? It seems very impertinent in us to fear a hurt in this 
tendency as if the gastric juices were beginning to dissolve the stomach & so the belly eat up its master.’ See ‘Journal E’ 
(Undated, 1839), JMN.VII., 303 
255 Emerson, ‘Journal B’ (Undated entry, 1836), JMN.V., 254 
256 Emerson, ‘Journal CO’ (Undated, 1851), JMN.XI., 375 
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(1841), he takes the quote—repeating it almost verbatim—in order to further underwrite his creative 
process of ‘second use.’ ‘A man is a method, a progressive arrangement; a selecting principle,’ he writes 
(borrowing Coleridge’s wording).257 The line then reappears once again, this time in the twilight stages of 
his career in ‘Powers and Laws of Thoughts’—an element of the late lecture series Natural History of Intellect 
(1870 to 1871). ‘Every man is a new method and distributes things anew,’ he writes. ‘If he could attain full 
size, he would take up, first or last, atom by atom, all the world into a new form.’258 Emerson’s ‘method’ 
is consistent with his interest in the link between identity and criticism and belief that the idiosyncrasies of 
personality should inform critical engagement. However, whilst this ‘method’ is key, it is rendered all the 
more complex by virtue of the connotations borne by both Emerson’s own interest in cultural economy 
and his developing sense of the social and cultural significance of political economy over the course of the 
1840s, evidenced—as we will see—in the ways in which ‘OTHERISM’ would evolve as a concept. 
In a journal entry of 1845, he would explicitly return to ‘OTHERISM,’ albeit under a different name. 
Now under the evocative moniker, ‘COMMERCIAL VALUE,’ he notes that we should ‘Take away those 
peaches from under the tree. Carry them out of sight of the tree, & their value is enhanced a thousandfold 
to all eyes.’ 
 
That is the main consideration in fruit, to put the tree out of sight. Drop your 
penknife or pencil case on the ground: what a costliness it wears in that 
unaccustomed place! Bread & butter, say housekeepers, relishes better away 
from home. “Another’s wine,” said Diogenes. Jugglery, or the order of 
wonder, consists in putting the tree out of sight.259  
 
‘The charm of alienation’ as he notes in 1836 (an echo of the ‘alienated majesty’ detailed by Emerson in 
‘Self-Reliance’ in 1841) is now systematized as an ‘order of wonder.’260 Returning to the twinned ideas of 
atomism and alienation allows us to consolidate the ideas discussed in previous chapters; namely, 
 
257 Emerson, ‘Spiritual Laws’ (1841), CW.II., 144 
258 Emerson, ‘Powers and Laws of Thought’ (1893) CW.XII., 29. Delivered between 1870 and 1871 at Harvard, and as 
posthumously collated in a print-volume edited by his son, Edward W. Emerson. 
259 Emerson, ‘Journal Y’ (Undated 1845), JMN.IX, 309-310 
260 Emerson: ‘In every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts; they come back to us with a certain alienated 
majesty.’ See ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), CW.II., 46 
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Emerson’s interest in the re-contextualization of objects as a way to denote new value, his receptivity to 
the publishing cultures of the early antebellum, and the authority he allots to the ways in which a movement 
or circularity of objects can alter and manipulate their accepted meaning and fixed value. Emerson’s 
allusion to Diogenes not only intimates the ‘flux’ of culture that he details in ‘Quotation and Originality,’ 
it underlines the significance of the ‘force of two in literature’—particularly given that the reference is to 
something decidedly external. In literary terms, this is another value system that not only looks beyond 
‘private enterprise,’ it allows us to freely circulate objects—ideas, images, stories—that depend upon the 
‘cooperation’ of the system’s participants. In these terms, the ‘force of two’ is endemic of the form of 
‘capitalism’ that Emerson signals in ‘Quotation and Originality.’ Restaging his ‘OTHERISM’ of 1836 as an 
explicit theory of ‘COMMERCIAL VALUE’ in 1845, this marks the traffic of Emerson’s thinking from the late 
1830s across the 1840s. 
 Emerson repurposes these ideas again in 1846 noting that ‘the juggle of commerce never loses its 
power to astonish & delight us, namely, the unlooked-for juxtaposition of things.’261 It is here, his theory 
of recontextualization—our need to assess and identify ‘the unlooked-for juxtaposition of things’—emerges 
as a theory of ownership. ‘Take the peaches from under the tree, & carry them out of sight of the tree,’ he 
notes, ‘& their value is centupled.’262 Here, his purposes are clearer; rather than detailing an act of exchange 
and re-contextualization, he now instructs that we need ‘take’ the peaches, to seize a personal rather than 
public ownership of goods through the process of recontextualizing an object. Again, in an undated 
notebook entry of the same period, the image recurs:  
 
Take the peaches from under the tree, & carry them out of sight of the tree, 
and their value is indefinitely enhanced. That is the main secret of commercial 
value to put the tree out of sight. Drop your penknife or pencil on the ground. 
What a costliness it wears in that unaccustomed place! Housekeepers say that 
tea & toast always relish better away from home. “Another’s wine is best,” 
said Diogenes.263  
 
 
261 Emerson, ‘Journal O’ (31st July, 1846), JMN.IX., 375 
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263 Emerson, ‘Notebook JK,’ (Undated, 1847), JMN.X., 391-2 
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As an analysis of the origin of surplus value, Emerson’s position is basic. But—if we are to look to his 
choice vocabulary the critical issue is nevertheless clear. ‘Take’ the peaches ‘from under the tree,’ Emerson 
writes, euphemistically sidestepping and concealing a principal cost of commercial peach production (at 
the time, nascent in the United States) which is the labour required to remove ripe peaches from the tree 
without bruising their delicate flesh. A windfall peach is an unsaleable peach and has no commercial value 
at all; Emerson’s emphasis instead is on how we can recontextualize the object taken to market, concentrate 
on its movement from context to context (seller to buyer), and consider how its value is altered once the 
point of production—the ‘tree’—is ‘out of sight.’ 
 The effortlessness of Emerson’s model of value-creation is distinctive: it differs in the sharpest terms 
possible from the vitalist orthodoxies of Ricardian political economy in the early nineteenth century in so 
far as it foregrounds the act of exchange over and above any question of the labour involved.264 But 
Emerson’s version of this concept includes a critical additional element in the obscure allusion to Diogenes, 
which makes little sense unless one contextualizes it within the canon of Emerson’s journals as an 
evocation of his 1836 definition of ‘OTHERISM.’ As Emerson writes, ‘I see plainly the charm which belongs 
to Alienation or Otherism. “What wine do you like best, O Diogenes?” “Another’s,” replied the sage.’ 
Surplus value in Emerson’s thinking derives from an ‘alienation’ which is, these paired passages suggest, 
also a function of language; an ‘alien’ idea is ‘charmed’ as it is now open to the process of re-
contextualization or ‘juxtaposition’ that he calls for. There is, however, an ironic plurality of meaning in 
Emerson’s allusion. In positing a theory of surplus value premised on indifference to the rights of a primary 
labourer, Emerson apparently exploits this relic of his own 1836 labours as we follow the recurrence and 
development of this idea from his early writings through to his more mature works of the 1850s. 
One such example can be found as Emerson’s ‘peaches’ also reappear in part in the essay ‘Wealth’ 
published in 1860’s Conduct of Life (but given as a lecture several times in the early 1850s):  
 
264 As Catherine Gallagher has written, political economy in the 1820s-30s in Britain (where it was vastly more developed 
than was the case in the United States) ‘coalesced […] around Ricardo’s analyses, […] increasingly [becoming] a kind of life 
science: the quantity of vital human energy exerted in its production—that is to say, the quantity of labor—was acknowledged 
to be the only source of a commodity’s exchange value.’ See ‘The Romantics and the Political Economists,’ The Body 
Economic: Life, Death and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2006), 22  
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When the farmer’s peaches are taken from under the tree, and carried into 
town, they have a new look, and a hundredfold value over the fruit which 
grew on the same bough and lies fulsomely on the ground. The craft of the 
merchant is this bringing a thing from where it abounds, to where it is 
costly.265 
 
Here, the complexity of his position is compounded into two acute sentences. On the one hand, it conveys 
the process of commodification according to standard rules of market value; on the other hand, it also 
pictures the authorial process described in Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ as he pictures his process and explores 
the ways in which an idea or image shifts in intimation and meaning as it moves between contexts. From 
the private confines of his journals to the public stage and published page.  
Readers familiar with Emerson’s journals and his compositional practice will find nothing peculiar 
in his use of repetition. Emerson always composed through a process of reiteration—a procedural ‘double 
writing’ as Benjamin Pickford terms it.266 But what stands out here is the parallel between the content of 
these passages and the practice of their re-inscription; a process in which the context of an idea’s 
conception, the time and place of some original labour of production, is ‘put out of sight’ by Emerson’s 
procedural transcription and re-transcription of an idea across different works. Here, he is both practicing 
and preaching his ‘method of mind,’ and he would document his efforts to implement this critical method 
as an authorial procedure.  
Indeed, ‘OTHERISM’ reappears in his journals, but is referred to as an experiment in process. ‘I have 
learned in my own practice to take advantage of the aforesaid Otherism that makes other people’s bread & 
butter taste better than our own & books read better elsewhere than at home,’ he notes, 1838.267 He would 
refer again to ‘the fact of Otherism or the rotation of merits’ in September of that year (wherein he also 
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suggestively sits notes on ‘Subjectiveness,’ ‘Otherism’ and ‘Originality’ side by side).268 Such a self-
consciousness—that Emerson is striving to both preach and practice his ‘OTHERISM’—is thus as intrinsically 
linked to the symbolic value of critical exchange as it is Emerson’s sense of the symbolic power of an object 
taken to market.  
In a journal entry of 1847, the dominant ideas involved in the establishment of ‘OTHERISM’ are 
chartered yet again. Once again, his aim is to examine how the transaction between reader and writer 
mirrors the correlation of ‘Other’ with ‘Another,’ centralizing his theory of ‘commercial value,’ in order to 
argue for critical exchange as a form of mutual benefit or ‘cooperation.’ ‘Thought is the property of him 
who can entertain it,’ ‘who can adequately place it,’ notes Emerson in an attempt to stress that any theory 
of ownership is the result of a form of social interaction: 
 
Again, that dream of writing in committee returns, the Beaumont & 
Fletcherism. The Seckle pear is the best in America. But it is small, & the tree 
is small. So we bud an apple tree just above the root from this pear, and the 
bud becomes root, and is assisted at the same time by the more succulent roots 
of the apple, and a most vigorous seckle pear is the result. Can we not help 
ourselves as discreetly by the force of two in literature? Certainly, it only needs 
two well-placed & well-tempered for cooperation, to get somewhat far 
transcending any private enterprise in literature. 
But it requires great generosity & rare devotion to the aim in the 
parties & not that mean thievish way of looking at every thought as property. 
Thought is the property of him who can entertain it. Thought is the 
property of him who can adequately place it.269 
 
This is the source for the previously cited material from ‘Quotation and Originality.’ I cite the passage 
below again in full not simply to foreground the pertinence of Emerson’s interest in ‘cooperation’ and a 
process of ‘writing by committee,’ but as a means of further identifying the explicit connection Emerson 
would draw between critical, commercial and capitalist modes: 
 
 
268 Ibid., 82 
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In literature, quotation is good only when the writer whom I follow goes my 
way, and, being better mounted than I, gives me a cast, as we say; but if I like 
the gay equipage so well as to go out of my road, I had better have gone afoot. 
But it is necessary to remember there are certain considerations 
which go far to qualify a reproach too grave. This vast mental indebtedness 
has every variety that pecuniary debt has, —every variety of merit. The 
capitalist of either kind is as hungry to lend as the consumer to borrow; and 
the transaction no more indicates intellectual turpitude in the borrower than 
the simple fact of debt involves bankruptcy. On the contrary, in far the greater 
number of cases the transaction is honorable to both. Can we not help 
ourselves as discreetly by the force of two in literature? Certainly, it only needs 
two well placed and well-tempered for coöperation, to get somewhat far 
transcending any private enterprise! Shall we converse as spies? Our very 
abstaining to repeat and credit the fine remark of our friend is thievish. Each 
man of thought is surrounded by wiser men than he, if they cannot write as 
well. Cannot he and they combine? Cannot they sink their jealousies in God’s 
love, and call their poem Beaumont and Fletcher, or the Theban Phalanx’s?270 
 
The repetition of material here is crucial, as it speaks to his earlier working definition of a 
‘Transcendental Criticism.’ ‘Criticism must be transcendental,’ he writes, ‘that is, must consider literature 
ephemeral & easily entertain the supposition of its entire disappearance.’ All work is ‘revisable, corrigible, 
reversible by [the critic].’ 271 Emerson’s ‘force of two’ may be a redrafting of this same line of thought, 
although noted down almost a decade later, but it is significant that his alienated ‘Transcendental Critic’ 
now explicitly requires ‘Another’ for their ability to ‘revise’ a work to function. The power of the ‘critic’ is 
here explicitly restaged as ‘the power of two,’ just as the ‘reader’ needs the ‘book,’ needs their author, in 
order for this transactional theory of critical exchange to take effect. 
 Not only does the ‘force of two’ indicate the need of ‘Another’ within the process of production—
both culturally and commercially speaking—but it also implies an act of duplication through reproduction; 
that the movement of ideas, images and objects is tantamount to a theory of economic and cultural 
productivity. Traces of this movement or ‘method of mind’ from the singular to the plural can be identified 
 
270 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 189-190 
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elsewhere in Emerson’s writings, and it is crucial to his first establishment of ‘OTHERISM’ in 1836. Following 
his allusion to ‘Diogenes,’ Emerson alludes to the possibility that his theory of ‘juxtaposition’ could read 
as a theory of reproduction.272 ‘I noticed […] that the picture pleases when the original does not,’ that ‘the 
subjective must be made objective,’ and fresh ownership of an object in circulation accordingly accrues 
new meaning as name and material coalesce into something new or ‘other.’273  
This remark is repeated in the early lecture ‘Literature’ (1837),274 and also—in part—in 
‘Experience’ (1844);275 and the line central to his enunciation of ‘OTHERISM’—‘What face thought, word, 
like we best?’ Another’s’—would be put to good effect in the early lecture ‘Society’ (1837), wherein he 
would seemingly test the idea as a means of not only considering critical enterprise, but also his thoughts 
on economic participation more broadly.276 Emerson’s interest in the symbolic value of ‘Another’—and, 
indeed, his assessment of the necessity of ‘Another’ to qualify our own terms of ownership of an idea—has 
been alluded to as emblematic of the ‘economic strain’ in Emersonian thought. According to Alexander C. 
Kern, ‘Although he was not an economist, and not even primarily interested in economics,’ Emerson ‘so 
frequently touched upon the subject’ that ‘an understanding of his economic thought is a prerequisite to 
the evaluation of his entire thought on any relative or absolute scale.’277 Whether we regard Emerson as 
signaling capitalism’s moral, ideological and practicable economic imperatives as ‘a symptom of [his] 
times’ or as a ‘motivating cultural force,’ the ways in which economics impacts his key philosophical 
conceits—as has been shown—is nonetheless paramount.278 ‘The principles of correspondence, 
melioration, [and] individualism’ are all underpinned by a receptivity and sensitivity to the ‘economic 
 
272 It is perhaps also worth noting the pertinence of Emerson’s allusion to Diogenes insofar as no written record of his thinking 
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structures’ that Emerson acknowledged as crucial, according to Kern. ‘When these principles are used to 
explain his economic theories, [...] some of the apparent inconsistencies [in his works] will vanish.’279  
 Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’—in its repetition, alteration, and restaging as a theory of ‘COMMERCIAL 
VALUE’—supports Kern’s claim. It speaks to the complexity of Emerson’s interpolative treatment of culture 
and capital; and, more so, it is precisely the economic system that he details in his ‘OTHERISM’ that 
underpins his ‘art of appropriation’ as both a practice and concept. That we can trace these ideas through 
from the nascence of his authorship to his later writings provides a sense of consistency in Emerson’s 
philosophical engagement with the ‘reader’—not only as the protagonist of his essays—but as their chief 
operator; Emerson being apparently aware of his own need of ‘Another,’ and theorizing that contingency. 
For Emerson, then, literature is dependent upon the ‘force’ of social participation; it is a form that 
axiomatically complicates the very idea of ‘private enterprise.’ A reader depends upon a writer (and vice 
versa) for a work of literature to do its work. But Emerson also locates a critical parity between pecuniary 
capitalism and critical engagement in so far as a ‘dollar’ is equally dependent upon both private and public 
terms of value. ‘The value of a dollar is social,’ he writes in ‘Wealth’ (1860), ‘as it is created by society;’280 
‘every word and particle is public and tunable,’ as he notes in ‘Quotation and Originality.’281 Both literary 
language and financial value are represented as cultural fields (or forms of currency) underpinned by 
systems of valorisation and instrumentality that Emerson regards as inherently social, even though they 
equally depend upon private application and personal resonance. The critical value of a work of literature 
is artificially established by the co-work of a reader and writer, mediated by a text; and Emerson considers 
the value of a single dollar bill in similar terms. However, the conflict between self and society in his 
thinking is re-established as he considers that value of that dollar in circulation. ‘The value of a dollar is 
social,’ he notes, ‘as it is created by society.’282 And yet he elsewhere admits that ‘Money’ itself ‘is of no 
value.’ That dollar ‘cannot spend itself,’ and ‘All depends on the skill of the spender.’283 ‘Money is 
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representative’—‘it follows the nature and fortunes of [its] owner’—and yet it remains a ‘delicate meter of 
civil, social and moral change’ as its etiological value.284  
These contradictory impulses (shifting from personal to pluralist forms of critical and cultural value 
and back again) illustrates the importance of mediation to Emerson’s mind; a culturalist and critical form 
of valorisation that seeks to empower our own sense of the significance of a given cultural object. His 
‘dollar’ is nothing but wastepaper stock without an economy above it, a social milieu to contextualize its 
value, and an individual on the ground to hold it up and apply its value to their own contexts and 
circumstances. Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ suggests that there is a distinct parity between a single dollar bill and 
a literary work to Emerson’s mind and, in this way, Emerson’s dollar becomes a tool to better unpick his 
complex relationship with literary culture. If the reader’s ‘aim is on life and not on literature,’ according to 
Emerson, then the high-minded connotations of the literary field mean little if we do not have the means 
of instrumentalizing and applying them.285 ‘The scholar will feel that the richest romance, the noblest fiction 
that was ever woven, the heart and soul of beauty, lies enclosed in human life,’ he writes.286 But that ‘life’ 
requires a social context for it to be afforded value to Emerson’s thinking. That he would claim that ‘The 
value of a dollar is social,’287 but that ‘all depends upon the skill of the spender,’ suggests that the ‘meaning 
of economy’ for Emerson was its imposition of an organizational principle for examining how value is 
afforded and contingent upon both personal and public contexts.288  
Emerson’s dollar bill dialectic of self and society is reminiscent of his remarks in ‘History,’ 
regarding the necessary publication of ‘private opinion.’289 Value, be it critical or commercial in character, 
is a ‘secular and generic result’ result of the ‘prodigality of life,’ of participation.290 Its ‘Mechanics’ denote an 
economic system that proves as dependent upon our private resources of mind as it does upon a public 
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determination of value. But Emerson’s romance of participation—his scrutinous examination of culture’s 
economic systems—is ultimately a theory of use. ‘Use society, do not serve it,’ he writes in his journals in 
1838; ‘use books, do not serve them.’291 And new value can be created by way of our forging new 
connections within the economic network of ‘others’ he envisages.  
Although the politics of Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ as a poetic system proves vital to the development 
and sophistication of his thinking, Emerson’s contribution to America’s larger political tradition is scarcely 
explicitly registered, regardless of his sense that ideological paradigm owes to each individual’s capacity to 
question and antagonize the connection between ‘antecedent and contemporary traditions’ through critical 
and cultural analysis.292 Whilst Emerson’s recent readers have proven increasingly keen to identify the 
corporatist and capitalist atmosphere that appears to accompany his allusions to the fortitude of the ‘private 
man,’ they do so without sufficient reference to the interrelation of commerce, capital and criticism as 
established in his early writings. However, and as shown, the notion that literary culture could relay a form 
of soft, governmental power—the idea that culture serves a significant political function by mirroring and 
challenging dominant ideas—is key to Emerson’s thinking. Emerson’s position can be contextualized, with 
regards to the cultural and political prerogatives of the American Revolution and its cultural effects in the 
first decades of the American 1800s. Considering the progress of American independence, a federalist 
newspaper in 1792 would ask, ‘To what physical, moral or political energy shall this flourishing state of 
things be ascribed?’ The answer posed therein would be ‘general government,’ disclosing a want to 
formalize and implement the country’s constitutional basis at both a local and federal level.293 Emerson, in 
1837, largely poses the same questions to an audience of students and educators in ‘The American Scholar.’ 
However, his response—rather than to appraise the qualities of ‘general government’—was to consider the 
calibre of literature as an agent of political change. ‘Who can doubt that poetry will revive and lead in a 
new age, as the star in the constellation Harp, which now flames in our zenith, astronomers announce, 
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shall one day be the pole-star for a thousand years?’294  
Emerson has since, accordingly, been argued as locating and advocating a form of ‘liberal critique’ 
as a favoured means of exploring forms of cultural relation that would foster America’s burgeoning literary 
culture as a form of political power.295 However, the dominance of the ‘self’ within Emerson’s wider 
thinking and critical legacy continues to complicate the political application of his ideas, and continues to 
perplex his readers, in terms of his want to identify a politics of individualism in tandem with his ‘market 
poetics.’296 Emerson’s well-documented solipsism, and the self-interest of Emerson’s reader (the ‘I’ or ‘eye’ 
of his argument) has both historic and bibliographic precedent. As Alexis de Tocqueville notes in Democracy 
in America (published in translation in 1835), American writers often employ ‘an oratory [that] often uses 
an inflated [rhetorical] style’—a kind of subjectivist impasse that Tocqueville sees as endemic to early 
American literary culture. The problem, as Tocqueville describes it, is that a significant form of symbolism 
has been warranted the act of self-reflection—the metonymic intimations of the American subject in the 
singular—and has proven a dominant culturalist trend since the country’s inception. Picturing America’s 
fledgling ‘democratic’ culture, he alleges that each citizen seems ‘habitually engaged in the contemplation 
of a very puny object: namely, himself.’297  
If we set that claim in its context, Tocqueville is confronting precisely the cultural syndrome that 
Emerson sought to entertain in his early analyses of ‘our use of literature’ and his sense of the symbolic 
implications that abound in his exploration of a reader’s laborious engagements with a page.298 I cite 
Tocqueville below at length: 
 
If [the writer] ever raises his looks higher, he then perceives nothing but the 
immense form of society at large, or the still more imposing aspect of 
mankind. His ideas are all either extremely minute and clear or extremely 
general and vague: what lies between is an open void. When he has been 
drawn out of his own sphere, therefore, he always expects that some amazing 
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object will be offered to his attention; and it is on these terms alone that he 
consents to tear himself for an instant from the petty complicated cares which 
form the charm and the excitement of his life. This appears to me sufficiently 
to explain why men in democracies, whose concerns are in general so paltry, 
call upon their poets for conceptions so vast and descriptions so unlimited. 
The authors, on their part, do not fail to obey a propensity of which they 
themselves partake; they perpetually inflate their imaginations, and 
expanding them beyond all bounds, they not unfrequently abandon the great 
in order to reach the gigantic. By these means, they hope to attract the 
observation of the multitude, and to fix it easily upon themselves: nor are their 
hopes disappointed; for as the multitude seeks for nothing in poetry but 
subjects of vast dimensions, it has neither the time to measure with accuracy 
the proportions of all the subjects set before it, nor a taste sufficiently correct 
to perceive at once in what respect they are out of proportion. The author and 
the public at once vitiate one another.299 
 
This sense that an early American literature is beset by an inability to correlate the local and ‘gigantic’ 
issues that impact social being was a problem that Emerson was particularly attuned to. The ‘open void’ 
that Tocqueville refers to is only at a slight remove from Emerson’s emphasis on the ‘gulf between every 
me and thee’ that he would detail in ‘Experience,’300 and in ‘Circles’ (1841), Emerson would allege that the 
progress of literary culture is largely correspondent to the period of radical change that the country had 
experienced over the course of the post-revolutionary period:  
 
We all stand waiting, empty, —knowing, possibly, that we can be full, 
surrounded by mighty symbols which are not symbols to us, but prose and 
trivial toys. Then cometh the god and converts the statues into fiery men, and 
by a flash of his eye burns up the veil which shrouded all things, and the 
meaning of the very furniture, of cup and saucer, of chair and clock and tester, 
is manifest. The facts which loomed so large in the fogs of yesterday, —
property, climate, breeding, personal beauty and the like, have strangely 
changed their proportions. All that we reckoned settled shakes and rattles; and 
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literatures, cities, climates, religions, leave their foundations and dance before 
our eyes.301 
 
Such comments appear to regard the American Revolution as having resulted in a culture of anticipation 
rather than political agency. However, the apparent failure of Emerson’s efforts to correlate his analyses of 
literary culture and effusive interest in self-determinacy—his inability to sufficiently analyze the ‘rattle’ of 
society and explicate the ‘gigantic’ issues of his hour—has resulted in a common dismissal of Emerson’s 
capacity to find stratification as a ‘serious philosopher.’302 As with Tocqueville’s remarks on the literary 
outlook of this new nation, the predominance of the ‘private man’ complicates Emerson’s equation of self 
and society; self and culture.  
As shown, Emerson’s ‘reader’ or ‘scholar’ traffics as a symbol or cipher for his longstanding interest 
in self-determinacy; a decentralization of power; and the ultimate authority of ‘the first person singular’ 
within his writings.303 However, to foreground his unerring interest in the fortitude of the ‘private man’—
and his interest in the institutionalization (and professionalization) of cultural and critical spheres—is to 
overlook the complex relationship with conditionality and contingency present in Emerson’s explorations 
of subjective thought as an empowering critical tool.  
Rather than merely an exegetic allusion that we can extract from Emerson’s writings, how we deal 
with the question of our conditionality is explicitly mapped in Emerson’s early essays. ‘People forget,’ he 
writes in (again in ‘Circles’), that it is the ‘eye’ which ‘makes’ the ‘mental horizon’—that we are the locus 
of a self-inventing optical illusion.304 In ‘Experience,’ he would note that ‘We have learned that we do not 
see directly, but mediately, and that we have no means of correcting these colored and distorting lenses 
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which we are.’305 Emerson’s insistence on the limitations of sight, of sight as only a means of mediation, 
or of sight as a means with which to question the authenticity of critical perspective, can be read as branding 
Emerson a philosopher of ‘sad self-knowledge’ (to borrow his own phrase).306 As Emerson admits, the ‘fact 
that we exist’ does not axiomatically guarantee an independence of mind, but rather a sense of our innate 
conditionality:307  
 
Perhaps these subject-lenses have a creative power; perhaps there are no 
objects. Once we lived in what we saw; now, the rapaciousness of this new 
power, which threatens to absorb all things, engages us. Nature, art, persons, 
letters, religions, objects, successively tumble in, and God is but one of its 
ideas. Nature and literature are subjective phenomena; every evil and every 
good thing is a shadow which we cast.308 
 
In this context, Emerson’s Transcendentalism, although popularly held as a paean to the vitality of an 
alienable self, is as dedicated to the conditional elements of our critical faculty as it is our agency and 
intellectual freedom. Contra to any sense of the powers of ‘self-reliance’ and self-determinacy with which 
Emerson is more popularly associated, Emerson is all-to-aware that we require ‘another’ to self-define, as 
shown, and such a perspective complicates his remarks on the ‘subject’ and his reflections on social, cultural 
and economic participation. 
Reading across his early writings, literature remains a favourite metaphor for an unpacking of this 
theory of critical contingency. ‘Our souls are not self-fed,’ he notes in ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature,’ 
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‘but do eat and drink of chemical water and wheat.’ ‘We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which 
makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity,’ Emerson claims (again inferring an interest in the 
networking of culture).309 Condensing the complex social-political implications of such dependency down 
to a consideration of the formal axioms of a book and its requisite need for a reader and writer, his acute 
awareness of the intellectual difficulty involved in theorizing a form of critical independence is clearly 
phrased. Recall, in the late essay ‘Books’ (1870), his aforementioned remark as per the connect between 
‘The reader and the book;’ that ‘—either without the other is naught.’310 This two-way street of either 
‘nothing or all’ is a familiar one. Again, it echoes the oft-cited ‘Transparent Eyeball’ passage of Emerson’s 
Nature,311 and is reminiscent of his characterization of a book as either ‘Everything or nothing,’ depending 
on the discerning interests of that which is ‘signified’ in the individual ‘eye.’312 However, Emerson’s interest 
in our ‘sad self-knowledge’ as a socially engineered sensation—a reflection of the maxim with which this 
thesis began (and epigraph that would open ‘Self-Reliance’) that we should not ‘look for things outside of 
ourselves’—is further complicated if we are to look again to ‘Quotation and Originality.’  
‘Quotation and Originality’ provides a significant expansion of Emerson’s theory of ‘original 
relation’ as set forwards in ‘Nature.’ It is here that Emerson most explicitly deals with the mechanisms of 
critical work—quotation and appropriation (as the essay’s title predicates). However, the essay also 
displays variants of unerring faith in ‘self-trust,’ ‘sensibility,’ and ‘intellectual power’ as he would propound 
in ‘Self-Reliance’ by foregrounding our ‘use’ or appropriation of errant material. 313 Emerson’s sense of the 
agential power of a single intellect is complemented by what he terms our ‘assimilating power:’  
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We expect a great man to be a good reader; or in proportion to the 
spontaneous power should be the assimilating power. And though such are a 
more difficult and exacting class, they are not less eager. “He that borrows the 
aid of an equal understanding,” said Burke, “doubles his own; he that uses 
that of a superior elevates his own to the stature of that he contemplates.”314 
 
Emerson connects the cultural significance of this ‘assimilating power’ with a more explicit theory of 
quotation; and explores the ways in which the act and agency of quotation and appropriation proves 
extensive as to inform the industrial, technological and technocratic advancement of antebellum culture. 
Books, proverbs, customs, laws and machines are all enlisted as quotable materials; ‘We quote not only 
books and proverbs, but arts, sciences, religion, customs and laws; nay, we quote temples and houses, tables 
and chairs by imitation,’ he notes.315 But Emerson also aims to further embolden his position by drawing 
comparison between a literary critic and ‘The Patent-Office Commissioner’ who ‘knows that all machines 
in use have been invented and re-invented over and over; the mariner’s compass, the boat, the pendulum, 
glass, movable types, the kaleidoscope, the railway, the power-loom, etc.’316 
In line with Emerson’s interest in the decentralization of government and an ascendant culture of 
privatization in the American antebellum, his early addresses frame an explicit want to wrest authority 
from federal authority to highlight, instead, the significance of individual agency and the ordinance of 
personal or private power. As noted, Emerson evocatively argues literature as a key cultural form capable 
of supporting such an aim, but his explicit remarks on the form and function of American governance are 
particularly pointed. In ‘New England Reformers’ (1844), for example, he ‘confesses’ that ‘the motto of the 
Globe newspaper is so attractive to [him], that [he] can seldom find much appetite to read what is below it 
in its column, that The world is governed too much.’317 ‘[Let] there be no control and no interference in the 
administration of the affairs of this kingdom of me,’ he notes.318 In ‘Politics’ (1844), he argues that ‘all 
public ends look vague and quixotic beside private ones;’319 and in ‘The Young American’ (1844)—
 
314 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 177-178 
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although he confesses that the ‘landscape seems to crave Government’—it is the authority of the ‘land lord’ 
rather than federal offices of Washington that he endorses.320 Those ‘who understand the land and its uses, 
and the applicability of men, and those whose government would be what it should, namely, mediation 
between want and supply.’321 Social progress is defined by the traffic of ‘private thought to the public 
opinion,’ as he notes in ‘The Young American’ (echoing the line of thought that would preoccupy him in 
‘History’); and the sacrifice of ‘private interest for public welfare’ is key to his comments on America’s 
political and industrial development. Such an aim seems to steadfastly and unequivocally support the 
further industrialization, privatization and commercialization of the American scene; emphatically 
stressing a culture of ‘want and supply’ as a form of political order. The axis of thought upon which 
Emerson’s ‘Young American’ depends pictures the co-dependency of ‘private interest’ and ‘public 
welfare.’322 ‘We build railroads, we know not for what or for whom; but one thing is certain,’ he writes; 
‘that we who build will receive the very smallest share of benefit.’323 An individual mediates the ‘want and 
supply’ of the broader social field to which they belong; but does so through investment in a mechanical 
expansion of the increasingly networked iteration of culture that Emerson seems so insistent upon 
exploring, expressing, philosophizing and eulogizing. 
In ‘The Young American,’ we’ve an interesting rejoinder to the ‘profit’ system of interpretation 
with which I began. As noted, Emerson is interested in the ‘profit’ of critical enterprise;324 insistent that we 
ought ‘credit literature with more than the bear word it gives us.’325 The ‘benefit’ that Emerson describes in 
‘The Young American’ is thus emblematic of the feeling of public betterment rather than the fact thereof; 
another iteration of the aforementioned ‘American sentiment’ that he would detail in this same essay. But 
 
320 Emerson, ‘The Young American’ (1844), CW.I., 384 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid., 374 
323 Ibid., 374-375 
324 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 194 
325 Emerson: ‘Observe moreover that we ought to credit literature with much more than the bare word it gives us. I have just 
been reading poems which now in memory shine with a certain steady, warm, autumnal light. That is not in their 
grammatical construction which they give me. If I analyse the sentences, it eludes me, but is the genius and suggestion of the 
whole. Over every true poem lingers a certain wild beauty, immeasurable; a happiness lightsome and delicious fills the heart 
and brain, as they say every man walk environed by his proper atmosphere, extending to some distance around him. This 
beautiful result must be credited to literature also in casting its account.’ See ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature’ (1840), 
CW.XII., 310 
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if we examine the ‘The Young American’ in more detail, Emerson’s investment in the enhancement of a 
public sphere carries with it an even more explicit regard for the private sector and the forms of invention, 
entrepreneurship, and industrialization that he suggests would expedite the social, philosophical and 
political progress of America’s cultural offices. As Eric Keenaghan argues, Emerson seems keen to figure 
a sense of America’s political futurity as dependent upon a literalization of the term ‘commonwealth.’326 
‘Trade,’ Keenaghan supposes, has supplanted the monarchical English parliamentary prerogatives rejected 
by the American Revolution as a key form of governance.327  
This idea can be located in ‘The Young American.’ Depicting this ‘new and anti-feudal power of 
Commerce,’ Emerson argues America’s cosmopolitical and cosmopolitan future depends upon the 
legislative support of a ‘commercial system:’328  
 
We plant trees, we build stone houses, we redeem the waste, we make 
prospective laws, we found colleges and hospitals, for remote generations. We 
should be mortified to learn that the little benefit we chanced in our own 
persons to receive was the utmost they would yield. The history of commerce 
is the record of this beneficent tendency. […] None should be a governor who 
has not a talent for governing. Now many people have a native skill for 
carving out business for many hands; a genius for the disposition of affairs; 
and are never happier than when difficult practical questions, which 
embarrass other men, are to be solved. All lies in light before them; they are 
in their element. Could any means be contrived to appoint only these! There 
really seems a progress towards such a state of things in which this work shall 
be done by these natural workmen; and this, not certainly through any 
increased discretion shown by the citizens at elections, but by the gradual 
contempt into which official government falls, and the increasing disposition 
of private adventurers to assume its fallen functions.  
 
Rather than simply prizing the ‘private adventurer’ alone in this theorization of the ‘history’ and culture of 
‘commerce,’ Emerson also looks to the inevitable corporatization of America’s self-management; enlisting 
 
326 Eric Keenaghan, ‘Reading Emerson in Other Times: On a Politics of Solitude and an Ethics of Risk,’ in The Other Emerson, 
171 
327 Ibid. 
328 Emerson, ‘The Young American’ (1844), CW.I., 385 
 98 
the ‘fallen functions’ of government as having left a cultural lacuna in their wake. Such ideas are 
reminiscent of Emerson’s previously noted ‘silent revolution,’ wherein the newspaper is held as a symbolic 
stand-in for the expansion of America’s cultural field. Again, Emerson looks to written matter to explain 
the complexities of his thinking; he cites the post office, the ‘private telegraph’ and the ‘express companies’ 
as would technologize communication in the 1840s:  
 
Thus, the national Post Office is likely to go into disuse before the private 
telegraph and the express companies. The currency threatens to fall entirely 
into private hands. Justice is continually administered more and more by 
private reference, and not by litigation. We have feudal governments in a 
commercial age. It would be but an easy extension of our commercial system, 
to pay a private emperor a fee for services, as we pay an architect, an engineer, 
or a lawyer. If any man has a talent for righting wrong, for administering 
difficult affairs, for counselling poor farmers how to turn their estates to good 
husbandry, for combining a hundred private enterprises to a general benefit.329 
 
Emerson’s interest in the Post Office parallels the 1838 journal citation with which I began; ‘by & by will 
come a reader and an age to justify all your context.’330 The postal service is emblematic of his want to 
consider the idea of textual communication and the object of our writing for ‘Another.’  
That Emerson should so centralize the efficacy of a ‘commercial system’ of governance as a means 
of combatting America’s feudal past diverges from a popular characterization of his philosophy as anti-
establishment in tone and indication. In this respect, Emerson’s emphasis on the efficacy—and the prospect 
of its privatization—is of interest.331 Here, in ‘The Young American’ (his ‘first full defense’ of capitalism’s 
social mechanisms, according to Keenaghan), he argues that ‘commerce’ could defray the authority of 
feudalist social structures by our practically, ideologically and intellectually investing in the private sector 
instead.332 The ‘public welfare’ he cites as the net result of ‘private’ work is only plausible if we privilege a 
conceptualization of self over society, however; an affiliated system of ‘private enterprises’ should be the 
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330 Emerson, ‘Journal D’ (Undated, 1838), JMN.VII., 118 
331 See Sacvan Bercovitch, ‘The Problem of Ideology in a Time of Dissensus,’ Rites of Assent, 348; 353-377 
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presiding focus of government, and ‘the easy extension of [a] commercial system’ our collective aim.333 
Emerson’s remarks on American commercialism would scan as provocatively to his contemporary 
audience as they read today and have been argued as politically opportunistic. Considering that Emerson’s 
interest in the ‘private man’ can thus be considered a political position rather than a philosophical paean 
to a romanticist individuality, Nathan Crick notes that 1841, the year in which Emerson published his First 
Series,334 the Boston area was galvanized by a public sense of opportunity informed by ‘the crushing defeat 
of Van Buren by the Whig Party’s campaign machinery’ in 1840.335 Economic recovery following the panic 
of 1837 was faltering, and Whig nominee William Henry Harrison would defeat the incumbent Van Buren 
of the Democratic Party in an election that would mark the first of two Whig victories in subsequent 
presidential elections, unsettling political foundations in Washington, and thus forging a demand for a new 
kind of cultural climate.336 This atmosphere was a favourable one for Emerson, whose sense of the 
‘commercial’ is anchored in a distinct suspicion of power systems and structures.337 Although it is important 
to note that Emerson harboured no particular political ambitions, as Alfred von Frank suggests (speaking 
to the general critical reception of Emerson’s early works and the political contexts that Crick signals as so 
important). Nonetheless, Emerson’s First Series should be regarded as ‘a manual for young persons against 
the tyranny and authority of the age.’338  
In this sense, Emerson’s epigraph to ‘Self-Reliance’—reference to Beaumont and Fletcher, ‘Do not 
seek for things outside of ourselves’—can be regarded as little more than an advert for American 
exceptionalism.339   
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Nevertheless, the simplicity of such an assertion does not accommodate the complexity of 
Emerson’s reflections on the machinations of critical engagement and the weight of external or ‘outside’ 
influence. As John Carlos Rowe writes, by way of Bercovitch, Emerson ‘hesitates’ as he searches for the 
‘proper paradox’ that could connect the aims of Jacksonian capitalism with the ambitions of European 
socialism.340 Emerson’s facilitation of a national cultural aesthetic (or ‘sentiment,’ to use his term), depends 
as much upon a theoretical engagement with alienation as it did any summary account of the political and 
ideological development of America as a nation-state (‘build your own world,’ as Emerson would famously 
declare).341 However, literature does appear the ‘proper paradox’ by which Emerson could ally his interest 
in the private life of the mind and the public offices of social engagement. Part Two will investigate this 
idea in more detail, and consider Emerson’s theory of the ‘outside’ by looking first to the economic and 
political contexts of his early works, and how such circumstances ‘[create] both man and methods.’342 I will 
argue Emerson’s ‘art of appropriation’ as a position conversant with Emerson’s own economic contexts, 
and explore this critical praxis relative to the financial crisis of 1837, the industrial enhancement and 
impediment of cultures of print and publication, and as a continuation of his interest in the circulatory 
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Annie Leibovitz, Above—Emerson’s Library’ (detail); Below—The contents of a 
study drawer, ‘a miniature globe, a turtle shell, pocketknives, folding scissors, and 
a folding bottle opener.’ ‘The contents of Emerson’s study are now in the Concord 







































‘America was the historical birthplace of the widespread use of paper money in the Western world, and a debate about the [value of] 
coined and paper money dominated American political discourse from 1825 to 1875. [...] The paper money debate was concerned with 
symbolization in general, and hence not only with money but also with aesthetics. Symbolization, in this context, concerns the relationship 
between the substantial thing and its sign. Solid gold (from which the ingots of gold coin were made) as associated with the substance of 
value. Whether one regarded paper as an appropriate symbol [...] or as an inappropriate and downright misleading one, that sign was 
insubstantial insofar as the paper counted for nothing as an [independent] commodity and was thus 'insensible' in the economic system of 
exchange. The paper of money was called an appearance or shadow. [The above cartoon], 'A Shadow is Not a Substance' (M.A Woolf, 
undated; nineteenth century) depicts the relationship between substance and shadow.' See Marc Shell, Money, Language and Thought: Literary 

































Under the direction of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S. Post Office would announce plans in 1938 for a series of stamps 
recognizing the twenty-nine American presidents who had taken office since independence and, in 1940, would follow that series 
with a companion run of a further thirty-five—issued over the course of a ten-month period—that would commemorate the 
country’s cultural legacy and craft ‘a philatelic message of hope and optimism to the American people.’  
Alongside appearances by Louisa May Alcott, James Fenimore Cooper, Walt Whitman, and a litany of authors, poets 
and educators who had taken their place in an American cultural canon, Emerson’s portrait would appear on a 3¢ stamp in a 
bright burgundy hue. A select sample of the stamps in this series (the 1934 ‘National Parks’ series; the 1938 ‘Presidential’ series; 
and the 1940 ‘Famous Americans’ series) are displayed at The Smithsonian National Postage Museum, and a collation of 
philatelic scans of these commemorative stamps can be viewed online in notes supporting the exhibition Delivering Hope: FDR and 







GEOLOGY AFTER AN EARTHQUAKE       

























[These] black times have a great scientific value. It is an epoch so 
critical a philosopher would not miss […]. What was, ever since my 
memory, solid continent, now yawns apart and discloses its 




RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
From his Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks (1837) 1 
 
 
I knew a draughtsman employed in a public survey who found that 
 he could not sketch the rocks until their geological structure was first 
 explained to him. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
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As Paul Jay has noted, ‘We cannot neatly separate economic from cultural commodities.’ ‘When 
commodities travel, culture travels, and when culture travels, commodities travel,’ and ‘materialist critics 
are therefore wrong when they claim that a culturalist model is inappropriate for studying what is 
essentially an economic phenomenon.’3 Although Jay is commenting on our need for new terminologies 
and systems with which to better explore the changing landscape of literary studies in the twenty-first 
century, his position—as shown in the previous chapters—is pre-empted by Emerson in his careful and 
considered efforts to ascertain the link between culturalist and capitalist phenomena.  
 Whilst Emerson’s own theoretical response to the ‘travel’ of culture between contexts needs be 
kept in mind, his theoretical ‘OTHERISM,’ the following chapters in this second section will concentrate on 
the historic contexts that inform Emerson’s conceptualization of commerce and criticism and examine 
their accommodation in Emerson’s practical and theoretical responses to the act of reading. I will examine 
his sense of the prospective intersection of culture and capital relative to the sociocultural, economic and 
industrial pressures of his period, and study how the expansion of the American book trade, the 
professionalization of the American publisher, and the introduction of new technological modes of 
production effected the circulation of paper matter. As will be shown, these factors served to further 
influence Emerson’s relationship with critical enterprise, commercial cultures of exchange, and can also be 
acutely traced in Emerson’s use of metaphor, impacting his theorizations of labour and scholarly labour in 
particular. Emerson’s complex relationship with industrialization, economic expansionism and the ethics 
and aesthetics of financial panic are reflected and refracted in his conceptualizations of criticism and 
interpretative agency. In the following chapters, his sensitivity to the symbolic, political and cultural 
intimations of economic expansionism will be claimed to affect his conceptualizations of the act of 
interpretation and the ownership of ideas and will be argued as of fundamental significance to recent 
critical, revisionist ‘reconstructions’ of his canonical and cultural standing.  
Such readings have ‘increasingly’ regarded Emerson’s philosophical relationship with literary 
culture, capital and commerce as a product of economic collapse, recovery and expansionism in his early 
 
3 Paul Jay, in introduction to Global Matters: The Transnational Turn in Literary Studies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2010), 3 
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writings of the 1830s and 1840s (in response to the financial crisis of 1837 in particular).4 As this thesis has 
sought to map, the distinction between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ Emerson pertains broadly to the dynamism and 
development of America’s economic biography, and Emerson can progressively be seen to identify the 
interplay of culture and commerce in his later writings.5 His registration of the industrialization and 
institutionalization of literature as a cultural domain is particularly acute; and the clarity of his position is 
supported by a cache of tropes, topics and symbols informed by the ascendancy of market ideologies over 
the course of his era. However, I will argue that this nexus of signs and symbols is also present in his early 
works. A clear and cumulative effort to engage both literary culture and marketization from the late-1830s 
onward is particularly visible if we consider Emerson’s philosophical engagement with the forms of labour 
concomitant with America’s cultural development, and his efforts to explore the relationship between an 
individual worker and broader ideological (and economic) systems and structures.  
Whilst the previous chapter concentrated more on the metacritical dimensions of Emersonian 
Criticism (vis-à-vis the works of Vernon Louis Parrington, Joel Porte and David LaRocca, amongst others), 
I will here turn to the political imperatives of recent critical responses and Emerson’s relationship with 
labour will be key. I will examine how, as Christopher Newfield notes, Emerson can be held as not only 
scrutinizing our ‘relation to external powers’ but also our ‘submission to them,’6 how a ‘collective theory 
of self-determination’ is informed by a theory of ‘individual obedience to the determination of higher 
powers,’ and explored by way of determining the ascendency of a market culture as both a practicable 
economic system and a new ideological paradigm.7 As will be shown, a conceptualization of labour is key 
to such an investigation. 
Newfield’s remarks are tendentious. Toying with the apparent interchangeability of theocratic and 
economic forms of ‘higher power’ in Emerson’s works, he infers that Emerson’s choice use of the term 
 
4 Grusin, ‘Put God in Your Debt: Emerson’s Economy of Expenditure,’ 35 
5 Although Wolfe more aggressively charts the distinction between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ Emerson, Porte also examines the 
ways in which a ‘new’ Emerson’s philosophical and political thinking has proven transformed in the second half of the 
twentieth century; ‘a figure whose complexities belied that older optimistic all-American aphorist once dear to captains of 
industry, genteel professors and hopeful preachers in search of suitably uplifting remarks.’ See Porte, ‘The Problem of 
Emerson,’ 28-29 
6 Newfield, ‘Emerson’s Corporate Individualism,’ 658 
7 Ibid. 
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‘Transcendental’ to describe his critical practice demands further investigation.8 Emerson would argue ‘the 
Transcendent [as] economy also,’ 1839, and I will argue that Emerson’s use of symbol and metaphor 
deliberately thus sought a new way to chart the ascendancy of a market culture that acts as both a 
practicable economic system and a new ideological paradigm.9 His awareness of the significance of literary 
culture to the ascendance and sophistication of market ideologies will be argued as particularly pertinent, 
as will be his sense that the agency of interpretation and the act of quotation or ‘art of appropriation’ serves 
to indicate the practical relationship between scholarly activity and the economic progress of an 
independent America. 
Historicist accounts of Emerson’s early thoughts on political economy are firmly anchored in the 
political life of antebellum America. However, this is not a question of political partisanship. Nonetheless, 
as Daniel Malachuk suggests, Emerson’s contribution to the philosophical development of Republicanism 
prior to the outbreak of the Civil War proves noteworthy if we are to consider the resonances of Emerson’s 
political thought today. Examining ‘often overlooked’ tropes and themes in Emerson’s early lectures, 1835 
to 1840, Malachuk argues that the philosophies underpinning the development of the ‘grand old party’ are 
in line with Emerson’s interest in proprietorship, self-determinacy and forms of self-governance. For 
Malachuk, ‘three versions of modern Republicanism’ are present in Emerson’s writings: the ‘classical,’ the 
‘liberal’ and the ‘cosmic.’10 However, more important is the link between economization and governance 
that allows for these three iterations of governance to coalesce. Malachuk suggests that Emerson sought to 
explore the ways in which ‘a market economy’ could ‘decisively’ dethrone ‘feudalism’ as a key precept of 
the United States pre-independence, and did so by ‘synthesizing’ these three modes into ‘a unique 
republican philosophy of self-reliance’ anchored in a faith in market systems.11 Emerson understood ‘the 
liberal republican view of commerce,’ and would ‘incorporate’ this position into his own thinking, 
Malachuk notes.12 However, it is Emerson’s combinatory view of culture and commerce, together with his 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 Emerson, ‘Journal D’ (Undated, 1839), JMN.VII., 259 
10 Daniel S. Malachuk, ‘The Republican Philosophy of Emerson’s Early Lectures,’ The New England Quarterly, 71.3. (1998), 
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11 Ibid., 407 
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investment in the structures and systems of labour (and literary or scholarly labour, in particular) that 
continues to be a perplexing element of his thinking and has preoccupied recent, revisionist accounts of his 
political thought and culturalist philosophies.  
Writing in his journals as a young student, 1822, Emerson would note that ‘In a money-making 
community literature will soon thrive.’13 
 
It must always follow not precede successful trade. The first wants to be 
supplied are the native ones of animal subsistence & comfort & when these 
are more than provided for & luxury & ease begin to look about them for new 
gratification the mind then urges its claim to cultivation.14 
 
Emerson’s analysis of America’s ‘claim to cultivation’ can be suggestively traced across his authorship. In 
‘The Young American,’ for instance, he notes that he is fascinated by ‘Trade’ and its status as a social 
‘instrument,’ but admits that it ‘must give way to [something] somewhat broader and better, whose signs 
are already dawning in the sky.’15 ‘I pass to speak of the signs of that which is the sequel of trade,’ Emerson 
writes, ‘in consequence of the revolution in the state of society wrought by trade.’16 Reading such a remark 
concordantly with Emerson’s early private writings, he explicitly signals his want to explore the cultural 
effects of commerce and its ideological inflections and inferences; the ‘sequel of trade,’ as he terms it. His 
investigation of the practicable and ideological effects of trade are, as we have already discussed in part, 
explored through an analysis of literary culture. 
Reflecting on Emerson’s resignation from the pulpit and the Unitarian church, 1832, Mary Kupiec 
Clayton notes that ‘If religion had failed Emerson as an instrument of moral reform, it was literature, then, 
that still held out hope to him.’17 Such thinking is not unique to Emerson, however, as the political ‘power’ 
of literature (recall Emerson’s evocative assessment of ‘the force of two’) owes in no small part to the 
writings of William Ellery Channing and Channing’s early work, ‘The Importance and Means of a 
 
13 Emerson, ‘College Theme Book, XVII’ (Undated, 1819-1824), JMN.I., 215 
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15 Emerson, ‘The Young American’ (1844), CW.I., 379 
16 Ibid. 
17 Mary Kupiec Cayton, ‘Organicism,’ Emerson’s Emergence: Self and Society in the Transformation of New England: 1800-1845 
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National Literature’ (1830), in particular.18  
For Channing, ‘as politics became more corrupt, literature was destined to succeed as an agent of 
progress and change.’19 Channing argues that political progress needed a cultural parallel, a means 
examining the conceptual ‘bonds,’ ‘symbols’ and ‘analogies’ that allow a democratic society to coherently 
function.20 For Channing, as for Emerson, the advent of a ‘national literature,’ a local economy of ideas 
and images, would prove a perfect accompaniment to the development of America’s federal offices in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century. Literature and government alike are composed of systems of 
‘circulation,’ writes Channing; ideological structures built of the ‘most quickening and beautiful thoughts, 
which have grown up in men of laborious study or creative genius.’21 Stating the case for the significance 
of ‘laborious reading’ to the country’s cultural progress, one in which ‘creative manners,’ ‘creative actions,’ 
and ‘creative words’ are fundamental to the characterization of a national ‘genius,’ Emerson rephrases the 
core ideas of Channing’s ‘National Literature’ in ‘The American Scholar.’22 Furthermore, his revisioning 
of Channing’s ‘creative genius’ is a more dynamic iteration: ‘genius creates,’ Emerson writes; ‘genius looks 
forwards.’23 Where Channing sought to investigate the intellectual foundations of a ‘national literature,’ 
Emerson worked to examine its prospective and dialectical development; its progress rather than its 
produce. Emerson’s conceptual appropriation and modulation of Channing’s thoughts toward a ‘national 
literature’ are significant, but it is the fact that Emerson concentrates on the labour involved in the receipt 
of a national literature (rather than its authorship) that the following chapters will focus on: Emerson’s ‘art 
 
18 Channing’s expansive definitions of literature—in terms of its social purpose and political influence—undeniably informed 
Emerson’s early writings. By ‘literature,’ Channing notes, ‘we mean the expression of a nation’s mind in writing. We mean 
the production among a people of important works in philosophy and in the departments of imagination and taste. We mean 
the contribution of new truths to the stock of human knowledge. We mean the thoughts of profound and original minds, 
elaborated by the toil of composition and fixed and made immortal in books. We mean the manifestation of a nation’s 
intellect in the only forms by which it can multiply itself at home and send itself abroad. We mean that a nation shall take a 
place, by its authors, among the lights of the world. It will be seen that we include under literature all the writings of superior 
minds, be subjects what they may. We are aware that the term is often confined to compositions which relate to human 
nature, and human life; [...] but the worlds of matter and mind are too intimately connected to admit exact partition. All the 
objects of human thought flow into one another.’ See William Ellery Channing, The Importance and Means of a National 
Literature (London: Edward Rainford, 1830), 4-5 
19 Cayton, ‘Vocation,’ Emerson’s Emergence, 156 
20 Channing, The Importance and Means of a National Literature, 5 
21 Ibid., 8-9 
22 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 90 
23 Ibid. 
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of appropriation.’ Not dissimilar to Emerson’s engagement with the works of Wayland and Channing, a 
vast array of textual and conceptual appropriations can be located in Emerson’s writings pertaining to a 
diverse range of totemic thinkers. Emerson appropriates and assimilates a panoply of ideas and images 
from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832); Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821); Gulian C. Verplanck 
(1786-1870); and Karl Marx (1818-1883). These occurrences of appropriation are crucial; not only because 
they elucidate the ways in which he self-consciously theorizes the act of appropriation, but also because he 
employs his own conceptualizations of cultural and economic forms of circulation to justify his ‘use’ of the 
works of others and consider the ‘meaning of economy’ more broadly.  
This is the foundation of Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM,’ as previously discussed. However, that the act of 
appropriation is regarded as an ‘art’ in Emerson’s later writings requires further investigation. Although 
‘OTHERISM’ pertains to the very beginnings of his career, and the ‘art of appropriation’ the very end, the 
conceptual coherency of these two critical formations portrays a more lucid, consistent and logically 
reasoned progression of ideas in Emerson’s writings than recent critics of his social and aesthetic 
philosophies have identified. The following analysis will identify some of the reasons why. 
For Newfield, Emerson’s later works are keenly invested in the establishment of what he would 
term a ‘market poetics’ (as previously mentioned); a ‘turn’ towards the political that would see Emerson 
centralize ‘circulation and play’ as the central motifs in his engagement with the idea of ownership, the 
activity of critical exchange, and the economics of cultural progress.24  To illustrate this idea, Newfield 
suggests that Emerson’s late period writings consider criticism as a metaphor for ‘the question of control’ 
in social contexts, and alludes to the ways in which the ecological system of metaphor in Emerson’s first 
major works—the idea of ‘natural history’ as an organic ‘ecosystem,’ as a means to consider the organicist 
interconnectivity and co-dependency of the various nodes of a networked society—is altered in his later 
writings. Where we first had a paean to an ecological order in ‘Nature’—both humanity and human 
enterprise being an extension of this regimen—Emerson would later consider ‘the continual exchange of 
shared materials’ as a means of regulating that order in a manner more akin to an economic system that 
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 112 
any organic environment.25 Newfield thus reads Emerson’s ‘market poetics’ as the product of a cumulative 
study of criticism rather than as a feature present from the outset of Emerson’s bibliography. However, 
drawing on both the portrayal of Emerson’s engagement with the act of reading as figured in Part One of 
this thesis—and the more overt depiction of his relationship with economization as will follow—I will 
argue that a more unequivocal and precise categorization of the act of reading can be identified as in 
progress across Emerson’s writings.  
If we return again to Emerson’s private notebooks and journals of the 1830s, a cogent 
characterization of critical enterprise as an ‘economic phenomena’ (to borrow Jay’s terminology) can be 
discerned from his early reflections on scholarship and critical activity to his later and more defined 
engagements with scholarship. The symbolic intimations of the scholar’s sociocultural responsibilities are 
frequently explored through ‘fiscal metaphor,’ as Ian Bell would note; and explicated in reaction to ‘fiscal 
circumstances.’26 As will be shown, Emerson’s thinking proves contingent upon a theorization of labour 
that can be regarded as in reaction to the intellectual lacuna that would accompany financial crisis in the 
late 1830s; a recession of meaning instigated by an exposition of the frailty and ‘fictionality’ of financial 
systems and a market-led ideation of commercial value.27  
For Andrew Kopec, Emerson’s thinking is predicated by the social milieu to which he belonged. 
Kopec argues that a conceptualist reaction to the very idea of ‘work’—one that centralizes notions of its 
symbolic function over and above the realities of labour itself—is keenly detailed in Emerson’s early 
writings. However, he also suggests that Emerson’s explicitly concentration on ‘scholarly work’ in the 
contexts of financial crisis demands further analysis.28  
Situating Emerson firmly within the contexts of the panic of ’37—and looking to ‘The American 
Scholar’ (1837) in relation to parallel public lectures of Emerson’s early authorship—Kopec argues 
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Emerson was self-consciously informed by what he would himself term the ‘fever of the market’ in his 
‘Address on Education’ (a significant precursor to Emerson’s ‘American Scholar,’ also 1837).29 Emerson’s 
early conceptualizations of both work and criticism may well be a direct symptom of marketization; both 
the sophistication and acuity of his thinking can be read as the product of popular feeling. As he notes in 
his journals, 1838, this ‘fever’ needs be read relative to his conceptual interest in ‘original relation,’ as 
detailed in ‘Nature,’ and the relationships that exist within the economic circuitry of the market. ‘Our 
health is our sound relation to external objects, our sympathy with external being,’ he writes. However, the 
complexities of his present political and socioeconomic circumstance, of depression, facilitate a ‘cold 
obstruction’ that disturbs the clarity of this theory of ‘sound relation.’ Listing the direct symptoms of this 
malaise, he notes that ‘Today, a man wakes in the morning sick with fever; he perceives at once that he 
has lost his just relation with the world. Every sound in the lower parts of the house, or in the street, falls 
faint & foreign on his ear.’30 The only cure for this ailment is direct contact with the world which, for 
Emerson, entails an imminent, sensory and empirical consideration of our social and cultural being; a 
realization of our interconnectedness to a social unit or, in other words, a logic and order of ‘relation.’ 
Once again, the desire to connect to the external life, to prove (in a sense) that literature enables an absolute 
connection between the inner and outer life poses a set of problems for Emerson. On the one hand, he 
argues for an ideal or ‘Transcendent’ criticism able to render literature ‘ephemeral.’ On the other hand, he 
considers the failure of his contemporaries to encapsulate the political climate in a singular work of 
literature as a proof ‘that we have lost our just relation to the world.’ In so doing, Emerson’s terminology 
again suggests a position that is both radical and—simultaneously—impossible.  
To deal with this intellectual deadlock, Emerson coins a neologism more commonly associated 
with twentieth-century American literature than nineteenth-century American philosophy. ‘Faction,’ a 
form of literature intent on synthesizing the real and the factual with the creative prerogatives of its author, 
is a term typically attributed to Norman Mailer (and that Mailer is typically held as defining). However, 
Emerson precedes Mailer and suggests that ‘faction’ is a literary trend resulting of this period of economic 
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difficulty (a pun on the partisanship or ‘factional’ qualities of an ascendant popular press and its extension 
to the more creative offices of literature). ‘A foolish formula is the Spirit of faction,’ Emerson notes, ‘as it 
is used in books old & new. Can you not get any nearer to the fact than that, you old granny? It is like the 
answer of children, who, when you ask them the subject of the sermon, say simply it was about Religion.’31 
Here, Emerson is explicit in his want to engage the truth value of a text; how, when seen only for its generic 
qualities, its social and interpretative application proves entirely limited. In this sense, his allusion to 
‘religion’ is particularly significant, as Emerson endeavours to argue the case for literature’s ‘ephemerality,’ 
for its essentially supplicant significance when considered relative to its real-world application. Emerson’s 
early period journals are riven with private remarks as per the limits of literary enterprise; with a want to 
‘get nearer to the fact.’32 ‘You are wrong in demanding of the bible more than can be in a book,’ he notes 
in the Winter months of 1838, for example,33 even ‘the devil can quote texts’ to justify an action.34  
While Mailer, in the late 1970s, argues the case for the (American) novel as a medium capable of 
dealing with the political and social exigency of late-twentieth century (American) life,35 his ‘faction,’ 
inspired in no small part by Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood (1966) and the ‘New Journalism’ movement of 
the 1970s,36 formally presents a ‘revision’ or ‘reworking of historical incidents in novel form.’37 Juxtaposing 
‘the historically viable with the imaginary’ in a hybrid practice that would fuse a documentarian impulse 
with the conventions of prose fiction, Mailer’s ‘faction’ attempted to consider the fictional potential of 
contemporaneous life.38 ‘All my writing life, I’ve been writing fiction in order to make nonfiction believable 
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‘faction’ was considered an opponent of the aims and ambitions of late twentieth century American literary 
fiction. See Diana Trilling, for example, who would disregard and deride Mailer’s prose experiments and 
critical proclamations to suggest that his position is ultimately ‘anti-artist,’ and ‘deeply distrustful of art,’ if 
only because he aims to ‘put a shield between the perception and the act’ by drawing concrete correlation 
between creative fabrication, fantasy, fabulation and real-world political circumstance.40 What proves of 
interest is the fact that Emerson appears to both pre-empt both Mailer and his critics.  
Cynical as Mailer’s approach may be, ‘faction’ has been argued as key to the progress of the 
twentieth century American novel; and the fact that we can trace the term back to Emerson is of undeniable 
significance. However, if we are to read Emerson’s definition of ‘faction’ in the contexts of depression, his 
call for a new and more intimate relation with the ‘facts’ of life arguably exacts itself as an early justification 
of his privileging a reader’s processes over and above any sense of the value of a literary product. Detailing 
a problem that he argues as effecting a reading of both ‘books old and new,’ Emerson’s urgent demand is 
that we need be ‘nearer to the fact,’ not examine the facts from a cultural remove. That we are focused on 
‘life’ and ‘not literature,’ as he would put it in ‘Quotation and Originality.’ Emerson’s immediate response 
to the cultural effects of financial crisis thus appear to directly impact his ongoing investigation of the 
‘mechanics’ of critical enterprise and, once again, it is the reader’s ability to discern the nuances of the 
sermon that enable them to see it as more than simply a product of ‘religion’ or social convention. Just as 
the value of a literary product is determined by the agency of the reader, so too must we realize that the 
text is never entirely made up and governed by the writer’s ‘sensibility’ alone.41 
Remarking on this process of thought—the need to move from an intellectual plain to a real-world 
context—Emerson’s ‘fever’ appears to be a response to the artificiality of the market itself as a system; as a 
kind of fiction that determines its own set of laws, characters and conventions and separates itself from 
both governmental order and principles of self-determination. A response to this ‘fever’ can be gauged 
elsewhere in Emerson’s early writings. However, his thinking consistently oscillates around a want to 
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contest both the ways in which we think about work as concept; how we need classify ‘thinking’ as itself a 
form of work; and, furthermore, examine the ways in which new forms of labour are engineered by new 
economic circumstances.42 Emerson notes that this ‘fever’ has ‘infected the brain of the scholar and the 
clerk and removed ‘the dreams of the poet’ only to replace such ambitions with a sense of the cultural 
significance of ‘mechanical force.’43 What proves of note, however, is that he explores the effects of this 
‘fever’ across his early period writings through a deliberative examination of the act of reading as a form of 
intellectual and ‘manual labor.’44 In this way, Emerson’s exploration of critical activity becomes a means 
of exploring labour cultures more broadly. 
 In what he would term the ‘Doctrine of Hands,’ 1837, he alleges that a reification of labour as a 
market device has transformed our perception of a ‘man’ as a social entity. Rather than a distinct identity, 
‘A man, in the view of political economy, is a pair of hands,’ he writes. ‘A useful engine to subdue the 
earth, to plant and build it over.’45 This idea recurs across Emerson’s authorship, as are his efforts to marry 
such a characterization of ‘man’ as a ‘useful engine’ with his want to figure critical thinking as itself a form 
of ‘manual labor.’ As we will see, this is key to some of the dichotomies in Emerson’s rhetoric concerning 
the congruence between literature and market forces as well. 
We look to the late essay ‘Domestic Life,’ for example—a lecture delivered in 1859 but composed 
of patchwork materials pertaining to the late 1830s—and see Emerson explicitly delineate the importance 
of ‘manual labor.’46 However, here, the question is not what work such ‘hands’ should be put to; rather, 
the question concerns the symbolic function of ‘man’ as a revolutionary ‘engine’ capable of impacting both 
thought and action: 
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I see not how serious labour, the labor of all and every day, is to be avoided; 
and many things betoken a revolution of opinion and practice in regard to 
manual labor that may go far to aid our practical inquiry. 47  
 
‘Another age may divide the manual labor of the world more equally on all the members of society,’ he 
writes, ‘and so make the labors of a few hours avail to the wants and add to the vigor of the man. But the 
reform that applies itself to the household must not be partial. It must correct the whole system of our social 
living.’48 Indicating yet another form of ‘silent revolution’ as can be encountered in Emerson’s writings—
a ‘revolution of opinion and practice’—in ‘Domestic Life,’ Emerson notes the ways in which our private 
life must relate to public discourse and, in so doing, transform the concept of ‘manual labor’ into the precept 
for a much larger concept of reform. An individual household, for example, is a symbol for ‘the whole 
system of our social living’ in ‘Domestic Life’—hence, the behaviour of one need aim to ‘correct’ an entire 
system.49 In this revolution, every household is a prospective agent of change. In ‘Nature,’ although 
Emerson’s call for ‘original relation’ first appears to stand as another paean to the importance of personal 
perspective, the ‘we’ that he repeatedly calls upon in the opening lines of that essay can thus also be read 
as an appeal to forms of socio-political participation; thus, entailing the self-same position he details in 
‘Domestic Life.’  
Looking, then, at early essays from ‘Nature’, ‘Domestic Life,’ his 1837 ‘Address on Education,’ 
and its more famous counterpart of that same year, ‘The American Scholar,’ Emerson’s thoughts on 
‘relation’ and ‘revolution’ together establish a theory of ‘serious labor’ that considers the theoretical 
implications and aims of labour as a concept rather than the realities of work itself. It is, as the following 
analysis will show, Emerson’s attempts to connect various representational haptics—this symbolization of 
the power of touch, grasp and control as cited in his ‘Doctrine of the Hands’—with his characterization of 
‘man’ as machine and ‘engine’ that situates ‘political economy’ at the heart of his work. The following will 
look closer at ‘The American Scholar’ (and Kopec’s thinking) in order to unravel the complexities of 
 




Emerson’s developmental relationship with political economy within the context of his own historical 
circumstances. 
Divided into three chapters, this second part of the thesis will thus examine the complexity of 
Emerson’s thinking on culture’s economic provenance; but I will first concentrate on Emerson’s 
aforementioned theory of ‘creative reading’ as he would term it in ‘The American Scholar’ (1837). If we 
are to accept the idea of ‘creative writing,’ Emerson argues that must admit the significance of ‘creative 
reading as well.’50 The work of our own ‘creative genius,’ to again borrow Channing’s term, is again 
channelled towards an analysis of an American audience over and above the efficacy of American 
authorship. Emerson details the practice of interpretation—homing in on the first glimpses of inspiration 
wherein ‘the page of whatever book we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion.’51 This is a 
constructive process to Emerson’s mind—a building of meaning—and thus needs be deemed creative in 
character. He explicitly describes his position as a theory of ‘labour and invention,’ and his terminology 
indicates the constructivist aims of his ‘creative reading.’ But if we consider his interest in economy and 
literature as functioning cooperatively rather than at cross purposes, whether Emerson is more invested in 
the ‘creation’ of an economic system, or in the ‘creation’ of new work ripe for circulation within this system, 
requires further examination.   
Emerson’s proposed new discipline, his ‘creative reading,’ has been regarded as a somewhat 
simplistic demonstration of the appropriateness of Emerson’s thinking for the progress of literary study and 
institutionalization of literary creativity today. Regarding recent interest in ‘Creative Writing’ as academic 
discipline, Lawrence Buell notes that ‘had the Harvard curriculum of 1820 included Creative Writing 
workshops as it does now, Emerson would very likely have wanted to sign up.’52 However, keeping in mind 
Emerson’s evocative explication of his theory of ‘creative reading’ as a theory of ‘labor,’ Emerson can be 
seen to circuitously approach the idea of creativity by looking to the activities of an array of definitions of 
both labour and productivity, only to complicate his position and undermine the simplicity of Buell’s 
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assertion.  
I will explore this claim by examining the correlation of a variety of workers as they appear in 
Emerson’s writings: the ‘reader,’ ‘scholar,’ ‘builder,’ and ‘spender.’ In Emerson’s own exploration of the 
economics of cultural work, these figures appear almost interchangeably in his envisioning of a ‘creative 
reading.’ The following chapters will—amongst other things—consider how some of these figures coalesce 
in Emerson’s theorizations of literature and its attendant labour forms. But before continuing to explore 
the impact of the financial crisis of 1837 upon Emerson’s early thinking, it is his evocative portrayal of the 
‘builder’ that we need first identify.  
In the early address ‘Literary Ethics’ (1838), Emerson portrays language as ‘the beautiful museum 
of human life.’ Considering the array of works that would populate the galleries of this ‘beautiful museum,’ 
Emerson arranges and organizes his ideas in this ‘museum’ by way of an array of fiscal processes. Every 
told story relays the evidence ‘of earnings, and borrowings, and lendings, and losses,’ he writes, and every 
object in this ‘museum’ is thus the biproduct of some form of financial transaction.53 This evocative image 
is key to the complex character of Emerson’s interest in literature and in ‘written composition.’ But it also 
elucidates the ways in which he leans on political economy as a means of organizing his thinking. 
Emerson’s interest in the act of ‘borrowing’ is expressed as in a kind of twinship with his theory of the 
‘builder’ and a ‘building’ of meaning; how a builder’s processes are contingent upon their use of pre-existent 
materials, and how a theory of debt helps clarify the complexities of their work. Examining the interrelation 
of these ideas, the significance of Emerson’s investment in economic metaphor to consider the terms and 
aims of a ‘creative reading’ are arguably made more apparent. 
As he notes in ‘Nature,’ language has evolved as a kind of a debt system: 
 
Every word which is used to express a moral or intellectual fact, if traced to 
its root, is found to be borrowed from some material appearance. Right means 
straight; wrong means twisted. Spirit primarily means wind; transgression, the 
crossing of a line; supercilious, the raising of the eyebrow. We say the heart to 
express emotion, the head to denote thought; and thought and emotion are 
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words borrowed from sensible things, and now appropriated. […] Throw a 
stone into the stream, and the circles that propagate themselves are the 
beautiful type of all influence.54 
 
We owe ‘natural history’ its proper accreditation, he writes, ‘the use of natural history is to give us aid in 
super-natural history; the use of the outer creation, to give us language for the beings and changes of the 
inward creation.’55 All our ‘words’ are ‘signs of natural facts.’56 However, all such ‘words’ are ‘appropriated’ 
from nature, ‘borrowed from sensible things.’ Emerson’s ‘beautiful museum’ is, in this regard, a collection 
of images and metaphors ‘appropriated’ from the natural world; a pool of resources that allow us to better 
reflect upon and express the details of an inner life and consider its expression through the ‘second use’ of 
signs and symbols. Furthermore, if we look his early lecture series ‘The Philosophy of History’ (1839), and 
his remarks on literature therein, they too allude to the ways in which an engagement with nature’s systems 
(and thus the curatorial implications of his ‘beautiful museum’) may work towards an ascendant or 
ideological system. As we will see, it is the formation of this ideological system that allows for the metaphor 
of the builder to function as a constituent element within a wider and more structured investigation of the 
idea of language as work.  
In the ‘Literature’ lecture of the ‘Philosophy of History’ series, Emerson reiterates his interest in a 
‘creative’ or ‘laborious’ form of reading; one in which every individual work of literature can and will 
contribute to the enlargement and sophistication of a ‘national’ culture of letters. Echoing Channing once 
again, he argues that ‘Written composition […] can surpass any unwritten effusions of however profound 
a genius; for, what is already writ is a foundation [for] a new superstructure, a guide to the eye for new 
foundation, and a provocation to proceed; so that the work rises, tower upon tower, with ever new and 
total strength of the builder.’57 Emerson’s own metaphoric tower—a Babel of his own—portrays his theory 
of language in terms both constructive and acquisitive. He notes that he is not so interested in the ‘structure 
 
54 Emerson, ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 25 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), EL.II., 64 
 121 
of literary works’ as he is ‘the Mechanics of literature;’ how a work of literature works.58 Just as it is the 
‘circumstance’ that supports the authorship of a work, it is the reader’s ability to glean the underlying 
structure and build upon it that enables—as Emerson notes— ‘a new foundation’ for further activity. This, 
however, is just one of the ways in which our ‘direct dependence [on] the author’ is diminished. It is when 
we look to contextualize a work of literature either within the contexts of canon, or within the real-world 
socio-political ‘circumstance’ of its reception, that the ‘mechanics’ of its construction also emerge: 
 
It is difficult to overestimate the value of letters. […] Whilst the form of 
literary works, as tragedy, history, romance, varies with ever age, and is not 
at the option of the writer but is determined for him by the state of mankind 
around him, there is an important circumstance relating to the structure of 
literary works that may be called the Mechanics of literature, which seems 
somewhat to modify this direct dependence of the author upon the absolute 
Reason. I mean the art of composition or the manner in which a continuous 
work like Hamlet or Don Quixote or Paradise Lost is created. I suppose that I say 
what all know, when I say that it is impossible that one of these works could 
be an improvisation. And an attention to the difference between a grand work 
like these a lyric effusion discriminates the advantage of written literature. […] 
It can be best illustrated by seeing a similar aid in architecture. It is what is 
already done that enables the artist to accomplish the wonderful.59  
 
Without forgoing a Western literary canon, Emerson nonetheless turns the ‘mechanics of literature’ 
towards a new vernacular that Americanizes the process. Built on the ‘strength’ of the individual ‘builder’ 
as opposed to the processual ‘building’ of meaning, the representative qualities of an alienated ‘builder’ 
functions metonymically for a culture of ‘building’ more broadly. In line with his want to explore both the 
establishment and progress of a sociocultural ‘superstructure’ (or ‘sentiment,’ as he would term it in ‘The 
Young American’), Emerson’s ‘builder’ is thus a ‘creative’ character; a figure engaged in the continual 
building of said ‘superstructure,’ rather than that already built. ‘It is what is already done that enables the 
artist to accomplish the wonderful,’ he notes; that which is ‘already done’ that the ‘builder’ works to further 
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develop and alter. It is not merely that the process of ‘building’ is set up as a parallel to that of ‘creativity,’ 
it is about acknowledging the influence that the ‘state of mankind’ has on the prospective evolution thereof: 
an acknowledgment of the importance of context and lineage needed to ‘accomplish the wonderful.’ 
As noted, Emerson terms his period ‘the age of the first person singular,’ and the self-interest of 
Emerson’s critical position has been held as a substantial difficulty in recent efforts to distinguish the critical 
mores and mechanisms of his works. As critics strive to enumerate the possible extension of his thinking 
into a conceptualization of the social, they are commonly interrupted by the subjectivist impasse that seems 
be intrinsic to Emerson’s canonical standing. As we have seen, however, the work of Emerson’s isolated 
‘builder’ is articulated in numerous guises: intimating both a process of self-discovery and a 
conceptualization of culture as a social economy. Emerson’s parallel between literary culture and 
‘architecture’—relative to his remarks on the symbolism of the individual household in ‘Domestic Life’—
appeal to both the expansive qualities of his want to incorporate the ‘builder’ into a more conceptualist 
revision of the dialectical progress of daily life and his interest in the cultural predominance of literary work 
(rather than literature itself, per se). Homebuilding is a literary exercise, to Emerson’s eye: ‘every house is 
a quotation out of all forests and mines and stone-quarries,’ he notes in ‘Quotation and Originality;’ 
‘Language is a city to the building of which every human being brought a stone.’60 In similar terms, a book 
is considered a kind of a dwelling space—a physical cell that we can inhabit—but each book is cellular in 
its relation to the construction of a broader cultural whole: ‘Our benefactors are as many as the children 
who invented speech, word by word,’ Emerson notes; ‘yet [nobody is] to be credited with the grand result 
than the acaleph which adds a cell to the coral reef which is the basis of the continent.’61 Every book being 
symbolically representative of the whole; that whole being dependent upon the particular; each individual 
book, the possible ‘foundation for a new superstructure.’  
For Naomi Greyser, such a line of thought owes to Emerson’s ‘critique of idealist autonomy,’ but 
his own assertion that literature and architecture are similar disciplines offers a clearer insight into his 
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position.62 Emerson elsewhere refers to a ‘Cyclopean architecture’ so as to again highlight the symbolic 
propensities of the ‘builder’ and ‘building’ as metaphors within his early works.63 ‘One man […] can build 
a church on solid blocks able to up uphold a mountain,’ he writes, again in ‘Philosophy of History,’64 
preceding his more famous assertion that  ‘An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man’ in ‘Self-
Reliance’ (1841).65 The individual builder at work on a building is indicative of the ways in which a single 
thinker can cultivate a popular concept or accepted idea that holds significant public value; an idea or 
‘church’ that a public can employ for their own purposes. He lists a litany of examples to prove his point: 
‘Monachism, of the Hermit Antony; the Reformation, of Luther; Quakerism, of Fox; Methodism, of 
Wesley; Abolition, of Clarkson. Scipio, Milton called “the height of Rome;” and all history resolves itself 
very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons.’66 ‘Every true man is a cause,’ Emerson 
writes, we just need study the process of causation. How such a ‘man’ may act as a catalyst in a fashion 
not dissimilar to his sense of our need to consider the traffic of an idea from the interiority of mind through 
to a public domain.67  
Emerson’s interest in the symbolic powers of language as a ‘museum of human life’ helps to explain 
the complexity and currency of his architectural metaphor; and we might argue that it provides space for 
the complexities of his relationship with literary culture and the act of reading. A museum houses a 
‘retrospective’ solely with future-facing ambitions, to maintain the culture of the past for the sake of a 
prospective future. As Emerson decries in ‘Nature,’ his ‘age is retrospective,’ and needs be invested in the 
advancement of culture rather than critical hindsight.68 Emerson’s ‘museum,’ in sum, thus serves as a 
metaphor for a cultural canon; like a ‘museum,’ a canon should serve to facilitate the progress of a culture 
‘forwards and not back,’ as he would put it in ‘The American Scholar.’69 This, in essence, is the work of 
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the museum;70 and the imaginary works that populate Emerson’s metaphorical ‘museum’ provide a way 
to consider the value of an individual speech act or literary work in its relation language as an ‘institution’ 
as well.71 To engage the world in language is thus to allude to the idea of language as a ‘social force’ as 
Emerson puts it in ‘Nominalist and Realist’ (1844): 
 
We infer the spirit of the nation in great measure from the language, which is 
a sort of monument to which each forcible individual in a course of many 
hundred years has contributed a stone. And, universally, a good example of 
this social force is the veracity of language, which cannot be debated. In any 
controversy concerning morals, an appeal may be made with safety to the 
sentiments which the language of the people expresses. Proverbs, words and 
grammar-inflections convey the public sense with more purity and precision 
than the wisest individual.72  
 
Again, Emerson could be argued as channelling Channing here; given his want to examine an explicitly 
national form of scholarship. What stands out, however, is the use of the vernacular as a more accurate 
barometer for public culture; a culture that can contain this sense of the ‘public’ and ‘individual’ value of 
language in practice. 
The recurrence of the museum as metaphor in Emerson’s writings suggests that it is far more than 
simply a repository of historical meaning. In ‘Wealth’, he again returns to the image of the ‘museum’ in 
order to posit it as a symbolic locale for a democratic articulation of how cultural productivity should 
function within the New Republic. Once again, Emerson considers the works accommodated within a 
metaphorical museum, and asks that we consider a singular sculpture in relation to the museum’s broader 
collection.  
 
The brave workman, who might betray his feeling of it in his manners, if he 
do not succumb in his practice, must replace the grace or elegance forfeited, 
by the merit of the work done. No matter whether he makes shoes, or statues, 
or laws. It is the privilege of any human work which is well done to invest the 
 
70 See Boris Groys on the ‘museological impulse’ in ‘The Rheology of Art,’ In the Flow (London: Verso, 2019), 1-6 
71 Emerson, ‘Journal TU’ (1849), JMN.XII., 134 
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doer with a certain haughtiness. He can well afford not to conciliate, whose 
faithful work will answer for him. The mechanic at his bench carries a quiet 
heart and assured manners and deals on even terms with men of any 
condition. The artist has made his picture so true that it disconcerts criticism. 
The statue is so beautiful that it contracts no stain from the market but makes 
the market a silent gallery for itself.73  
 
Language, ‘a beautiful museum;’ the market, ‘a silent gallery’—these two provocative and evocative 
‘institutions’ are key to an analysis of Emerson’s relationship with culture, cultural labour, and the idea of 
the ‘builder’ or ‘reader’ as working towards the betterment of an ascendent ideological or cultural 
‘superstructure.’ The works that haunt Emerson’s ‘silent gallery’ are portraits of work itself, and the ‘grace 
and elegance’ of labour is key to Emerson’s cultural enquiry. The idea that—be it a shoe, law, statute, or 
statue—they are all objects produced through a process of conscientious labour and therefore ingrained 
with the signature of a manufacturer. A trace of the ‘doer,’ to borrow his term, always registers in the done. 
But it is the parallelism between language and the market that I wish to home in upon here as Emerson so 
loudly considers the value of the ‘second use’ of an object or phrase and, in so doing, its value as a 
circulatable entity. Recalling Emerson’s portrayal of ‘the beautiful museum of language’ as a house of 
‘earnings, and borrowings, and lendings, and losses,’ he consistently reinstates the idea that literary culture 
is not only defined by economic dynamism, but that literary culture assists us in our efforts to define 
political economy itself. As he would note in the late essay ‘Poetry and Imagination’ (1872), ‘we shall never 
understand political economy until Burns or Béranger or some poet shall teach it in songs.’74 
While the image of the museum posits both a stationary dwelling place for the progressive nature 
of American culture and a locale for amassing the products of that culture, Emerson’s awareness of the 
potential problems surrounding the economic dynamism of the United States must also be taken into 
account. Not only does Emerson absorb the cultural atmospherics of the panic of 1837, his later 
assessments of culture as a pedagogical device able to explain our socioeconomic circumstances are 
instigated by this moment of economic collapse. In ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), he would argue such 
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a line of thought unequivocally. ‘Events, actions arise that must be sung,’ he notes; but admits that these 
‘Events’ will ‘sing themselves.’75 That little needs be done to qualify the significance of such ‘events’ 
through any act of creative or cultural elaboration; that they inescapably inform and rewrite the meaning 
and intimation of any cultural or sociopolitical ‘song’ as could be ‘sung.’ This off-hand remark is 
emblematic of a broader anxiety that Emerson appears to maintain across the bulk of his cultural 
commentaries in the late 1830s and as informing his later interest in proprietorship. Emerson admits that—
engaging these sociopolitical ‘songs’ as we may—we can’t help but want to attain a singular ownership and 
proprietorship of the idea or implication carried in these events. ‘Sometimes,’ he writes in ‘Wealth,’ ‘could 
I only have music on my own terms.’76 Whilst these sociopolitical ‘songs’ are redolent of our cultural being, 
we also need a personal relationship or sense of ownership of said song for a sense of cultural belonging to 
cohere. A ‘song’—as Raymond Williams has remarked—is a crucial and folkloric means of ascertaining a 
culture’s cohesion. ‘The song of the land, the song of rural labor, the song of delight;’ every industrial 
culture carries with it a long, ethnomusicological history of ‘song’ as a means of bonding a disparate 
population through a common cultural form.77 Emerson’s early works argue ‘literature’ as a cultural form 
capable of achieving such cultural cohesion. However, his early reference to the ‘song’ and to history’s 
capacity to ‘sing’ is striking.  
Of course, whilst a song is a dominant culture force, a song does not exist. It is an immaterial form 
of culture—with its roots in an oral tradition—and defies objectification until the moment it is documented. 
Emerson was alert to precisely this conflict as between the material and immaterial cultural forms. Indeed, 
he admits that America’s ‘song’ is yet to be vocalized. ‘Our log-rolling, our stumps and their politics, our 
fisheries, our Negroes and Indians, our boats and our repudiations, the wrath of rogues and the 
pusillanimity of honest men, the northern trade, the southern planting, the western clearing, Oregon and 
Texas, are yet unsung,’ he writes in ‘The Poet’ (1844).78 But the radical tenor of his perspective owes to his 
want to consider cultural memory as a material and/or immaterial form (thus his interest in the symbolic 
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stature of the museum as an institution). As he would suggestively propose—again in ‘Wealth’—the simple 
fact that ‘property is an intellectual production’ disputes the value of cultural property as a physical entity 
but does not dispute its significance.79  
The following chapters will continue an investigation into Emerson’s theorizations of labour, 
creativity and property. I will examine how such ideas prove key to the development of Emerson’s 
‘OTHERISM’—1836 to 1845, and impact the authorship of his later essays—‘Wealth’ (1860) and ‘Poetry and 
Imagination’ (1875), in particular—before exploring the ways in which Emerson would self-consciously 
detail his engagement with cultural labour and critical exchange as ‘capitalist’ in character and scope in 
‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), and how such thinking informs his investment in the act and ‘art of 
appropriation.’  
Beginning with a return to Emerson’s ‘creative writing,’ I will consider the significance of the 
financial panic of 1837 to both Emerson’s conceptualizations of reading and recent readings of Emerson’s 
cultural commentaries. This will preface an analysis of the ways in which historicist readings have engaged 
the cultural effects of industrialization and economization across his first major period of productivity as 
author, 1836 to 1845. Within this analysis will be a consideration of the metaphorical value that Emerson 
imparts on technology and tools as an extension of scholarly work, the labours of his ‘builder,’ and the 
instrumental value of literature or a ‘book’ as a technological device in itself. Emerson’s interest in the 
‘mechanics of literature’ and how this can be read within the wider framework of a mechanization of 
culture will precede my concluding chapter. By correlating Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ with his ‘art of 
appropriation’ the critical partnership between his early and later works will be further identified.  
The key term in this appraisal of secondary, mediated production is charm—the ‘charm of 
alienation,’ as he puts it in 1836. Bewitched, enchanted, or fascinated by ‘Alienation or Otherism,’ Emerson 
appears to avow the complex social mediatory systems inherent in cultural labour that displace the primacy 
of a work’s creator. Unlike Hegel, who conceived of alienation as the (dialectically self-affirming) 
registration of ‘the mind’s inability to recognize itself in an externalization which it nevertheless knows to 
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be its own,’ Emerson insinuates that the productive disengagement which ostensibly represents a loss for 
the agent should instead be considered in terms of innovation and development through a process of 
collaboration that he acknowledges as key to both sociocultural and economic discourses.80  
Rephrasing his ‘OTHERISM’ in Representative Men—‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850)—he notes that 
‘society is glad to forget the innumerable laborers who ministered to [its] architect;’ that ‘we are multiplied 
by our proxies. How easily we adopt their labors!’81 In ‘Wealth,’ he articulates his position once again, 
writing that ‘he is the richest man who knows how to draw a benefit from the labors of the greatest number 
of men, of men in distant countries and in past times.’82 Such ideas distinctly appeal to the significance 
Emerson would later allot the act or ‘art of appropriation,’ the ways in which a retooling or ‘remodelling’ 
of extant ideas (to borrow his phrase) is as dependent upon the alienation of subject and the elevation of 
that subject as informing an identificative ‘selecting principle’ for the valorisation and retooling of cultural 
matter.  However, considering the form of collectivism he deigned the best fit for a description of these 
ontoepistemological conditions—the best means of categorizing the ideological indications of his ‘richest 
man’ capable of profiting from the ‘labors of the greatest number of men’—Emerson remarks, ‘Well, the 
man must be capitalist.’83 It is this self-conscious classification of his argument as ‘capitalist’ in character 
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The Ethics and Aesthetics of Financial Panic: 


















The coin is a delicate meter of civil, social and moral changes. […] A dollar 
is not value, but representative of value, and, at last, of moral values. Wealth 
is mental; wealth is moral. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
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This chapter will read Emerson’s theory of ‘creative reading’ relative to the financial panic of 1837. Further 
compounding the importance of the ‘reader’ and ‘builder’ as characters in his writings, I will explore his 
interest in the circulation of culture (and the act of reading) as encouraged by his receptivity to the 
sociocultural effects of economic downturn and depression. In this context, Emerson introduces the idea 
of the ‘spender’ in ‘Wealth’—a figure that will constitute another significant link between Emerson’s early 
and later writings, and whom should be regarded as paralleling the aforementioned ‘builder’ as a character 
and trope. I will examine his investigation into the circulation of currency relative to his interest in the 
circulation of literary matter, and how the figure of the ‘spender’ can be read as a constituent part of 
Emerson’s take on the ‘philosophic’ and ‘scientific’ value of the panic of ’37, as seen in his journals. My 
analysis will be interlaced with an assessment of the ways in which critics have recently sought to centralize 
this historic event as fundamental to Emerson’s intellectual development. However, we should begin by 
examining Emerson’s references to ‘creative reading,’ as it appears in ‘The American Scholar’ and 
elsewhere in his early writings, and by exploring the ways in which his thinking prefaces an engagement 
with the economics of intellectual proprietorship and critical exchange as will follow.  
Writing to a young Margaret Fuller in the late 1830s, Emerson would caution her not to read ‘when 
the mind is creative.’ ‘Reading long at one time anything, no matter how it fascinates, destroys thought as 
completely as the inflections forced by external causes,’ he remarks. He continues only to ascertain literary 
matter itself as one such ‘cause.’ ‘Stop if you find yourself becoming absorbed at even the first paragraph’—
‘learn to divine books, to feel those that you want without wasting much time over them,’ Emerson suggests; 
‘The glance reveals what the gaze obscures.’2 Emerson’s critical ‘glance’ evidences a more important 
theoretical position than the flippancy of word alone may indicate. His remarks to Fuller reinstate his 
regular identification of self-determinacy as the ‘useful engine’ that underwrites both his cultural and 
pedagogical engagements with literary criticism and, in other words, returns us to the primacy of the self 
in Emerson’s ‘creative’ rubric. This logic traffics out of Emerson’s correspondence with Fuller to his public 
writings. In ‘The Transcendentalist’ (1842)—a public lecture delivered to an audience assembled at 
 
2 Emerson, in a letter to a young Margaret Fuller; see Margaret Fuller, (ed.) Robert N. Hudspeth, The Letters of Margaret 
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Boston’s Masonic Temple—he critiques the ways in which social and political exigency corrupts the clarity 
of interpretative thought. Extending his advocacy of the critical ‘divination’ that he advocates to Fuller, he 
appears to go against the literary as a realm driven by special interests and partisan pressures in order to 
instead advocate an archly apolitical form of interpretation.  
The ideological inferences of economic culture are so instrumental and persuasive, to Emerson’s 
eye, that the process of critical engagement needs to work doubly hard so as to overcome any overtly 
politicized perspective. ‘Each cause as it is called’—emphasis his own—‘say Abolition, Temperance, say 
Calvinism, or Unitarianism—becomes so speedily a little shop, where the article, let it have been at first so 
subtle and ethereal, is now made up into portable and convenient cakes, and retailed in small quantities to 
suit purchasers.’3 Here, it seems that Emerson’s aim is to engineer a critical movement capable of 
withstanding the commodification of various ideological groupings and positions. Rather than facilitate a 
vaguely defined movement against movements themselves, he suggests that we must be vigilant regarding 
the wholesale application of specific agendas (in a position reminiscent of his aforementioned remarks on 
‘the spirit of faction’). Again, in ‘The Transcendentalist,’ he condemns the social disengagement he reads 
in his peers and seeks to clarify his position on the ‘individual culture’ gaining ground—the tendency to 
remove oneself from the communal and political exigencies of the day. Referring to the market systems 
and ideologies in ascendance parallel to his authorship, he writes: ‘It is a sign of our times, conspicuous to 
the coarsest observer, that many intelligent and religious persons withdraw themselves from the common 
labors and competitions of the market and the caucus, and betake themselves to a certain solitary and 
critical way of living, from which no solid fruit has yet appeared to justify their separation.’4 
 
They hold themselves aloof: they feel the disproportion between their faculties 
and the work offered them, and they prefer to ramble in the country and perish 
of ennui, to the degradation of such charities and such ambitions as the city 
can propose to them. They are striking work and crying out for somewhat 
worthy to do! What they do is done only because they are overpowered by 
the humanities that speak on all sides; and they consent to such labor as is 
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open to them, though to their lofty dream the writing of Iliads or Hamlets, or 
the building of cities or empires seems drudgery. They are lonely; the spirit of 
their writing and conversation is lonely; they repel influences; they shun 
general society; they incline to shut themselves in their chamber in the house, 
to live in the country rather than in the town, and to find their tasks and 
amusements in solitude.5  
 
 
‘Society, to be sure, does not like this very well,’ he claims; ‘it saith, Who so goes to walk alone, accuses 
the whole world; he declares all to be unfit to be his companions; it is very uncivil, insulting; Society will 
retaliate.’6 Here, Emerson’s assessment of the social responsibilities of cultural critique sways in its 
emphasis from self-interest to social exigency. For Julie K. Ellison, this theory of ‘egocentric reading’ 
struggles to delineate any cogent or political position on the social attributes of the literary culture, however 
(partly because it questions its own significance to America’s sociopolitical progress). Indeed, the link 
between Emerson’s interest in the symbolic virtues of the ‘builder’ and the process or concept of ‘Bildung’ 
in the German Romantic tradition (translating as ‘self-cultivation’) is notable.7 Emerson’s ‘builder’ appears 
to equate as much with the process of self-development as social progress, in this instance; and Emerson’s 
program appears to accentuate the apolitical emphases of his critical practice. This is a charge we can levy 
by virtue of the repetition of this material, and his repeated insistence that we need be wary of the 
intellectual and interpretative precedence of ‘external cause.’ 
In Charles Woodbury’s Talks with Ralph Waldo Emerson (1890), Woodbury—reflecting on the 
parlour seminars Emerson would deliver to small groups of students in the 1840s and 1850s—reports a 
range of ‘instructions’ that Emerson would pose to his audience so as to guide their intellectual 
development and hone their critical faculty. Notably, these comments rephrase the key ideas enlisted in 
Emerson’s ‘creative reading’—as Emerson would detail in ‘The American Scholar’ and in his letter to 
Fuller—and the advice he would pose Fuller is repeated to Woodbury verbatim. ‘Reading is closely related 
 
5 Ibid., 340-341 
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Goethe’s overall influence on his writings. See Richardson, Emerson: The Mind on Fire, 172 
 134 
to writing,’ he notes, and continues to assert the degree of care we need exercise so as to read away from 
the weight and stress of ‘external’ influence:8 
 
When the mind is plastic there should be care as to its impressions. The new 
facts should come from nature, fresh, buoyant, inspiring, exact. Later in life, 
when there is less danger of imitating those traits of expression through which 
information has been receive, facts may be gleaned from a wider field.9 
 
Arguing how we are to best combat the ‘limestone condition’ of a fixed intellectual position, as Emerson 
terms it, he repeats for Woodbury precisely the same directive he would pose to Fuller. ‘Do your own 
quarrying,’ he writes:10 
 
Learn to divine books, to feel those that you want without wasting much time 
over them. Remember you must know only the excellent of all that has been 
presented. But often a chapter is enough. The glance reveals what the gaze 
obscures. […] Learn how to tell from the beginning of the chapters and from 
glimpses of the sentences whether you need to read them entirely through.11 
 
Gustaaf Van Cromphout argues this passage as key to our understanding the complexities of 
Emerson’s engagements with criticism. Interested in what he would term ‘tonic books’ (a brand of 
philosophical self-help),12 Emerson ‘had scant respect for those he considers guilty of bibliolatry;’13 the 
‘restorers of readings, the emendators, the bibliomaniacs of all degrees.’14 He was interested in our ability 
to essay ‘original thought’ rather than ‘copy or imitate,’ and his conceptualization of our ‘quarrying’ 
through cultural matter is indicative of the work of critical engagement that he sought to champion.15 As 
we have previously discussed, Emerson would dictate a ‘sternly subordinated’ role for the book as an entity; 
 
8 Charles J. Woodbury, ‘Counsels,’ Talks with Ralph Waldo Emerson (New York, NY: Baker and Taylor, 1890), 24 
9 Ibid., 24-25 
10 Ibid., 25 
11 Ibid., 27 
12 Emerson, ‘Journal GH’ (Undated, 1847), JMN.X., 167 
13 Gustaaf Van Cromphout, ‘Literature,’ Emerson’s Ethics (Columbia, MO: The University of Missouri Press, 1999), 165 
14 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 89 
15 Cromphout, ‘Literature,’ Emerson’s Ethics, 165 
 135 
it is our capacity to render something tangible from the book that he was focused upon.16 A book needed 
be considered of secondary significance to the forms of intellectual labour it enabled; and Emerson 
endeavoured to establish an ‘experiential critical discourse’ anchored in application and explicitly ‘anti-
bookish’ in character.17 But in his elicitation of a certain kind of ‘creative reading’—as we seen in the 
guidance he offers both Fuller and Woodbury—he espouses a form of critical ‘divination’ driven by feeling 
rather than fact. What comes to the fore here is the question of literature’s instrumental qualities; its ability 
to impact and effect daily life.  
Emerson’s recommendation to both Fuller and Woodbury—that they need focus on the ‘creative’ 
qualities of a reading—is indicative of his efforts to practically facilitate his popular and aforementioned 
theoretical position that a ‘creative reading,’ as practice, must be of coeval importance of to the act of 
‘creative writing.’ Despite the promise of a more ‘experiential’ critical discourse, Emerson’s ‘creative 
reading’ nonetheless holds implications that hit beyond the simple self-interest we can associate with the 
process of our educating our own critical eye through the offices of cultural engagement. That his position, 
again, depends upon the work of ‘others’ is key (as is his dependency on the resulting fruit of labour as a 
recurring metaphor), and the fact that his theories of creativity prove more reactionary than endogenous in 
character is also of significance.  
In foregrounding the personal perspectivism of reading as practice, Emerson seems be considering 
the ways in which a ‘reading’ comports a form of property. A reading needs be considered something 
tangible; however, in considering a reading practice rather than the act of writing as his chief object of 
enquiry, Emerson opens up a struggle with immateriality, conceptually speaking: the simple fact that he 
needed retool the idea of interpretation to such an extent that a reading, an argument, could be considered 
an object of attention as valid as the work or idea that it engages. As I will argue, this is a direct result of 
economic disequilibrium in the late-1830s and affected by Emerson’s want to identify the intellectual 
outcomes of the panic of ’37. This anxiety, concerning the distinction between physical objects and 
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immaterial concepts, is notable and traffics through the major writings of his early period. In ‘Experience’ 
(1844), for example, Emerson explicitly laments his inability to corroborate immaterial concepts and 
material objects as ‘graspable’ entities. ‘Property,’ he notes—akin to ‘reality’—‘turns out to be scene-
painting.’ A concept of such ‘lubricity’ that it ‘[slips] through our fingers when we clutch the hardest.’18  
If a work of literature is a coalescence of ‘lubricious’ concepts, and yet the act of authorship is 
regarded as a material craft (even a profession), the work of interpretation and critical agency needs be 
considered as a more concrete form of labour; a theory of ‘manual labor,’ as he would term it in ‘Domestic 
Life.’ The kinship between the ‘builder’ as a recurrent metaphor in Emerson’s writings and his career-long 
concern for the social and personal implications of creative practice is anchored in such thinking; but, 
likewise, Emerson’s interest in the aims, ambitions and efficacy of the ‘American Scholar’ should be 
considered a direct result of his engagement with ‘property’ as a concept. How intellectual property is 
‘created,’ is ‘built,’ and how that property should then behave in a cultural or informational marketplace. 
As an industrial or institutional culture that seeks to plasticize, objectify or thingify concepts for the 
purposes of their communication, debate, acceptance and—ultimately—the dialectical progress of a 
culture, American ‘scholarship’ is a perfect forum to Emerson’s mind; an arena designed to formalize 
various modes and methods of knowledge production and intellectual exchange. Emerson’s desire to 
classify scholarship as itself a form of physical work is notable, as is his want to find parity between the 
symbolic virtues of ‘manual labor’ and the burgeoning ‘revolution of opinion and practice’ previously 
noted. However, the question remains, then, as to how Emerson’s interest in ‘market fever’ would 
transmute into a response to the crisis of ’37 and the effects of economic depression on literary practice.  
The panic of ’37 was treated as an intellectual opportunity more than it was a catalyst for social or 
political intervention on Emerson’s part. As he would note in his journals, in the winter months of ’37, ‘I 
was born a seeing eye and not a helping hand,’ and such remarks are indicative of the ways in which 
Emerson perceived social disturbances that would follow the crisis more as an intellectual problem rather 
than as underpinning a political or socioeconomic moment of difficulty.19 But the commitment of 
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Emerson’s self-confessed efforts to derive philosophical worth from this period depression are noteworthy. 
Emerson’s biographer Robert D. Richardson summarizes the contexts for this financial crisis as 
follows:  
 
The supply of paper money had tripled in the United States between 1830 and 
1837 as part of the general economic boom that had begun in 1825. Hoping 
to strengthen the central bank, President Jackson stipulated that all 
obligations to the United States be paid in specie. Overseas creditors made 
similar demands. Then the wheat crop failed in 1836 and the price of cotton 
fell as well. Bank after bank suspended payment. All the banks in Boston had 
suspended payment by May of 1837. Many failed outright. […] Hard money 
was in very short supply.20  
 
Robert Sampson usefully supplements Richardson’s summary by synthesizing the panic’s effects on labour:  
 
The collapse of the inflationary and speculative boom of the 1830s coincided 
with the start of Martin Van Buren’s administration. In New York City alone, 
six thousand construction artisans were thrown out of work. By September it 
was thought that nearly all of the East Coast’s embryonic factories had closed. 
Clerks and salesmen in Philadelphia endured unemployment rates estimated 
at between one-half and two- thirds. Mothers begged in the streets of New 
York City for scraps to feed their children as poorhouses overflowed. 
Workers’ wages dipped from one-third to one-fifth 1836 levels.21 
 
Rather than pertinent to the development of Emerson’s authorship alone, a trigger-point for his ongoing 
interest in public and private forms of value, the magnitude of this moment is often proposed as key to the 
intellectual development of antebellum culture more broadly.  
Borrowing from Nicholas K. Bromell, Andrew Kopec suggests that the panic of ’37 is best regarded 
as the era’s first and broadest ‘cultural contestation of the meaning of work.’22 However, he also notes that 
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Emerson was a key figure in directing this ‘contestation’ more specifically toward a conceptual 
reinvigoration of labour, and ‘scholarly labor in particular.’23 Emerson saw the crisis as a pedagogical event 
and—as such—considered his own position on labour relative to the frailty of economic systems exposed 
by financial collapse. He understood that ‘the crisis affected labor,’ but also that ‘it seemed to be caused by 
labor as well,’ and believed ‘that Americans had misunderstood the nature of their work, indeed, they had 
construed labour as a material—rather than an ideal—process whereby they created saleable property.’24  
However, Emerson nonetheless sought to envisage how we should define labour as concept, and 
cultural labour in particular, by considering the circulatory systems that, themselves essentially fictitious, 
served to decentralize power structures by establishing the merchant as a key political figure.25 Emerson’s 
‘scholar’ should be considered a parallel figure to Emerson’s ‘merchant,’ and ‘The American Scholar’ 
something of a manifesto for the ‘revolution of opinion and practice’ he sought to instigate. ‘The American 
Scholar’ was delivered in the immediate wake of the panic, August 1837; and Kopec argues the lecture as 
the first steps toward what he would term ‘Emerson’s political economic project’—an attempt to combat 
the errors and ills of fiscal speculation with ‘philosophical speculation.’26 In order to characterize the 
progressive calibre of Emerson’s ‘project’ in its contexts, Kopec looks to the twenty-first century and the 
ways in which ‘a belief in critique’s social efficacy’ was sparked by the financial crisis of 2008,27 a crisis that 
facilitated a ‘more dynamic account of how economics impinges on literary production’ and how ‘literary 
texts are capable of performing socially progressive work.’28 Whilst the socioeconomic dislocation of 
twenty-first century financial crisis are not identical to those of the panic of ’37 in terms of cause nor scale, 
‘Emerson had such critical ambitions,’ Kopec notes; he worked to overcome ‘the central problem of market 
economics’—namely, ‘scarcity’—and would do so by interlacing a theorization of labour and an ideation 
 
23 Kopec, ‘Emerson, Labor and Ages of Turbulence,’ 251 
24 Andrew Kopec, ‘Emerson, Labor and Ages of Turbulence,’ 251-284  
25 Karl Polanyi, ‘The Self-Regulating Market and the Fictitious Commodities: Labor, Land, and Money,’ The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944, 2001), 71-81 
26 Kopec, ‘Emerson, Labor and Ages of Turbulence,’ 261 
27 Frank Donoghue, ‘The Uneasy Relationship between Business and the Humanities,’ American Academic, 1. (2004), 93-109; 
and Christopher Lorenz, ‘If You’re so Smart, Why are You Under Surveillance? Universities, Neoliberalism and New Public 
Management,’ Critical Inquiry 38. 3 (2012), 599-629 
28 Kopec, ‘Emerson, Labor and Ages of Turbulence,’ 253 
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of creativity.29 In short, the practice of meaning-making, of examining the ‘manifold allusions’ of a given 
page, should be read equally as a theory of economic productivity. As Randall Fuller has suggested, and 
as previously mentioned, the crisis of ‘37 should thus be argued as engendering a ‘conceptual shift’ in 
Emerson’s early works.30 However, what proves crucial to this present study is that such a ‘conceptual shift’ 
is more than simply the product of any revisionist or historiographic ‘reconstruction’ of Emerson’s 
philosophical position (to again borrow Wolfe’s phrase for recent re-examination of Emerson’s 
philosophical and cultural merits). It is, as shown, self-consciously laced into Emerson’s own reflections 
on the panic itself.  
Documenting the panic in his journals, Emerson would describe the event only to elucidate its 
philosophical and intellectual significance. Referring to the immediate cultural aftermath of the crisis, he 
would note that ‘[These] black times have a great scientific value,’ that ‘It is an epoch so critical a 
philosopher would not miss.’ ‘What was, ever since my memory, solid continent,’ he writes, ‘now yawns 
apart and discloses its composition and genesis. I learn geology the morning after an earthquake. […] The 
artificial is rent from the eternal.’31 As Harold Bloom has noted, the texture of Emerson’s language indicates 
that he would seemingly respond to the crisis of ’37 with an ‘idealistic glee.’32  
His comment on geology is more than an offhand aside, as such; it is a means with which to reticulate and 
organize Emerson’s thinking through an investigation of his use of metaphor. I will here concentrate briefly 
on Emerson’s interest in ‘geology’ in particular. 
Emerson’s sensitivity to the economic dynamism of his era is particularly definitive but requires 
further explication. As Alexander Kern suggests, ‘the principles of correspondence, melioration, [and] 
 
29 Ibid., 262 
30 Randall Fuller, in introduction to Emerson’s Ghosts, 6 
31 Emerson, ‘Journal C’ (May 14, 1837), JMN.V., 304 
32 ‘Emerson was electrified by financial storms,’ as Howard Bloom notes in an op-ed written for The New York Times in the 
wake of the collapse of the Lehmann brothers bank in 2008, and in the thick of an election campaign that would see Barack 
Obama first take office. ‘It may shock that the Sage of Concord should react to catastrophe with […] idealistic glee,’ Bloom 
writes. ‘Emerson would have understood our current raging polarities; ‘That American cultural nationalism should have 
been stimulated by a banking disaster is a wholly Emersonian paradox.’ The crucial ‘enigma,’ for Bloom, ‘is the direct link 
between the lingering financial crisis and Emerson’s formulation of his mature, stance’ demonstrated in his theories of 




individualism’ that inform Emerson’s philosophical position on culture and criticism can all be identified 
as underpinned by a receptivity and sensitivity to the ‘economic structures’ and systems in ascendance over 
the course of his early years. For Kern, the function of ‘economy’ in Emerson’s works— if we are to explore 
how it pivotally informs his relationship with subjectivism as a philosophical position—can in fact counter 
the ‘inconsistencies’ that oftentimes disrupt a reading of Emerson today.33  
However, the problem remains that Kern’s argument remains elusive and, as Richard Grusin 
infers, has only bred further confusion as per the critical implications of Emerson’s conceptualist 
engagements with commercial cultures. Grusin concedes the importance of ‘economy’ to Emerson’s 
thinking, but argues that our assessment thereof (more often than not) results in a number of ‘perhaps’ 
statements, rather than any definitive position.34 Perhaps Emerson’s contribution to ‘anthropology and 
economic theory is more widespread than has generally been understood,’ he writes,35 noting Emerson’s 
brief cameo in Marcel Mauss’s Essai sur le don (The Gift, 1950) as evidence.36 But beyond our 
acknowledgment of a recurring pattern in Emerson’s vocabulary (‘debt,’ ‘expenditure,’ ‘credit,’ 
‘reciprocity’ and ‘obligation’ all recurring in his cache of topics and tropes), Grusin admits that Emerson’s 
‘economic thought’ remains so obtuse that all we can surmise from it is that, from ‘the outset of his 
authorship,’ he challenges us to ‘repay him with interest.’37  
Grusin’s pun is evocative, as it incorporates Emerson’s engagement with (and receptivity to) the 
sociocultural circumstances of his authorship and economic dynamism of his era into what (he proposes) 
has constituted and sustained Emerson’s popularity and his philosophical appeal beyond the antebellum.38 
 
33 Ibid. 
34 Kern, ‘Emerson and Economics,’ 680 
35 Grusin, ‘Put God in Your Debt: Emerson’s Economy of Expenditure,’ 35 
36 Marcell Mauss, (trans.) W.D. Halls: ‘The unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it inferior, 
particularly when it has been accepted with no thought of returning it. We are still in the field of Germanic morality when 
we recall the curious essay by Emerson entitled ‘Gifts.’ Charity is still wounding for him who has accepted it, and the whole 
tendency of our morality is to strive to do away with the unconscious and injurious patronage of the rich almsgiver.’ The 
Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Routledge, 2002), 83. See also Emerson, ‘Gifts’ (1844), 
CW.III., 157-166 
37 Grusin, ‘Put God in your Debt: Emerson’s Economy of Expenditure,’ 44 
38 The popular press often occasions an effort to describe the progressive qualities of Emersonian thought and, at times, with 
significantly less difficulty than the conversation is warranted in academic circles. For example, for a good summary of the 
‘anticipatory’ qualities, see Frederick Turner, ‘Still Ahead of His Time,’ Smithsonian Magazine (May 2003) 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/still-ahead-of-his-time-82186396/ (Accessed 30.04.20) 
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However, the specifics of our own ‘interest’ in Emerson often overlooks the systems and patterns in place 
within his authorship, as discussed, but also the explicit and clear minded assertion of the significance of 
economic systems to the early development of his thinking in the late 1830s.  
Emerson’s private sense that the financial crisis of 1837 is of ‘scientific’ or even ‘philosophical’ 
value is a key precedent to his later (and public) assertion that we need identify the ‘meaning of economy’ 
some four years later in ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841), and arguably underpins his eventual reestablishment 
of his theory of ‘OTHERISM,’ 1836, as a theory of ‘COMMERCIAL VALUE,’ 1845. However, his expression of 
a want to learn ‘geology’ from an ‘earthquake’ directly parallels his later identification of our need to wrest 
‘meaning from economy.’ In ‘History’ (1841), Emerson notes that he ‘knew a draughtsman employed in a 
public survey who found that he could not sketch the rocks until their geological structure was first 
explained to him.’39 Emerson’s interest in ‘geology’ is a want to identify the grounds and foundations of an 
American culture; however, following the panic of ’37, he is explicit in his sense that we need understand 
how the ‘geological structure’ of a national identity is largely sculpted by the depth and pervasiveness of 
cultural event. Arguably, this contradicts Emerson’s previously noted assertion that we need be wary of the 
gravitas of ‘external cause’ as capable of effecting the creativity and spontaneity of our own critical agency. 
However, it is of note that he should here so explicitly identify a want to examine the ‘scientific value’ of 
cultural trauma and consider the cultural impact thereof.  
It is here, we could argue, that Emerson’s interest in the intersection of literary culture and political 
economy is first and most astutely defined, but it is his fascination in the systems of circulation that would 
both provoke this ‘earthquake’ and emerge intact thereafter that I will concentrate on in the following two 
chapters. Emerson’s interest in the circulation of money, and the introduction of a paper currency as a 
means of considering forms of social and personal signification is bound to an analysis of his economic 
history as a foundation for his analyses of the possibility of a national literary culture or scholarship. As we 
have seen, this is a quality of Emerson’s thinking that previous critics have noted, but the contexts for 
Emerson’s thinking are key.  
 
39 Emerson, ‘History’ CW.II., 16 
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Marc Shell, for example, has argued that the Jacksonian ‘specie circular’ of 1836, pursuant to the 
Coinage Act, augured a significant pedagogical function in the development of an American culture of 
letters.40 Read in partnership with rising literacy rates in the American North East, the introduction of the 
paper dollar instigated a complex relationship with value assignation as concept and signification as process 
amidst an increasingly literate American populace.41 Due, in part, to the distinction between hard and soft 
currencies—between gold and paper—this cultural shift precedes the panic of 1837 but informs the kinds 
of questions that Emerson would pose in the wake thereof.42 Shell refers to the Jackson administration’s 
assertion that land acquisition should be dealt with in hard rather than soft currency—in gold or silver 
rather than paper money—and suggests that this was a confusing accompaniment to the administration’s 
efforts to sufficiently introduce the country and culture to a new monetary system. Rather than expediting 
a general acceptance of the paper dollar, the ‘circular’ galvanized a public awareness of a distinction 
between forms of finance and proved effective primarily in its destabilization of a public sense of trust. The 
dollar became a code for the fictionality of financialist culture; the delicate and artificial value of paper 
money being foreshadowed by the hard and fast symbolic authority of gold or silver as signs and 
determiners of value. The introduction of the paper dollar, according to Shell, thus served to indicate the 
 
40 Leon Jackson examines this statement through investigation the professionalization of authorship in antebellum America 
relative to the political support of the marketplace as both practicable economic system and ideological paradigm; see Leon 
Jackson, ‘From the Profession of Authorship to the Business of Letters,’ The Business of Letters: Authorial Economies in 
Antebellum America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 9-53. Whilst Jackson’s assessment of the intercedence 
of cultural and market economics is one of the more thorough analyses of the evolution of American literature as industry 
and definable entity, Emerson’s exclusion from his array of case studies and enlisted commentators is noteworthy.  
41 Charles Sellers: ‘Wherever Yankees migrated [in the first decades of the nineteenth century] they outstripped natives in 
wealth and culture while pressing their example through multiplying churches, colleges, schools, libraries, and a new 
perceptual realm of mass literacy and cheap print. Voluntary associations spread rapidly across the North to promote 
missions and Sunday Schools, enforce morality and temperance, aid and uplift the poor, and maintain libraries and lyceum 
lecture series for cultural self-improvement. […] By the 1840s an exfoliating cultural infrastructure and the powerful new 
medium of cheap print were carrying the American bourgeoisie to the most pervasive hegemony of any modern ruling class. 
[…] The cutting edge of the market’s cultural conquest was a surge of literacy and schooling. Ever since alphabetic writing 
set off a cultural revolution in Greece, literacy has fostered an analytical individualism that separated educated elites for two 
millennia from oral majorities attuned to communal memory. Literacy began to slowly widen only with the emergence of 
the printing press, bourgeoisie and Protestantism in early modern Europe. Colonial literacy seems to have extended little 
beyond elites, except among Bible-reading male Yankees and self-making Ben Franklins in centers of trade.’ See ‘The 
Bourgeois Republic,’ The Market Revolution, 364-365 
42 See Jackson, ‘From the Profession of Authorship to the Business of Letters,’ 49. Jackson would look to both the impact of 
the crisis on a public engagement with literature, but also in terms of the ways in which publishers would remunerate their 
authors. 
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degree of invention and faith involved in financial systems.43 As a form that was liable to depreciate in 
value relative to the gold reserves elsewhere held that it was designed to signify, the dollar has thus been 
argued as codifying a certain kind of a nervousness amidst the American populace.44 Whilst questions as 
per the value and validity of paper money were raised in the popular press, it also introduced fraud as a 
tripartite cultural predicament. Counterfeiting, notes Shell, was held to be as much an epistemological 
problem as it was both a legalistic and political concern.45 The excessive speculation of land following the 
Indian Removal Act of 1830 brought with it an increasingly widespread counterfeit culture, and impacted 
public opinion as per the degree of trust that could be allotted federal, fiscal measures.46  
Rather than consider the economic and cultural effects of the introduction of paper money to the 
American territories, Shell therefore proposes that it was the widespread circulation of fraudulent bills that 
served to sophisticate and enlighten an American readership. Foregrounding an awareness of the artificial 
construction of value; the discrete distance between an object and its signification; and the importance of 
circulation as a means of distilling both cultural and economic fortitude, the circulation of the paper dollar 
also drew attention to regionalized economic disequilibrium; the difference between an urban and rural 
working class; and—in essence—a disparity between personal need and public welfare. 
Emerson was alert to the complex intellectual difficulties that accompanied America’s early 
 
43 Emerson would remark specifically on this in ‘The Transcendentalist,’ wherein he would note that ‘the sturdy capitalist,’ 
sits all their faith and enterprise in a system beyond their control; in so doing, they serve as a symbol of precisely that system: 
‘no matter how deep and square on blocks of Quincy granite he lays the foundations of his banking-house or Exchange, [the 
capitalist] must set it, at last, not on a cube corresponding to the angles of his structure, but on a mass of unknown materials 
and solidity, red-hot or white-hot perhaps at the core, which rounds off to an almost perfect sphericity, and lies floating in 
soft air, and goes spinning away, dragging bank and banker with it at a rate of thousands of miles the hour, he knows not 
whither,—a bit of bullet, now glimmering, now darkling through a small cubic space on the edge of an unimaginable pit of 
emptiness. And this wild balloon, in which his whole venture is embarked, is a just symbol of his whole state and faculty.’ 
See ‘The Transcendentalist’ (1844), CW.I., 331-332 
44 Jonathan A. Glickstein, ‘The Pauper Labor of the Old World, Free Labor, and Gresham’s Law,’ American Exceptionalism, 
American Anxiety: Wages, Competition and Degraded Labor in the Antebellum United States (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 2002), 183-210 
45 Marc Shell, ‘The Gold Bug: Introduction to the Industry of Letters in America,’ Money, Language and Thought, 5-24.; see 
also, Richard H. Timberlake, ‘The Specie Circular and Sales of Public Lands: A Comment,’ The Journal of Economic History, 
25.3. (1965), 414-416.; and Richard H. Timberlake, ‘The Specie Circular and the Distribution of the Surplus,’ Journal of 
Political Economy, 68.2. (1960), 109-117 
46 David R. Johnson: ‘According to the New York Times, nearly 80% of all bank notes in circulation in 1862 were counterfeit.’ 
See ‘The Social World of Counterfeiting,’ Illegal Tender: Counterfeiting and the Secret Service in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1995), 37 
 144 
relationship with the dollar, and the ways in which this paper media affected Americans on both a personal 
and public level are keenly detailed in his later writings. If we look to ‘Wealth,’ for example, his somewhat 
wary relationship with inflation and value is explicit; the ways in which a single dollar accrues value in 
different contexts enabling a specific form of American atomism. As Emerson notes, ‘The value of a dollar 
is social,’47 but equally that ‘all depends upon the skill of the spender.’48 In short, Emerson’s argument is 
that ‘Money is of no value,’ that only an examination of its contexts and circulation could deem it as of 
value, and that such an argument needed to contend the coeval significance of both an active self and a 
participatory social economy for the ‘value of a dollar’ to be considered as of any worth whatsoever, just 
as a ‘building’ requires a ‘builder,’ to again borrow Emerson’s image once again. 
It is this difficult correlation of self and state that Emerson details in ‘Wealth.’ How does a singular 
economic system accommodate the sheer diversity of labour forms that it depends upon to exist in the first 
place? Emerson’s response is partly to signal the ways in which a ‘dollar’ means different things in different 
places. First, he considers this idea relative to a consideration of labour as a determiner of value. ‘The 
farmer’s dollar is heavy, and the clerk’s is light and nimble,’ he writes, it ‘leaps out of his pocket; jumps on 
to cards and faro-tables: but still more curious is its susceptibility to metaphysical changes. It is the finest 
barometer of social storms and announces revolutions.’49 However, rather than explaining his meaning nor 
the ‘metaphysical’ changes that cleave to the itinerant dollar—and considering the relationship between 
‘revolution,’ ‘social storms’ and financial systems—Emerson explicitly notes that it is ‘civil advancement’ 
that ‘makes every man’s dollar worth more.’50 However, it is not only the contexts of labour and 
expenditure that effect the public and private resonances of his dollar; Emerson also turns his attention to 
the breadth of America’s geography. The circulation of a single ‘dollar’ through a diverse and disparate 
number of territories, both urban and rural, both inflates and depreciates its worth.51 ‘In California, the 
country where [the dollar] grew, —what would it buy? A few years since, it would buy a shanty, dysentery, 
 
47 Emerson, ‘Wealth’ (1850), CW.VI., 104 
48 Emerson, ‘The Young American’ (1844), CW.I., 383 




hunger, bad company and crime,’ he notes; ‘There are wide countries, like Siberia, where it would buy 
little else to-day than some petty mitigation of suffering. In Rome, it will buy beauty and magnificence.’ 52 
‘A dollar in a university is worth more than a dollar in a jail […].’53 This problem—the simple fact that 
inflation would stretch and narrow the purchasing power of a dollar dependent upon where his ‘spender’ 
happened to be situated—can only find resolution if an industrialization of American infrastructure could 
meet the growing demands of a burgeoning market economy. Looking to his own native Massachusetts, 
Emerson notes in 1860 that ‘Forty years ago, a dollar would not buy much in Boston.’ ‘Now,’ he suggests, 
‘it will buy a great deal more in our old town, thanks to railroads, telegraphs, steamers and the 
contemporaneous growth of New York and the whole country.’54 The growth of America’s economy serves 
to support the universal value of the dollar; just as a broader acceptance of the dollar’s value will support 
the industrial enhancement of American culture.  
Whilst this analysis of material wealth and the dollar value of goods amalgams Emerson’s ideas of 
‘public welfare’ with a general faith in the private sector as he would note in ‘The Young American,’ in 
‘Wealth’ he continues to detail the ways in which the ‘dollar’ has both ‘moral’ and ‘mental’ significance as 
a symbol. ‘A dollar is not value,’ he writes, ‘but representative of value, and, at last, of moral values. Wealth 
is mental; wealth is moral.’55 Here, Emerson returns to his sense that the dynamism of America’s economic 
expansion is of both ‘scientific’ and ‘philosophical’ value; that it informs the behavioural or ‘moral’ 
engagement that we should have with the world and it informs a ‘revolution’ of both ‘opinion and practice.’ 
‘The whole value of the dime is in knowing what to do with it,’ he notes; ‘One man buys with it a land-
title of an Indian, and makes his posterity princes; or buys corn enough to feed the world; or pen, ink, and 
paper, or a painter’s brush, by which he can communicate himself to the human race as if he were fire; and 
the other buys barley candy.’56 
Emerson’s assessment of the purchasing power of the dollar (in both moral, mental and material 
 
52 Ibid., 102-103 
53 Ibid., 103 
54 Ibid., 102-103 
55 Ibid., 102 
56 Emerson, ‘The Young American’ (1844), CW.I., 383 
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terms), is enhanced by his reflections on counterfeit culture as well. Echoing Shell’s appraisal of an 
American sensitivity to fraud as key to the progress of an antebellum literary culture, he notes that ‘the 
Bank-Note detector is a useful publication’—‘but the current dollar, silver or paper, is itself the detector of 
the right and wrong where it circulates.’57 
 
If a trader refuses to sell his vote, or adheres to some odious right, he makes 
so much more equity in Massachusetts; and every acre in the state is worth 
more, in the hour of his action. If you take out of State Street the ten honestest 
merchants and put in ten roguish persons controlling the same amount of 
capital, the rates of insurance will indicate it; the soundness of banks will show 
it; the highways will be less secure; the schools will feel it; the children will 
bring home their little dose of poison; the judge will sit less firmly on the 
bench, and his decisions be less upright; he has lost so much support and 
constraint, which all need; and the pulpit will betray it, in a laxer rule of life.58  
 
This correlation of the ‘control of capital,’ and its potential misuse, is accentuated by Emerson through 
another botanical metaphor in ‘The Young American’—one that bears a crucial resemblance to ‘Nature’ 
in terms of its emphasis on relation, use and value: 
 
An apple-tree, if you take out every day for a number of days a load of loam 
and put in a load of sand about its roots, will find out. An apple-tree is a stupid 
kind of creature, but if this treatment be pursued for a short time, I think it 
would begin to mistrust something.59 
 
In this somewhat heavy-handed allusion—the idea that the growth of capital is equivalent to the living 
growth of a fruiting tree—‘the value of a dollar is social,’ but it is also markedly sculpted by society (just as 
an orchard must be tended to function efficiently). Rather than by an individualized acceptance of its 
‘representative’ value alone, both social and labour contexts effect the facilitation of value.60 However, such 
 
57 Ibid., 103-104 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 104 
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ideas of growth and of mind, in Emerson’s hands, not only pertain to the organic character of capital; they 
also impact his early theorizations of language, critical agency, and intellectual property. 
In this passage from ‘Nature,’ for example—and the chapter on ‘Language’ in particular—
Emerson reflects on the ways in which an ecosystem or language ‘economy’ needs be grounded in truth 
and in fact. The metaphor that he chooses to illustrate the difficulties and potential failures of this linguistic 
aim is nonetheless, once again, the potential ‘perversion’ of a paper currency: 
 
The corruption of man is followed by the corruption of language. When 
simplicity of character and the sovereignty of ideas is broken up by the 
prevalence of secondary desires,—the desire of riches, of pleasure, of power, 
and of praise,—and duplicity and falsehood take place of simplicity and truth, 
the power over nature as an interpreter of the will is in a degree lost; new 
imagery ceases to be created, and old words are perverted to stand for things 
which are not; a paper currency is employed, when there is no bullion in the 
vaults. In due time the fraud is manifest, and words lose all power to stimulate 
the understanding or the affections. Hundreds of writers may be found in 
every long-civilized nation who for a short time believe and make others 
believe that they see and utter truths, who do not of themselves clothe one 
thought in its natural garment, but who feed unconsciously on the language 
created by the primary writers of the country, those, namely, who hold 
primarily on nature.61 
 
Rather than simply a testament to the economic anxiety that Shell alludes to, the connection between 
language, meaning, and currency is here explicitly about the potential schism between sign and signifier, 
between falsehood and truth. We can insert this into the wider discourse employed in Emerson’s early and 
later works on value and labour as concepts, but here, the malleability of a ‘paper currency’ is key. The 
consistency of Emerson’s interest in circulation, and political economy more broadly, is not merely about 
the recycling of materials between his private journals, addresses and essays. It is about establishing a 
theory of critical value concomitant with the economic evolution of an independent American culture. For 
 
61 Emerson, ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 29-30 
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Emerson, in other words, the ability to render language without corruption, to interrogate the ‘sovereignty 
of ideas’ is not all that dissimilar to the wider circulation of capital. Once again, the financialist and the 
writer occupy the same marketplace, one in which the centrality of the dollar cannot be circumvented. In 
‘Wealth,’ a single dollar has the value to subvert and disrupt the moral values of a society; in ‘Nature,’ a 
fraudulent word ‘perverted to stand for things with are not,’ is a false dollar: a paper bill that circulates 
‘when there is no bullion in the vaults.’ These impressions argue a correlation and consistency of approach 
in Emerson’s writings that correlates his early writings, 1836, with his later and more explicit reflections 
on the development of market cultures, 1860.  
To return to the ‘apple tree’ as a metaphor in ‘Wealth,’ the recurrence of both fruit and the fruiting 
tree as a favoured metaphor for consumption and critical relation is significant. As we have already touched 
upon, the fruiting tree functions as a symbol of fundamental importance to Emerson’s characterization of 
the mechanics of both critical and commercial culture. Consider his remarks in ‘Uses of Great Men’—his 
characterization of ‘mind’ as ‘endogenous,’ an organic object that aims to feed off external stimuli only to 
bud and produce. We’ve also his emphatic relation of the ‘apple’ and the ‘I’ in ‘Thoughts on Modern 
Literature’ (‘What is the apple to me?’); and his assessment of the commercial viability of the windfall 
peach that we can follow through the evolution of Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ and the later repetition of 
materials in ‘Wealth.’ As in his ruminations on the corruption of language that occurs once it is distanced 
from the origin of whatever metaphor it employs, so too is the fruit of labour when it is distanced from the 
site of production and taken (proverbially) to market. ‘Take the peaches from under the tree,’ he writes. 
Emerson’s interest in ‘Commerce’ as ‘a single fruit’ on the boughs of Leroux’s tree is, likewise, dependent 
upon the proper care to support its further cultivation and fruition. 
That the aims and ambitions of our stewardship of the natural world is so popularly associated 
with Emerson’s early writings (Emerson famously enumerating the ‘medicinal’ qualities of time spent away 
from the demands of professional and urban life) is ironic, considering his want to consider both the tree’s 
relationship with its environment and the market potential of its produce: the fruits of labour.62 Both the 
 
62 Emerson: To the body and mind which have been cramped by noxious work or company, nature is medicinal and restores 
their tone. The tradesman, attorney comes out of the din and craft of the street and sees the sky and the woods and is a man 
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tree, its capacity to produce, and its fruit are seemingly preferred symbols for Emerson to consider the 
relationship between cultural production and critical consumption, as well as a way to identify the 
metonymy of market participation in general. The fruit is representative of the tree’s growth; its growth is 
contingent on the purity of the soil; the fruit is thus emblematic of both the tree and the ecosystem that 
would produce it. In an oft-cited journal entry, 1840, he would note this process of thought in passing: ‘I 
dreamed that I floated at will in the great Ether,’ he writes, ‘and I saw this world floating also not far off 
but diminished to the size of an apple. Then an angel took it in his hand and brought it to me and said, This 
must thou eat. And I ate the world.’63 Here, we’ve an evocative rephrasing of Emerson’s dollar bill dialectics, 
as they could be termed. The ‘spender’ is a metonym for the culture of expenditure that they participate in; 
the dollar bill both vitiates the ‘spender’ as a subject and the social system that affords their activity value; 
the ‘spender’ is representative of the social system that they partake in; and that system requires a multitude 
of isolated ‘spenders’ to remain coherent.  
Among the many readings of this ‘provocative dream,’ of Emerson’s desire to ‘eat the world,’ Eric 
Wilson suggests ‘that Emerson revises Genesis in light of his celebration of nature—not scripture—as the 
locus for revelation.’ The ‘visionary’ of Emerson’s dream ‘would eat from the tree of knowledge of good 
and evil and report his findings; only to better identify the causal interrelation of all and any such findings.64 
Wilson also notes that such thinking underpins the conceptual attractiveness of ‘economy’ to Emerson. ‘In 
the economy of the world […] I can find no traces of a beginning, no prospect of an end,’ Emerson writes, 
1838.65 In sum, whether we examine the ‘spender’ or the economic systems that supports their activity, the 
interrelation between them is circular and cyclical as both figures will always be symbolically and 
conceptually co-dependent. 
 
again.’ See ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 16. Richard Grusin argues Emerson’s position here as key to the establishment and 
development of the American National Parks system and—comparing Emerson’s position with architect and journalist 
Frederick Olmsted’s efforts to further support the ‘medicalization of that antebellum axiom, the sanative influence of natural 
scenery.’ See Richard Grusin, ‘Reproducing Yosemite: Olmsted, Environmentalism, and the Nature of Aesthetic Agency,’ 
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Returning to Emerson’s evocative wording in his reflection on the ideological and analytical value 
of financial crisis, ‘I learn geology the morning after an earthquake,’ this referral to economy as a system 
in constant evolution and movement (with ‘no traces of a beginning, no prospect of an end) appears in the 
midst of a conceptual paean to ‘geology’ more broadly; a discipline that Emerson regarded as though ‘a 
book of Genesis, wherein we read how the worlds were made, and are introduced to periods as portentous 
as the distances of the sky.’66 Emerson’s reflections on the symbolic value of ‘geology’ are anchored in his 
reading of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1833) and James Hutton’s theories of the formation of coal 
that he likely appropriated from Playfair’s Illustrations of the Huttonian Theory of the Earth (1802).67 By 
aligning ‘geology’ and ‘economy’, the development of America’s own history of ‘political economy’ 
emerges as Emerson’s own ‘Genesis’ moment; an indication of the ‘conceptual shift’ that Randall Fuller 
identifies in Emerson’s writings following the panic of ’37.  
How we are to best define Emerson’s interest in ‘economy’ is the subject of a self-conscious and 
searching critical scrutiny in his writings. However, the ideas behind Emerson’s use of the term, and his 
predilection that ‘the Transcendent is economy also,’ appear unequivocally bound to his efforts to consider 
our relationship with the exchange and ownership of ideas, the assignation of critical value, and an 
identification of the link between sign and signified.68 Etymologically speaking, Emerson’s thinking both 
mirrors and extends the lexical development of American English and the definition of the term ‘economy’ 
as can be localized to the early nineteenth century. Noah Webster, in 1828, collated the first dictionary of 
American English and, seeking to crystalize ‘the meaning of economy’ himself, insisted that the personal 
ramifications of ‘economy’ take premiership over and above its extension into the social domain of political 
economy.  
 
ECONOMY, n. 1. Primarily, the management, regulation and government of a family 
or the concerns of a household. 2. The management of pecuniary concerns or the 
expenditure of money. 3. A frugal or judicious use of money […] and of time, of labor, 
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and of the instruments of labor. 4. The disposition or arrangement of any work; as the 
economy of a poem. 5. A system of rules, regulations, rites and ceremonies […]. 6. The 
regular operations of nature in the generation, nutrition and preservation of animals or 
plants; as animal economy; vegetable economy. 7. Distribution or due order of things.69 
 
Here, the word ‘economy’ first or ‘primarily’ refers to the management and organization of self and 
household—of society in miniature (as in ‘Domestic Life’)—ahead of its inferential shift to the fiscal 
structures that govern wider society; the ‘distribution’ or ‘due order of things’ (as in ‘Wealth’). Emerson’s 
own definition echoes Webster’s succinctly if we are to consider his sense of the representative value of 
‘petty economy.’ ‘The interest of petty economy is this symbolization of the great economy,’ he notes in 
‘Wealth’; ‘the way in which a house, a private man’s methods, tally with the solar system, and the laws of 
give and take, throughout nature.’70  
Emerson’s thinking, relative to the historic contexts of the panic of 1837, are suggestive as per the 
prospective politics of his position. Keen to note the possibility that the panic could instigate a moment of 
collective action or revolution, Emerson is alert to the possibility that the panic of ’37 is an instance capable 
of facilitating a radical overhaul of society’s economic and political management. He would note that the 
sixty thousand plus labourers ‘to be presently thrown out of work’ should form a radical collective. That 
they are best represented as ‘a formidable mob’ and should stand ready ‘to break open banks, rob the rich 
and brave the domestic government.’71 But rather than consider how these ‘black times’ effect the realities 
of financial disequilibrium, or indeed the possibility of revolution, Emerson was more alert to the 
intellectual effects and cultural potential of this period of economic downturn.  
It is of note, as such, that his epoch was largely defined by such ‘black times.’ In an early publication 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research on the growth and stability of the post-revolutionary period, 
Wesley Mitchell identifies fourteen depressions between 1790 and 1870 (1796-98, 1803, 1808-9, 1815-21, 
1829, 1834, 1837, 1839-43, 1846, 1848, 1854-55, 1857-58, 1861 and 1866-67); and Joseph Fichtelberg 
suggests that, even if some of these downturns proved too brief to be considered genuine depressions by 
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our contemporary standards, nineteenth-century American society experienced six ‘deep depressions’ 
before 1870 that would profoundly affect both material growth and cultural progress. Nevertheless, the 
cultural effects of the panics of 1819, 1837 and 1857 were particularly far-reaching,72 and if we consider the 
major dates of Emerson’s authorship—with his first publication dated 1822, and his last, 1875—the fault 
lines of his period can therefore be unequivocally argued as largely defined by a cyclical process of 
downturn,  depression, recovery and downturn again.73 Resultingly, Emerson was alert to the spirit of 
‘competition’ wrought by market economics; ‘We live in a market, where is only so much wheat, or wool, 
or land,’ he would note in ‘Uses of Great Men,’ ‘and if I have so much more, then every other must have 
so much less.’74 But the ways in which he conceptualizes ‘competition’—and considers the practical terms 
of scarcity and want and supply—portrays a more complicated cultural evocation of market-based practices 
and ideologies than one might assume, and speaks to later critical reflection on the correlation of critical 
and commercial trends. ‘The power of the market is the power of public evaluation,’ as André Orléan has 
remarked; and from this perspective, we can go so far as to say that it is a power of opinion.75 Orléan’s 
aside is antedated by Emerson’s supposition that the development of market cultures constitutes a 
‘revolution in opinion and practice.’ But ‘exchange,’ as Georg Simmel has observed, ‘is the sociological 
phenomenon sui generis’ that demands further exploration in any analysis of market systems.76 The power 
of the market informs public opinion, but proves contingent on private engagement, and Simmel’s assertion 
echoes Emerson’s position in a variety of ways; a system of expenditure requires a ‘spender,’ a building 
requires a ‘builder,’ a text requires a ‘creative reader,’ but all these figures contribute toward a broader 
ideological ‘superstructure,’ to borrow Emerson’s own phrase: in sum, a view of the market as a romance 
of participation. 
Examining the co-dependency of individual and collective forms of economy, Christopher 
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Newfield notes there is sufficient evidence to evince the claim that Emerson was more interested in 
contractility than he was property; in our ‘spiritualist adherence’ to the contractual obligations of exchange 
culture rather than the material exchange of goods or ideas itself. Newfield suggests that Emerson would 
repeatedly highlight the prospective connection of a singular mind to an ‘othered, or private, or otherwise 
inaccessible corporate [body],’ an idea that he puts forwards with no mention of Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM,’ 
and instead focuses on how Emerson sought to facilitate an ‘understanding of agency as a participatory 
and collective activity.’77 In this way, the privilege afforded to the individual mind can co-exist with that 
mind’s freedom being reliant on a social body as well. In this context, a ‘book’ can be an effective vessel 
for our economic being and the instrumental qualities of literary culture in an industrial or commercial 
milieu. As has been shown, Emerson’s interest in our ‘use of literature,’78 our ‘use of books,’79 becomes a 
way to repeatedly analyse and romanticize forms of economic participation and contractual correlation, 
the constancy of his emphasis on ‘use,’ a way to assess how individual freedom and social conciliation can 
be symbolically traced in the relationship between a reader and a writer.80 This has not uncommonly led 
to the association of his cultural philosophies with the development of laissez-faire economic systems and 
ideologies in antebellum culture, and Emerson repeatedly seems keen to explore the possibility of culture 
as an intellectual and ideological beneficiary of these ‘black times,’ portraying critical exchange as simply 
another kind of corporatism, but one distanced from the dynamics of downturn and recovery.81 
Emerson’s sense of the intellectual significance of economic depression—pooled with his 
realization of the frailty of paper currencies—are two vital, co-dependent elements of his self-reflexive 
cultural analysis; both his investigation of culture and his investigation of that investigation itself. However, 
the etiological impact of economic growth and collapse can also be directly linked to Emerson’s 
development of a ‘creative reading.’ Look to ‘The Poet’ (1844), for example, wherein Emerson explores 
the ‘use of emblems’ as instruments of public office:82   
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The schools of poets and philosophers are not more intoxicated with their 
symbols than the populace with theirs. In our political parties, compute the 
power of badges and emblems. See the great ball which they roll from 
Baltimore to Bunker Hill! In the political processions, Lowell goes in a loom, 
and Lynn in a shoe, and Salem in a ship. Witness the cider-barrel, the log-
cabin, the hickory-stick, the palmetto, and all the cognizances of party. See 
the power of national emblems. Some stars, lilies, leopards, a crescent, a lion, 
an eagle, or other figure which came into credit God knows how, on an old 
rag of bunting, blowing in the wind on a fort at the ends of the earth, shall 
make the blood tingle under the rudest or the most conventional exterior.83 
 
The aesthetics of political power are indicative of a symbolic language in American culture—‘the power of 
emblems and badges’—and Emerson argues that our capacity to read these symbols is the practice of both 
self-identification and an identification of authority. ‘The schools of poets and philosophers are not more 
intoxicated with their symbols than the populace with theirs,’ he writes, and ‘our political parties’ are no 
different. The act of recognition is a creative act, an act of reading that acknowledges both political power 
as composed through symbols; and a realization of political participation is delineated through a realization 
of our ability to understand said symbols. Such thinking arguably underpins Emerson’s theory of ‘creative 
reading,’ and if we are to regard ‘The American Scholar’ as itself a product of financial crisis (as would Kopec, 
amongst others), that such a position on the legibility of culture should emerge out of a period of financial 
collapse indeed indicates the radicality of Emerson’s engagement with scholarship and political economy. 
Emerson’s initial reactions to the poverty indentured by the panic of ’37 were staunchly idealistic 
but—equally—unrealistic. Rather than a demonstration of Emerson’s political engagement, his 
theorizations of value in the late 1830s and early 1840s indicate his distance from the inexorable poverty 
that would follow the panic of ’37. Emerson’s own finances were left relatively unscathed by the collapse. 
He would note in 1838 that his estate would include domestic property, $22,000 worth of stocks, and an 
income from his public appearances in the range of $400 to $800 a year. In short, his security was assured 
whilst the gulf between rich and poor—landowner and the labourer—exponentially broadened in the New 
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England area.84 As Cary Wolfe notes, the year preceding Emerson’s delivery of ‘The American Scholar’ 
was unquestionably the ‘worst’ in the country’s economic history to date. Thousands had rioted in New 
York, protesting inflated prices for food, writes Wolfe; the city’s flour warehouses were raided; cotton had 
depreciated in value by one-half; public land sale in the West had decreased by 82%. Although financial 
collapse had wholly diminished the extension of banking systems outwards from New York, ‘the 
depression left the Massachusetts and the Boston Banks relatively unscathed, which allowed [Emerson] to 
coolly investigate the meaning of the panic from a safe economic distance.’85 This is notable in the 
somewhat detached critical disposition and rhetorical flair of Emerson’s reflections on the ‘loud cracks in 
the social edifice’ engineered by the crisis of ’37, but also speaks to the ideological volume of his reactions 
to financial collapse.86 ‘Hard times,’ writes Emerson, documenting the view from his study window; ‘men 
breaking who ought not to break; banks bullied into the bolstering of desperate speculators; all the 
newspapers a chorus of owls.’87  
For Emerson, this historic moment had exposed ‘the ridiculous fiction of a society governed by 
economic law […] for the delusion he always knew it to be, and he took no small satisfaction in such 
revelation.’88 However, these ‘hard times’ are arguably key to our contextually corroborating the form and 
content of Emerson’s early essays, as has been noted by a number of recent critics. Considering the ways 
in which he would foreground the importance of interpretative agency, self-determinacy and independence 
in his early works, it seems an easy intellectual leap to allege that such ideas are the result of the collapse 
of a system so reliant upon collective participation, cultures of exchange, and a hierarchical class system 
that Emerson would compare to the ‘feudalist’ organization of British Colonial Rule. But these direct and 
political allegations are relatively few, and this period of depression and disequilibrium both stylistically 
and conceptually impacts Emerson’s ‘experimental’ authorship more acutely than it would inform the 
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partisan persuasions of his politics.89 
Considering the weight of his socioeconomic conditions and their influence upon his aesthetic 
philosophy—and the period of collapse, recovery and economic expansion that would parallel the 
ascendance of Emerson’s popularity—Carolyn Porter locates in Emerson’s economic and historic moment 
as ‘a set of geographical, social, and political conditions which were to foster a relatively, even uniquely, 
unimpeded capitalist expansion.’90 It was a period that cultivated a ‘rapidly accelerated’ process of 
‘atomization and alienation’ in America that presages the ‘European, and modernist, fact,’ notes Porter; 
and Emerson’s astute awareness of the ways in which a period of depression would inform the cultural and 
ideological progress of the 1800s should be registered.91 Wolfe agrees and, in The Limits of American Literary 
Ideology (1993)—a text that explores the comparability of Emersonian and Poundian ‘newness’ by 
correlating Modernist and Transcendentalist tropes—alleges that ‘the standard features usually associated 
with Modernism (anomie, subjectivism, and so on)’ are anticipated in the literature of the antebellum 
American North East ‘because the economic conditions of modernity are anticipated there as well.’92  
Michael Gilmore would take Porter and Wolfe’s arguments a step further. Considering the rapid 
cultural reification of ‘American Romanticism’ in a late nineteenth century culture of letters and the ‘retreat 
into unintelligibility’ exemplified by the avant-garde habits of the movement’s key practitioners (he 
numbers Emerson, Hawthorne, Melville and Thoreau as particularly indicative exemplars), Gilmore 
argues that what first appears a deliberate ‘estrangement from the market system’ in the works of this period 
behaves, in end, as a question of literary culture’s complicity in its expansion. ‘The power of the market’ is 
elucidated by virtue of a need to clearly characterize precisely the economic systems they deigned to 
attack.93 As Cornel West notes, this logic particularly troubles our receipt of Emerson’s writings today.  
Emersonian notions of ‘power, provocation and personality in the context of academic culture’ 
are—as we have seen—unarguably underpinned by an interest in ‘capitalist industrialization’ and the 
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‘national consolidation’ of a ‘market’ culture as something greater than merely a theory of economic 
productivity; it is a means of organizing and disseminating commercial produce, on the one hand, but also 
the traffic and trade of ideas.94 In some respects, this is an attribute of Emerson’s historical specificity. The 
overall cultural effect of America’s movement ‘from agrarian to urban industrialization, from vocational 
education to professional training, and from entrepreneurial capitalism to monopoly capitalism’ not only 
forging ‘new circumstances and challenges’ for Emerson’s authorship, but also for our interpretation of 
‘Emersonian discourse’ (with the benefit of hindsight and historical retrospect kept in mind).95 But whilst 
West would argue that the ascent and development of capitalist culture influences how we read Emerson, 
the form and function of Emerson’s own engagement with political economy remains unclear as his 
inconsistent relationship with capitalist culture troubles our capacity to cleanly type Emerson as either 
protesting or participating in the hegemonic expansion of a market culture.  
To better elucidate the confused character of Emerson’s early works, West also cites the 
significance of the financial panic and subsequent depression of 1837 as key to the development of 
Emerson’s political consciousness. ‘The depression of 1837 not only adversely affected Emerson’s personal 
fortunes,’ he writes, but also impacted upon his otherwise ‘complacent’ worldview.96 It was both a practical 
and theoretical crisis; an awakening from ‘slumber.’97 To depict America’s emerging capitalist ‘edifice’ in 
Emerson’s own words is to represent a position that would, at first glance, avail an anti-market sensibility. 
Characterizing the marketplace as a socio-symbolic ‘system of selfishness, […] of distrust, of concealment, 
of superior keenness, not of giving but of taking advantage,’98 Emerson would declare that ‘out of doors all 
seems a market;’99 that ‘Trade is the lord of the world nowadays,’ and exact the idea of ‘government as 
only a parachute to this balloon.’100 Less the ‘seer of laisser-faire capitalism,’ that Daniel Aaron would 
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recognize in Emerson,101 ‘than a critic of the marketplace’ for whom nature,102 regarded solely as a 
commodity, ‘is debased, as if one looking at the ocean can remember only the price of fish,’ here Emerson 
himself appears to contradict his initial and tendentious response to the panic, and—accordingly—his 
politics are difficult to define.103  
Regardless of these evocative assertions and insistences as per ‘the danger of commerce,’ West, as 
would Newfield, argues that it is thus the variety of Emerson’s interest in market exchange that is crucial. 
‘Unlike reification in capitalist exchange relations that objectify and thingify persons,’ West writes, ‘the 
aim of Emersonian provocation is to subjectify and humanize unique individuals’ and to address the 
morality of proprietorship rather than the mores and mechanisms of the marketplace.104 In so doing, 
‘Emerson projects a conception of self that can be easily appropriated by market culture for its own 
perpetuation and reproduction.’105  Jeffrey Sklansky agrees, and argues that Emerson seemed attuned to 
the ways in which cultures of proprietorship, contractual obligation and forms of commercial exchange 
were proving to transform the collectivist structure and ambition of an identificative American culture. For 
Sklansky, Emerson’s conceptualization of literary agency is contingent on the twinship between 
spontaneity and proprietorship; ‘property, like beauty, was in the eye of the beholder, not the deed of the 
proprietor’ to Emerson’s mind.106 Emerson was more interested in the acquisitive, intellectual and spiritual 
components of property than he was the bureaucratic offices of contract culture,107 and Emerson can be 
argued as chiefly concerned with elucidating the economic impact on a cultural ‘psyche’ borne by economic 
disturbances than he was the bureaucratic ‘sovereignty’ of property itself.108  
However, his thinking is arguably more complex than either West or Sklansky allow for; and, once 
again, it is ‘Wealth’ that appears to offer a compound response to such readings. Writing in his journals, 
1850, Emerson would return to his analysis of the ‘scientific’ and ‘philosophical’ value of economic fallout 
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as he considers the possibility of his establishment of a conclusive position on ‘political economy.’ Referring 
to a number of ideas that would eventually find publication in ‘Wealth,’ Emerson notes the following in 
his private papers, an apparent allusion to the authorship of that essay:  
 
I thought last night that the right Conclusion of my Chapter on polit. 
Economy is the statement that the merchant is right—infinitely right; —all his 
rules are the laws of the Universe, and there only needs a liberal expounding 
of them. He is a reduced copy, —you must give us a new draught of the size 
of life. The Merchant’s economy is a coarse symbol, but a faithful one of the 
soul’s economy. It is to spend for power & not for pleasure, it is to invest all 
its income(s), that is to say, to take up particulars into generals, days into 
integral eras—literary, emotive, practical…109 
 
The editors of the Harvard publication of Emerson’s journals and miscellany note that the next ‘leaf’ is torn 
out, but Emerson’s satisfaction with his conclusions can be postulated as large swathes of this material 
would traffic verbatim into his published work:110 
 
All things ascend, and the royal rule of economy is that it should ascend also, 
or, whatever we do must always have a higher aim. Thus, it is a maxim that 
money is another kind of blood, Pecunia alter sanguis: or, the estate of a man is 
only a larger kind of body and admits of regimen analogous to his bodily 
circulations. So there is no maxim of the merchant which does not admit of 
an extended sense, e. g., “Best use of money is to pay debts;” “Every business 
by itself;” “Best time is present time;” “The right investment is in tools of your 
trade;” and the like. The counting-room maxims liberally expounded are laws 
of the universe. The merchant's economy is a coarse symbol of the soul's 
economy. It is to spend for power and not for pleasure. It is to invest income; 
that is to say, to take up particulars into generals; days into integral eras—
literary, emotive, practical—of its life, and still to ascend in its investment. 
The merchant has but one rule, absorb and invest; he is to be capitalist; the 
scraps and filings must be gathered back into the crucible; the gas and smoke 
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must be burned, and earnings must not go to increase expense, but to capital 
again.111 
 
Appropriating Rabelais (who would first declare that ‘Pecunia est alter sanguis’), ‘The royal rule of economy’ 
is the ‘capitalist’ process of ‘absorption’ and ‘investment’ to Emerson’s mind. To absorb an idea only to 
invest again and return that idea, now transformed, ‘to capital again.’112 He parallels the ‘bodily 
circulations’ of an individual, the circulation of blood, as akin to a ‘larger kind of [social] body’—a position 
that again foregrounds the work of the ‘builder,’ ‘spender’ and ‘reader’ in Emerson’s works and their 
collective aim to ‘take up particulars into generals.’ To contribute to the facilitation of a social 
superstructure.  
Such a position reinforces West’s sense of the comparability of Emerson and Marx’s work. 
Furthermore, Emerson’s wording curiously parallels a summary position that Marx would stake as 
characterizing his own philosophical inquiry into the form, function and intimations of political economy 
as discipline. ‘The reader who wishes to follow me at all must resolve to climb from the particular up to 
the general,’ Marx would write in preface to his Critique of Political Economy (1859).113 This idea will prove 
significant to the following chapter. I will remain with Emerson’s historical contexts—and investigate the 
ways in which both Emerson and his recent readers have regarded his period as ‘revolutionary’ in scope—
but will look particularly to the institutionalization and industrialization of literary culture as alluded to by 
Emerson in his reference to the progress of a ‘silent revolution.’ The coalescence of literary and market 
cultures will again be foregrounded, and I will consider the pertinence of Emerson’s ‘revolution in opinion 
and practice’ as a means of considering the industrialization and technologization of literary culture in 
adjacency to his early writings and conceptualizations of labour. 
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It is easy to see that a greater self-reliance must work a revolution in all the 
offices and relations men; their modes of living; their association; in their 
property; in their speculative views. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
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Under the heading ‘SKEPTICAL’ in a private notebook, titled ‘Literature,’ Emerson would remark that ‘We 
must not inquire too curiously into the absolute value of literature.’ It is ‘Enough,’ he writes, ‘that it amuses 
and exercises us.’2 Here, Emerson dismisses the cultural significance of literature in order to assert a parity 
between the ‘resources of a statesman, of a socialist, of a scholar.’3 Arguing an ‘equivalence’ between these 
characters as indicative of the intellectual consequences of commercialism and trade, his remarks on 
American industrialization in the late ‘Progress of Culture’ (1875) summarize his position on labour as 
seen in earlier works:  
 
In this country the prodigious mass of work that must be done has either made 
new divisions of labor or created professions. Consider, at this time, what 
variety of issues, of enterprises public and private, what genius of science, 
what of administration, what of practical skill, what masters, each in his 
province, the railroad, the telegraph, the mines, the inland and marine 
explorations, the novel and powerful philanthropies, as well as agriculture, 
the foreign trade, the home trade (whose circuits in this country are as 
spacious as the foreign), manufactures, the very inventions, all on a national 
scale too, have evoked! —all implying the appearance of gifted men, the rapid 
addition to our society of a class of true nobles, by which the self-respect of 
each town and state is enriched.4 
 
This chapter will concentrate on the ‘enterprises public and private’ that inform Emerson’s 
conceptualizations of literary culture. As seen above, Emerson’s interest in ‘practical skill’ is enhanced by 
technological and industrial developments, allowing him to add literary culture to his itinerary of powerful 
‘circuits’—‘the railroad, the telegraph, the mines, the inland and marine explorations, the novel and 
powerful philanthropies, as well as agriculture, the foreign trade, the home trade.’ I will explore how the 
technological enhancement of print and publication cultures fed Emerson’s analysis of the cultural effects 
of economic circuitry and impacted his conceptualizations of critical agency more broadly. 
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Shifting our attention from the beginnings of Emerson’s career to the late address ‘The Man of 
Letters’ (1863), we see Emerson return to a number of the ideas he would raise in his analysis of the aims 
and ambitions of ‘American Scholarship’ in the late 1830s.5 Retrospectively summarizing the economic 
contexts of the last three decades, he remarks that ‘The country was full of activity, with its wheat, coal, 
iron, cotton; the wealth of the globe was here, too much work and not men enough to do it. Britain, France, 
Germany, Scandinavia sent millions of laborers; still the need was more. Every kind of skill was in demand, 
and the bribe came to men of intellectual culture.’6  ‘Come, drudge in our mill,’ was the key maxim that 
underwrote mass migration to America’s shores, Emerson notes.7 But the disparity he acknowledges as 
between forms of material and immaterial labour—between cultural progress and material providence—
dominates his response to the industrial revolution of his era. 
Speaking of the cultural sway of the gold rush at mid-century, Emerson notes that ‘America at 
large exhibited such a confusion as California showed in 1849, when the cry of gold was first raised.’8 
	
All the distinctions of profession and habit ended at the mines. All the world 
took off their coats and worked in shirtsleeves. Lawyers went and came with 
pick and wheelbarrow; doctors of medicine turned teamsters; stray clergymen 
kept the bar in saloons; professors of colleges sold cigars, mince-pies, matches, 
and so on. It is the perpetual tendency of wealth to draw on the spiritual class, 
not in this coarse way, but in plausible and covert ways. It is charged that all 
vigorous nations, except our own, have balanced their labor by mental 
activity, and especially by the imagination, —the cardinal human power, the 
angel of earnest and believing ages.9 
 
The priority afforded certain forms of labour over and above ‘the cardinal human power’ would trouble 
Emerson consistently. It is as apparent in his comments on the social impact of financial crisis in the 1830s 
as it is here, in his efforts to reassert the significance of criticism as an institution whilst America was 
 
5 Emerson, ‘The Man of Letters’ (1863), CW.X., 240-258 
6 Ibid., 242 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., 243 
9 Ibid. 
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proving again economically transfigured by another ‘earthquake,’ to borrow his phrase, the outbreak of 
Civil War. Although Emerson does propose the war as itself a demanding moment in America’s biography 
(he anecdotally draws on the Napoleonic wars as a means of distinguishing the significance of the ongoing 
war to America’s cultural identity), he nonetheless again turns his attentions to the cultural significance of 
scholarship and the character of scholarly work in a moment of stark, social exigency. A scholar should 
evade political evangelicalism, he notes (‘A scholar defending the cause of slavery, of arbitrary government, 
of monopoly, of the oppressor, is a traitor to his profession’);10 a scholar should evade political influence 
(‘The fears and agitations of men who watch the markets, the crops, the plenty or scarcity of money, or 
other superficial events, are not for him’).11 And yet the scholar does serve distinct political purpose in 
Emerson’s argument: ‘The scholar is bound to stand for all the virtues and all the liberties,—liberty of trade, 
liberty of the press, liberty of religion,—and he should open all the prizes of success and all the roads of 
Nature to free competition.’12  
That this triptych of concerns should underwrite his interest in scholarship—and so succinctly ally 
his interest in the freedom of interpretative agency with the ‘free competition’ of the marketplace—provides 
an evocative means with which to reconsider the kind of work Emerson seems deem his ‘American Scholar’ 
should be undertaking. Detailing a failure to correlate the practical and ideological dimensions of ‘labor’ 
in America, he argues that ‘The fault lies with the educated class, the men of study and thought.’13 It is 
‘Thought makes us men,’ he writes; thought that ‘ranks us;’ thought that ‘distributes society;’ thought that 
‘distributes the work of the world.’14 In sum, the management and control of a cultural or informational 
economy is as important as any stewardship of the country’s economic and industrial progress. As will be 
shown, it is Emerson’s interest in ‘distribution’ that proves particularly instrumental as he strives to define 
the ideological dimensions of labour. 
 
10 Ibid., 247 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 254 
13 Ibid., 252 
14 Ibid. 
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From Stanley Elkins’ ‘intellectual without responsibilities’ and Carlos Baker’s ‘eccentric’ to Taylor 
Stoehr’s ‘nay-sayer,’ academic characterizations of Emerson have drawn a compelling portrait of their 
‘teacher’ as an isolated individual ‘whose philosophical idealism ensured at best a tangential relationship 
to the work-a-day world of Jacksonian America.’15  In part, this is due to the tendency towards abstraction 
in Emerson’s writings. ‘From the tenets of sincerity and self-reliance’ to ‘advice from novels and courtesy 
books,’ Emerson’s ‘ambivalence’ and abstractions allowed Bostonians to react to a ‘range of gentlemanly 
standards whilst political conflicts festered’ outside the Lyceum’s windows.16 According to Charles Capper, 
this type of self-awareness and self-centeredness can indeed be located in Emerson’s writings. If we look to 
either his ‘antebellum wildflowers’ or the ‘more manicured landscape of the postbellum years,’ Emerson is 
ever a tiller of ‘self-conscious soil,’ writes Capper.17  
Capper’s disparaging reading of Emerson’s self-interest is largely anchored in his analysis of 
Emerson’s later work, and ‘Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New England’ (1867) in particular. In 
‘Historic Notes,’ an essay largely written in fragments and delivered in a patchwork lecture some thirteen 
years later, Emerson argues the central motif of his age as that of the ‘self-conscious individual.’18 Reflecting 
on his authorship, he claims that ‘The key to the period appeared to be that the mind had become aware 
of itself. […] This perception is a sword such as was never drawn before it detaches bone and marrow, soul 
and body, yea, almost the man from himself. It is the age of severance, of dissociation, of freedom, of 
analysis, of detachment.’19 Emerson’s professionalism (his self-consciousness of his own celebrity) is an 
interesting extension of his own thinking as per the powers of the ‘first person;’ his awareness of his 
 
15 Peter S. Field, ‘The Transformation of Genius into Practical Power: Ralph Waldo Emerson and the Public Lecture,’ 
Journal of the Early Republic (2001), 469. See also Stanley Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Taylor Stoehr, Naysaying in Concord: Emerson, Alcott, and Thoreau (Hamden, 
CT, Archon Books, 1979) 
16 Katherine Wolff, Boston’s Culture Club: The Curious History of the Boston Athenaeum, (Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2009), 11; 118 
17 Charles Capper, ‘A Little Beyond: The Problem of the Transcendentalist Movement in American History,’ The Journal of 
American History, 85.2. (1998), 505 
18 Ibid. 
19 Emerson, ‘Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New England’ (1867), CW.X., 326 
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increasing authority of voice after some thirty years on the public stage.20 But given the predominance of 
his efforts to scaffold an enquiry as per our best ‘use of literature,’21 and his simultaneous condemnation of 
our ‘preposterous use of books,’ Emerson’s receptivity to the ways in which the literary field was 
increasingly marked by technologization, industrialization and marketization also demands further 
investigation.22  
That Emerson should propose that literary culture should be side-lined and, instead, superseded 
by a broader interest in the industrial and commercial mechanisms of antebellum societal and industrial 
expansion is key to his conceptualization of interpretative agency and practical interest in our ‘use’ of 
culture. It signals his sensitivity to the industrialization of the cultural sphere and its subjection to distinct 
economic systems. In ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), he would famously note that the particular brand of self-
determinacy he was calling for could facilitate ‘a revolution in all the offices and relations of men; in their 
religion; in their education; in their pursuits; their modes of living; their association; in their property; in 
their speculative views.’23 Interestingly, such a position is not underpinned by Emerson’s interest in 
instrumentality and ‘use’ alone, but also how the dissemination of ideas—the circulation of literary 
matter—could transform cultural behaviours. In this chapter, I will explore how academics have articulated 
various forms of ‘revolution’ as affecting Emerson’s era, before looking to the ways in which Emerson’s 
own expressed interest in market systems prove extensive to his metacritical engagements with 
interpretative and critical agency. I will examine Emerson’s ‘silent revolution’—his ‘revolution of opinion 
and practice’—relative to the expansion of the American book trade; the professionalization of the 
American publisher; and the introduction of new technological modes of production. In ‘The Method of 
Nature’ (1841), Emerson affords ‘manual labor’ or ‘mechanical craft’ a purpose beyond the products 
manufactured: ‘I look on trade and every mechanical craft as education also’, Emerson writes.24 Keen to 
 
20 For a particularly interesting account of Emerson’s canny professionalism (including analyses of royalty payments and 
estate management), see Joel Myerson, ‘Money,’ in (ed.) Wesley Mott, Emerson in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 213-221 
21 Emerson, ‘Circles’ (1841), CW.II., 312 
22 Emerson, ‘Spiritual Laws’ (1841), CW.II., 164 
23 Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), CW.I., 77 
24 Emerson, ‘The Method of Nature’ (1841), CW.I., 192 
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establish work as a reticulated or networked domain rather than a strictly hierarchical schema, it is 
Emerson’s interest in ‘political economy’ that allows us to unpick how such a domain might operate. 
Whilst Emerson would argue that ‘economy’ is ‘transcendent,’ 1839, two years later, he would refine his 
position to encompass a more practical instruction in ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841): ‘a man should have […] 
a mechanical craft for his culture’ as ‘a basis for higher accomplishment.’25 Emerson’s interest in economy 
appears to corroborate a want to consider the conceptual interrelation of workers in America rather than 
their estrangement or alienation either in terms of class, pecuniary wealth, or the social importance (or 
cultural stigma) as may be attached to any particular form of work. Still, it is in his merging of these fields 
of inquiry—of labour and economy—that allows Emerson’s poetics attain a significant political context. 
In fact, Emerson’s poetics are particularly marked by labour cultures, the industrialization of the literary 
sphere, and the ascent of an American culture of print and publication. 
As Richard Brown claims, by the time of Jefferson’s first presidential administration, 1801, even 
conservative Federalists were trying to figure the possibility of an all-inclusive ‘republic of letters [where], 
as every man has some influence, it is very natural he should use what he has to recommend his own 
notions of government.’ It was ‘the right of all men to debate and chat about political principles, to build 
castles in the air, or governments on paper […] and to shed in ink discussing speculative points at their 
leisure.’26 Such a philosophy was employed to drive down the price of the daily newspaper so as to 
exponentially broaden an American readership. The idea of foregrounding availability and access in order 
to increase participation was argued repeatedly by early nineteenth-century commentaries. See William 
Manning, for example—a farmer of Billerica, Massachusetts—who, considering the rising cost of printed 
matter, would envisage the general audience in America as the general labourer and insist that print cultures 
need work to the terms, interest and needs of such an audience. It is the ‘common farmer & laborer that 
 
25 Emerson: ‘The doctrine of the manual labor of society ought to be shared among all the members, there are reasons proper 
to no person. A man should have a farm or a mechanical craft for his culture.  We must have a basis for our higher 
accomplishments, our delicate entertainments of poetry and philosophy, in the work of our hands. […] Manual labor is the 
study of the external word.’ See ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841), CW.I., 234 
26 Anonymous, ‘Editorial: For the Palladium,’ New England Palladium, (Boston, MA), November 2nd, 1804. Cited by Richard 
D. Brown in ‘The Revolution’s Legacy for the History of the Book,’ A History of the Book in America: An Extensive Republic; 
Print, Culture and Society in the New Nation, 1790-1840 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press; The 
American Antiquarian Society, 2010), 67 
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are the most interested in the measures of the times,’ he writes; it is the common work that needs ‘git any 
information from them,’ and thus the cultural significance of contemporary political movements and 
current affairs cannot be characterized by virtue of ‘the expense of the time & money they cost.’27 As was 
the case for the daily news, the American audience for political writing had also grown in the first decades 
of the 1800s. Breaching ‘traditional social boundaries,’ the widened participation of peoples involved in 
this cultural conversation constituted a codification of civic membership.28 But rather than simply 
constituting an evolution in cultural feeling, this print culture was contingent on the advent and 
introduction of new print technologies in the American North East. 
A revolution in cultural mechanization, a ‘revolution in relation,’ new print mechanisms were 
expediting the growth of an American cultural voice and fast becoming a self-conscious characteristic of 
the 1830s and 1840s. The introduction of the cylinder rotary press, for example, ‘made for a dramatic 
increase in the productive power of American publishing,’ writes Richard Teichgraeber.29 An American 
publishing industry was both indentured and transformed by virtue of the introduction of such new 
technological mechanisms, and the widening of an American readership as a result of these technological 
developments proves significant. Where we previously had a parlour activity for the wealthier classes, we 
now have a major industry evolving to cater to ‘the demands of a new mass reading public;’30 ‘the partial 
and noisy readers of the hour,’ as Emerson disparagingly terms them.31 These technologies were 
accompanied by the enlargement of an increasingly complex schemata of copyright laws that saw local 
networks of oral communication extended and expanded upon by the potential reach of new print 
cultures.32 As Teichgraeber suggests, the broadening ambitions of an American literature can be argued as 
 
27 William Manning ‘The Key of Liberty,’ in (ed.) S.E. Morison, William and Mary Quarterly, 3.13 (1956), 205-206, 232, 247-
254. Cited by Brown in ‘The Revolution’s Legacy for the History of the Book,’ Ibid. 
28 Michael Warner, in introduction to The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 12 
29 Richard F. Teichgraeber, Sublime Thoughts/Penny Wisdom: Situating Emerson and Thoreau in the America, xiii.; 158 
30 Ibid., 163 
31 Emerson: ‘There is no luck in literary reputation. They who make up the final verdict upon every book are not the partial 
and noisy readers of the hour when it appears, but a court as of angels, a public not to be bribed, not to be entreated and not 
to be overawed, decides upon every man’s title to fame. Only those books come down which deserve to last. Gilt edges, 
vellum and morocco, and presentation-copies to all the libraries will not preserve a book in circulation beyond its intrinsic 
date.’ See ‘Spiritual Laws’ (1841), CW.II., 154 
32 Teichgraeber, Sublime Thoughts/Penny Wisdom, xiii 
 170 
unequivocally linked to the technological sophistication of print cultures and technologies over the course 
of the antebellum.  
Between 1815 and 1850, a glut of printed information in newspapers, magazines and books became 
the essential means of mass communication and an increasingly dominant source of cultural activity.33 In 
sum, while production for the market had been widespread since the political revolution of 1776, during 
the antebellum period the term ‘market’ came to characterize ‘a greater range of activities than ever before 
in American history.’34 Emerson was particularly sensitive to this ‘politics of print,’ to borrow a phrase 
from Meredith McGill. Cultures of reprinting—and new systems established to support the dissemination 
of literary materials—provided a means by which a ‘centralization of American culture was forestalled,’35 
and the expansion of trade networks wrought by the introduction of new publishing houses and paper 
cultures facilitated a dynamic economy of ‘things’ and ‘thoughts’ that, in their circulation, would champion 
a further decentralization of power. Cultural commerce, the movement of ideas and images from place to 
place, became as important a means of working towards a common culture as the relation of state and 
federal offices of government.  
The chronology of Emerson’s publications roughly runs from 1836 to 1850,36 and this historical 
phase crudely mirrors the period that Meredith McGill has argued as America’s ‘print revolution,’ 1834 to 
 
33 Ibid. Such thinking has also been argued as key to Emerson’s involvement in the establishment of The Atlantic Monthly. A 
‘mission statement’ published in the first issue of The Atlantic, in the late winter months of 1857, would frame such an aim 
succinctly. The founders of the periodical disavowed prejudice, writes Annika Neklason, and promised to ‘be the organ of 
no party or clique,’ and to pursue morality and truth no matter where they stemmed from or led to. They sought too to 
advance American writing and the ‘American idea’ wherever ‘the English tongue is spoken or read;’ ‘a reflection of 
Emerson’s desire for a national intellectual identity that could transcend the country’s institutions and borders.’ Emerson’s 
magazine work can be read as a reaction to his general contempt for the popular press; Emerson would name and number 
‘the measles, the influenza, and the magazine’ as the three scourges afflicting literary Boston in the early 1850s.  
See Annika Neklason, ‘Ralph Waldo Emerson’s American Idea,’ The Atlantic, November 2019. 
 <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/the-atlantic-and-ralph-waldo-emersons-american-idea/602689/> 
(Accessed, 03.01.2020); and Ralph Waldo Emerson, as cited by Jessie Roberts in ‘A Magazine is Born,’ The Atlantic (August 
2007) <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/08/a-magazine-is-born/306164/> (Accessed 03.01.2020). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Meredith L. McGill, ‘The Matter of the Text,’ American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting: 1834-1853, 13-14 
36 A range of dates I cite as it frames the publication of Emerson’s most widely read essays writings: his debut publication 
‘Nature,’ published in 1836; his First Series essays, 1841; second series, 1844; and the collection Representative Men, 1850. 
Emerson would continue to publish and lecture into the 1870s, however. The Daily Alta California would publish an account 




1853,37 broadly paralleling the period that Teichgraeber proposes as so significant to the development of an 
American cultural voice, 1815 to 1850.38 During this timeframe, McGill argues that a clear link exists 
between ‘conceptions of literary property’ and theories of ‘American cultural production’ unequivocally 
related to the availability of  such technologies as the rotary press.39 She suggests that, ‘in this period, legal 
and political resistance to tightening controls over intellectual property produced a literary marketplace 
suffused with unauthorized publications’ and the implications of this surfeit of pirated literary matter is 
indicative of a cultural effort to support and sophisticate the idea of an American ‘reader’ in tandem with 
attempts to bolster the cultural prestige of an American publisher (as opposed to the inalienable value of 
an author).  
Emerson was observant of such developments; interested popular and populist cultures both, he 
was particularly invested in the ways in which an increased access to cultural matter could support the 
development of culture as a form of soft, political power. For Emerson, high literature should be ‘as available 
as the newspaper’—arguing that ‘the power of the newspaper is familiar in America, and in accordance 
with [the country’s] political system’—and he would accordingly and explicitly celebrate the work of the 
‘cheap press’ and American publishing house as ardently as he would either the author or poet in his 
enumeration of America’s burgeoning literary culture.40 For example, he would explicitly celebrate Bohn’s 
Library; a press that—to his mind—‘have done for [American] literature what railroads have done for 
internal intercourse,’41 transforming literary culture into an industrial resource, a new, ‘national’ cultural 
 
37 See McGill’s American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853. Particularly of note are subchapters ‘Dissemination 
and the State,’ 58-63., and ‘Maintaining Decentralization: Reprinting and the Syncopation of the National Imaginary,’ 102-
109., wherein McGill details the ways in which Federal policy and democratic ideals infiltrated a view of the necessary 
management of a literary marketplace and, axiomatically requiring a conceptual participation of “readers” in this culture of 
consumption, proved to develop literary culture as analogous for the health of American democracy ideologically, 
intellectually and economically speaking. 
38 Teichgraeber, Sublime Thoughts/Penny Wisdom, xiii 
39 McGill, ‘The Matter of the Text,’ American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1. See also, Michael Winship, ‘The 
Transatlantic Book Trade and Anglo-American Literary Culture in the Nineteenth Century,’ in (ed.) S. Fink, S. Williams, 
Reciprocal Influences: Literary Production, Distribution and Consumption in American (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 
199), 98-122 
40 See Emerson, ‘The Times’ (1856), CW.V., 261.; and Emerson, ‘Plato, or the Philosopher’ (1850), CW.IV., 53 
41 Emerson, ‘Books’ (1870), CW.VII., 196 
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institution.42 Publishing houses like Bohn’s are ‘like the new railroad from ocean to ocean,’ Emerson notes, 
highlighting the forms of communication and connectivity afforded the general public by the book trade.43 
However, McGill’s claim that American literary culture during the antebellum was chiefly supported by 
the circulation of ‘unauthorized’ or pirated materials requires a little more unpacking. 
The mass-market for literature in America was ‘built and sustained by the publication of cheap 
reprints of foreign books and periodicals,’ and ‘the primary vehicles were uncopyrighted newspapers and 
magazines.’44 Rather than any kind of literary landgrab, this was a cultural trend facilitated by 
congressional support that would herald far-reaching implications in the development of an antebellum 
culture of letters. ‘Although we have come to think of the classic works of mid-nineteenth-century 
American authors as national property, these texts emerged from a culture that was regional in articulation 
and transnational in scope.’45 Essentially, cultural copyright was dogeared by Congress not only as a means 
of establishing internal mechanisms for cultural communication between American citizens, but also to 
better consider how this new American would self-represent to the rest of the world.  
As such, the first decades of the nineteenth century would witness the establishment and 
enhancement of a technologized communication network ‘as complex and sophisticated to its participants 
as ours is to us.’46 As Stacy Margolis notes: 
 
Social networks are old; network theory is new. At least this is what we've 
been told in countless recent books that link the emergence of network theory 
to the rise of the digital age. Instant and global electronic connections not only 
have transformed our ability to form and manage groups, create new social 
ties, and foment political change, but these theorists maintain, have fostered 
 
42 In an obituary for Henry George Bohn (1796-1884), the periodical The Bookseller would refer to him as ‘the bookseller of 
the nineteenth century’ (4th September 1884), and Book Monthly (April 1904) would commend Bohn’s legacy, considering all 
he had achieved in the provision of a ‘literature for all the masses’ in America. See Brian Louis Pearce, ‘Henry George Bohn: 
The Bookseller,’ RSA Journal, 140.5434. (1992), 788-790. Robert D. Richardson notes the importance of books carried in 
Bohn’s library to the preparation of the Representative Men lectures for publication in the late 1840s. See Robert D. Richardson, 
‘The Science of Liberty,’ Emerson: The Mind on Fire, 467 
43 Emerson, ‘Books’ (1870), CW.VII., 203-205 
44 McGill, ‘The Matter of the Text,’ American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1 
45 Ibid. 
46 Robert Darnton, ‘An Early Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris,’ American Historical 
Review, 105.1 (2000), 1-35 
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new interest in figuring out exactly how such networks function. According 
to Duncan J. Watts, [...] “the science of networks” emerged in response to a 
newfound sense of global connection: “Surprised by the meteoric rise of the 
internet, stung by a series of financial crises from Asia to Latin America, and 
stunned by ethnic violence and terrorism from Africa to New York, the world 
has learned the hard way that it is connected in a manner few people had 
anticipated and no one understood.”47 
 
Whilst Margolis finds an echo in the international political and economic circumstances that beset the 
nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, her sense of the ‘meteoric’ rise of the daily newspaper is key. Echoing 
McGill’s sense of the increased circulation of information amidst an American public as a kind of 
revolution in literary culture, or ‘silent revolution’ as Emerson would term it.48 
As David Paul Nord suggests, Emerson’s audience—the bourgeois ‘reading classes’ of the 
American East Coast—had, after ‘[American independence] and its aftermath,’ been left ‘with a heightened 
taste for newspaper reading.’49 By 1794, Philadelphia alone had eight newspapers, four of them dailies, and 
these newspapers carried at least ten times as much material as had the city’s two weeklies in 1764.50 More 
often than not, this material was circulated outside of the control of copyright law and an analysis of this 
free-floating intellectual ‘property,’ information or material further qualifies Teichgraeber and McGill’s of 
the importance of circulatory print cultures to Emerson’s period, but also provides a framework for the 
central role the reader would come to stake in Emerson’s cultural commentaries.  
William Charvat notes that, in early nineteenth-century America, ‘the general or common reader 
(he who stands somewhere between the avant-garde and the consumers of mass diversion)’ had ‘a greater 
and more direct influence on the writer than his counterpart in Europe.’51 
 
 
47 Stacey Margolis, ‘Network Theory circa 1800: Charles Brockden Brown’s Arthur Mervyn,’ Novel: A Forum on Fiction, 45.3. 
(2012), 344.; Margolis cites Duncan J. Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 
2003), 13 
48 Emerson, ‘The Fugitive Slave Law’ (1854), CW.XI., 218 
49 David Paul Nord, ‘Communities of Reception,’ Communities of Journalism: A History of American Newspapers and Their Readers 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 202 
50 Ibid. 
51 William Charvat, ‘Publishing Centers,’ Literary Publishing in America, 22-23 
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Reciprocity between writer and reader […] has been of essence in our literary 
history, and it is this which leads me to define the American cultural center 
as the place or places in which reciprocal influences are explicitly and 
crucially operative; where the publisher not only accepts or rejects but 
influences literary work through his knowledge of taste in the country as a 
whole; and where changes in public taste are often initiated through a 
publisher’s willingness to let a writer open up new literary territory.52 
 
This culture of ‘reciprocity’ was keenly anchored in the development of trade relations and commercial 
infrastructure, notes Charvat; whilst the railroads were key ‘from 1830 on,’ publishing centres were first 
fostered by ‘deep harbor water’ as ‘the ocean was the chief highway between [America’s] towns’ (and 
‘because it made a considerable difference to a publishers prosperity whether the first copy of a new work 
by Byron or Scott was taken off a boat in their city or some other’).53 Thus, ‘New England was [initially] 
publishing chiefly for itself,’ notes Charvat, and the ambitions of attaining a national audience were more 
ideological fantasy than functional, working reality.54  Within such a context, it is important to remember 
that the early works of ‘The Transcendentalists of Brook Farm’ were initially self-serving, ideologically 
grounded ‘financial failures.’55 However it is the development of both an intellectually curious public and 
their demand for a culture of public intellectualism that would recur as a focus in Emerson’s writings.  
Nonetheless, the history of authorship in an American context is a complex one. The ‘author,’ as 
Peter Jaszi describes them, has been the central protagonist in a drama played out on the parallel stages of 
literary and legal culture in the years leading towards industrialization in both European and American 
critical and cultural contexts. By the mid-seventeenth century, Jaszi notes that writers began to assert claims 
to special status by designating themselves as authors; and during the eighteenth century, the idea of 
authorship became intimately associated with the Romantic movement in literature and art.56 The author 






56 Peter Jaszi, ‘Towards a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship,’ Duke Law Journal, X. (1991), 455 
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experience. It is this form of artisanry and artistry that is more popularly associated with Emerson’s 
philosophical project. However, whilst the traditional understanding of an author serves so as to foreground 
the private ownership of a literary object—and thereby conceal its capacity for social circulation and 
personal resonance—the development of copyright cultures in a post-revolutionary America of the 1780s 
and 1790s counters such a reading. As will be further explored, Emerson’s study of the progress of a ‘silent 
revolution’ is intrinsically linked to the cultural and critical literacy of the reader, who in turn, cannot be 
divorced from the circulation of print material, regardless of how it enters into the public domain.57  
This makes the figure of the author all the more significant to the early years of American 
independence, but primarily with regard to the advent of new copyright laws and questions of 
proprietorship. A legal iteration of an author as an individual who creates new ideas through the power of 
the intellect and holds the claim of author’s rights—often denoted natural property rights—first appeared 
in the context of state copyright statutes legislated in the early 1780s. In 1783, Joel Barlow—one of the first 
beneficiaries of authorial copyright in America—wrote to convince Congress that ‘the rights of authors 
should be secured by law,’ and his position depended upon a conceptualization of the rights of authors as 
an ideated form of natural (rather than national) property. ‘There is certainly no kind of property, in the 
nature of things,’ he would note, ‘so much his own, as the works which a person originates from his own 
creative imagination. […] It is a principle of natural justice that he should be entitled to the profits arising 
from the sale of his works, as a compensation for his labor in producing them.’ The demarcation of an 
authored work as a privileged kind of commercial object would ‘[give] a laudable direction to that 
enterprising ardor genius.’ According to Barlow, ‘We are not to expect to see any works of considerable 
magnitude […] offered to the Public till such security be given [to the author] as the fact of intellectual 
property.’ As Oren Bracha puts it, ‘The same mix of imagery of authorship, natural property rights, and 
utilitarian arguments can be found in virtually all twelve state copyright statutes.’58 However, ‘at the same 
time that authorship came to dominate the theoretical and abstract discourse surrounding copyright law, 
 
57 Ibid., 455-456 
58 Oren Bracha, ‘The Rise and Fall of Authorship-Based Copyright,’ Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins of American 
Intellectual Property (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 61-64 
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the institutional-doctrinal details of copyright remained rooted in traditional pre-authorship patterns.’59 
Furthermore, the subject of ‘originality’ as a claim to ownership and commercial right was the subject of 
significant scrutiny:  
 
The rift between the new official ideology and actual institutional forms was 
staggering. Original authors were celebrated as the raison d’etre of the regime, 
but copyright had no mechanism whatsoever to identify either authors or 
works of authorship. The newly recognized author's rights were often 
described as “property rights,” but copyright, far from bestowing general 
control or even generalized control over an object of property, remained the 
traditional printer's entitlement to print and sell copies of the product of the 
printing press. The 1790 Act described it as “the sole right and liberty of 
printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” a map, chart, or book. Finally, 
the object of property, the “thing” owned, was understood to be the 
intellectual work created by the author, but copyright law lacked any 
mechanisms for conceptualizing such intellectual objects or for demarcating 
their boundaries. Instead of ownership of intellectual works, the notion 
embedded in the traditional scheme adopted by the 1790 A making verbatim 
copies of a particular text. In short, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
copyright remained the old economic privilege of the publisher (now 
conferred on authors) wearing an official rhetorical mask of authorial proper 
authorship ideology in actual copyright nineteenth century.60  
 
 
Amongst other things, Bracha touches upon how the cultural privilege afforded the American publisher is 
a direct result of the ways in which new print technologies commercialized and marketized the literary 
object. A poem was no longer simply a poem, for example, but a form of circulatable property that would 
carry with it a complex industry.  
McGill would concur, suggesting that the powers given to publishers and printers in the early 1800s 
over and above authors indirectly bestowed a new power to readers over authors in efforts to develop and 
nurture an American literary culture. Such a hierarchical schema would further impact a public 
 
59 Ibid., 198-100 
60 Ibid., 63 
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understanding of the redolent importance of ‘originality’ to literary enterprise, and this can be evidenced 
in Bracha’s exploration of the complex philosophical reflections on copyright culture in ascendance parallel 
to Emerson’s authorship. Referring to the courtroom minutes for a case concerning the disputed ownership 
of a text, the idea of originality/unoriginality was not only indicated as a slippery, legal subject; but also, 
as a complex philosophical conundrum for the contemporary author of the 1840s.  
Referring to the 1845 case Emerson v. Davies (a namesake, Frederick Emerson, and not Ralph 
Waldo), the justice would pen a succinct ‘anti-romantic’ manifesto that neatly elaborates on such a claim: 
 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, 
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. 
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows—and must necessarily 
borrow—and use much which was well known and used before. No man 
creates a new language for himself, at least if he be a wise man, in writing a 
book. He contents himself with the use of a language already known and used 
and understood by others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, 
unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every 
man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and 
expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own 
genius or reflection. If no book could be the subject of copy-right which was 
not new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be 
no ground for any copy-right in modern times, and we should be obliged to 
ascend to very high, even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such 
eminence.61 
 
This ‘anti-romantic’ sentiment speaks to the cultural championship of the American reader, a pragmatic 
attempt to define the process of creativity as one of appropriation and mimicry. As already noted in 
previous sections, Emerson’s understanding of this is crucial for a further examination into his stance on 
‘borrowed’ language—both in terms of its commercial ambitions and how it renders a vision of writing as 
 
61 Justice, C.C.D. Massachusetts, 1845.; Ibid., 202.; see also, Lyman Ray Patterson, ‘The Early American Copyright,’  
Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 180-203 
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something collective and public. However, such a stance on ‘borrowed’ language also has an industrial 
foundation.  
1816 is a significant date in a history of U.S. publishing. The general duty on books and printed 
matter imported from abroad was raised from 5% to 15% and, as a direct result, printers began to publish 
their own pirated editions of all accessible English and continental matter they could. As ‘copyright laws 
in those years protected U.S. [authors] but did not extend to foreign books,’ Nancy Vogeley notes, an 
increased receptivity to literature’s mercantile potential took hold. The introduction of such laws has 
industrial precedent. Look to publisher Mathew Carey’s ‘Manifesto of the Philadelphia Company of 
Booksellers’ (1802), for example. The manifesto would explicitly cite ‘The growing interests of LITERATURE 
in this rising Empire’ (Carey’s capitalization, not mine), and predicate a need for the public patronage of 
publishers deigning to circulate ‘vehicles fit to communicate literary information, as well of Books already 
published, as of those contemplated to be executed.’62 A culture of ‘outrageous piracy and piratical 
competition,’ America would not accept international copyright until 1891.63 Until then, American 
publishers could and did steal literary material from any source—but especially from Britain. Scott, Byron, 
Hunt, and the other British writers were very much the rage in the United States. ‘Carey had his agents in 
England and Scotland who would buy a copy of a newly published work and ship it post-haste to him in 
Philadelphia,’ Clarkin notes. ‘Arrived there, Carey would have it printed up and bound so as to be shipped 
to his booksellers throughout the Union. He did this with all speed because, of course, his rivals, the 
Harpers in New York City, were doing the very same thing. Whoever got the work out first would make 
great profit. It is small wonder, then, that these books often got themselves published in a sloppy slam-bang 
manner. It wasn’t very moral, but it was legal.’64 In 1822, following a minor period of depression in the 
American economy, Carey wrote and published a series of pamphlets on these present conditions for the 
American publisher.65 Under the penname “Hamilton” he would consider the prospective circulation of a 
 
62 Nancy Vogeley, ‘Philadelphia,’ The Bookrunner: A History of Inter-American Relations—Print, Politics and Commerce in the 
United States and Mexico, 1800-1830 (Philadelphia, PA: The American Philosophical Society, 2011), 44 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 For an account of Carey’s public writings and political appeals, see James N. Green, ‘For the Common Good,’ Mathew 
Carey, Publisher and Patriot (Philadelphia, PA: The Library Company of Philadelphia), 29-31 
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new literary work, and declare that ‘any bookseller desirous to republish it, from motives of public spirit or 
profit has the writer’s Permission.’66 To widen the circulation of a given work of literature was not an 
exercise in profiteering, to Carey’s mind, but a moral obligation. 
Thus, the complicated iteration of originality and ownership as concepts proves knotty, and yet 
key to an identification of the cultural atmosphere circumambient to the authorship of Emerson’s early 
works. Nonetheless, these examples can be argued as indicating the ways in which American literary 
culture was informed by European Romantic tradition. See Martha Woodmansee’s essay ‘The Genius and 
the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the Author’ (1984), for example, 
wherein she ‘tracks the development of the idea of authorial originality in the writings of authors such as 
Klopstock, Fichte, and Herder, and argues that the Romantic debate over the nature of authorship 
responded to the chaotic state of the German book market and lay the groundwork for the recognition of 
authors’ rights in German law.’67 Woodmansee’s essay actually has little to say about the technicalities or 
the legislative history of copyright in Germany. Rather, ‘her aim was to place Romantic ideas about literary 
property in socioeconomic context and to argue more broadly for interdisciplinary attention’ to be paid to 
the emergence of the author as a conduit for discussions around the management of information in an era 
of increasingly complex market relations.68 Woodmansee’s efforts to express the ‘interplay between legal, 
economic and social questions’ and ‘philosophical and esthetic’ dimensions that accompany this 
broadening of an author’s ‘symbolic purchase’ prove more complex within an American sociopolitical and 
cultural context.69 In a subsequent essay, ‘On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity’ (1994), she argues 
copyright law as steadfastly ‘rooted’ in a Romanticist view of writing as practice.70 Envisaging this 
emerging author as the result of cliché, as ‘a solitary and individual pursuit’ that would itself become 
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70 Martha Woodmansee, ‘On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity,’ in (eds.) M. Woodmansee and P. Jaszi, The 
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something of a stand-in for post-enlightenment theories of individuation,71 Mark Rose admits that the 
figure of the ‘author’ undergoes a significant process of bureaucratization (and thus socialization, by proxy) 
in the early nineteenth century.72  For Rose, the view of the author as a romantic hero turned into an ‘author 
as owner and originator and the work as the proper object of property established and institutionalized in 
legal discourse’ is a ‘major aesthetic realignment.’73 For Emerson, then, such analyses of literary culture 
brings to the fore what we have hitherto defined as the ‘mechanics of literature.’ Less interested in literature, 
less interested in what a book is than what a book does, Emerson knew that ‘literature’ could no longer be 
read as an isolated medium but should be seen an ‘an arm or a weapon’ of the country’s ‘interior energy.’74  
For Charles Sellers, the development of American democracy must also be read in the context of 
the growth of publishing cultures; cultures that allowed an emergent, populist voice a point of 
dissemination and enabled the communication of ideas and ideologies vital to the country’s economic and 
political growth: an assembly of factors that Sellers argues as key to an American ‘market revolution.’ 
Significant also is the date range of Seller’s revolution—1815 to 1846—a period that reflects the timeline 
that both McGill and Teichgraeber define as of ‘revolutionary’ significance.75 America was proving 
increasingly defined by a hybrid political economy in the early antebellum; fed by wage labour and 
widespread capitalist agriculture in the North and an entrenched slave-based plantation order in the South; 
the diverse and distinct needs of these two industrial republics was dependent upon the establishment of 
new communication channels. Emerson is only briefly mentioned by Sellers, who affords Emerson a 
particularly tendentious kind of cultural resonance as he anoints him ‘the mid-century prophet of the 
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corporate [and] capitalist millennium.’76 But he does cite Emerson as enumerating a relationship with those 
natural resources harnessed by the expansion of the American marketplace.  
Emerson’s chief directive, for Sellers, is his ‘instruction’ that we need exercise and cultivate ‘power’ 
enough ‘to evoke the sleeping energies of land and water.’77 According to Sellers, it is in ‘Wealth’ that 
Emerson contributes to the development of a capitalist hegemony that Sellers seeks to identify as in 
ascendance over the course of the antebellum. Arguing capitalist economics as the principal context for 
Emerson’s thinking, Sellers writes: ‘Wealth’ aimed to establish an idealized distillation of America’s 
‘beneficent marketplace.’ The ‘merchant’s craft,’ Emerson claims, consists of ‘bringing things from where 
they abound to where they are wanted.’ Looking for analogy, Emerson depicts the ‘farmer’ who—
relocating their produce from country to city (the ‘peach’ is Emerson’s key product in this instance, as 
mentioned)—gives ‘a new look and a hundredfold value over the fruit which grew on the same bough and 
lies fulsomely on the ground.’78 This process of movement, and of the effectuation of value, is explicitly 
inferred as an ‘industrial power’ and Emerson details the ways in which an awareness of the human element 
that underpins this ‘power’ is essential to its application. Mapping its cultural and conceptual significance, 
he sees this human element as encouraging a certain kind of metonymy; the industrial ‘power’ can equally 
be read in the symbolic capacity of ‘a horse or a locomotive to cross the land, in a boat to cross the sea; in 
tools to work with, in books to read; and so in giving on all sides by tools and auxiliaries the greatest 
possible extension to our powers; as if it added feet and hands and eyes and blood, length to the day, and 
knowledge and good will.’79 ‘Every warehouse and shop-window, every fruit-tree, every thought of every 
hour’ is indicative of this ‘power,’ Emerson notes.80  
We’ve come upon these lines already in this thesis, as the material that Seller’s draws upon is vital 
to the development of Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM.’ In a fashion redolent of Emerson’s sense of the value of 
‘Another’s book’—as would first instigate this long train of thought in Emerson’s writings—Sellers argues 
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that the function of the market as a metaphor in ‘Wealth’ is crucial to any consideration of Emerson’s 
cultural worth from the vantage point of twentieth and/or twenty-first century scholarship. As a basis for 
us to consider Emerson’s ‘revolution in relation,’ these assessments of the economics of print and market 
are all compounded in Emerson’s theorizations of ‘relation’ and ‘power.’ Given the mirroring of the 
historical accounts given by Teichgraeber, McGill and Sellers, our reading of Sellers’ ‘market revolution’ 
(1815 to 1846) needs be considered in adjacency to McGill’s ‘print revolution’ (1834 to 1853) and 
Teichgraeber’s indication of America’s revolution in American publishing (1815 to 1850). If we consider 
Emerson’s own chronology, the significance of this Venn diagram of ‘revolutions’ in the development of 
his perspectivism speaks for itself. Enrolling at Harvard in 1817—and at Harvard’s New School of Divinity 
in 1825—Emerson is first published in ’22 and delivers his first public address in ’33, an almost a fifty-year 
career up until his death in 1882. Emerson’s efforts to merge these three revolutions is vital, and his own 
history mirrors their advancement; but it is the progress of the market and the rapid industrialization of the 
American landscape that predominates in recent criticism over and above any effort to picture Emerson’s 
receptivity to its terms of growth and cultural effectivity.81 However, I would argue that that changes in 
print and publishing cultures are of a coeval if not greater significance to an analysis of Emerson’s use of 
metaphor.  
Parallel to the early phases of Emerson’s authorship, the United States is shifting from a static 
agrarian economy to a mobile commercial society, land (or ‘Nature’) is accordingly conceptually drawn 
into the orbit of the market and dethroned from the supreme position it had occupied in the eighteenth-
century. By the early 1830s, Nature ‘was now perceived as an asset to be developed for profit or an object 
of speculation,’ writes Gilmore; ‘liable, like any commodity, to arbitrary and fluctuating assessments of its 
value.’ Under the market regime, ‘value itself came to be regarded as subjective, determined not by the 
inherent properties of an object, but by extrinsic factors such as opinion and desire.’82 If ‘one must be an 
inventor to read well,’ as Emerson notes, and ‘reading creatively find simpatico energy in living life 
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creatively as a work of art,’ how we are to then value and use that art? 83 As noted previously, Emerson 
finds himself repeatedly posing such questions. How do ‘extrinsic’ and personal factors ‘such as opinion 
and desire’ enable both an individualized and social delineation of critical worth? Emerson’s reaction to 
such queries—as will preoccupy the following chapter—concentrates on our operation of cultural matter; 
and the ‘mechanical’ processes of quotation and appropriation in particular, as he envisages the book as a 
kind of technology ripe for tooling the terms of both self and social definition. 
Emerson’s receptivity to new technologies has become a consistent feature of recent revisionist 
critical engagements with the progressive qualities of his metacritical writings on literary culture. Even the 
lecture platform and Emerson’s celebrity have been argued as mechanical tools consciously 
instrumentalised and self-reflexively examined by Emerson himself. As Peter Field notes, considering 
Emerson’s formal experimentation with the public address, ‘The lecture platform scarcely existed until the 
1840s’ nor did ‘the decade’s wholesale proliferation of lyceums, mercantile associations, and other such 
quasi-educational organizations throughout the northern United States.’84 Emerson was well-aware of the 
cultural trend towards public dissemination in this regard, but equally aware of the increased 
technologization of literary culture. Field summarizes Emerson’s receptivity to these changes as follows: 
 
Technological innovations in printing, publishing, and distribution drove 
down the cost of the printed word and in time provided the means to satisfy 
affordably the public’s budding thirst for knowledge. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, the first hint of the means to create mass culture came into existence, 
resulting in what sociologist Alvin Gouldner called “the dialectic of ideology 
and technology.” The rise of a culture industry enabled Emerson’s emergence 
as “an American Prophet,” or as peddler-turned-schoolteacher Bronson 
Alcott grandiosely declared: “there was no public lecture till Emerson made 
it,” that Emerson called into being “a public to listen to the master and his 
disciples […]. That were a victory worth a life, since the lecture is the 
American invention, serving the country with impulse and thought of an ideal 
cast and conquering virtue. The lyceums are properly Emersonia, and we must 
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substitute the founder’s name for the thing he has invented.” Emerson both 
created and was the creation of this novel cultural agency.85 
 
The rolling cultural evolution of the antebellum, dependent upon what Gouldner terms the ‘dialectic of 
ideology and technology,’ is—as we have seen—continually punctuated by the advent of new technologies 
and the ways in which information and communication technologies mark the traffic of American ante- 
and postbellum culture.86 There is photography and telegraphy in the 1830s; rotary power printing in the 
1840s; the typewriter in the 1860s; transatlantic cable in 1866 and the telephone, 1876. These technologies 
all had a profound effect on our understanding of culture and any attendant theory of labour; Emerson 
himself draws the links by proposing his own theory of cultural labour in the late address ‘American 
Civilization’ (1862): 
 
USE, labor of each for all, is the health and virtue of all beings. Ich dien, I serve, 
is a truly royal motto. […] God is God because he is the servant of all. Well, 
now here comes this conspiracy of slavery,—they call it an institution, I call 
it a destitution,—this stealing of men and setting them to work, stealing their 
labor, and the thief sitting idle himself; and for two or three ages it has lasted, 
and has yielded a certain quantity of rice, cotton and sugar. And, standing on 
this doleful experience, these people have endeavored to reverse the natural 
sentiments of mankind, and to pronounce labor disgraceful, and the well-
being of a man to consist in eating the fruit of other men’s labor.87  
 
 
‘American Civilization’ was delivered as a lecture to a crowd assembled at Washington’s Smithsonian 
Institute ‘only a few hundred yards from the site of wartime hospitals standing between the Smithsonian 
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and the capitol.’ The aim was to speak directly to the ‘existing’ presidential administration in order to call 
upon Lincoln to address the ethical bases of his presidency, and the development of the abolitionist 
movement as the country stands on the brink of war.88 ‘The end of all political struggle is to establish 
morality as the basis of all legislation,’ Emerson claims—‘Morality is the basis of all legislation,’ ‘the object 
of government.’89 But, seeking to distance himself from wartime ideologies and any direct adulation of the 
Agrarian south or explicit celebration of Northern industry, he instead ‘coins’ a theory of work:90 ‘Labor: 
a man coins himself into his labor; turns his day, his strength, his thought, his affection into some product 
which remains as the visible sign of his power; and to protect that, to secure that to him, to secure his past 
self to his future self.’91 Once again, Emerson’s interest in technology becomes a way to turn his theory of 
labour into an ‘object’ in its own right. ‘OUR nineteenth century is the age of tools, he notes in ‘Work and 
Days’ (1870). ‘They grew out of our structure. [...] The human body is the magazine of inventions, the 
patent office, where are the models from which every hint was taken. All the tools and engines on earth 
are only extensions of its limbs and senses. One definition of man is ‘an intelligence served by organs.’ 
Machines can only second, not supply, his unaided senses.’92  
This notion that a machine should serve to ‘second’ our critical intentions and ambitions is a 
pungent one, in so far as it rhetorically elevates the intellectual ability of humankind to govern even within 
a rapidly changing society. As will be explored in the following chapter, the idea of the machine in servitude 
to the artist and thinker bears crucial similarities to his theory of ‘second use.’ In ‘second use’—or the act 
or ‘art of appropriation’—the ability to appropriate existing materials emerges as a later, practical mirror 
for his earlier version of the ‘mechanics of literature,’ and the following chapter will examine how 
Emerson’s position on appropriation, critical agency and originality is both practically and theoretically 
made manifest in his later writings and ‘Quotation and Originality,’ in particular. 
 
88 For an in-depth description of the audience reaction to Emerson’s address, and detail of his subsequent meeting with 
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Appropriating the American Scholar:  















The old animals have given their bodies to the earth to 
furnish through chemistry the forming race. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875) 1 
 
 
What we think & say is wonderfully better for our spirits & 
trust, in another’s mouth. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
From his Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks (1851) 2 
 
 
Even those we call great men build substructures, and, like 
Cologne Cathedral, these are never finished. Lord Bacon 
begins; Behmen begins; Goethe, Fourier, Schelling, 
Coleridge, they all begin. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 












1 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
2 Emerson, ‘Journal CO’ (May 14, 1851), JMN.V., 423 






“The classes and the races too weak to master the new conditions of life must give way.” 
Cor[respondent] of the Tribune,  







Figure i. — Emerson’s Journal GO, p. 292.  












Figure ii. — Emerson’s ‘Journal XO,’ p. 68.  
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In Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM,’ the ways in which he systematized the act of critical exchange lay the foundation 
for his interest in the act (or ‘art’) of appropriation as well. In his explicit desire for ‘Another’ as an 
adjudicator of value and the sense of the ‘force of two in literature’, Emerson details a cultural economy in 
which the circulation of ideas depends upon a participant model of ownership. Aiming to establish a theory 
of exchange capable of incorporating the 1840 conceptualization of ‘subjectiveness,’ Emerson explicitly 
looks to literary culture. He notes that ‘My own book [is] read with new eyes once a stranger has praised 
it,’ suggesting that this ‘radical fact’ impacts the ways in which we consider how a modification of value 
functions within literature once the transaction from writer to reader occurs.6 A reader requires a writer; 
one requires another; one interchanges goods with that other; and the cycle continues. A network of 
exchange or economy of ideas is developed through the exchange of an image or idea that incrementally 
expands by virtue of reciprocal desire and mutual benefit. In this sense, as he writes in ‘Literary Ethics 
(1838), a literary work is a ‘resource’ to Emerson’s mind. ‘The old animals have given their bodies to the 
earth to furnish through chemistry the forming race,’ he suggestively claims in ‘Quotation and Originality’ 
(1875).7 ‘Nature decomposes all her harvests for recomposition,’ is the essay’s closing remark.8  This 
chapter will focus on Emerson’s practical and theoretical interest in ‘recomposition,’ both in relation to his 
characterization of a literary work as a ‘resource’ and to the ‘scientific value’ of the socioeconomic 
circumstances previously discussed. 
Emerson’s terminology is tendentious whether we look either to the development of ‘OTHERISM’ 
or ‘Quotation and Originality.’ The ‘charm of alienation’ is that we need ‘Another’ to define ‘alienation’ 
as a both term and concept.9 The ‘force of two in literature’ is an allusion to the ways in which the collective 
work of an author and reader informs a circulation of culture, ensuring the dialectical progress of a thought 
as it moves between proprietors; altered by each owner; only then to move on again. The former is regarded 
as a theory of ‘commercial value,’ the latter, a theory of ‘capitalist transaction’ (to borrow his terms). The 
coalescence of these ideas is key to the development of Emerson’s economy or ‘circle of intelligence,’ as he 
 
6 Emerson, ‘Journal B,’ (Undated, 1836), JMN.V., 254 
7 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
8 Ibid., 204 
9 Emerson, ‘Journal B’ (Undated, 1836), JMN.V., 254 
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writes in ‘Quotation and Originality.’ Emerson here admits that this is a borrowed idea; a play on the 
‘bodies’ of ‘old animals.’ 10  
 
Swedenborg threw a formidable theory into the world, that every soul existed 
in a society of souls, from which all its thoughts passed into it, as the blood of 
a mother circulates into her unborn child: and he noticed, that, when in his 
bed, —alternately sleeping and waking—sleeping, he was surrounded by 
persons disputing and offering opinions on the one side and on the other side 
a proposition: waking, the like suggestions occurred for and against the 
proposition as his own thoughts: sleeping again, he saw and heard the 
speakers as before, and this as often as he slept or waked. If we expand this 
image, does it not look as if we men were thinking and talking out of an 
enormous antiquity, as if we stood not in a coterie of prompters that filled a 
sitting room, but a circle of intelligences […].11 
 
As the editors of the Harvard/Belknap publication of Letters and Social Aims note, Emerson’s unattributed 
reference sees him summarize (rather than plagiarize) Swedenborg’s thinking. Swedenborg ‘discusses the 
circulation of blood between mother and unborn child’ in Part II of The Generative Organs Considered 
Anatomically, Physically and Philosophically (first published in translation 1852); and the remarks on ‘sleeping 
and waking’ owe to The Spiritual Diary of Emanuel Swedenborg (first published in Latin, 1873, seventy-one 
years after its author’s death).12 However, Emerson’s allusion to ‘men thinking’—a pluralist iteration of his 
assessment of the singular ‘thinking man’ of ‘The American Scholar’ (1837)—is significant if we are to 
consider ‘Quotation and Originality’ as an essay in correspondence with Emerson’s earlier writings. 
However, it is first necessary that we unravel what role ‘this circle of intelligences’ exactly play in 
Emerson’s thinking.13 
 
10 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 198 
11 Ibid., 198-199 
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(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), n. 24; 255 
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 192 
Picturing this ‘circle of intelligence’ in practice, Emerson cites ‘all thinkers’ as participants; as 
engaged in the upkeep of a ‘society of souls.’ ‘Poets, inventors, and wits, men and women, English, 
German, Celt, Ninevite, Copt, —back to the first geometer—bard, mason, carpenter, planter, shepherd’—
‘our benefactors are as many as the children who invented speech,’ he notes.14 Repeating his position in 
the ‘Present Life’ series of the late 1830s, Emerson once again looks to urbanization as a means of 
explaining the complexities of his thinking. Looking to the kind of co-work necessitated in the development 
of a national literary culture, he notes that a literary ‘language’ ‘is a city, to the building of which every 
human has brought a stone.’ 15 This a significant remark if we recall Emerson’s allusions to the ‘strength of 
the builder’ in 1837; noting their contribution to a superlative ideological ‘superstructure.’16 However, 
whilst we work individually toward this collective aim, he proposes that act of cultural consumption that 
underpins our capacity to ‘think’ should encourage ‘the indefeasible persistency of the individual to be 
himself.’17 
 
Every mind is different and the more it is unfolded the more pronounced is 
that difference. He must draw the elements into him for food, and, if they be 
granite and silex, will prefer them cooked by sun and rain, by time and art, to 
his hand. However received, these elements pass into the substance of his 
constitution, will be assimilated, and tend always to form not a partisan but a 
possessor of truth.18 
 
Emerson’s insistence on the all-important ‘indefeasible persistency’ of selfhood needs to be seen in light of 
a concept of accreditation as well as the notion of ‘use’ that underpins his engagement with literature, more 
broadly, and literary criticism, more specifically. Emerson is adamant that our singular contribution to the 
development of this space should not be recognized, despite his description of ‘language’ as a ‘city’ in its 
own right. Each individual, each ‘builder’ as he notes in ‘37, ‘is no more to be credited with the grand result 
 
14 Ibid., 199. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), EL.II., 64 
17 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 201 
18 Ibid. 
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than the acaleph which adds a cell to the coral reef which is the basis of this continent.’19 A city is thus built 
collectively; our uses of the city are archly individualized; and therefore to place too much emphasis on the 
authors or ‘builders’ of said city is to undermine the simple idea that we exploit all that the city offers to 
meet the terms of our own needs and wants. Emerson’s ‘circle of intelligence,’ and his ‘city,’ are both the 
products of ‘joint work’ rather than the ‘private enterprise’ of authorship (to borrow phrases from both ‘The 
American Scholar’ and ‘Quotation and Originality’). In this way, Emerson’s ‘circle of intelligence’ relates 
directly to his theory of ‘relation,’ 1836, and a range of previously cited ideas in his early works. His position 
on the establishment of a cultural space as a ‘city’ speaks to the forms of social betterment or ‘public welfare’ 
that underpin ‘The Young American’ (1844).20  
Furthermore, his assertion that our outlook is ‘unfolded’ echoes his insistence in ‘Uses of Great 
Men’ (1850) that ‘Man is endogenous,’ and that ‘education is his unfolding,’ 21 and the idea that the progress 
of a culture of ideas necessitates a theory of ‘proposition’ echoes the dialectical evolution of a literary 
culture that depends upon both private reflection and publication, as noted in ‘History’ (1841).22 Similarly, 
the comparison he draws between the circulation of ideas and the circulation of blood between an unborn 
child and its mother echoes his reference to Rabelais in ‘Wealth’ (1860).23 Once again, these numerous 
cross-references and inferences add to the claim that ‘Quotation and Originality’ is a key essay in Emerson’s 
oeuvre; a work in which he consolidates the centrality of critical agency and exchange in a manner that 
can be traced back to 1836 and the very beginnings of his authorship. However, it is how Emerson comes 
to term this position on critical exchange as explicitly ‘capitalist’ that that needs further extrapolation.  
As previously mentioned, Emerson’s sense of the ‘force of two in literature’ connects Emerson’s 
mid-period and later writings. In 1847, Emerson writes:  
 
 
19 Ibid., 199 
20 Emerson, ‘The Young American’ (1844), CW.I., 374-375 
21 Emerson, ‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850), CW.IV., 31 
22 Emerson, ‘History’ (1841), CW.I., 5 
23 Emerson, ‘Wealth’ (1860), CW.VI., 125-126 
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Can we not help ourselves as discreetly by the force of two in literature? 
Certainly, it only needs two well-placed & well-tempered for cooperation, to 
get somewhat far transcending any private enterprise in literature. 
But it requires great generosity & rare devotion to the aim in the 
parties & not that mean thievish way of looking at every thought as property. 
Thought is the property of him who can entertain it. Thought is the 
property of him who can adequately place it.24 
 
In 1875, however, he repeats this through a much more discernibly ‘economic metaphor’ in ‘Quotation 
and Originality.’25 Envisaging the practice of quotation and/or appropriation as a form of ‘mental 
indebtedness,’ he writes, ‘The capitalist of either kind is as hungry to lend as the consumer to borrow.’26 
 
[The] transaction no more indicates intellectual turpitude in the borrower than 
the simple fact of debt involves bankruptcy. On the contrary, in far the greater 
number of cases the transaction is honorable to both. Can we not help 
ourselves as discreetly by the force of two in literature?  Certainly, it only needs 
two well placed and well-tempered for coöperation, to get somewhat far 
transcending any private enterprise! Shall we converse as spies? Our very 
abstaining to repeat and credit the fine remark of our friend is thievish. Each 
man of thought is surrounded by wiser men than he, if they cannot write as 
well. Cannot he and they combine?27  
 
The specifically ‘capitalist’ context that Emerson builds around his analysis of critical activity—his 
assertion of the ‘force of two’—adds to recent revisionist readings of the politics of Emerson’s poetics. As 
 
24 Emerson, ‘Journal GH’ (Undated, 1847), JMN.X., 154-55 
25 A phrase I borrow from Arjo Klamer and Thomas C. Leonard who, responding to such cliché as ‘TIME IS MONEY,’ explore 
the ways in which the practical implementation of economic systems facilitates its own poetic language; how an analysis of 
‘the nature of work’ in a ‘commercial society’ depends upon a culture of ‘elaborate and systematic metaphor’ They explain 
their thinking thus: ‘Do Alaskans have trouble keeping their liquid assets from being frozen? Bubbles, bears, bulls, bliss 
points, sun spots, cobwebs and dirty floats all dot the economic landscape. Our most rigorous scientific expressions [in 
economic theory] are unabashedly metaphorical.’ Whilst Emerson comments on precisely this fact, it is of note that—at the 
tail end of his career—his own investigation of economic metaphor comes to describe his philosophical position in more 
concrete, economic terms. See Arjo Klamer and Thomas C. Leonard, ‘What is an Economic Metaphor?’ in (ed.) Mirowski, 
Natural Images in Economic Thought: Markets Read in Tooth and Claw (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 20-
52 
26 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 189 
27 Ibid., 189-190 
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John Carlos Rowe suggests, 1997, ‘Emersonian Transcendentalism had an important ideological function 
to serve in nineteenth-century America: the legitimation of those practices of intellectual abstraction 
required to rationalize the contradictions of the new industrial economy,’ a point that can be applied to 
‘Quotation and Originality’ unequivocally if we consider the stresses of Emerson’s argument and distinct 
classification of his position as ‘capitalist.’28  
At a technical level, the essay is practical in its interests; invested in ‘the use and relevancy of the 
sentence’ taken out of context and put to work elsewhere; interested in the mechanisms of scholarship and 
how we are to employ (or appropriate) the works of others to build new argument.29 The fact that Emerson 
expresses this activity as an economic phenomenon is significant. His ‘circle of intelligence,’ part of the 
development of a larger more encompassing intellectual and ideological ‘superstructure,’ also serves to 
characterize Emerson’s thoughts on the political and poetic significance of the marketplace. This system is 
built up by virtue of a collectivist kind of ‘joint-work,’ to borrow a phrase from ‘The American Scholar,’ 
with the results of that labour configured as a distinctly ‘capitalist’ venture. 
Recall the link between a commercial society and the isolated ‘spender’ previously discussed; 
similar to Emerson’s builder, the ‘spender’ should not be credited for authoring the economic system of 
circulation in itself; however, their participation helps define and maintain that system. As Joel Porte 
argues, Emerson thus sought to engineer a ‘spiritual’ iteration of ‘capital’ that would ally ‘mental mobility 
to the boom-and-bust cycles of American capitalism,’ giving power to each individual so they could assist 
in the regulation of such an economic system or ‘superstructure’ (to borrow Emerson’s own phrase).30 In 
addition to his qualification of critical exchange as a ‘capitalist’ procedure, Emerson repeatedly draws on 
the ‘debt’ as a framework with which to explain this exchange.31 As we will see, this longstanding fiscal 
metaphor in Emerson’s works, the ways in which Emerson’s relationship with appropriation and quotation 
 
28 John Carlos Rowe, ‘At Emerson’s Tomb,’ At Emerson’s Tomb: The Politics of Classic American Literature (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), 5 
29 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 194 
30 Leverenz, ‘The Politics of Emerson’s Man-Making Words,’ 41. See also Joel Porte, Representative Man: Ralph Waldo 
Emerson in his Time (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1979), 257-66., 292.; See also, Barbara Packer: ‘[Americans] 
did not really want money, but the sense of self-esteem and possession it would confer.’ See ‘Portable Property,’ Emerson’s 
Fall: A New Interpretation of the Major Essays (New York, NY: Continuum, 1982), 96 
31 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 194 
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serves to signal the importance of ‘debt’ to his thinking, is equally crucial for an understanding of his critical 
practice. 
It matters not ‘whether your jewel was got from the miner or from the auctioneer,’ writes Emerson 
in ‘Quotation and Originality.’32 Whether we examine a first-hand citation, or a quotation dislocated from 
its source, the process of recontextualization charges each ‘sentence’ with a new significance. ‘We are as 
much informed of a writer’s genius by what he selects as what he originates;’ ‘We read [a] quotation with 
new eyes,’ and see the cited material ‘find a new and fervent sense,’ ‘borrowing new interest from the 
rendering.’33 Emerson admits that, at times, we give literature too much significance by concentrating on 
the ultimate value of individual phrases, clauses and images. ‘In hours of high mental activity,’ he suggests, 
‘we sometimes do the book too much honor, reading out of it better things than the author wrote: reading, 
as we say, between the lines.’34 However, for Emerson, the benefits of ‘reading between the lines’ and the 
accrual of critical ‘interest’ by comparing the relation of an author and reader to that of a debtor and 
borrower is highly significant (and again harks back to ideas he would entertain in ‘Nature,’ 1836).35 
As I will argue, Emerson’s reflections on the practice of quotation and appropriation speak to 
Rowe’s suggestion that Emerson sought to establish a connection between ‘intellectual abstraction’ and the 
ascent of a ‘new industrial economy.’ As we’ve already seen, Emerson’s ‘OTHERISM’ is enormously useful 
in terms of the ways in which it showcases the coherent development of ideas across his authorship. How 
an idea—first raised in 1836—could recur with such frequency only to find publication in 1860; and thereby 
chart the arc of Emerson’s major period of activity (from the publication of Nature through to the 
publication of The Conduct of Life). Whilst I’ve previously surveyed the ways in which such ideas recur 
across Emerson’s early writings, I will now turn my attention to the ways in which Emerson’s later position 
on appropriation consolidates and compounds his earlier writings. Looking to ‘Quotation and Originality,’ 




34 Ibid., 197 
35 Emerson, ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 37 
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between ‘well-tempered coöperation’ and ‘private enterprise’ a principle point of focus.36 Although 
Emerson would first announce his ‘art’ in ‘Quotation and Originality’—an essay unpublished until 1875 
(although based on lectures delivered in the late 1850s)—I will indicate a range of instances of appropriation 
in Emerson’s writings that elucidate the significance of this ‘art’ to his authorship more broadly. I will 
consider the ways in which Emerson can be seen to both practice and preach his ‘art’ through a number of 
examples that date back to the very beginnings of his career.37 
Across previous chapters, I’ve identified the significance of ownership and exchange as dominant 
tropes in Emerson’s conceptualist and pedagogical remarks on the act of reading. Emerson’s thinking is 
anchored in a poetic system that identifies cultures of criticism and cultures of commerce as conceptual 
rhymes in his reimagining of the American marketplace as a ‘poet’s economy.’ However, if we look for 
concrete examples of appropriation in Emerson’s works—and partner such instances with an analysis of 
the ways in which ‘Quotation and Originality’ illustrates the notion that criticism and commerce 
intersect—then the act of critical exchange as a form of inherently capitalist ‘transaction’ emerges.38 As 
explored in previous chapters, I will investigate the ways in which Emerson’s later and more explicit 
remarks regarding the economics of cultural and critical enterprise reflect and refract the significance of 
market practices and ideologies identified in his early works. In conclusion, I will look again to Emerson’s 
sense that the ‘the silent revolution which the newspaper has wrought’ adds to a theorization of circulation, 
critical exchange, and complex forms of intellectual ownership and ‘creative’ thought. I will suggest that 
his position can be expanded to include the value of literature and critical practice within his works more 
widely despite the fact that Emerson’s theorizations of creativity are more invested in the maintenance of 
a cultural economy rather than the act of creativity itself.39  
We can identify both the act of appropriation—and an enumeration of appropriation as art—as a 
constant across Emerson’s authorship. In pursuit of this idea and following on from the conceptual 
appropriations of Francis Wayland and William Ellery Channing previously cited, I will explore Emerson’s 
 
36 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 189 
37 Ibid., 200 
38 Ibid., 189 
39 Emerson, ‘Seventh of March Speech on the Fugitive Slave Law’ (1854), LL.I., 334 
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relationship with appropriation through three examples: his appropriation of Gulian C. Verplanck; citation 
of Johann von Goethe; and his plagiarizing of the works of Karl Marx. The consistency of Emerson’s 
‘borrowed thoughts’—as Emerson refers to them—will be argued as proof of the importance of 
appropriation to his authorship. The centrality and significance of appropriation as part of Emerson’s 
navigation of the metaphoric qualities of the act of reading will be foregrounded, as will the symbolic 
significance of intellectual ownership to ‘creative reading.’ Signalling the importance of appropriation as 
both act and art in Emerson’s works, the politics of Emerson’s poetics will be drawn to the fore, and the 
importance of market ideologies to his aesthetics argued as incontrovertible. 
The variety of appropriation in Emerson’s work—both as practiced and preached—has precedence 
within the wider history of American letters. Emphatic cases that support his interest in culture’s 
itinerancy—in the ways in which an idea changes in terms of intimation and value—can be identified 
throughout the history of American literature; particularly with regard to the conflict of public or private 
theories of value and relative to an analysis of the subjective qualities of a text’s capacity to inspire. 
Considering one such example, the public denouncement of Helen Keller’s work in the late-nineteenth 
century (following an accusation of plagiarism) is particularly noteworthy. In 1892, Keller was accused of 
intellectual theft after her short fiction, ‘The Frost King’ (1891),40 was identified as markedly comparable 
in form and content to Margaret Canby’s ‘Frost Fairies’ (1889).41 Whilst an official investigation 
followed—as did a tribunal, during which Keller was eventually acquitted of any crime—Keller later 
detailed this alleged instance of copyright infringement in her autobiography The Story of My Life (1903). 
Therein, she speaks plainly of the conceptual drive behind her ‘habit of assimilating [material] and giving 
it out again as [her] own.’42  
 
40 First titled ‘Autumn Leaves’ and retitled ‘The Frost King,’ ahead of its pamphlet publication by Perkins School for the 
Blind, 1891, a detailed account of both Keller’s work and its reception can be found in Hillel Schwartz, ‘Discernment,’ The 
Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 259-260 
41 Margaret T. Canby, ‘The Frost Fairies’ in Birdie and his Fairy Friends (Philadelphia, PN: W.M. Fell and Company, 1889), 
110-122 
42 From Hellen Keller’s The Story of my Life, published in digital facsimile by the Virginia Commonwealth University Library 
Social Welfare History Project in four parts, 2017. For Keller’s commentary on the period of allegation and charge, see part 
four; <https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/issues/keller-helen-story-life-part-4/>  
(Accessed 22.06.2019) 
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Discussing the ways in which she sought to ‘reproduce’ and ‘transform’ her sources of ‘inspiration,’ 
Keller argues that she learned ‘as all young and inexperienced persons learn; by assimilation and imitation,’ 
by putting ‘new ideas’ into ‘[borrowed] words.’ ‘Everything I found in books that pleased me I retained in 
my memory,’ she notes; ‘consciously or unconsciously, I adapted material [to my own purposes].’43 Keller 
describes her process of assimilation and creative re-creation—of appropriation, in sum—as a kind of 
‘mental gymnastics.’ An autopoiesis of remembered and recollected material that, somewhat akin to the 
experience of ‘déjà vu,’ pictures plagiarism as a ‘recursive’ elemental process of interpretation; 
‘irrepressible’ and ‘inevitable as a recipe constantly resurfacing.’44 Keller’s insistence on the pedagogical 
value of plagiarism—of our ‘trying on a paradigm’ as Charles Bernstein would later put it—is expanded 
upon in her memoirs as foundational to a reader’s relationship with literary matter. Plagiarism, or 
‘appropriation,’ informs a reader’s project of self-discovery to Keller’s mind; and should be considered a 
significant form of interpretative labour.45  
Upon publication of her memoirs, Keller’s case gained greater notoriety and—as a result—Mark 
Twain wrote to Keller to emphatically offer his support. Rather than involve himself directly in the legal 
specificities of the tribunal itself, Twain responds more to Keller’s conceptualist directive and would second 
her definition of plagiarism as an elemental attribute of any author’s work. For Twain, Keller’s case is in 
fact illustrative of the need to assess the conceptual importance of appropriation and inspiration as 
interconnected fields and as a means of understanding literature’s function as a social form. He effusively 
terms Keller’s case an ‘object lesson,’ suggesting that the complaints surrounding her work and her 
‘assimilation’ of Canby’s writings are of a critical rather than legalistic concern.  
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Schwartz, ‘Discernment,’ The Culture of the Copy, 259-260 
45 Charles Bernstein describes how—through the process of ‘copying’ convention—we arrive at an original convention of 
our own. In pursuit of this idea, he cites Emerson only to illustrate a variety of appropriation as Emerson would seek to both 
question and facilitate: ‘In ‘The American Scholar,’ Emerson talks about a boy standing before water and not realizing that 
he can swim. It’s an image I find very useful in responding to questions about how people can understand poetry that hasn’t 
already been written, that they’ve not learned about previously. […] Trust your private thoughts, Emerson urges his young 
scholars, because they will speak the most publicly. Trust the associations that make sense to you, even if they appear out of 
tine or inarticulate or inconsistent: allow them to speak. […] (Why do I mention Emerson here? Is it a purely a rhetorical 
gesture to try to pull someone with that kind of legitimating authority into an otherwise…) Bernstein does not conclude this 
point; leaving a redolent pause where a consolidation of this argument would sit. See ‘Optimism and Critical Excess,’ Critical 
Inquiry, 16.4. (1990), 839 
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‘As if there was much of anything in any human utterance, oral or written, except plagiarism!’, 
Twain writes in response to Keller’s case; ‘The kernel, the soul—let us go further and say the substance, 
the bulk, the actual and valuable material of all human utterances—is plagiarism:’46 
 
For substantially all ideas are second-hand, consciously and unconsciously 
drawn from a million outside sources, and daily use by the garnerer with a 
pride and satisfaction born of the superstition that he originated them; 
whereas there is not a rag of originality about them anywhere except the little 
discoloration they get from his mental and moral caliber and his 
temperament, and which is revealed in characteristics of phrasing. When a 
great orator makes a great speech, you are listening to ten centuries and ten 
thousand men—but we call it his speech, and really some exceedingly small 
portion of it is his. But not enough to signify. It is merely a Waterloo. It is 
Wellington’s battle, in some degree, and we call it his; but there are others 
that contributed. It takes a thousand men to invent a telegraph, or a steam 
engine, or a phonograph, or a telephone or any other important thing—and 
the last man gets the credit and we forget the others.47 
 
Twain thus emphatically frames ‘plagiarism’ as a means of exploring the critical and cultural implications 
of creative exchange on a wider level in his analysis of Keller’s work. But in so doing, his prose vociferously 
apes the position Emerson previously set forwards in his own engagements with the act of appropriation 
and his propositioning of his ‘art of appropriation.’  
Twain’s wording—‘for substantially all ideas are secondhand’—is only at a slight remove from 
Emerson’s effusive study of the ‘secondary use’ in ‘Poetry and Imagination.’48 Furthermore, whether by 
accident or design, Keller’s own defence of her position also mimics Emerson’s perspective. Keller’s case 
functions as a compound of a number of Emerson’s ideas. Interested in the ‘mechanics of literature,’ as 
Emerson puts it in ‘Philosophy of History,’49 she shares Emerson’s sense of the value and validity of ‘ready-
 
46 Twain, cited by Schwartz, ‘Discernment,’ Ibid., 313 
47 Ibid. 
48 Emerson, ‘Poetry and Imagination’ (1875), 11 
49 Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), EL.II., 63 
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made’ materials as a creative resource.’50 Furthermore, her allusion to original thought and interpretation 
as a form of ‘mental gymnastics’ is itself a rewording of Emerson’s insistence in ‘Nature’ that ‘the 
gymnastics of the understanding’ propel the mind towards a need to comprehend and examine the mores 
and mechanisms of proprietorship.51  
If we sit Emerson’s own ‘mental gymnastics’ in its original context, he explains his position by way 
of a fiscal metaphor once again. Correlating ‘Property and its filial systems of debt and credit,’ he suggests 
that ‘debt’ serves a keen pedagogical function above and beyond the lived experience of poverty or social 
disequilibrium:  
 
Debt, grinding debt, whose iron face the widow, the orphan, and the sons of 
genius fear and hate;—debt, which consumes so much time, which so cripples 
and disheartens a great spirit with cares that seem so base, is a preceptor 
whose lessons cannot be foregone, and is needed most by those who suffer 
from it most.52  
 
Here, in somewhat unforgiving terms, Emerson infers that ‘debt’ extends beyond the lived experience of 
poverty to underpin something ‘profounder’; the ‘hiving’ of ‘spirit’ and ‘understanding.’ 
 
Moreover, property, which has been well compared to snow, —“if it fall level 
to-day, it will be blown into drifts to-morrow,” —is the surface action of 
internal machinery, like the index on the face of a clock. Whilst now it is the 
gymnastics of the understanding, it is hiving, in the foresight of the spirit, 
experience in profounder laws.53 
 
It is the ‘internal machinery’ of authorial and interpretative agency that underwrites his ‘debt’ system in 
Emerson’s ‘art of appropriation,’ keeping in mind that ‘Nature’ is Emerson’s debut, his first public 
declaration of his position on mass-produced paper. An engagement with the notion of ‘debt’ and 
ownership thus traffics through from the onset of Emerson’s career to its end. ‘Our debt to tradition through 
 
50 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), 200 




reading and conversation is so massive, our protest or private addition so rare and insignificant,’ he writes, 
that we shall never pay any debt to-day;’ ‘If we confine ourselves to literature, ‘t is easy to see that the debt 
is immense to past thought;’ and yet ‘This vast mental indebtedness has every variety that pecuniary debt 
has,—every variety of merit.’54 In other words, regardless of the importance and extent of this debt, the 
‘present’ is our chief concern: the contemporary ‘moment.’ ‘We cannot overstate our debt to the Past, but 
the moment has the supreme claim,’ Emerson notes. ‘The Past is for us; but the sole terms on which it can 
become ours are its subordination to the Present.’55 This is the ‘merit’ of a culture in ‘debt’—it cumulatively 
leads up to the ‘present,’ inverting ‘debt’ as a principle. As in any system of accreditation, the ‘past’ must 
be read forwards to inform the ‘present.’  
Whether Keller’s reference to Emerson occurs either by accident or by design is not the point—
and Twain does not mention Emerson in his comments on Keller’s circumstances as an ‘object lesson.’ 
Nonetheless, the fact that both Keller and Emerson rephrase the value of appropriation in ways that directly 
reference Emerson’s commentaries on original thought through an act of conceptual appropriation, is useful 
for our current argument. Keller’s appropriation of Canby—her act of ‘mental gymnastics’—serves to 
indicate both the complexity of Emerson’s thinking in ‘Quotation and Originality,’ and the power of his 
perspective through its reappropriation in Keller and Twain. However, before we consider Emerson’s own 
practical relationship with appropriation, we should first look at the ways in which his choice terminology 
in ‘Quotation and Originality’ on ‘secondary use,’ ‘quotation’ and ‘appropriation’ operates.  
In ‘Quotation and Originality,’ Emerson envisages the ways in which our management of textual 
material through quotation and appropriation encompasses both the personal practice of textual analysis 
and the formation of a common culture. ‘Our knowledge is the amassed thought and experience of 
innumerable minds,’ he writes; ‘our language, our science, our religion, our opinions, our fancies we 
inherited. Our country, customs, laws, our ambitions, and our notions of fit and fair, —all these we never 
made, we found them ready-made; we but quote them.’56 Whilst the plurality of Emerson’s concern is of 
 
54 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 178, 180, 189 
55 Ibid., 204 
56 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
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note (he stresses this culture as ‘ours’ rather than ‘mine’ or ‘yours’), little to no academic work has been 
undertaken to identify the fact that Emerson’s use of the phrase ‘ready-made’ antedates Marcel Duchamp’s 
later popularization of the very same term.57  
In 1961, reflecting on his creative practice at the beginnings of the twentieth century before a crowd 
assembled at New York’s Museum of Modern Art, Duchamp reiterates the importance of the term 
‘readymade’—his ‘happy idea’—as a term and concept established by himself:  
 
In 1913 I had the happy idea to fasten a bicycle wheel to a kitchen stool and 
watch it turn. A few months later I bought a cheap reproduction of a winter 
evening landscape which I called “pharmacy” after adding two small dots, 
one red and one yellow, in the horizon. In New York in 1915 I bought at a 
hardware store a snow shovel on which I wrote “IN ADVANCE OF A BROKEN 
ARM.” It was around that time that the word “READYMADE” came to mind 
to designate this form of manifestation. A point which I want very much to 
establish is that the choice of these “READYMADE” was never dictated by 
esthetic delectation. This choice was based on a reaction of visual indifference 
with at the same time a total absence of good or bad taste… in fact a complete 
anaesthesia. That sentence instead of describing the object like a title was 
meant to carry the mind of the spectator towards other regions more verbal.58 
 
I have found no evidence that Duchamp ever read Emerson; however, the intersection of their arguments 
is undeniably significant. Beyond their shared usage of the term ‘ready-made’ itself, Duchamp echoes 
Emerson’s assertion that ‘the receiver’s aim is on life, and not on literature;’ that our ‘indifference to the 
source’ of our inspiration should be maintained; and that our concentration should focus on the 
interpretation and application of ideas. Duchamp’s own theory of ‘selection’ also depends upon a theory 
 
57 Considering Emerson’s pluralist concerns in ‘Quotation and Originality,’ it is worth bearing in mind that he would note 
his call for ‘original relation’ as similarly collectivist in its ambitions in ‘Nature’—’OUR age is retrospective. It builds the 
sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld God and nature 
face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we 
have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs?’ 
Emerson, ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 3 — emphasis my own  
58 From a talk delivered by Duchamp at the Museum of Modern Art, New York (October 19th, 1961); published in Art and 
Artists, 1.4. (1966), 47-48., and reprinted in Marcel Duchamp, (eds.) M. Sanouillet and E. Peterson, The Writings of Marcel 
Duchamp (London: Da Capo Press, 1973), 141-142 
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of ‘indifference’—of ‘visual indifference’ in this instance—and Duchamp explicitly notes that an alteration 
of public matter, itself an echo of Emerson’s insistence that every word is ‘tunable,’59 constitutes an act of 
intellectual ownership through a form of creative modification.60 Duchamp’s position—that he aimed to 
‘carry the mind of the spectator’ to ‘other regions’ is also distinctly Emersonian. Recall Emerson’s assertion 
that ‘A certain awkwardness marks the use of borrowed thoughts; but as soon as we have learned what to 
do with them they become our own.’61 The assumption is that once we can predict a particular purpose, if 
we can envisage an alternate ‘use,’ we can transform the object of attention and thus elevate the status of a 
given object to that of a work of art. As Emerson asserts in ‘The Poet’ (1844): ‘all symbols are fluxional; all 
language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries and horses are, for conveyance.’62 The shared 
employment of the term ‘readymade’ and investment in cultures of ‘assemblage’ are thus useful for a 
reconsideration of how artistic practice, in this instance, crosses from a 19th century perspective and into 
the avant-garde tradition of the early to mid-twentieth century.  
Duchamp’s final remark to his ‘egomaniac’s discourse,’ as he called his position on the significance 
of the ‘readymade,’ was that in essence all creative fabrication is a ‘work of assemblage.’ ‘Since the tubes 
of paint used by the artist are manufactured and readymade products,’ he notes, ‘we must conclude that all 
the paintings in the world are a kind of readymade.’63 To quote Emerson’s identical position: ‘Our country, 
customs, laws, our ambitions, and our notions of fit and fair, —all these we never made, we found them 
ready-made,’ he writes; ‘we but quote them.’64 The act of observation, to Emerson’s mind, is itself an act 
of ‘assemblage’—an ‘art of appropriation.’ Duchamp’s thoughts on the artificiality of the very materials of 
art, once again, argues comparison between these two thinkers. While the consistency of Emerson’s interest 
in appropriation in conceptual terms has already been elucidated, the Duchampian angle provides us with 
a sense of the complexity of Emerson’s treatment of appropriation as an inherently creative form of critical 
enterprise. 
 
59 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 189 
60 Emerson, ‘Shakespeare, or the Poet’ (1850), CW.IV., 201 
61 Ibid., 198 
62 Emerson, ‘The Poet’ (1844), CW.II., 34 
63 Ibid., 141 
64 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
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We can connect, then, Emerson’s desire to express ‘the internal machinery of self,’ as noted in 
‘Uses of Great Men,’65 with our aspiration to ‘paint out [our] thoughts’ to others and to ourselves.’66 
Emerson’s use of ‘paint’ as a medium and metaphor becomes then another way to link a distinctly personal 
perspectivism with the materials of everyday life. In ‘Nominalist and Realist’ (1844), for example—an essay 
included in 1844’s Second Series—Emerson suggests that we read as though we were looking to extract the 
very base materials for a visual form of art: ‘I think I have done well if I have acquired a new word from a 
good author,’ he writes; ‘and my business with him is to find my own, though it were only to melt him 
down into an epithet or an image for daily use: “Into paint will I grind thee, my bride!”67 Delivered in 
unflinching terms, Emerson’s statement indicates something both extractive and exploitative in his 
imaginings of a reader at work on a page. In his characterization of an imaginary painter, Emerson 
unequivocally pictures the instrumental virtues of literature that interest him—not merely their ‘daily use’ 
but their ability to regenerate a new ‘epithet or image’ (arguably an iteration of his ‘silent revolution’ in 
miniature). As Duchamp would later claim, an original idea is an assemblage; built from publicly available 
cultural forms. As Emerson would suggest, we ‘grind’ public matter into a material we can use to our own 
ends; assemble meaning from particle and pigment; to better ‘paint out our thoughts to [ourselves].’ 
However, Emerson’s position in ‘Nominalist and Realist’ is more complex than it may first appear.  
Note that the above citation concludes with an unattributed citation; the phrase “Into paint will I 
grind thee, my bride!” that sits suggestively in quotation marks. This textual allusion is lifted from 
Washington Allston’s ‘The Paint King’ (1809), a gothic ballad in which the titular Paint-King woos a 
damsel in order to grind her into a paint suitable for a portrait of the Queen of the Fairies.68 Allston had 
died just a year before the publication of Emerson’s Second Series, 1844. Leaving his work behind him, his 
corpus becomes ‘an epithet or an image for daily use’ and Emerson’s act of appropriation becomes a way 
 
65 An idea that Emerson would fleetingly touch upon in Nature, and the ‘Discipline’ chapter in particular: property, which 
has been well compared to snow,—“if it fall level to-day, it will be blown into drifts to-morrow,”—is the surface action of 
internal machinery, like the index on the face of a clock. Whilst now it is the gymnastics of the understanding, it is hiving, 
in the foresight of the spirit, experience in profounder laws. See Emerson, ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 37-38 
66 Emerson, ‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850), CW.IV., 31 
67 Emerson, ‘Nominalist and Realist’ (1844), CW.III., 240-241 
68 Washington Allston, ‘The Paint King,’ The Sylphs of the Season, with Other Poems (Cambridge, MA: Hilliard and Metcalf, 
1813), 115-131 
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to both symbolically and formally frame his argument and detail the process by which his act of 
appropriation becomes art. Allston’s work now works for Emerson, but only in the form of a surplus value 
which declines any duty to honor the investments of Allston’s own labour, personhood, and the productive 
relations which placed the text in Emerson’s hands. Instead, Allston becomes merely another pigment in 
Emerson’s palette of materials.  
Emerson’s desire to ‘melt down’ the works of others into materials of his own, into ‘paint,’ frames 
an exploration into how we assimilate, absorb and transform existing and past culture only to ‘make it new’ 
(to borrow a maxim from Ezra Pound). Where we would previously find Allston behind the text, for 
example, Emerson is now the ‘painter’ in question and, to the next reader, his works will be subject to the 
same process. Emerson is aware that—following the point of publication—he would himself be subject to 
this circular process of publication, interpretative assimilation and expressive transformation. Further 
supporting the correlation between Emerson and Duchamp, his own theory of ‘assemblage’ thus extends 
a personalist form of critical practice as well as the development of a common, national culture.  
Mapping what he terms the ‘slow growth’ of an idea, and echoing the prospective revolution in 
public thought and feeling articulated in ‘History,’ in ‘Quotation and Originality’ Emerson explicitly argues 
that this type of critical assimilation is key to the progress of culture.69 ‘Mythology is no man’s work,’ he 
notes. Rather, it is a social exercise; an idea or image ‘tossed from believer to poet, from poet to believer, 
everybody adding a grace or dropping a fault or rounding the form, until it gets an ideal truth.’70 Emerson 
was transfixed by the ‘common stories that circulate;’71 ‘the circulation of poems;’72 the ‘generalizations 
[that] circulate in the world,’73 and his interest in ‘circulation’—as detailed in ‘Quotation and Originality’—
supersedes his concern for the idea or object itself in circulation. As discussed throughout this thesis, 
Emerson’s fascination with the mechanisms and implications of an object’s movement between contexts 
 
69 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 182 
70 Ibid., 181 
71 Emerson, ‘The Man of Letters’ (1863), CW.X., 256 
72 Emerson, ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature’ (1840), CW.XII., 319 
73 Emerson, ‘Literature’ (1837), EL.II., 65. For a particularly interesting assessment of Emerson’s interest in circulation and 
our ability to glean meaning from his work outside of the contexts of American cultural history, see David Watson, 
‘Transcendental Untranslatables: Emerson and Translation,’ in (eds.) S. Hegelsson, P. Vermeulen, Institutions of World 
Literature: Writing, Translation, Markets (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 209-225 
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impacts both his pedagogical interests in the qualitative act of reading itself and the ways in which he 
defines the role of the reader or scholar. The kinship between Emerson and Duchamp in this regard, in 
terms of their shared investment in a new and industrious form of creative reproduction, alludes to the 
radicality of Emerson’s ‘creative’ approach. If we are to examine Emerson’s own relationship with 
appropriation—identify instances in which he would ‘grind’ the works of others into paint—the idea (and 
importance) of appropriation is only further emboldened. 
Detailing the practice of appropriation that underpin the theoretical ideas at work in ‘Quotation 
and Originality,’ Emerson cites Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as the source of his ‘art of appropriation.’ It 
was Goethe, he notes, who first ‘frankly said, “What would remain to me if this art of appropriation were 
derogatory to genius? Every one of my writings has been furnished to me by a thousand different persons, 
a thousand things: wise and foolish have brought me, without suspecting it, the offering of their thoughts, 
faculties and experience.”74 Emerson’s interest in this ‘art’ is hands-on; his allusion to Goethe is more than 
simply a proof of influence and cultural inheritance; more than simply a practical indication of his interest 
in cultural ‘debt.’ It is also indicative of Emerson’s desire to investigate the function of appropriation and 
quotation in the works of others in order to better understand his own relationship with the page, his own 
relationship with the canon he seeks to be a part of. ‘We are as much informed of a writer’s genius by what 
he selects as by what he originates,’ Emerson suggests: ‘We read the quotation with his eyes, and find a 
new and fervent sense’ of the implications carried by that cited material as it is wrested from its original 
textual environment.75 Again, Emerson’s position in ‘Quotation and Originality’ is unequivocally informed 
by ideas we encounter earlier in his writings; recall his assertion that ‘A scholar is a selecting principle,’ 
1838: ‘He takes only his own out of the multiplicity that sweeps & circles by him. He is like one of these 
nets or frames that are set out from the shore on rivers to catch driftwood, &c.’76  
Goethe’s ‘art of appropriation’ is first detailed in his journals, 1832, in response to Étienne 
Dumont’s reactions to the cultural effectuality of the French Revolution. The Revolution’s cultural 
 
74 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
75 Ibid., 194 
76 Emerson, ‘Journal D’ (Undated, 1838), JMN.VII., 40 
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implications are well documented as a sociocultural and political event of significant magnitude that would 
impact Dumont’s writings and his general outlook on both the philosophical and sociological progress of 
republicanism and its intellectual and political corollaries (such as utilitarianism and democratic 
participation, for example).77 Responding to a reading of Dumont’s Recollections of Mirabeau (1832),78 
Goethe reflects on his ‘second reading’ of the text:79 
 
The French want that their Mirabeau should be their Hercules. And they are 
right: —but a Hercules must be abundantly supplied with food. The forget, 
good people, that this colossus is composed of parts; —that this demi-god is a 
collective being. The greatest genius will never be worth much if he pretends 
to draw exclusively from his own resources. What is genius, but the faculty of 
seizing and turning to account everything that strikes us; — of co-ordinating 
and breathing life into all the materials that present themselves; of taking here 
marble, there brass, and building a lasting monument with them? If I were not 
assured that Mirabeau possessed in the highest possible degree the art of 
appropriating the knowledge and thoughts of those around him, I should not 
believe in the stories told of his influence.80  
 
He then continues to develop his stance on the significance of this ‘art of appropriating the knowledge and 
thoughts of those around [us]’ and it is here that we find the passage that Emerson later draws on: 
 
The most original young painter, who thinks he owes everything to his 
invention, cannot, if he really has genius, come into the room in which we are 
now sitting, and look around at the drawings with which it is hung, without 
going out a different man from what he came in, and with a new supply of 
ideas. What should I be—what would remain to me—if this art of 
appropriation were considered derogatory to genius? What have I done? I 
have collected and turned to account all that I have seen, heard, observes: —
 
77 Cyprian Blamires, ‘The Creator of the Bentham Brand: Dumont in the French Revolution,’ The Revolution and the Creation 
of Benthamism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 132-180 
78 For the first English-Language translation, see Étienne Dumont, Recollections of Mirabeau and of the Two First Legislative 
Assemblies of France (London: Edward Bull, 1832) 
79 Johann Wolfgang on Goethe, (tr. & ed.) S. Austin, Characteristics of Goethe; from the German of Falk, von Müller, Vol. III 
(London: Effingham Wilson, 1849), 71 
80 Ibid., 74-75 
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I have put into requisition the works of nation and of man. Every one of my 
writings has been furnished me by a thousand different persons a thousand 
different things—the learned and the ignorant, the wise and the foolish, 
infancy and age, have come in turn—generally without having the least 
suspicion of it—to bring me offering of their thoughts, their faculties, their 
experience: often they have sowed the harvest I have reaped; my work is that of 
an aggregation of beings taken from the whole of nature; —it bears the name of Goethe. 
Such was Mirabeau: he had the genius of popular oratory; the genius of 
observation; the genius of appropriation; he detected talent where it existed, 
—fostered and reared it to maturity; and talent attached itself to him. He 
turned everything to account that he thought useful or apposite, without 
thinking himself obliged to quote his sources; his principal art was that of 
setting in motion a vast number of springs.81 
 
In ‘Quotation and Originality,’ Emerson’s citation would plagiarize Goethe’s original verbiage. It is 
Goethe’s ‘art of appropriation’ that directly points to the creative assemblage of myriad sources into a 
single, confident critical, philosophical and/or political position: “What would remain to me if this art of 
appropriation were derogatory to genius? Every one of my writings has been furnished to me by a thousand 
different persons, a thousand things: wise and foolish have brought me, without suspecting it, the offering 
of their thoughts, faculties and experience. My work is an aggregation of beings taken from the whole of 
Nature; it bears the name of Goethe.”82 Emerson’s own appropriation borrows and paraphrases its original 
source so that his own appropriation from the ‘amassed thought of innumerable minds’ directly 
corresponds with Goethe’s insistence that all cultural figures are a form of  ‘composite being’ or ‘colossus’ 
of composite thoughts. Emerson self-consciously describes this process of appropriation as follows: 
 
Most of the classical citations you shall hear or read in the current journals or 
speeches were not drawn from the originals, but from previous quotations in 
English books; and you can easily pronounce, from the use and relevancy of 
the sentence, whether it had not done duty many times before,—whether your 
jewel was got from the mine or from an auctioneer. We are as much informed 
 
81 Ibid., 76-77 
82 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 200 
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of a writer's genius by what he selects as by what he originates. We read the 
quotation with his eyes and find a new and fervent sense; as a passage from 
one of the poets, well recited, borrows new interest from the rendering. As the 
journals say, “the italics are ours.” The profit of books is according to the 
sensibility of the reader.83  
 
It is significant that Emerson’s considerations regarding the appropriation of ‘selected’ material also refer 
to the editorial notes that accompany the 1849 translation and collation of Characteristics of Goethe (a 
collection of anecdotes and asides from Goethe’s works). In Emerson’s appropriation of Goethe’s original 
coining of ‘the art of appropriation,’ I’ve left the italics intact at the suggestion of the first editor and 
translator of the 1849 edition of Characteristics of Goethe, Sarah Austin. Austin adds a footnote beneath 
Goethe’s comments on Mirabeau: ‘I cannot refrain from calling the reader’s attention to these remarkable 
words,’ she writes in a ‘Translator’s Note,’ ‘That Goethe would claim ‘The italics are ours.’ 84 In a passage 
that already speaks explicitly to the value of ‘secondary use’—Emerson re-establishes the basis of his own 
interpretation of Goethe’s art of appropriation relative to Austin’s emphasis. ‘The italics are ours,’ Emerson 
writes, implying both ownership and co-ownership of material shared between himself, Goethe, and 
Austin.85  
As Robert D. Richardson notes, Emerson’s engagement with Goethe’s ‘art of appropriation’ is 
particularly complex as it both speaks to Emerson’s own practice of mining material for his own purposes 
and, simultaneously references the act of interpretation as a social enterprise. Richardson notes that 
Emerson’s fondness for Goethe’s ‘art’ is significant as it speaks to a longstanding habit of transcribing 
quotations into his private journals and notebooks. It ‘was enormously helpful to Emerson to hear Goethe 
committing himself so clearly to the extensive and frank reuse of another’s material,’ Richardson notes, a 
process that Emerson ‘already found so congenial.’86As Emerson would state himself in his journals, 1851, 
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84 Sarah Austin, ‘Translator’s Note,’ Characteristics of Goethe; from the German of Falk, von Müller, 77 
85 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 194 
86 Robert D. Richardson, ‘The Inner Light,’ Emerson: The Mind on Fire, 172 
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‘Goethe was the cow from which all milk was drawn.’87  
According to Richardson, Emerson was struck by ‘Goethe’s liberating endorsement of literary 
appropriation’ as it would endorse his own want to stretch and ‘extend’ his thinking beyond the present 
‘horizon of thought and tradition:’88  
 
Such appropriation does not mean, of course, that one adopts the ideas of 
others because one has no thoughts of one’s own. It does mean that the 
individual must be free not only to have his own thoughts but to take up the 
thoughts of others when they coincide with, restate, or extend his own.89  
 
Richardson’s quiet suggestion here is that there is a melancholy streak in ‘Quotation and Originality’—a 
quality that accompanies Emerson’s sense of the ‘liberating’ virtues of appropriation as a practice rather 
than simply an act of imitation. Instead, an idea or image is irrevocably altered by virtue of this act of 
recontextualization. As we have previously noted, Emerson believed that ‘Other men are lenses through 
which we read our own minds,’ as would assert in ‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850).90 That a published work of 
literature is ‘altered, remodeled and finally made [our] own’ through the process of reading.91 
Appropriation, in this sense of the word, is a means of portraying the dialectical progress of an idea; the 
movement from private reflection to public ordinance that Emerson articulates in ‘History’—his notion 
that ‘Every reform was once a private opinion, and when it shall be a private opinion again it will solve the 
problem of the age.’92 In this sense, the modification of an idea both harkens to cultural progress and the 
need for cultural progress itself. A state of ‘sad self-knowledge,’ to again borrow Emerson’s phrase. It is 
worth noting also that, in ‘Man the Reformer,’ Emerson retitles his ‘reformer’ as a ‘Remaker of what man 
has made.’ Within the ‘mechanics’ of critical enterprise, the ‘remaker’ extends beyond literary institution 
 
87 Emerson: ‘It will hereafter be noted that the events of culture in the nineteenth century were the new importance of the 
genius of Dante, Michel Angelo, & Raffael, to Americans; the reading of Shakespeare and, above all, the reading of Goethe. 
Goethe was the cow from which all their milk was drawn.’ See ‘Journal CO’ (Undated, 1851), JMN.XI., 382 
88 Richardson, ‘The Inner Light,’ Emerson: The Mind on Fire, 172.; see also, Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), 
CW.VIII., 180 
89 Richardson, ‘The Inner Light,’ Emerson: The Mind on Fire, 172-173 
90 Emerson, ‘Uses of Great Men’ (1850), CW.IV., 5 
91 Emerson, ‘Shakespeare, or the Poet’ (1850), CW.IV., 201 
92 Emerson, ‘History’ (1841), CW.II., 5 
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alone. As Emerson writes, ‘We quote not only books and proverbs, but arts, sciences, religion, customs 
and laws; nay, we quote temples and houses, tables and chairs.’93  
Considering Emerson’s complex reflections on appropriation, it is notable how Emerson himself 
is often subject to appropriation and critical redirection. Look to Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, who 
famously cites Emerson’s ‘Circles’ (without proper accreditation) in his essay ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
(1873) alongside an array of canonical sources (Oliver Cromwell, Michel de Montaigne, Diogenes, and 
others). The appropriative habit in Nietzsche’s work is indicative of his conceptualist understanding of 
every author as the beneficiary ‘of the long and sweeping tide of intellectual history.’94 However, it 
constitutes more than simply a critical deviation from the practice of citation as an informational or 
evidential support for an argument. Nietzsche is quilting these authors into something new; into a new 
fabric of images and ideas entirely distanced from the positioning and thinking of the works he draws upon, 
and Nietzsche’s quotation of Emerson in this context (or ‘the American,’ as he succinctly terms him) 
demands that we ask what a text does; what history does to a text; and what we can do to better merge the 
study of culture and the study of cultural contexts. It draws the concept of context to the fore and asks that 
we consider not how a text its created or authored but how its social circumstances disrupt its claims and 
arguments. ‘A new degree of culture would instantly revolutionize the entire system of human pursuits;’ 
Emerson writes in ‘Circles,’95 and as Nietzsche would ‘parrot’ in his reflections on Schopenhauer and frailty 
of institutional philosophy. 96 This new ‘culture,’ as Emerson seems envisage it, is contingent not on the 
creation of new works of literature; rather, it depends upon a consideration of our ‘use of literature,’ our 
 
93 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 178-179 
94 David LaRocca, ‘Emerson Recomposed: Nietzsche’s Uses of his American Soul-Brother,’ in (ed.) M.T. Conrad, Nietzsche 
and the Philosophers (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 227 
95 Emerson: ‘There are degrees in idealism. We learn first to play with it academically, as the magnet was once a toy. Then 
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he is in me; and that all things are shadows of him. The idealism of Berkeley is only a crude statement of the idealism of 
Jesus, and that again is a crude statement of the fact that all nature is the rapid efflux of goodness executing and organizing 
itself. Much more obviously is history and the state of the world at any one time directly dependent on the intellectual 
classification then existing in the minds of men. The things which are dear to men at this hour are so on account of the ideas 
which have emerged on their mental horizon, and which cause the present order of things, as a tree bears its apples. A new 
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96 Friedrich Nietzsche, (tr.) R.J. Hollingdale, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator,’ in (ed.) D. Breazeale, Untimely Mediations (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 193-194 
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‘use of books.’  
As the self-designated judge of ‘so-called culture,’ Nietzsche suggests that the critic or philosopher 
‘supervises’ culture from ‘a dignified distance,’ where they should be working towards an ‘amalgamating’ 
of the disparate spheres of human knowledge.97 This is also Emerson’s instruction, as David LaRocca 
notes. For LaRocca, Emerson’s interest in classifying appropriation as an ‘art’ emphasizes the critical 
authority of context. It tasks us with individually identifying ‘what is not there in the [original] text,’ ‘what 
is beyond the text,’ and consider the forms of critical and creative opportunism afforded by the ways in 
which historic and sociocultural development may revitalize and transform the initial meaning of a text 
and its original terms of argument. LaRocca proposes that Emerson’s allusion to Goethe’s ‘art of 
appropriation’ engenders such an argument.98 Appropriation is thus emphatically an ‘art’ to Emerson’s 
mind—‘a radical and creative amendment and enriching’ of extant literary culture, and not an outright 
theft—and LaRocca provocatively suggests that Emerson’s engagement with appropriation is enough for 
us to reconsider his ‘heraldic’ status for our present times.99 Perhaps Emerson is our ‘patron saint for the 
creative commons,’ to again recall LaRocca’s remark and consider the contemporaneity of Emerson’s 
thinking in conceptual terms.100  
The interest in the practice of decontextualizing, appropriating and re-using literary work in 
Emerson’s writings is sufficient enough to support LaRocca’s assertion. And perhaps the greatest, practical 
example of this ‘art of appropriation’ in Emerson’s corpus is his late collection Parnassus (1876). A 
tendentiously titled late anthology of aphorisms, allusions, citations and poems that Emerson developed 
through his journals and notebooks over the course of a fifty-two-year period (the earliest entry dated is 
1822; the last, 1874).101  
 
97 Ibid., 194 
98 LaRocca, ‘Emerson Recomposed,’ 227 
99 Ibid., 223 
100 Ibid.  
101 See Ralph Waldo Emerson, (ed.) E. Emerson, Parnassus (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1874); see also the entry 
on ‘The Parnassus Plays,’ in The Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XX. (1911): ‘PARNASSUS PLAYS, a series of three scholastic 
entertainments performed at St John’s College, Cambridge, between 1597 and 1603. They are satirical in character and aim 
at setting forth the wretched state of scholars and the small respect paid to learning by the world at large, as exemplified in 
the adventures of two university men, Philomusus and Studioso. […] The three pieces have but small literary and dramatic 
value, their importance consisting almost wholly in the allusions to, and criticisms of contemporary literature. Nikhil 
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Parnassus could be classified as an anthology, but it is also—and more interestingly—the single 
longest book published under Emerson’s name in his lifetime that would itself take the lion’s share of his 
lifetime to complete. It details the relationship with citation, appropriation, ownership and influence that 
Emerson elsewhere displays through a continuous and dedicated use of quotations, appropriations and 
aphorisms. Parnassus, which clocks in at over five hundred pages, features almost seven hundred distinct 
poetic fragments and works from almost two hundred poets. It ‘exhibits the most extensive range of quoted 
source materials in any of [Emerson’s] works.’102 As an anthology, theoretically and critically speaking, it 
foregrounds the more progressive qualities of Emerson’s authorship and conceptualist engagement with 
reading and interpretation, but it is of vital significance that it percolates across the entirety of Emerson’s 
career. Emerson confides his rationale for Parnassus to his journal (in an undated entry in a journal kept 
between 1870 and 1873). ‘One reason for Parnassus,’ he notes, ‘is that I wish a volume on my own table 
that […] shall have nothing but poetry.’103 However, and as Nikhil Bilkawesh writes, ‘the very difficulty in 
authorizing such a text makes us attend to the role citation and quotation [stakes] in Emerson’s work.’ It 
provokes ‘larger proprietary questions of nineteenth-century authorship,’ ‘twentieth-century discourse of 
the death and rebirth of the author,’ and pre-empts anxieties that would abound in twenty-first century 
culture; ‘in [our] current age when digital dissemination threatens copyright value and challenges writers 
to reconfigure [their] conceptions of creative composition in formally innovative works.’104 Emerson 
himself seems to have been aware of the theoretical significance of Parnassus as a publication and as a 
reflection of a praxis he had long been cultivating.  
Writing in preface to its 1874 first publication, Emerson notes: ‘This volume took its origin from 
an old habit of copying any poem or line that interested me into a blank book. In many years, my selections 
filled the volume, and required another; and still the convenience of commanding all my favorites in one 
album, instead of searching my own and other libraries for a desired song or verse, and the belief that what 
 
Bilwakesh infers that Emerson’s aims and intentions were broadly similar in scope through comparing Emerson’s efforts to 
subsequent anthologies of verse and national literature. See Nikhil Bilwakesh, ‘Emerson’s Decomposition: Parnassus,’ 
Nineteenth-Century Literature, 67.4. (2013), 520-545 
102 Bilwakesh, ‘Emerson’s Decomposition: Parnassus,’ 521 
103 Emerson, ‘Journal ST’ (Undated, 1870-1873), JMN.XVI., 224 
104 Ibid. 
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charmed me probably might charm others, suggested the printing of my enlarged selection.’105 In terms of 
the bibliographic extent of the ‘enlarged’ miscellany of texts that feature in Parnassus, Bilkawesh 
summarizes the range of Emerson’s curatorial eye as follows: 
 
Shakespeare is, by far, the most represented poet, with eighty-eight pieces, 
including nine sonnets. William Wordsworth, Geoffrey Chaucer, Byron, and 
Walter Scott are also heavily represented. The selection of prominent 
Americans includes Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, William Cullen Bryant, 
and Ellery Channing, but no Americans from before the nineteenth century, 
nor Edgar Allan Poe, Walt Whitman, or Emerson himself. Poems from lesser-
known poets like Forceythe Wilson, Felicia Hemans, Emerson’s brother, 
Edward Bliss Emerson, and from writers not necessarily known for their 
poetry—John Quincy Adams, Henry David Thoreau, J. J. Garth 
Wilkinson—are also included. A second edition (1875) added Percy Bysshe 
Shelley among others, and reprints in 1876, 1878, 1880, 1881, 1882, and 1884 
demonstrate the book’s popularity.106 
 
The publication of Parnassus, going by Emerson’s preface to the first edition, could be easily dismissed as 
an egotistical endeavour facilitated by his long-life on the public stage and his celebrity status.107 Despite 
the possible desire to capitalize on this, Emerson’s ‘old habit’ of copyism provides a theoretical framework 
that demands further investigation. As Ronald Bosco notes, ‘Parnassus is a practical example of a poetic 
theory’ expressed in Emerson’s later lectures and essays that raises important questions ‘about inter-
textuality and textual integrity.’108 However, I would argue that we can track the foundations of Emerson’s 
interest in intertext back to the very beginnings of his career. 
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Parnassus to a revision of Emerson’s later works, also provides a useful manuscript study; exploring the ways in which 
Emerson would prepare the final manuscript. Bosco concentrated on Emerson’s notebooks: ‘Parnassus Scraps, a now 
mutilated 32-page notebook which bears early dates (17 February-4 July 1824), and contains two minimal entries relating to 
Parnassus and [another], subtitled Theory of Poetry: a 291-page notebook which dates from the late-1860s to the early-1870s 
and contains transcriptions of many poems for Parnassus as well as of material incorporated into the late essay ‘Poetry and 
Imagination,’ 262-264 
108 Ibid., 259-260 
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For example, although Emerson would decry our need to ‘parrot of other men’s thinking’ in ‘The 
American Scholar’, ‘The American Scholar’ is itself emblematic of conceptual appropriation in Emerson’s 
early writings. Although unmentioned in Emerson’s private or public works of his early period—and 
entirely unregistered by Emerson’s critics—his ‘American Scholar’ is narrowly preceded by an address of 
that same title delivered by Gulian C. Verplanck the previous year. Emerson would deliver his ‘American 
Scholar’ to Phi Beta Kappa Society at Cambridge, Massachusetts, on August 31st, 1837; Verplanck would 
narrowly antedate him with his own ruminations on the socio-cultural responsibilities and implications of 
critical work in an address titled ‘The Advantages and Dangers of the American Scholar,’ for the 
proceedings of the Annual commencement of Union College on July 26th, 1836.109 Beyond their shared 
title, the comparability between Verplanck and Emerson is particularly noteworthy and demands further 
analysis. 
A prominent attorney and public figure with ties to America’s developing financial culture, 
Verplanck’s work demonstrates the importance that an independent literary culture would play in securing 
and stabilizing America’s successes as an independent economic nation. In Verplanck’s 1831 oration ‘The 
Laws of Literary Property,’ he discusses the vital and hegemonic role of literature in the evolutionary 
development of America’s constitutional basis. However, rather than elucidating an acculturation and 
education of a general public through the exchange of cultural works, Verplanck was more interested in 
the legal mores surrounding the question of their ownership. Verplanck sought to develop a philosophical 
sense of the legal and existential rights of an author; a suite of rights that he saw as ultimately superseding 
the more ephemeral claims to a work of literature that a reader could possibly stake. Referring to the 
establishment of a gamut of copyright laws in the early nineteenth century as assuring the ‘security’ of an 
‘American’ cultural legacy—and reflecting on James Madison’s successes in proposing such legislation—
Verplanck sees such an ‘act of great and useful public policy’ as ‘an early and favourite object of the [the] 
 
109 Gulian C. Verplanck, The Advantages and Dangers of the American Scholar (New York, NY: Wiley and Long, 1836) 
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constitution and the fathers of [America’s] civil liberties.’ For Verplanck, the ‘creativity’ incarnate to 
literary work pertains wholly to the concretisation of national and cultural order:110 
 
In the convention which framed the present constitution of the United States 
of America, resolutions and amendments to the same effect were brought 
forward from different quarters; and when the section giving Congress this 
power was reported in the form it now bears, it appears to have been adopted 
unanimously. These venerable and great men judged well and wisely. They 
knew that the best security of national union and national power was to be 
sought in the influence of national literature, science, arts, and education. 
They saw clearly that their own legislation, and that of those who were 
destined to administer the government they had reared, would be but feeble 
and temporary without the aid of that more potent and far more lasting, 
though secret and silent legislation which acts on the mind and the affections. 
They were deeply read in the history of the past, and all history that had taught 
them the truth. Philosophy and poetry repeated this impressive lesson.111 
 
The lesson of ‘philosophy and poetry’ is that which underlines the significance of literary culture to the 
‘national union’ and in turn, ‘national power’ depends upon a ‘national literature, science, arts and 
education.’ Verplanck would himself versify these ideas in an unattributed appropriation: 
 
Lycurgus fashioned Sparta’s fame,  
And Cæsar gave the Roman name universal sway. 
Where are they? Homer’s reverend page, 
Holds empire to the latest age,  
And tongues and climes obey.112     
 
A verse lifted from Mark Arkenside’s anthology The Pleasures of the Imagination (1819), the importance of 
literature to the political extension of America’s cultural ambitions is unambiguously indicated by 
 
110 Gulian C. Verplanck, ‘The Law of Literary Property’ (1831) in Discourses and Addresses on Subjects of American History, Arts 
and Literature (New York: J. & J. Harper, 1833), 220 
111 Ibid., 220-221 
112 Ibid., 221 
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Verplanck’s reference to the ‘reverend page.’113  
Considering the viability of a national literary aesthetic, Verplanck sees an American literary 
culture as a diagnostic tool for the economic health of the country. As would Emerson, he notes the absence 
of the equivalent of an ‘American Homer,’ and like Emerson’s allusions regarding the social significance 
of literature, Verplanck desires culture to be on a par with other legislative models of governance.114 He 
acknowledges the need for a ‘silent legislation’—a mirroring of Emerson’s later insistence of the importance 
of beauty as a form of ‘legislature,’ one in which the ‘market’ is a ‘silent gallery’ poised for a ‘silent 
revolution.’115 But the locus of Verplanck’s argument, however, refers us more directly back to the 
nationalist nuances of Emerson’s ‘Quotation and Originality.’ Once again, American culture must move 
away from the weight of its European inheritance and assert its own identity. ‘It be the rare lot of countries 
and of ages far apart to produce genius [as] peerless as that of Homer,’ Verplanck notes:  
 
Yet our patriots saw that in our state of society the absence of such glory, 
should that haply be the destiny of our country—we trust far otherwise—
would be more than supplied in aggregate effect by the number of powerful 
and cultivated minds, their activity, intensity, and constancy of action, 
through every channel of education or instruction, of mental gratification, and 
amusement. These are causes which, (to use the expressive phrase of an 
excellent and highly-gifted countryman of ours, who, if he had not been 
impelled by his genius to aspire at being the Raphael of his native land, might 
have been its Tasso (I mean Washington Allston,) these are causes and 
influences “which mould a nation’s soul.”116  
 
It is an evocative accident (but an accident nonetheless) that Allston reappears in this context. Here, 
Verplanck depicts the reactionary qualities of America’s early literary output; the need for an American 
 
113 From Mark Arkenside’s ‘Ode VII., On the Use of Poetry’ in The Pleasures of the Imagination, and Other Poems (New York: 
R. & W.A. Bartow, 1819), 109., cited by Verplanck, ‘The Laws of Literary Property,’ 224 
114 The editors of the 1904 Riverside edition of Emerson’s Complete Works note that—answering to the large number of 
references to Homer as a character in Emerson’s essays—’Homer stood for Greece’ and argue Emerson was constantly on 
the hunt for an American equivalent. See ‘Plato, or the Philosopher’ (1850), CW.IV., n.1, 87 
115 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 87 
116 Verplanck, ‘The Laws of Literary Property,’ 225 
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‘Raphael’ or ‘Tasso’ suggests a receptivity to European cultural influence, but also a need for a creative and 
contextual critical process able to adapt these cultural terms to an American context. Emerson also states 
such an idea in ‘Quotation and Originality,’ wherein he cites not only the importance of Tasso’s works 
alone, but the critical inferences that abound in a generalized reading of Tasso—‘Read Tasso, and you 
think of Virgil; read Virgil, and you think of Homer.’117 But as Emerson admits the narrow appeal of this 
chain of referents, Verplanck and Emerson’s thinking play out as a call and response. ‘The originals are 
not original,’ Emerson writes, ‘There is imitation, model and suggestion, to the very archangels, if we knew 
their history. The first book tyrannizes over the second […] [it] forces you to reflect how narrow are the 
limits of human invention.’118  
The comparability between Verplanck and Emerson is further substantiated when we turn our 
attention to Verplanck’s subsequent addresses of the 1830s. Verplanck’s ‘The Advantages and Dangers of 
the American Scholar’ continues some of the ideas established in ‘The Laws of Literary Property’ by 
comparing intellectual property and deed to land. As Manuel Shvartzberg Carrió has argued, the working 
out of contract and land acquisition inspired America’s early literary culture. As a form of power both 
paper-based and immaterial, the metaphor of the contract was crucial on multiple levels. It could disrupt 
any popular consensus as per the mythic understanding of land and ownership, question the Jeffersonian 
agricultural imperative behind America’s industrial future, and function as a form of critical (or cultural) 
transaction; not to mention interrogate the dominant, symbolic (and political) ideation of the frontier in 
antebellum society. Commenting on the development of this contract culture, Carrió remarks on a key shift 
in public perception with regards to the ways in which the abstraction of value through sales aided in the 
understanding of individualism:119 ‘Land was becoming less and less important for how it could sustain a 
particular community and more important for how it could produce value for an anonymous market—
either agriculturally or in itself as a universalized territorial commodity that could be sold in the land market 
 
117 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 180 
118 Ibid. 
119 Manuel Shvartzberg Carrió, ‘Contracts’ in (eds.) Reinhold Martin, Jacob Moore, Susanne Schindler, The Art of Inequality: 
Architecture, Housing and Real Estate (New York: Columbia University Press; The Temple Hoyne Buell Center for the Study 
of American Architecture, 2015), 134-148 
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[to the benefit of the private individual].’120  
Carrió continues to allege that this transference of symbolic power from the product itself to the 
point of purchase ‘made land abstract in the sense of being understood (or represented) as equal to other 
lands which were comparable to it only by reference to an external figure, the price of a unit area, in a 
universal sphere, the market.’ Thus, the capacity of an individual to own and work land—in other words 
manipulating its public value through private effort—could encourage a culture of competition dependent 
upon the privileging of private labour.121 For Carrio, the pressures of this kind of abstraction in labour terms 
lead to a kind of ‘revolution’ in which the ‘radical subjectivism of contracts between private individuals, 
understood as the simple expression of a meeting of minds,’ facilitated the ascendancy of a merchant class. 
‘Legal conflicts could therefore now be determined by reference to the inherent laws of this new realm, a 
rational-universal market, in which the individual speculator was king,’ he writes.122 As Morton J. Horwitz 
has suggested, this had an acute impact on the symbolic qualities of ‘land’ in the popular American psyche. 
No longer anchored in an abstract view of necessity but rather in an idea of exchange between parties, a 
right to the acquisition of land (rather than land itself) became key. Land was rendered an indifferent article 
relative to the more subjective terms of the marketplace; and ‘If value is subjective […] the function of 
exchange is to maximise the […] incommensurable desires of individuals.’123  
 In Verplanck’s ‘American Scholar,’ land and territory are also at the heart of an identification of 
labour as a facilitator for individualism. He notes that America’s ‘immense extent of fertile territory’ has 
opened up ‘an inexhaustible field for successful enterprise, assuring to industry a certain reward for its 
labors,’ and assuring that ‘land’ metaphorically denotes ‘a magnificent [political] system.’124 That a capacity 
to work, till, buy and build upon the land serves as a symbol for the interrelation of ‘political system, […] 
popular feeling and public opinion’—and the supposed availability of land and resource parallels the 
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‘unconstrained freedoms of opinion, of speech, [and] of the press.’125 As with Emerson, Verplanck alleges 
that this intellectual freedom is only attainable if the ‘American citizen’ will turn on themselves with an 
‘attentive eye,’ ‘turn [their] contemplation inward upon [themselves], examine [their] own breast and life, 
and readily perceive how external causes control his fortunes.’126 The similarities of these ideas to the 
instruction that Emerson gives to Fuller and Woodbury is noteworthy, and Verplanck and Emerson’s 
shared interest in inward contemplation gives their work and theoretical stance a commonality that is more 
than incidental. The proximity of Verplanck and Emerson’s lectures both in terms of their history and 
conceptual content has caused Verplanck’s biographers to directly allude to the possibility of Emerson 
having plagiarised Verplanck. Given the narrowness of Verplanck’s audience and the absence of any 
palpable acknowledgement of his critical works (compared to Emerson’s status) it would appear as if 
Emerson’s appropriation of Verplanck was successful in this regard.   
Newfield argues that Emerson’s interest in citation as detailed in ‘Quotation and Originality’ ‘is 
rooted in private property,’ not sociality, despite the fact that exchange is a fundamental part of the social 
sphere. ‘Quotation is of course a borrowing, but it requires no return’ he notes; and Emerson’s interest 
appears to be in our capacity to assimilate and appropriate material so as to assert ownership of an object 
or idea.127 Emerson refers to this critical process as a form of ‘vamping’ in ‘Quotation and Originality,’ a 
way to follow the ‘slow growth’ of an image as it shifts between cultural contexts: 
In romantic literature examples of this vamping abound. The fine verse in the old 
Scotch  ballad of The Drowned Lovers—   
Thou art roaring ower loud, Clyde water, 
Thy streams are ower strang; 
Make me thy wrack when I come back, 
 
125 Ibid. Writing in the wake of the discovery of the ‘new world,’ and looking to unpack something of the complexities of his 
Biblical allusions, Locke would employ America as an explicatory tool; explicitly citing the ‘vacant places,’ ‘wild woods’ 
and ‘uncultivated wastes of America’ as an opportunity for a philosophical conceptualization of ‘tillage or husbandry’ sa a 
means of conceptualizing intellectual and political freedoms at both a local and national level. See Barbara Arneil, 
‘Colonialism: Economic and Ethical Debates,’ John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 110; and John Locke, ‘Of Civil Government,’ Two Treatise of Government (London: C. and J. 
Rivington; et al, 1824), 151-152 
126 Verplanck, The Advantages and Disadvantages of the American Scholar, 6-7 
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But spare me when I gang— 
 
…is a translation of Martial’s epigram on Hero and Leander, where the prayer 
of Leander is the same: — 
 
Parcite dum propero, mergite dum redeo. 
 
Hafiz furnished Burns with the song of John Barleycorn, and furnished Moore 
with the original of the piece, — 
 
When in death I shall calm recline, 
Oh, bear my heart to my mistress dear, etc.128 
  
Emerson’s reference to the Roman poet Martial in this context is particularly evocative. The first classical 
poet to use the term plagiarius to refer to literary theft (the term etymologically denotes a “kidnapping,” an 
illegal or improper enslavement), Martial’s innovative relationship with the concept of plagiarism goes far 
beyond his simply coining the term: he distinctly and uniquely treats plagiarism as a poetic process.129  
Plagiarism, after Martial, terminologically engenders a reflexive discourse on the nature of poetry 
and its materiality, as evidenced in the fact that Martial would complain of somebody stealing his verses 
only to then dispute whether such a theft was possible considering the immateriality of an idea. Introduced 
into English in 1601 as a means to classify an intellectual ‘theft’ by dramatist Ben Jonson, the word 
plagiarism also signals the ways in which the materiality of a literary object renders an idea a commercial 
 
128 Ibid., 186 
129 See Gideon Nisbet, whose own translations of Martial are used to great effect in his essay ‘Martial’s Poetics of Plagiarism’: 
nostris uersibus esse te poetam, / Fidentine, putas cupisque credi? / sic dentata sibi uidetur / Aegle emptis ossibus Indicoque cornu; / sic, 
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she has teeth, because she’s bought ones made of bone and Indian ivory; and Lycoris, who’s blacker than a windfall mulberry, loves how 
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‘Martial’s Poetics of Plagiarism,’ The American Journal of Philology, 141.1. (2019), 55-81. For the supposed first use of the term 
in Martial’s work, see Martial, (tr.) Gideon Nisbet: ‘In my little books, Fidentinus, there’s just one page that’s your own—
but one that’s branded with the unmistakeable style of its master, which exposes your poems to public disgrace as blatant 
plagiarism. A Lingonian kaftan hung alongside double-dyed city purples dirties them with its greasy tufts—just like this; if a 
black raven promenades along the banks of the Cayster amidst Leda’s swans it attracts mockery—just like this; when a sacred 
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lullabies—just like this. My books have no need of an informer or judge: your own page takes the stand and tells you, ‘You’re 
a thief.’ I.53., Epigrams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 19 
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entity; written down, a thought becomes a circulatory and sellable property and can thus be bought, sold, 
and stolen (recall the previous allusion to Emerson’s interest in the ‘sung’ and ‘unsung’ elements of 
American society previously mentioned in Chapter ii.i).130  
As J. Mira Seo notes, Martial’s project was to provide a distinction between ‘the tangible book and 
the incorporeal song’ as cultural modes, and in so doing propose stark contrast between ‘the trendy 
notoriety of the present’ (the ‘tangible’ book) and ‘the eternal glory of the future’ (the immaterial song).131 
His question, responding to this categorical distinction of forms, was a simple one. ‘If poetry can be stolen, 
is it an object?’ If that object is stolen, can it serve any purpose beyond a self-interested act of attainment?132 
Could this object ever accrue the kind of cultural value that a song is traditionally afforded?133 Martial’s 
legacy, according to Luke Roman, was thus to confront the economic fiction of literary patronage and the 
origins of the publishing house by considering literature in terms of its ‘utility, discardability […] and 
immediate social usages.’ The result is a concentrated ‘commodification of poetry’ that, instead of 
foregrounding the detail or meaning of a specific poem, portrays culture as a kind of an ‘economy,’ 
governed by processes of ‘transaction,’ that—drawing attention to the transference of an idea or image 
between reader and writer; and framing the popularity of an idea or image as an attribute of its author—
supplants the commonality of oral traditions with a mercantile atmosphere of competition.134  
As Newfield notes, and as we have seen throughout this thesis, Emerson was alert to the theoretical 
grounds of such a process of valorisation. However, and this is a crucial distinction, Emerson’s interest in 
appropriation denotes a receptivity to the ways in which ‘exchange value’ is constituted by relations among 
various entities rather than by reference to the essence of literature as a singular commodified object. If we 
return to the ‘force of two in literature’, explained by Emerson as a ‘transaction’ of mutual benefit: 
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The capitalist of either kind is as hungry to lend as the consumer to borrow; 
and the transaction no more indicates intellectual turpitude in the borrower 
than the simple fact of debt involves bankruptcy. On the contrary, in far the 
greater number of cases the transaction is honorable to both. Can we not help 
ourselves as discreetly by the force of two in literature? Certainly it only needs 
two well placed and well-tempered for coöperation, to get somewhat far 
transcending any private enterprise! Shall we converse as spies? Our very 
abstaining to repeat and credit the fine remark of our friend is thievish. Each 
man of thought is surrounded by wiser men than he, if they cannot write as 
well. Cannot he and they combine?  
 
Newfield defines Emerson’s thinking here as follows: ‘Once on the market, texts commodities or 
individuals are defined through transaction rather than self-possession, through others rather through inner-
being, and through change rather than through absolutes.’135 Emerson, he argues, was transfixed by the 
ways in which value was fluid; in constant ‘flux,’ as Emerson puts it in ‘Quotation and Originality.’ In this 
way, Emerson’s ‘transaction’ echoes more widely accepted definitions of the ‘market’ as a system built of 
critical negotiation. Barbara Herrnstein Smith describes the idea as follows: 
 
The market does not characteristically operate as the site of desecration but, 
rather, as the arena for the negotiation, transformation and redistribution of 
value, including social-symbolic cultural value; and the traditionally despised 
trader, banker and merchant (‘panderer, ‘usurer,’ ‘shopkeeper’) are seen, 
accordingly, as the most visible mediators of change as well as the most 
obvious profiteers of exchange.136  
 
Smith’s model of ‘social-symbolic value’ brings us back full circle to the very beginnings of this thesis in 
which Emerson’s onus on critical sensibility equates to an analysis of the ‘profit’ of critical exchange.137 As 
noted, Emerson’s characterization of critical activity depends upon a fiscal symbolism. The ‘profit’ of 
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critical enterprise;138 that our ‘debts and credits […] are the very best basis of poetry;139 that we ought ‘credit 
literature with more than the bear word it gives us.’140 These fiscal terms do more, then, than simply provide 
a distinct atmosphere for Emerson’s remarks on criticism, they reflect once again a career-long conviction 
that the mechanisms and mannerisms of market economics are key to Emerson’s established theory of 
critical or ‘original relation.’ Emerson sees the reader as a ‘mediator of change,’ it is the reader’s ‘sensibility’ 
and the profit of exchange that evolves into the theory of ‘OTHERISM’, and in more practical terms the type 
of acts of appropriation seen in Emerson and Verplanck. Once again, literary exchange is read as a form of 
marketplace. 
 Such claims demand that we return to Cornel West, and his exploration of the ways in which 
Emerson and Marx intersect. As previously noted, West supposes that Marx’s identification of ‘prevailing 
structures’ acts as a precursor to the development of class consciousness and revolution. Emerson, 
conversely, is too preoccupied with personality, subjectivity, and ‘sensibility’ for his work to move beyond 
the domain of a literary culture. Nonetheless, Emerson’s interest is ‘revolution’ is a constant across his 
works. I’ve previously cited Emerson’s call for a ‘revolution in relation’ in ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841); ‘a 
revolution of opinion and practice,’ in ‘Domestic Life’ (1870) and, as Emerson writes in History (1841): 
‘Every revolution was first a thought in one man’s mind, and when the same thought occurs to another 
man, it is the key to that era.’ These characterizations of ‘revolution’ are all accompanied by close analyses 
of the transmission and dissemination of ideas, images, and information—specifically the ways in which a 
‘revolution’ is not written but read into being. As noted in relation to Emerson, reading antedates action 
allowing for interpretation and the absorption of writing as a form of private property before being made 
public again to influence the thought and action of an ‘other.’ These ideas coalesce in what Emerson would 
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term a theory of ‘silent revolution.’ In his address on the passing of ‘The Fugitive Slave Law’ (1854), 
Emerson first uses this phrase to detail the socio-political significance of a ‘reading class’ to legislative 
change in America: 
 
For who are the readers and thinkers of 1854? Owing to the silent revolution 
which the newspaper has wrought, this class has come in this country to take 
in all classes. Look into the morning trains which, from every suburb, carry 
the businessmen into the city to their shops, counting-rooms, work-yards and 
warehouses. With them enters the car—the newsboy, that humble priest of 
politics, finance, philosophy, and religion. He unfolds his magical sheets, —
two pence a head his bread of knowledge costs […].141 
 
Emerson’s ‘silent revolution’ is a provocative means with which to consider and characterize the kind of 
political power he believed the written word should be afforded, and the revolutionary potential carried by 
the act of reading these ‘magical sheets.’ However, if we consider a textual history of the term ‘silent 
revolution’ we are not only privy to another instance of appropriation in Emerson’s writings—an evocative 
retooling of work pertaining to a young Karl Marx—but also a concrete example of the process that 
Emerson describes in ‘Nominalist and Realist.’ His instruction that we need ‘melt down’ the works of 
others ‘into an image or epithet for daily use.’  
In ‘Journal GO,’ a private notebook kept from 1852 to 1853, Emerson quotes a line from an article 
Marx had published in his capacity as European correspondent for the New York Tribune on 22 March 1853, 
‘Forced Emigration.’142 The line in Emerson’s notebook is sub-headed ‘FATE,’ and runs ‘The classes and 
the races too weak to master the new conditions of life must give way’ attributed to ‘Cor[respondent] of 
the Tribune, Karl Max [sic]’ (see Fig. I).143 It is the only time in his oeuvre that Emerson directly quotes his 
contemporary Marx, Marx to my knowledge, never read Emerson at all.  
 
141 Emerson, ‘The Fugitive Slave Law’ (1854), CW.XI., 218 
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While the existence of this quotation is relatively well-known, only one critic has ever given it close 
attention. A brief ‘Memoranda and Documents’ essay of 1960, by Lewis S. Feuer, concludes that any 
further critical attention to Emerson’s manifestly ignorant quotation of “Karl Max” is not warranted.144 As 
Feuer writes, ‘[how] widely read and how influential were the numerous articles which Marx published in 
the New York Daily Tribune from 1851 to 1862?’ and thus leading him to question whether ‘Emerson’s 
absorption of a strain of Marx’s philosophy more than a solitary instance?’ These questions have never 
received further attention, and beyond the occasional mention, the evocative reference to Marx in 
Emerson’s private ledger is rarely treated as of any significant consequence.  
In part, this is due to the question of Marx’s development as political and economic thinker than 
any question of Emerson’s textual habits or relationship with appropriation. Of course, given the 
chronology of both Emerson and Marx (they were essentially direct contemporaries: Emerson, 1803-1882; 
Marx, 1818-1883), the Marx (née Max) that Emerson borrows from is not the totemic Marx so dominant 
to contemporary thought. However, this critical cameo is not a ‘solitary instance’ of Marx’s appearance in 
Emerson’s works, and it is not insignificant that this citation substantiates another instance of unattributed 
appropriation in Emerson’s work.  The article in question would likely have gone unnoticed had Marx not 
gone on to commit the work to paper that he did.  
As discussed, Emerson composed through a process of medial re-transcription. He copied journal 
passages into notebooks, notebook passages into journals; later, both these resources were mined for 
passages which were composited into lecture manuscripts; and those manuscripts were recomposited with 
further journal and notebook passages in the composition of work for publication. Marx’s words were 
subjected to precisely this treatment. Emerson transcribes the line into another journal sometime between 
1856 and 1870, and then versifies it: 
 
THE bard and mystic held me for their own, 
I filled the dream of sad, poetic maids, 
 
144 Lewis S. Feuer, ‘Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Reference to Karl Marx,’ New England Quarterly, 33.3 (1960), 378-379. Feuer 
notes that this citation was initially falsely dated at 1852 by Emerson’s editors, E. W. Emerson and W. E. Forbes, in 1912; 
the location of Marx was subsequently reinstated by the editors of the subsequent Harvard University Press publication of 
Emerson’s Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks; see JMN.XIII., n. 229, 127 
 228 
I took the friendly noble by the hand, 
I was the trustee of the hand-cart man, 
The brother of the fisher, porter, swain, 
And these from the crowd’s edge well pleased beheld 
The service done to me as done to them. 
 
WITH the key of the secret he marches faster, 
From strength to strength, and for night brings day; 
While classes or tribes, too weak to master 
The flowing conditions of life, give way.145 
 
The issue of attribution is more codified by this stage; the indexical reference to ‘GO 292’ obscures the line 
of transmission by revealing only the medial step preceding this iteration and there is no reference to the 
text’s initial contexts (see Fig II). Thereafter, the versified version of Marx’s line is transcribed in Emerson’s 
poetry notebooks NP with indexical cross reference only to XO 68, and three more times in other notebooks 
without any cross reference at all.146 Finally, it was included along with a host of Emerson’s other 
unpublished poetic fragments under the heading ‘Fragments on Nature and Life’ by his literary executors—
his children Edward and Ellen Emerson working in partnership James Elliot Cabot—and published 
posthumously in volume nine of the Riverside Edition of Emerson’s Collected Works in 1883.147  
Whilst this second transmission of Marx’s work into Emerson’s poetry is recorded by the editors 
of the Harvard/Belknap publication of Emerson’s journals, its interest and resonance remains largely 
academic.148 For example, we turn to the Library of America publication of Emerson’s Poems and 
Translations (published in 1994, and edited by Harold Bloom and Paul Kane), and there is no accompanying 
 
145 Emerson, ‘Fragments on Nature and Life’ (Undated), CW.IX, 357 
146 Emerson, in (eds.) R.H. Orth, A.J. Von Frank, L. Allardt, D.W. Hill, The Poetry Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson 
(Columbia, MO: The University of Missouri Press, 1986), 500; 395; 593; 597 
147 Emerson, ‘Fragments on Nature and Life,’ (Undated), CW.IX., 335-358 
148 This second use of material from ‘Forced Emigration’ is cited by the editors of the Harvard edition of Emerson’s Journals, 
however attention is only given to its forward movement into ‘Fragments of Nature and Life’ without any attention given to 
the original source of the citation or its significance. See JMN.XIII., n. 229, 127 
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note to indicate the source of this verse in Emerson’s ‘Fragments,’ nor its origin as pertaining to Marx’s 
early journalism.149  
Although Feuer argues this instance of appropriation as of no consequence, Richardson suggests 
that our ability to locate Marx in Emerson’s writings remains suggestive in terms of Emerson’s own 
engagements with culture, capital, economy, industry and conceptualizations of labour. In The Mind on 
Fire (1995), Richardson argues that the article in question—Marx’s ‘Forced Emigration’—constitutes a 
realization of technology as a cultural power effectuating the experience and opportunity afforded the 
industrial proletariat. This idea recurs in Marx’s early writings,150 and—according to Richardson—is 
present in Emerson’s desire to consolidate his own philosophical position in the 1850s.151  
The ‘application of science to material production’ leads to a twofold, critical impasse in Marx’s 
‘Forced Emigration.’ New economic and industrial circumstances in the late mid- to late-nineteenth 
century had cultivated a ‘new situation’ in which increased productive power ‘led landlords and mill 
owners to limit population by way of the technologization of industrial processes’ as ‘anything more than 
a basic minimum workforce constituted a drain on profits.’152 Furthermore, Marx describes how workers—
concentrated in the large manufacturing cities—‘are unable to emigrate by themselves and unlikely to be 
helped by the middle class.’153 ‘Society is undergoing a silent revolution, which must be submitted to,’ Marx 
writes; ‘and which takes no more notice of the human existences it breaks down than an earthquake regards 
the houses it subverts. The classes and the races, too weak to master the new conditions of life, must give 
way. But can there be anything more puerile, more short-sighted, than the views of those Economists who 
believe in all earnest that this woeful transitory state means nothing but adapting society to the acquisitive 
propensities of capitalists, both landlords and money-lords?’154  
 
149 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Fragments on Nature and Life’ in (eds.) H. Bloom, P. Kane, Poems and Translations (New York, 
NY: Library of America, 1994), 425.; for notes on this sequence of Emerson’s ‘Fragments’ and their sources (and the notably 
absent reference to the New York Tribune), see 618 
150 In particular, see Karl Marx, (trans.) Martin Nicolaus, ‘The Chapter on Capital,’ Grundrisse (London: Penguin, 1993), 
690-712 
151 Richardson, ‘Fame,’ Emerson: The Mind on Fire, 508-509 
152 Ibid., 509 
153 Ibid.  
154 Marx, ‘Forced Emigration,’ 531 
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Richardson notes that Marx’s position in ‘Forced Emigration’ is conceptually appropriated by 
Emerson in ‘Wealth’ (a chapter in Emerson’s English Traits, 1856, and not the 1860 essay of the same title 
collected in Conduct of Life); an essay where Emerson’s sensitivity to the increasing difficulties posed by 
industrialization and urbanism is made manifest and where Emerson himself cites the difficult relationship 
between worker and industrial technologies and the possibility of emigration.155 In very Marxian terms, 
Emerson emphasizes the importance of the ‘spinning-jenny’ in England’s industrial revolution and the 
ensuing problematic social ramifications of industrialization:  
 
Hargreaves invented the spinning-jenny and died in a workhouse. Arkwright 
improved the invention, and the machine dispensed with the work of ninety-
nine men; that is, one spinner could do as much work as one hundred had 
done before. The loom was improved further. But the men would sometimes 
strike for wages and combine against their masters, and, about 1829-20, much 
fear was felt lest the trade would be drawn away by these interruptions to 
Belgium or the United States. Iron and steel are very obedient. Whether it 
were possible to make a spinner that would not rebel, nor mutter, nor scowl, 
nor strike for wages, nor emigrate?156 
 
Whilst ‘Wealth’ showcases his interest in industry and the individual worker, the interesting point is 
Emerson’s awareness of how these pressures traffic into all avenues of cultural production: ‘You shall find 
this sentiment, if not so frankly put, deeply implied in the novels and romances of the present century, and 
not only in these but in biographies, and in the votes of public assemblies, in the tone of preaching and in 
table-talk,’ he notes.157 But ‘The difference between Emerson and Marx,’ writes Richardson, is ‘not in their 
assessment of modern industrial conditions, not in their grasp of the dynamics of industrial production, 
 
155 Richardson, The Mind on Fire, n. viii, 648; Paul Gilmore also cites Emerson’s interest in a technologically facilitated ‘silent 
revolution’ as a basis for comparison between Emerson and Marx and Engel’s Communist Manifesto (1848). See ‘Mechanical 
Means,’ n. 19, 257. Emerson’s collection English Traits (1856), a scrutiny of England’s economic and industrial productivity, 
is a collection founded in the belief that ‘America would succeed England in moral leadership,’ but was self-conscious of 
America’s relative cultural ‘immaturity’ as troubling such an ambition. For an interesting account of the aims and authorship 
of English Traits, see Richard Bridgman, ‘From Greenough to Nowhere: Emerson’s English Traits,’ The New England Quarterly, 
59.4. (1986), 469-485 
156 Emerson, ‘English Traits’ (1856), CW.V., 158 
157 Ibid. 
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and not in their understanding of the alienation of the individual under the conditions of modern 
production but in the proposed remedy.’158  
Where Marx would seek out social change, Emerson stresses the importance of reflection on the 
role of industry, technology, culture and their potential for marketization, looking directly to culture’s 
capacity to accommodate or instrumentalize industrial and technological progress. In this sense, his 
perspective is significantly more hands off. He confesses that he is chiefly interested in the ‘what next?’ of 
cultural progress; in the ‘kind of curiosity which loves to see the human mill of ingenuity going, and cares 
little whether the product be an Identitäts-Philosophie or a spinning-jenny.’159  
The philosophical resonance of the rhetorical ‘what next?’ is of fundamental importance. It 
illuminates—amongst other things—how Emerson’s engagements with the technological developments of 
his era and the new forms cultural forms indentured by new technologies are not dissimilar to his interest 
in the railroad and factory as, above all, poetic motifs in the American landscape. Crucially, however, the 
process of the ‘what next?’ is still described by Emerson in Marxian terms as a ‘silent revolution.’  
The phrase ‘silent revolution’ can be regarded as important in Emerson’s works by virtue of its 
repetition, and the clarity of the term when sat in context. Although Emerson’s first allusion to ‘silent 
revolution’ is accompanied by the desire to better identify his audience—‘Who are the readers of 1854?’—
he elsewhere tools the term to consider the importance of technologization, economization and the 
intellectual outcomes of industrialization. In ‘Worship,’ an essay published in the collection Conduct of Life 
(1860), Emerson notes that a ‘faith in chemistry, in meat and wine, in wealth, in machinery, in the steam-
engine, galvanic battery, turbine-wheels, sewing-machines, and in public opinion, but not in divine causes’ 
has been shaken by a ‘A silent revolution’ that ‘has loosed the tension of the old religious sects,’ positioning 
a new form of intellectualism ‘in place of the gravity and permanence of those societies of opinion.’160 In 
 
158 Richardson, ‘Fame,’ Emerson: The Mind on Fire, 509 
159 Emerson, ‘Literary Intelligence’ (The Dial, January 1843) in (ed.) Ronald A. Bosco, The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson: Uncollected Prose Writings, Addresses, Essays and Reviews (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2013), 240 
160 Emerson, ‘Worship’ (1860), CW.VI., 208. For a particularly interesting analysis of the power structures addressed in 
Emerson’s Conduct of Life, see Michael Lopez, ‘The Conduct of Life: Emerson’s Anatomy of Power,’ in (ed.) J. Porte, The 
Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 243-266 
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‘The Progress of Culture’ (1875), he again uses the phrase to suggest that a ‘silent revolution’ has ‘impelled’ 
a new culture of self-determinacy in America’s self-governance, underpinning a ‘new kind of social science’ 
and effectuating conceptualizations of ‘labor; the coöperative societies; the insurance of life and limb; the 
free-trade league; the improved almshouses; the enlarged scale of charities to relieve local famine, or burned 
towns, or the suffering Greeks; the incipient series of international congresses.’ ‘All, one may say, are in a 
high degree revolutionary’ Emerson writes; ‘teaching nations the taking of government into their own 
hands, and superseding kings.’161  
Emerson’s interest in appropriation is thus not only a form of remaking or creative 
constructionism, but it also serves to elicit a picture of a market revolution in miniature. A ‘silent 
revolution’ underpinned by critical receptivity and interpretative agency. As has been argued, such thinking 
depends upon a circulation of ideas, the very circulation that Emerson systematizes and theorizes across 
his authorship. From the introduction of ‘OTHERISM’ in 1836 to the ‘art of appropriation’ in 1875, Emerson 
works to consider not only the theoretical possibility of culture’s dialectical progress, but furthermore, the 
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CONCLUSION —  
















A man of Napoleon’s stamp almost ceases to have a private speech & opinion. 
[…] Every line of Napoleon’s therefore deserves reading as it is the writing of 
France, & not of one individual. 
 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
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‘The measure of an artist’s originality, put into the simplest terms, is the extent to which his selective 
emphasis deviates from the conventional norm and establishes new standards of relevance,’ notes Arthur 
Koestler, 1964:  
 
All great innovations, which inaugurate a new era, movement, or school, 
consist in such sudden shifts of attention and displacements of emphasis onto 
some previously neglected aspect of experience, some blacked-out range of 
the existential spectrum. The decisive turning points in the history of every 
art-form are discoveries which show the characteristic features already 
discussed: they uncover what has always been there; they are ‘revolutionary,’ 
that is, destructive and constructive; they compel us to revalue our values and 
impose a new set of rules on the eternal game.2 
 
As I have discussed over the course of this thesis, Emerson’s investigation of the ‘mechanics of literature’ 
expresses a similar position; a desire to explore the ‘revolutionary’ aspect of cultural enterprise through the 
political, economic and creative pressures that ‘compel’ an artist to ‘revalue their values.’  
As with Koestler a century later, Emerson’s project sought to assess the malleability of ‘standards 
of relevance’ relative to various economic and industrial circumstances and, as this thesis has shown, a 
number of questions operate consistently from the beginning of Emerson’s trajectory as a writer and thinker 
that prove echoic of Koestler’s ‘measure of an artist’s originality.’ What ‘set of rules’ may best accompany 
the practice of critical engagement? More importantly, how does such a rubric reflect the transformative 
socioeconomic impetuses of their hour?  
Emerson examines such ideas through a thorough investigation of the act of reading, within the 
contexts of literary cultures more broadly, and Koestler’s ‘existential spectrum’ covers—in this respect—
the self-same desire to examine how critical agency can be genuinely ‘revolutionary,’ that is to say how 
critical agency can be ‘both constructive and destructive’ simultaneously. How the act of interpretation 
underpins the progress of a culture by disrupting, rearranging and diminishing the authority of the ‘dry 
 
2 Arthur Koestler, ‘The Act of Creation,’ The Act of Creation (London: Hutchinson, 1964), 334-335 
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bones’ of the past; how cultural work effects notions of being in ways both publicly and privately felt.3 
Concentrating on the ‘shifts in attention’ and ‘emphasis’ galvanized by cultures of invention and 
industrialization, Emerson’s engagement with the ways in which ideas circulate, both culturally and 
practically speaking—trafficking from the annals of private reflection through to the public domain—forms 
the very backbone of his philosophical program. Whether we term Emerson’s theoretical position 
‘OTHERISM;’ a theory of ‘COMMERCIAL VALUE;’ or a more general call to ‘learn the meaning of economy,’ 
the kinship he establishes as between the act of reading and cultures of commercialization can be traced 
across his writings. Culminating in his ‘art of appropriation,’ his assertion that the ‘force of two in literature’ 
parallels the ascent of ‘capitalist’ ideology and wider societal exchange mechanisms, Emerson’s sense that 
the marketplace serves as a key social structure for the movement and progress of intellectual and critical 
cultures is undeniable. As shown, he strove to identify the formation of a cultural economics in both 
practical and conceptual terms as a marketplace of meaning; a space wherein the correlation of various 
forms of commercial and critical value reflects the developing economic circuitry of America’s burgeoning 
antebellum economy.  
Responsive to financial crisis, industrialization and the percolation of a national literary culture, 
Emerson explored how literary engagement reflected, impacted and refracted the dominant economic ideas 
of his hour in a career-long study of ‘silent revolution,’ of processes of cultural and sociopolitical 
transformation. As we have seen, his investigation of the terms of this ‘revolution’ does not shy away from 
an expression of the radical potential of cultural engagement. Examining Emerson’s relationship with 
exchange, creativity and agency, these chapters have explored the ways in which Emerson argued for 
cultural progress as exegetically bound to America’s political and economic progress; how the work of one 
effects the concept of work for the many; how the work of a reader on a text can be conceived of as a 
metonym for the progress of America’s ‘market revolution,’ 1815 to 1850; how an ability to read and intuit 
the value of work is enhanced by the application of a critical eye to an analysis of our social milieu. The 
fact that Emerson—as discussed in the previous chapter—argues capitalism as a means of articulating the 
 
3 Emerson, ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 3 
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power and pertinence of his ‘force of two’ nonetheless demands that we review his interest in ‘revolution,’ 
and consider the ways in which Emerson endeavoured to enlighten and illuminate the ‘neglected aspect of  
experience,’ and ‘the blacked-out ranges’ of our ‘existential spectrum,’ to again borrow Koestler’s terms. 
Emerson’s third-hand appropriation of an aphorism from Napoleon—a phrase that gives this thesis its 
title—may provide some clues: ‘the market-place is the louvre of the common people.’4  
In this conclusion, I will briefly summarize Emerson’s position on critical exchange and social 
correlation in relation to his terminological use of ‘capitalism.’ According to Koestler: ‘The decisive turning 
points in the history of every art-form […] uncover what has always been there,’ an assertion that is key to 
Emerson’s interest in the symbolic powers of ‘second use,’ of interpretive agency and literary matter. By 
exploring the source of his Napoleonic citation in detail, we see once again how the idea of sociality, 
collectivism, and the role of art figures prominently throughout Emerson’s oeuvre, indicating—amongst 
other things—the diction of Emerson’s thinking between his early and later works.  
As discussed, the act and institution of scholarship is central to Emerson’s examination of 
American culture. In this respect, Emerson intuits—as many of the critics cited here have noted—how the 
institutionalization of critique fosters an economic system all of its own. In a manner again redolent of 
Koestler’s remarks on the ‘revolutionary’ properties of art, Emerson’s characterization of scholarly labour 
is underwritten by a ‘selecting principle’ and by an assessment of the effects of industrial and ideological 
‘invention’ on the arts and on creativity in general. In ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), for example, 
Emerson argues that ‘One must be an inventor to read well,’ that reading needs be addressed as a ‘creative 
exercise,’ and that—when ‘braced by labor and invention’—‘the page of whatever book we read becomes 
luminous with manifold allusion.’5 The work of ‘invention’ is the forging of critical connection for Emerson; 
the widening of an informational economy; the finessing of ‘allusion’ in order to develop a critical reaction 
and to better compose an argument, idea, or challenge. As we saw, in ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), 
Emerson returns to this idea in his twilight works only to clarify his thinking. Arguing that an original 
argument is facilitated only by our ‘borrowing’ from extant ideas, Emerson concentrates on the intersection 
 
4 Emerson, ‘Napoleon, or the Man of the World’ (1850), CW.IV., 240 
5 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 92 
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of his theories of creativity, ‘second use,’ and the importance of ‘invention.’ ‘Only an inventor knows how 
to borrow,’ he notes in the closing remarks to ‘Quotation and Originality;’ that is, ‘every man is or should 
be an inventor.’6 ‘We must not tamper with the organic motion of the soul,’ as it is ‘certain that thought 
has its own proper motion,’ that ‘the hints which flash from it, the words overheard at unawares by the free 
mind, are trustworthy and fertile when obeyed and not perverted to low and selfish account.’7  
Emerson’s theory of a ‘free mind,’ is—as we have seen—intrinsically connected to the cultural 
merits of free enterprise. His condemnation of the ‘low and selfish’ strata of critical thought is fundamental 
to his belief that theories of economy underpin conceptions of ‘social labor’ in an antebellum context. By 
tracing existing readings of Emerson’s perspectivism and apparent championing of individualism, we saw 
how Emerson’s theory of ‘subjectiveness’ (1840) was as much about the social implications of a public or 
published thought as the personal freedoms of critical ‘relation.’8 Looking at the institutional and technical 
‘mechanics’ of literary enterprise, Emerson consistently read the process of writing and reading as a form 
of social work; an innovative form of ‘laborious’ thought both social in character and socially minded in 
its ambitions.9 ‘I embrace the common,’ Emerson famously writes in ‘The American Scholar.’ ‘I explore 
and sit at the feet of the familiar;’ that is to say, he works to facilitate a cultural commons; a common 
ground for critical conversation in which ‘the philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life, are 
the topics of the time.’10 We ‘borrow’ from this commons to better explore ‘the meaning of household life,’ 
Emerson writes, or  (and as importantly), ‘the meaning of economy.’ For Emerson, distancing himself from 
the cultural institutions of his hour becomes a truly revolutionary way to both define and delimit their 
power. Be it the university, organized religion, federal government, or the rigidity of a cultural canon, 
Emerson would reject the diktats of cultural convention turning instead to his ‘fellow writers’ as a means 
of regulating America’s governance and ideological progress. He surveys a prospective deregulation of 
power by underlining the ‘spontaneous power’ of a ‘free mind,’ and it is here, in the examination of 
 
6 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 204 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Emerson, ‘Thoughts on Modern Literature’ (1840), CW.X., 108 
10 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 110-111 
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literature’s social and political agency that the relationship between a reader and a book; a reader and a 
writer; a book and its canon; and a book and its cultural contexts comes to the fore.11 In sum, Emerson is 
transfixed by the ways in which the work of one requires the work of ‘Another’ to establish any genuine 
value; and once again, invention and commonality lead us back to Emerson’s interest in appropriation and 
proprietorship. 
 ‘The imitator dooms himself to hopeless mediocrity,’ Emerson notes in his famous ‘Divinity 
School’ address, 1838 (a lecture that sees him barred from Harvard for a thirty year period).12 The 
‘inventor,’ conversely, works with ‘borrowed’ materials ‘natural to him’ and—owing to their ‘charm’ and 
personal value—strives to put ideas to ‘use’ rather than simply compete for accreditation.13 Emerson’s 
‘inventor’ works with ‘borrowed’ materials but does not do so to articulate any ‘low and selfish account’ of 
their worth relative only to their private appeal or personal resonance. Rather, we borrow, quote and 
appropriate to more keenly consider the purpose and process of repurposing an idea or image across 
contexts; to assess the merits of an idea or image in relation to both private and public domains; and to 
investigate the ‘daily use’ or implementation of that idea or image. In this way, Emerson is keen to consider 
what is necessary for us as individuals in order to comprehend the social and dialectical progress of culture 
—not as a given—but as a product born out of and circulated within the collective. How the work of an 
isolated ‘inventor’ or ‘reader’ serves to impact and affect a characterization of culture more broadly, and 
how such an activity might correspond with the progress of a ‘general mind’ dependent on (rather than 
divorced from) an active form of ‘social labor.’14 
 Nonetheless, such a ‘revolutionary’ theory of ‘labor’ begins at home. Concerned by the vivacity of 
the ‘epileptic modern muse,’15 Emerson would call for ‘A revolution in all the offices and relations of men; 
in their religion; in their education; in their pursuits; their modes of living; their association; in their 
 
11 Richardson, ‘Go Alone: Refuse the Great Models,’ The Mind on Fire, 287-290 
12 Richardson describes the radicality of this lecture as owing to his belief that ‘religion is not served by conventional 
preaching but only by living discourse.’ Ibid, 290 
13 Emerson, ‘An Address delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Cambridge, Sunday Evening, July 15th, 1838,’ 
(1838), CW.I., 145 
14 Emerson, ‘Shakespeare, or the Poet’ (1850), CW.IV., 199 
15 Emerson, ‘Journal K’ (Undated, 1842), JMN.VIII., 243 
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property; in their speculative views,’ is an essential aim across Emerson’s authorship.16 This, as we have 
discussed in part, is a misleading element of Emerson’s popular appeal. His stress on the idea that ‘[every] 
man is his own star’ in ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841) has led to his dismissal as a thinker of any tangible 
philosophical, social, or even political worth. Instead, Emerson’s interest in self-determinacy has fostered 
his status as an emissary of a naïve, subjectivist celebration of the self at the expense of an engagement with 
social exigency, civil unrest, or economic disequilibrium.17 However, as has been shown, Emerson’s 
politics and poetics are not only deeply enmeshed, and both participate in a language of the marketplace 
through exploring the connectivity of ideas as within an economic matrix. Considering the especial status 
that Emerson affords the singular ‘star,’ he would equally concede that the singular star is nothing without 
a theory of ‘constellation.’18 ‘We want’ and work ‘for one star more in our constellation, for one tree more 
in our grove,’ as he writes in ‘Nominalist and Realist’ (1844).19 A culture requires ‘a constellation of genius’ 
to progress in political, cultural and economic terms, as he suggests in ‘Plato, or the Philosopher’ (1850);20 
much as a culture requires ‘a constellation of cities’ to better ‘animate and illustrate the land’ as he would 
note in ‘Civilization’ (1870).21 As with so many of the ideas and metaphors traced in this thesis, the idea of 
‘constellation’ recurs across Emerson’s writings as another way to emphatically underline his concern for 
the connection between ideas as opposed to the intendent and independent vitality of a single idea alone. 
‘What would be base, or even obscene, becomes illustrious, [when] spoken in a new connection of thought,’ 
Emerson notes in ‘The Poet’ (1844).22 ‘Thought makes everything fit for use,’ he notes; and the object of 
the process of critical reflection is that of a ‘a mirror carried through the street, ready to render an image of 
every created thing.’23 But the key ambition prevalent in Emerson’s reflections on critical thinking is that 
 
16 Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), CW.II., 77 
17 Ibid., 43 
18 Emerson: ‘When we are dizzied with the arithmetic of the savant toiling to compute the length of her line, the return of 
her curve, we are steadied by the perception that a great deal is doing; that all seems just begun; remote aims are in active 
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total nature is growing like a field of maize in July […].’ See ‘The Method of Nature’ (1841), CW.I., 202-203 
19 Emerson, ‘Nominalist and Realist’ (1844), CW.III., 240 
20 Emerson, ‘Plato, or the Philosopher’ (1850), CW.IV., 40 
21 Emerson, ‘Civilization’ (1870), CW.VII., 32 
22 Emerson, ‘The Poet’ (1844), CW.III., 17 
23 Ibid., 41 
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we should aspire to conjugate or ‘constellate’ these images into a coherent whole; a broader and multipart 
image composed of a myriad number of single stars.  
‘Poetry,’ he notes in ‘The American Scholar,’ is one such star. ‘Who can doubt that poetry will 
revive and lead in a new age, as the star in the constellation Harp,’ he writes, arguing that poetry could 
serve as a potential ‘pole star’ for America’s cultural progress.24 This stress on a ‘constellation’ of ideas is 
also a way to explore the collective force of various avenues of American culture; as a guiding light capable 
of seeing the country through the intellectual and ideological traumas of financial crisis and 
industrialization. ‘Who cares what the fact was when we have made a constellation of it to hang in heaven 
an immortal sign?,’ he writes in ‘History.’25 The constellation of ‘facts’ supersedes the importance of the 
isolated fact alone; a ‘national literature’ or ‘poetry’ is of more importance than one definitive and alienable 
work of art. ‘The capitalized and socially defined link between writing and property has the effect of a 
shackle in which the human is forever caught,’ Eric Wertheimer writes; and this underpins Emerson’s 
famous call for an independence of mind.26 What critics tend to overlook, however, is that Emerson 
concentrates as much on the links in this chain as he does the ideas of ‘writing’ and ‘property’ themselves.  
The relationship between the ‘star’ and its ‘constellation’ is a useful metaphor for our considering 
the complexities of Emerson’s relationship with quotation and appropriation, in this respect. A star, a pre-
existing object of attention, can be appropriated so long as the purpose withstands that we seek to forge its 
potential partnership with a parallel. The forging of new ‘constellation’ is thus emblematic of the value of 
the ‘art of appropriation,’ to Emerson’s mind—how a new image can be created out of pre-existent points 
of light—underscoring the significance of the ‘builder’ as a quintessential figure. Emerson’s individualism 
stresses an ability to build a new and multipart sign in which each individual point of light is necessary for 
it to cohere; just as a capitalist economy supposedly serves its consumers, and a literary work, its readers. 
As such, parallels can be drawn between Emerson’s cultural commentaries and later analyses of cultural 
criticism’s reticular aims.  
 
24 Emerson, ‘The American Scholar’ (1837), CW.I., 82 
25 Emerson, ‘History’ (1841), CW.II., 9 
26 Eric Wertheimer, ‘Boston,’ Underwriting: The Poetics of American Insurance, 1722-1872 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 120-122 
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Michael Walzer, in his landmark text Interpretation and Social Criticism (1987), articulates what he 
terms the ‘connected critic.’ A figure who ‘earns his [or her] authority, or fails to do so, by arguing with his 
[or her] fellows—who angrily and insistently, sometimes at considerable personal risk, […] objects, 
protests, and remonstrates.’27 In many ways, Walzer’s position is a refraction of Emerson’s theory of 
‘constellation.’ As Walzer puts it: ‘This critic is one of us;’ ‘their appeal is to local or localized principles; 
if [he or she] has picked up new ideas on [his or her] travels, he [or she] tries to connect them to the local 
culture, building on his [or her] own intimate knowledge; [they are] not intellectually detached.’28 Walzer 
contends that ‘Social criticism must thus be understood as one of the more important by-products of a 
larger activity’—‘let us call it the activity of cultural elaboration’—an action he describes as key to processes 
of social formation and fundamental to an assessment of any sociological or political survey of literary 
culture. Again, we can see this mirrored in Emerson’s sense of the importance of ‘relation’ and 
‘constellation.’29  
In this sense, Emerson’s call for cultural or critical ‘constellation’ has preoccupied this thesis, as 
has the way in which the process of ‘constellation’ becomes one of ‘creative principle’ in his writings.30 
Although Emerson argues ‘invention’ as a theory of the ‘preoccupation of mind,’ suggesting that our critical 
attention irrevocably alters the shape and meaning of the object observed, he is more concerned with the 
‘relation’ of ideas; more interested in the circuitry of cultural progress, and in the individual contribution 
to the betterment of a social whole.31 Explaining his position, in ‘History,’ he again calls upon the ‘builder’ 
as a trope: 
 
A Gothic cathedral affirms that it was done by us and not done by us. Surely 
it was by man, but we find it not in our man. But we apply ourselves to the 
history of its production. We put ourselves into the place and state of the 
builder. We remember the forest-dwellers, the first temples, the adherence to 
 
27 Michael Walzer, ‘The Practice of Social Criticism,’ Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), 39 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 40 
30 Ibid. 
31 Emerson, ‘An Address delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Cambridge, Sunday Evening, July 15th 1838,’ 
(1838), CW.I., 147 
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the first type, and the decoration of it as the wealth of the nation increased; 
the value which is given to wood by carving led to the carving over the whole 
mountain of stone of a cathedral. When we have gone through this process, 
and added thereto the Catholic Church, its cross, its music, its processions, its 
Saints’ days and image-worship, we have as it were been the man that made 
the minster; we have seen how it could and must be. 
 
Exploring the ‘Gothic cathedral’ as kind of material ‘constellation’ of concerns, Emerson argues for the 
study of the ‘relation of cause and effect’ as in essence as another version of his theory of ‘creative reading.’ 
On the one hand, our appreciation of this ‘Gothic cathedral’ needs be read backwards to the process of its 
construction; the participation of those involved in its construction; and the history of the culture that 
necessitated its construction in the first instance. On the other hand, the building must inferentially and 
prospectively command a sense of its present and future purposes as a ‘public edifice.’ It must be examined 
relative to its culture, its public function, ‘its cross, its music, its processions, its Saints’ days and image-
worship.’ The building is both a codification of its history, a testament to its ongoing cultural purchase, 
and a means of examining the culture around it that continues to make demands of it. Our responsibility, 
as such, is to examine any ‘edifice’ relative to its evolving ‘standards of relevance’ and resonance, to 
consider the cathedral not as a composite of the ‘dry bones’ and ‘faded wardrobe’ of the past, but as a 
means of considering the collectivist effort that underpinned its construction.32 How ‘the man made the 
minister,’ so the ‘minister’ could serve the ‘man;’ this is the focus of Emerson’s practical interest in 
‘creativity.’ 
 Indeed, the ‘minister’ is a redolent symbol, in this regard. Emerson’s analysis of reading is in 
essence a theory of mediation; an idea explored here by looking at the comparability of the reader, ‘builder,’ 
and ‘spender’ in Emerson’s writings. If we turn again to Emerson’s ‘Quotation and Originality,’ he argues 
that the same demands put upon the making of the ‘Gothic Cathedral’ can be applied to a consideration 
literary culture, and both as convention and tradition. In so doing, he examines the process of canon 
formation; how ‘human invention’ effects and extends our ‘horizon of thought.’ ‘The first book tyrannizes 
 
32 Emerson, ‘Nature’ (1836), CW.I., 3 
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over the second,’ he writes, we need work doubly hard to overcome the weight and gravitas of convention 
and tradition to read a work forwards and consider it both a product of ‘invention’ and catalyst for a new 
prospective ‘constellation’ or ‘original relation,’ as he calls it in ‘Nature.’ 
 
If we confine ourselves to literature, ‘t is easy to see that the debt is immense 
to past thought. None escapes it. The originals are not original. There is 
imitation, model and suggestion, to the very archangels, if we knew their 
history. The first book tyrannizes over the second. Read Tasso, and you think 
of Virgil; read Virgil, and you think of Homer; and Milton forces you to reflect 
how narrow are the limits of human invention. The Paradise Lost had never 
existed but for these precursors; and if we find in India or Arabia a book out 
of our horizon of thought and tradition, we are soon taught by new researches 
in its native country to discover its foregoers, and its latent, but real 
connection with our own Bibles. Read in Plato and you shall find Christian 
dogmas, and not only so, but stumble on our evangelical phrases. Hegel 
preëxists in Proclus, and, long before, in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Whoso 
knows Plutarch, Lucian, Rabelais, Montaigne and Bayle will have a key to 
many supposed originalities. Rabelais is the source of many a proverb, story 
and jest, derived from him into all modern languages; and if we knew 
Rabelais’s reading, we should see the rill of the Rabelais river.33  
 
In another echo of Koestler’s assessment of the aims and ambitions of a ‘creative act’—the process of our 
‘[uncovering] what has always been there’—we need consider the movement of an idea or image between 
stations, and the ways in which its movement and mediation adjusts its meaning. However, Emerson 
admits that literary tradition encourages a retrospective process of mind. ‘If we confine ourselves to 
literature,’ we’re bound to read innovation backwards (‘Read Tasso, and you think of Virgil; read Virgil, 
and you think of Homer,’ et cetera), and Emerson is keen that we work beyond the ‘rill’ of a cultural river, 
to instead work dialectically; to plot our progress beyond a given or fixed intellectual ‘horizon’ rather than 
work back towards that river’s source. 
 
33 Emerson, ‘Quotation and Originality’ (1875), CW.VIII., 180-181 
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Instead, we must consider the collaborative work involved in establishing a work of literature as a 
valuable cultural entity, akin to a chapel or a cathedral, that serves a distinct social function: 
 
Mythology is no man’s work; but, what we daily observe in regard to the bon-
mots that circulate in society,—that every talker helps a story in repeating it, 
until, at last, from the slenderest filament of fact a good fable is constructed,—
the same growth befalls mythology: the legend is tossed from believer to poet, 
from poet to believer, everybody adding a grace or dropping a fault or 
rounding the form, until it gets an ideal truth. Religious literature, the psalms 
and liturgies of churches, are of course of this slow growth, —a fagot of 
selections gathered through ages, leaving the worse and saving the better, until 
it is at last the work of the whole communion of worshippers. The Bible itself 
is like an old Cremona; it has been played upon by the devotion of thousands 
of years until every word and particle is public and tunable.34 
 
‘Mythology’, ‘Religious Literature’ are all constituent parts of a wider form of ‘social labor’ and Emerson’s 
sense of the constitution of ‘mythology’ as an inherently social practice serves as a significant indicator of 
the type of coherency and cogency we have seen throughout his various essays. His portrayal of the ‘slow 
growth’ of an idea, his sense of ‘the charm of alienation or Otherism;’ his sensitivity to a broader culture of 
expenditure in cultural terms; the builder, and the building resultant of their labours, or the ways in which 
the value of a dollar is dependent on both social and personal contexts as it changes hands. Emerson’s 
sense of the ways in which the movement of ideas effects their meaning is both a conceptual and practical 
constant in his engagement with the ‘mechanics’ of critical enterprise. Similarly, a parallel can be drawn 
between Emerson’s conceptualization of what constitutes a ‘creative reading’ and Walzer’s 
characterization of the ‘connected critic.’ As Emerson notes in his journals, 1851, event and critical 
perspective are bound by an ‘inevitable tie,’ and a responsibility to consider the ways in which our relative 
social connect is enhanced by historical circumstance is key. ‘We think the event severed from the person,’ 
 
34 Ibid., 181-182 
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he notes, ‘and do not see the inevitable tie. It is like the nudicaulis plant, —the leaf invariably accompanies 
it, though the stems are connected underground.’35 In this way, ‘all events are profitable.’36 
Emerson’s study of this connect, as shown, is paralleled with an interest in ‘profit,’ privatization, 
economization and industrialization, which in turn has been (and can be) argued as evidence of an 
obscurantist tendency as at the heart of his critical theory of ‘constellation.’ In practice, his position is 
succinctly deontological. We are bound by ‘duty’ to connect the particular and the general—to ‘constellate’ 
the details of private life with the dimensions of our political or economic being and by necessity wrest 
‘meaning from economy,’ as Emerson puts it. In ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841), for example, he argues that 
‘The duty that every man should assume his own vows, should call the institutions of society to account, 
and examine their fitness to him, gains in emphasis if we look at our modes of living.’37 Responding to his 
own ‘optative’ perspectivism with a particularly acute cynicism, Emerson’s ‘revolution in relation,’ his 
‘silent revolution,’ is nonetheless often underpinned by a sense of his being alienated from the dominant 
cultural practices of his hour: 
 
I ought to be armed by every part and function of my household, by all my 
social function, by my economy, by my feasting, by my voting, by my traffic. 
Yet I am almost no party to any of these things. Custom does it for me, gives 
me no power therefrom, and runs me in debt to boot. We spend our incomes 
for paint and paper, for a hundred trifles, I know not what, and not for the 
things of a man. Our expense is almost all for conformity.38 
 
Emerson errs intermittently toward both a left- and right-wing predilection in his exploration of this form 
of intellectual alienation. The powers of collectivism, the force of economic and cultural participation, the 
necessary diminution of government, and the ascendance of the private sector all intersect and overlap in 
his efforts to characterize an American cultural economy, or the ascent of an ‘American sentiment’ as he 
 
35 Emerson, in his Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks, 1851, cited by Edward Waldo Emerson in a footnote to the late essay 
‘Power’ (1860), CW.VI., n.1, 56  
36 Emerson, ‘History’ (1841), CW.II., 12 
37 Emerson, ‘Man the Reformer’ (1841), CW.I., 243 
38 Ibid., 243-244 
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calls it in ‘The Young American.’ However, in ‘Man the Reformer,’ he plainly articulates a sense an of 
estrangement from cultural ‘custom.’ He draws ‘no power’ from convention; struggles to understand the 
worth of ‘paint and paper;’ and expresses a clear distrust of (and disdain for) the idea of ‘conformity’ as an 
intellectual end to social engagement.  
In this respect, Emerson’s vacillation between engagement and detachment is also key to an 
unravelling of the conceptualist treatment of the ‘mechanics of literature’ that we have charted across 
Emerson’s oeuvre. His evocative metaphorics of reading is described and explicated by way of an 
explorative assessment of ‘social function,’ of ‘economy,’ of ‘feasting,’ ‘voting’ and the ‘traffic’ of ideas 
between participants within the country’s nascent literary culture. How we are ‘party’ to this period of 
transformation—complicit in its ideology, and responsible for its cultivation, sophistication, and 
‘constellation’ of concerns—is vital to his reflections on the ‘capitalist’ character of ‘the force of two.’ ‘Man 
the Reformer’ frames the gravitas of Emerson’s interest in ‘social function,’ but equally portrays his theory 
of ‘party’ or ‘constellation’ as intimating a hypothetical economic system in which an inclusive market 
determines a ‘revolution of relation’ in constant flux, constantly evolving. 
His statement of alienation—his inability to stand ‘party’ to the dominant social determinates of 
his hour—narrowly precedes his desire to extort ‘meaning from economy,’ to explore the properties of such 
‘public edifices’ as ‘conversation,’ ‘art,’ ‘music,’ and ‘worship’ relative to the ‘high, human office’ of 
political economy.39 Emerson both desires to be ‘party’ to the dominant ideas of his age and analyse the 
fissures that complicate everyone’s participation thereof; in addition, he lacks the definitive political 
direction of his peers. Emerson lacks the single-mindedness of ‘The American Marxist before Marx,’ 
Orestes Brownson;40 the receptivity to class, systems of urbanization lyrically detailed by his progeny, 
Henry D. Thoreau;41 and the wayward, categorical commemoration of art we see in the works of Walt 
 
39 Ibid., 245 
40 Arthur M. Schlesinger, ‘Orestes Brownson: An American Marxist Before Marx,’ The Sewanee Review, 417 (1939), 317-323. 
See also, Benjamin Pickford, ‘Towards a Fungible Scrip: Orestes Brownson’s Boston Quarterly Review and the Valuation of 
American Literature, Open Library of the Humanities, 2.1. (2016), 3-6 
41 See Richard W. Judd, ‘Thoreau in the Age of Industry, 1862-1890,’ Finding Thoreau: The Meaning of Nature in the Making of 
an Environmental Icon (Cambridge, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2018), 25-55 
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Whitman.42 Nonetheless, Emerson is arguably at his clearest when he explores his theory of ‘constellation’ 
relative to economic structures of thought. How the marketplace is a domain conceptually dependent upon 
processes of exchange, correlation and participation; a social system contingent upon a commercial form 
of ‘constellation’ to cohere.  
In this sense Emerson is, as noted in my introduction, an ‘Ayn Rand beforehand.’ A figure not 
only fascinated by the structure and efficacy of market systems; but keen to propose the marketplace as an 
aesthetic, philosophical and ideological domain crucial to America’s sociopolitical and cultural identity. 
Emerson’s efforts to ally economics and criticism as twinned domains is emblematic of his want to establish 
a critical praxis capable of correlating the ‘common’ with the ‘ephemeral’—the ‘low’ with the 
‘transcendent’ and how these are key to the formation and development of the American marketplace. The 
social ambitions of both Emerson and his contemporaries are nonetheless often overlooked. In an 1846 
review of Margaret Fuller’s Papers on Literature and Art in The American Whig Review, for example, the 
anonymous reviewer describes Fuller’s works as enumerating a ‘new kind of criticism,’ an ‘aesthetic 
criticism,’ but nonetheless argues that the American Transcendentalist movement, should be broadly 
condemned.43 Tarring Fuller, Emerson and their associates with a rhetorical stain, the article notes that 
‘[the] Transcendental school, embracing the new aesthetic model of criticism,’ works solely ‘to discover 
and reproduce the veritable spirit of [its] author,’ an apotheosis—in other words—of critical and socio-
political detachment. 44  
According to Jeffrey Sklansky, Emerson’s early works thus represent an ‘explicitly non-economic 
kind of psychological self-expression or self-representation;’ an elicitation of a philosophical stance ‘that 
rejected principles of socio-economic dependency’ and was therefore ‘sharply in tension with [the then 
current models] [. . .] of classical political economy.’45 However, whilst Sklansky reads Emerson’s 
‘economic thought’ in historical terms, stressing the theories of ‘spontaneous thought’ and endogeneity that 
 
42 Matt Miller, ‘Poems of Materials,’ Collage of Myself: Walt Whitman and the Making of Leaves of Grass (Lincoln, NA: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2010), 161-215 
43 A review of Margaret Fuller’s ‘Papers on Literature and Art,’ The American Whig Review, 4. (1846), 515-518 
44 Ibid. 
45 Sklansky, ‘Transcendental Psychology,’ The Soul’s Economy, 42 
 249 
we encounter in Emerson’s early writings, he overlooks the revolutionary (and archly contemporary 
aspects) of Emerson’s engagement with American capital. Over the course of this thesis, I have argued a 
counter position to Sklansky’s assertion. Reading Emerson’s ‘Transcendental Criticism’ as a practical 
theory of attachment or ‘constellation’ rather than as a detached ‘aesthetic,’ Emerson’s ‘economic thought’ 
constitutes an explicitly ‘economic’ form of ‘psychological self-expression’ designed to maintain an 
economic system of thought able to accommodate theories of flux, productivity and creativity as well. 
‘Politics is an afterwork,’ in this regard, and literary culture is argued as a means of considering the ‘market’ 
as a significant cultural system dependent upon cultures of critique and creativity.46 Thus, the phrase that 
Emerson purloins from Napoleon provides an evocative means to consider the broader aims of his 
engagement with America’s fledgling commercial cultures: ‘The market-place is the louvre of the common 
people.’ 
In Representative Men (1850), Emerson ‘approvingly’ cites this aphorism, indicating Napoleon as its 
source.47 If we identify the original contexts of this citation, we not only encounter yet another instance of 
appropriation, we also see the constancy and coherency of Emerson’s interest in both the ‘mechanics of 
literature’ and the cultural significance of the ‘mechanics’ of the market. Emerson’s first encounter with 
this phrase, with this assertion that ‘the market-place is the Louvre…,’ more likely owes more to the 
popularity of the anthological compendium Anecdotes and Characteristics of Napoleon Bonaparte (1840) than 
to Napoleon’s writings themselves.48 Amassed by an anonymous editor (who in the collection’s front 
matter is simply referred to as “AN AMERICAN”), Anecdotes and Characteristics is a portrait penned by a panoply 
of voices that collated ‘the writings of Napoleon himself’ alongside excerpts from ‘the memoirs and military 
histories’ in order to paint a public and personal portrait of Napoleon.49 Rather than a biased 
 
46 Emerson, ‘Journal CO’ (Undated, 1851), JMN., XI., 416 
47 Emerson, ‘Napoleon, or the Man of the World’ (1850), CW.IV., 240 
48 Emerson, ‘Journal V’ (Undated, 1845), JMN.IX., 140 
49 An American (ed.), Anecdotes and Characteristics of Napoleon Bonaparte (Philadelphia, PA: C.F. Stollmeyer, 1840). Although 
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commemoration of his political history, Emerson’s mixture of analogy and anecdote seeks to remedy the 
degree of heroism associated with Napoleon’s character. In an introduction addressed ‘TO THE PUBLIC,’ 
Napoleon is portrayed as ‘a man whose influence extends further than the confines of his native land,’ who 
‘belongs to the world’ and therefore needs be ‘arraigned before its tribunal’ for critical assessment.50 
Emerson’s own study of Napoleon in Representative Men is fittingly subtitled ‘The Man of the World,’ 
reflecting and compounding the aims of this editorial; and his private reflections on Napoleon’s cultural 
and critical worth are indicative of a want to study forms of cultural ‘influence’ within the ‘confines’ of his 
own ‘native land.’  
As Emerson notes in his journals, 1849, ‘A man of Napoleon’s stamp almost ceases to have a 
private speech & opinion. […] Every line of Napoleon’s therefore deserves reading as it is the writing of 
France, & not of one individual.’51 Such remarks serve as an indication that Napoleon’s public persona 
supersedes his ability to harbour ‘private speech & opinion,’ and—above all—is thus emblematic of 
Emerson’s belief that a certain kind of publication facilitates a form of public ownership. ‘A man is to ride 
alternately on the horses of his private and public nature,’ Emerson notes in his journals, 1851; and 
Napoleon’s reflections are representative of the voice of a country and culture rather than of an individual 
mind (a potential moment of transferal from Napoleon to Emerson, as Emerson would so vocally 
pronounce his fears and ambitions for the voice of America as well).52 Taken singularly, such an assertion 
appeals to the popular notion that Emerson’s works serve to Americanize a Carlylean iteration of the ‘great 
man’—a study of cultural heroism that considers the living metonymies of a national culture through the 
antics and ideas of its ‘Representative Men.’ But we must remember that Emerson is not interested in the 
fact of representation alone; he is, as the introductory essay to Representative Men suggests, more absorbed 
by our ‘Uses of Great Men’ than he is the semiotics of cultural celebrity.  
Scarcely read outside of the contexts of Emerson’s own corpus, Representative Men is seldom 
historicized according to the circumstances in which its manuscripts were developed. Emerson spent nine 
 
50 Ibid., iii 
51 Emerson, ‘Journal V’ (Undated, 1845), JMN.IX., 139-141 
52 Emerson, ‘Journal CO’ (Undated, 1851), JMN.XI., 377 
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months in Europe, 1847 to 48, fine-tuning his forthcoming book on the lecture circuit before visiting Paris 
in 1848 in time to experience the revolutionary mood first-hand.53 More importantly—with Emerson’s 
appropriation of Marx as discussed in the previous chapter in mind—Emerson’s study precedes Marx’s 
own analysis of that period, and specifically of the ‘representative man’ Louis Bonaparte’s efforts to direct 
historical development, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). These two texts are seldom noted 
in parallel.54 Nonetheless, considering Emerson’s rolling interest in ‘revolution,’ his adoption of Marx’s 
phrasing in his exploration of this ‘silent revolution,’ and Marx’s own famous investment in a prospective 
‘poetry of the future’ as documented in the Brumaire, Emerson’s interest in ‘use’ is stridently revolutionary 
in character.  
Marx, in the Brumaire, establishes his own theory of creativity as he considers the creative 
construction of history: 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in 
circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present 
circumstances, given and inherited. Tradition from all the dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they appear 
to be revolutionising themselves and their circumstances, in creating 
something unprecedented, in just such epochs of revolutionary crisis, that is 
when they nervously summon up the spirits of the past, borrowing from them 
their names, marching orders, uniforms, in order to enact new scenes in world 
history, but in this time-honoured guise and with this borrowed language. […] 
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot create its poetry from 
the past but only from the future. It cannot begin till it has stripped off all 
superstition from the past. Previous revolutions required recollections of 
world history in order to dull themselves to their own content. The revolution 
 
53 Lee Rust Brown comments on Emerson’s first visits to Paris in the 1830s as a particularly influential phase in his later 
development. Emerson refers to Paris as a ‘loud New York of a place,’ inspiring in him a sense of the complex character of 
urban capitalism. Emerson lists his activities (‘I go to the Sorbonne and hear lectures. I walk in the Jardin des Plantes. I stare 
and stare at the thousands of shop windows. I go to the Louvre, the King’s Library, the Theatre.’), a flâneurial relationship 
with the city market marked by the commercialism of its shops and boutiques and the cultural exhibitions of its museums 
and galleries. See Lee Rust Brown, ‘Paris and the Scientific Eye,’ The Emerson Museum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997), 157. See also Ralph Waldo Emerson, (ed.) Ralph L. Rusk, The Selected Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol. I. 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1939), 387-388 
54 For a recent exception, see Elizabeth Duquette, ‘The Man of the World,’ American Literary History, 27.4 (2015), 635-664 
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of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury the dead in order to realise 
its own content.55 
 
Emerson arguably emanates a similar line of argument in Representative Men two years previously. 
However, where Marx would concentrate on a prospective ‘poetry of the future,’ Emerson would look to 
the ‘Poets’ responsible for the authorship of progress; the intellectual ‘producers,’ as he terms them, that 
forge the ideological basis of the ‘city-building market-going’ culture to which he belongs: 
 
Among Eminent persons, those who are most dear to men are not the class 
the economist calls producers; they have nothing in their hand; they have not 
cultivated corn, nor made bread: they have not led out a colony nor invented 
a loom. A higher class in the estimation and love of this city-building market-
going race of mankind, are the Poets, who, from the intellectual kingdom, 
feed the thought and imagination with ideas and pictures which raise men out 
of the world of corn and money, and console them for the shortcomings of 
the day and the meanness’s of labour and traffic. […] Wherever the sentiment 
of right comes in, it takes precedence of everything else. For other things, I 
make poetry of them; but the moral sentiment makes poetry of me.56  
 
This is key to Emerson’s thinking on critical exchange. Recall Emerson’s aforesaid remark in ‘History’ 
(1841), that ‘Every revolution was first a thought in one man’s mind, and when that same thought occurs 
to another man, it is the key to that era.’57 Recall also Emerson’s remarks on Napoleon in his journals, 
1849, that reflect his sense that the publication of thought heralds a key, political and progressive function; 
that Napoleon’s word is ‘the writing of France, & not of one individual.’ In ‘History,’ Emerson asserts that   
‘Every reform was once a private opinion,’ that ‘when it shall be a private opinion again, it will solve the 
problem of the age.’58 He pluralises the process of thought that he would acknowledge in the public 
ownership of Napoleon’s ‘private opinion’ and, in so doing, again reasserts the significance of his 
 
55 Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ (1853) in (ed.; trans.) T. Carver, Marx: The Later Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32-34 
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‘OTHERISM’ as a critical position. ‘I make poetry of [another],’ Emerson writes, knowing full well that ‘the 
moral sentiment’ of the time ‘makes poetry of [him].’ That, in publishing private thought, he is contributing 
to the dialectical progress of this revolution; that his word, made public, is malleable (or ‘tunable’ to borrow 
Emerson’s term) and thus revolutionary. 
Here, the idea of appropriation and that of publication synthetically move towards a declaration 
of a poetic futurity, another version of the process he details in his journals through the publication of 
Napoleon’s private reflections. It is because of Napoleon’s public persona that his writings belong more to 
the public domain than to Napoleon himself. This, however, is not a declaration of creative defeat, nor any 
diminution of persona. As we saw over the course of these chapters, the ways in which Emerson 
enumerates a marketplace of meaning is precisely through the ‘reforming,’ ‘remodelling,’ or ‘remaking’ of 
ideas; through considering the activity of thinking as a means of considering persona as both the subject, 
object and ‘lens’ of critical labour. ‘All thinking is analogizing,’ Emerson famously writes in ‘Poetry and 
Imagination’ (1875); ‘tis the use of life to learn metonymy.’59 Every idea is metonymic of a broader culture 
of ideas, to Emerson’s mind—‘a mirror carried through the street’—and as Richard Poirier notes, 
Emerson’s philosophical effort was (broadly speaking) to conceive of a critical, hermeneutic mode driven 
by the idea that we need recognize the simpatico between the language we use to explore our surroundings 
and the same language that we use to ‘know ourselves.’60 We charter a sense of belonging through our 
capacity to disrupt that language (‘by means of troping, punning, parodistic echoings’) and ‘by letting 
vernacular idioms play against revered terminologies,’ are able to occasion a social self; ‘a private body 
built out of public materials.’61  
Emerson believed that a public voice should be imbued with a political atmosphere. ‘Fame of voice 
or of rhetoric will carry people a few times to hear a speaker,’ he notes, ‘but they soon begin to ask, “What 
is he driving at?” If this speaker ‘does not stand for anything, [they] will be deserted.’ ‘A fact-speaker of any 
 
59 Emerson, ‘History’ (1841), CW.II., 4-5 
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kind,’ conversely, ‘they will long follow.’62 The political positionality of a thought made public—its 
capacity to reflect the demands of our space and time—is of fundamental significance to Emerson’s 
reflections on the act of reading. In this sense—and considering Representative Men in the historical contexts 
of its authorship—the fact that the Louvre reorganized its collection in 1848, parallel to the regime change 
following the February Revolutions in France that same year, undoubtedly impacted Emerson’s thinking 
as well. With an emphasis on prioritizing French painting from 1710 on, the museum’s curatorial 
restructure became a lens for the form, function and social seating of a national and cultural voice, a way 
to hone the self-reflection of a society dealing with a post-revolutionary fervour and imperialist aspirations 
simultaneously (not unlike the United States in some ways). The restructuring of the Louvre antedates the 
publication of Representative Men by just two years, setting the scene for the type of exploration of culture 
and voice that Emerson himself would so vividly engage in.63 We can see, then, the appeal and value of 
Napoleon’s assertion that ‘The market-place is the louvre…,’ to Emerson’s mind.  
The fact that this phrase appears as a second-hand source in Anecdotes and Characteristics is also key. 
Napoleon’s phrase is reported anecdotally: ‘The emperor directed particular attention to the 
embellishments of the markets of the capital. He used to say, The market-place is the Louvre of the common-
people.’ The adoption of this citation is a curious means with which to entertain the connection between 
culture, the marketplace, and the practical structures of cultural memory in Emerson’s writings.64 
Furthermore, the practice of ‘grinding truisms’ or the works of ‘others’ into the pigment that enables 
Emerson to ‘paint’ and illustrate the actual work or labour of critical engagement further sophisticates the 
function of the ‘museum’ as a metaphor in Emerson’s writings.65 Emerson’s aforementioned citation of 
Washington Allston, for instance, is also based on his claim that we need ‘grind’ the material of a published 
author or article into an ‘epithet’ fit ‘for daily use.’66 Consider also his claim in ‘Swedenborg, or the Mystic’ 
 
62 Emerson, ‘Eloquence’ (1870), CW.VII., 94 
63 For a detailed account of the changes made to the Louvre’s institutional governance and revised policy for collection and 
display in the 1840s, see James Kearns, ‘From Store to Museum: The Reorganization of the Louvre’s Painting Collections 
in 1848,’ The Modern Language Review, 102.1. (2007), 58-73 
64 An American (ed.), Anecdotes and Characteristics of Napoleon Bonaparte, 47 
65 Emerson, ‘Literary Ethics’ (1838), CW.I., 165 
66 Emerson, ‘Nominalist and Realist’ (1844) CW.III., 241 
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that we make ‘poetry of [others],’ or—in ‘Plato, or the Philosopher’—his claim that the facets of ‘external 
biography’ serve only to facilitate another corpus of materials. ‘Plato has no external biography,’ Emerson 
notes; ‘If he had lover, wife, or children, we hear nothing of them. He ground them all into paint.’67 As 
we’ve seen, Emerson both preaches and practices such a position, using the figure of the painter (as he did 
the builder) as a model for revolutionary change more widely and our capacity to radically ‘remodel’ an 
idea; however, a space was needed to accommodate the resulting produce of the radical forms of cultural 
engagement he envisaged. 
In his 1841 ‘Lecture on the Times,’ Emerson suggests that we need ‘draw for these times a portrait 
gallery.’ Here—stretched ‘across the wall’ of a ‘silent gallery’—it will be the painters and creators 
themselves that are ‘painted.’68  
 
Let us paint the agitator, and the man of the old school, and the member of 
Congress, and the college professor, the formidable editor, the priest and 
reformer [...]. Could we indicate the indicators, indicate those who most 
accurately represent every good and evil tendency of the general mind, in the 
just order which they take on this canvas of Time, so that all witnesses should 
recognize a spiritual law as each well-known form flitted for a moment across 
the wall, we should have a series of sketches which would report to the next 
ages the color and quality of ours.69 
 
Rather than simply a rendering of a parade of figures that define the ‘times,’ Emerson’s interest in the 
process of ‘painting’ supersedes his interest in the portrait as a product. In other words, the work of the 
painter is more important than the elevation of the portrait as a work, and the value of a ‘portrait’ is only 
in its indication of a possible prospect; a possible future—or as Emerson puts it—an actualized ‘canvas of 
time.’ The relation between painter and painting is akin to that of the silent partner to the progress of the 
‘silent revolution,’ and ‘Paint’ is another means of considering how the qualities of Emerson’s interest in 
capitalism and cultural progress coalesce. As he later notes in ‘Politics’ (1844), ‘What the tender poetic 
 
67 Emerson, ‘Plato, or the Philosopher’ (1850), CW.IV., 43 
68 Emerson, ‘Lecture on the Times’ (1841) CW.I., 264 
69 Ibid., 264-265 
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youth dreams, and prays, and paints to-day, but shuns the ridicule of saying aloud, shall presently be the 
resolutions of public bodies.’70 Emerson is not simply detailing the authority of the portrait as a cultural 
tool; he is arguing that culture’s ‘ephemerality’ needs to be registered if we are to consider its appropriation 
and indeed re-appropriation into more art, more creativity, and consider the social effects of this process.  
The aim is to consider ‘life’ and ‘not literature’ and to activate the terms of his ‘Transcendental 
Criticism.’ The painter paints a catalyst; a cause; knowing not what that cause may drive towards, only 
that the exchange of ideas mirrors the commercial dynamics of a market mentality. To focus so on the 
painter’s process and subject—rather than the results of their work—points to the creative potential of 
labour and how it may enlarge the ‘general mind.’ However, the painter’s work requires a context; a space 
able to support both intellectual freedom and commercial enterprise. Again, as Emerson claims by way of 
Napoleon, ‘the market-place is the louvre of the common people;’ the market—a ‘silent gallery’—
accommodates the work of the ‘common’ labourer and elevates the work produced to the status of high 
art. Paralleling the culture of growth, expenditure and exchange in ascendance with the culture and 
institutionalization of criticism, a theory of critical engagement and critical agency undeniably contributed 
to the dialectical progress of a ‘silent revolution’ to Emerson’s mind; one in which writer and reader—
‘other’ and ‘Another’—stand on equal footing as symbolic subjects in a nation built on equal parts 
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A Note on Primary Sources 
 
Whilst I will employ the Harvard/Belknap edition of Emerson’s Complete Works for the purposes of further 
annotation (as indicated in footnotes), I have elected to use the ‘Centenary’ Edition (1903-1904) as a 
primary source due to the digitization of each volume in this series by the University of Michigan. As a 
revision of the ‘Riverside’ edition of Emerson’s collected works (1883-1893; a nine-volume sequence 
supervised by Ralph Waldo Emerson himself and his literary executor, James Eliot Cabot, between 1841 
and 1875), this public and accessible concordance of the ‘Centenary’ publication of Emerson’s collected 
works for the University of Michigan Digital Content Collection (UMDL, 2006) is an important resource 
that allows for the subjection of Emerson’s writings to new kinds of research.  
Expediting critical engagement by allowing for a field searches Emerson’s published works, the 
UMDL ‘Centenary’ edition encourages investigation of the occurrence and re-occurrence of single words 
and phrases; repetition of word and phrase in a single collection, work, page or paragraph; and the co-
occurrence of words or phrases across his publications. This enables revisionist assessment of the coherency 
and congruency of Emerson’s use of language previously only possible through archival and manuscript 
study. Used concordantly with the Harvard/Belknap publication of Emerson’s Journals and Miscellaneous 
Notebooks, I have utilized the UDML Centenary concordance to undertake research into the consistency of 
approach, language and symbol in Emerson’s use of metaphor and—as will be shown—concentrate on the 
repetition of materials across Emerson’s private and public writings.  
The digitization of the ‘Centenary’ edition is also symbolically significant if we are to consider 
Emerson’s own habit of revising and recycling materials across his essays and addresses. Emerson would 
regularly mine his private writings for the purpose of embellishing his public works with intertextual 
aphorisms and allusions, but this habit would also extend to his own writings and we can trace the traffic 
of a single word or phrase from his notebooks through to his public matter for either the page or stage. 
Assessing the significance of reappearing words, phrases, motifs and metaphor in Emerson’s corpus, the 
UDML Emerson concordance represents an extension of what has come to be termed as ‘The Emerson 
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factory.’* A systemic project begun during Emerson’s own lifetime that has sought to revise and reframe 
his ‘cultural presence’ by way of an array of paratextual devices such as bibliographic notes, historical and 
textual introductions; but that also allowed for the continuous, automatic authorship of a series of 
Emerson’s later essays. Under the editorship and stewardship of Cabot and Emerson’s circle, these works 
would be authored through a process of drawing together unpublished materials from Emerson’s private 
notebooks (indexed by Emerson himself) into thematic projects (on subjects such as ‘Greatness,’ and 
‘Love,’ for example), quilting aphorisms and asides into more coherent textual entities.  
Whilst serious work still needs be undertaken on this machinic process of composition/re-
composition in Emerson’s later works, and the project of this ‘Factory’ more broadly, this thesis has 
explored the ways in which the industrialization and, indeed, commodification is both theorized and 






















* A phrase I borrow from Ronald A. Bosco’s ‘Historical Introduction’ to the Harvard edition of Emerson’s Letters and Social 
Aims (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2010), Vol. VIII in Emerson’s Collected Works, xxxvii. 
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The two pages from Emerson’s Poetry and Topical Notebooks (pp. 238-239), detailing 
his reference to “Karl Max,” are excerpted from the unpublished essay ‘SOUNDING A 
SILENT REVOLUTION: RALPH WALDO EMERSON’S MARXIST BURLESQUE’ (Dr. Benjamin 
Pickford, Université de Lausanne and Dominic Jaeckle, Goldsmiths, University of 
London). Emerson’s notebooks and journals are housed in his archives at Houghton 
Library, Harvard. The reproduction of the US Post Office ‘Ralph Waldo Emerson’ 3¢ 
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